Practical Measures

Moral imperatives can lead to impractical measures that end up requiring forceful power structures to maintain. The moral differential between what is and what should be can become so complex and the solutions so at cross purposes, all that remains is to be left in the lap of the gods.

Uncontrollability of complex, self-directed variables has ontological legitimacy. On the one hand, the system can be so diffuse and pluralistic to be uncontrollable. On the other, the component parts can be so big and consolidated in order to control the uncontrollable (to avoid the alpha risk) that it is too big to fail, but with an accumulation of risk that is out of control and presents as crises (the gamma-risk ontology).

These are two different kinds of control with very different ontologies. These differences relate to ethical legitimacies of various sorts such as incentives that are described as "moral hazards" as in the pluralistic case, or a legitimacy that is merely deemed a lack of culpability due to unintended consequences as in the non-pluralistic case in which the risk is consolidated, accumulated into a crisis proportion to be managed, rather than actually being avoided.

The differential we have now is between free markets and consolidaton. The equilibrium of one is not the equilibrium, but the disequilibrium, of the other. Thus, the differential.

Conventional wisdom and practice tends to favor the consolidated model because an accumulation of risk provides for its well-defined management. The question is, of course, to what end?

A well-defined end is much more elusive, which has a practical effect. The end (the purpose, the intention) then becomes a part of the means, rendering a useful, practical complexity that can be shaped, or managed, to fit a legitimacy of the general case to any particular case at any particular time (the deductive method). The result is a false induction that will induce a public policy that conserves the model with the appearance of being based on the evidence. Instead, the evidence is based on (managed to fit) the conclusion.

Currently, for example, the too-big-to-fail model is in a state of questionable legitimacy. It certainly does fail the model of free-market pluralism, but that is the intended affect since the consolidation is intended to accumulate the otherwise pluralized risk.

The consolidation model did not fail, but it did fail the free-market model (the critical differential). The successful model must now be managed to fit, or reconcile, with the failed free-market model that, by definition of its failure, does not obtain.

Since reconciliation of the opposing models is not possible we observe the critical differential focused on the lack of failure (a moral hazard), which is the measurable success of the too-big-to-fail model (the intended consequence). The too-big part of this equation--the necessary condition (the determinant) of the model's success--is conserved as a function of practical efficiency.

Being too-big then becomes the functional coefficient so that, the bigger a firm is the more measurably successful--profitable--a firm is likely to be. Being too-big is then both the means and ends with a perfect (predictable) correlation coefficient. As we have seen, again and again, the coefficient is not the reduction, but avoidance, of risk, with crises being the functional coefficient.

Large, economies of scale are measureably more efficient than small firms because they can operate with more risk without failure which, of course, defines the problem, not the solution.

Within the body of analytical complexity to render failure the value of success, the analyst is to either ignore that accumulation of the too-big-to-fail risk causes crises, or admit that it is a fully intended practical efficiency with a value of success that exceeds the cost of failure.

We are expected to believe that being too-big is the best practice as long as it is allowed to-fail? All this means is that the too-big-to-fail model is a failure in any case.

Since our mostly Ivy-League technocratic elite must "validate" a "success" coefficient in the face of "verifiable" failure, it is necessary to shift (manage) the variables of the differnetial to suggest a functionally reconciled model with a positive, general value.

As a practical measure, there is more utility to forgive the negative effects of consolidation, including inflation and unemployment, than to prosecute and correct for a culpable cause because, according to the conservative evaluation, the organized benefit of minimizing the risk of innovation to the value of capital investment (the declining rate of profit) assures the probability of taking that risk, and everybody benefits (the general welfare).

Assuring the practical efficiency of accumulation (consolidation), proponents of economies of scale argue, requires an assured limited liability (ensuring a predictable certainty of the retributive value to the coefficient).

Without a durable limit to liability (assured risk reduction that supports the measurable value of the coefficient) supply (the expected value of GDP inverted to the interest rate) will not predictably expand if the people best suited to organize it are deprived of pursuing the goal of accumulation without risk in the fullest measure.

The reason (the need) for this base-line level of risk is teleological. It is not a descriptive ontology but a normative, teleological prescription that reflects the Aristotelian ethical model. The difference is not merely philosophical. It is a practical measure that affords effective legitimacy to the distributive value (the coefficiency) of the outcome: it gives syllogistic support to the aristocratic--Hamiltonian--model of power.

The model of consolidation has an ethical value of coefficiency syllogistically expressed as declarative knowledge: If the model of practical governance is not forgiving (if the liability and exposure to risk is not limited), the natural aristocracy will not expand the pie.

Conserving the value of accumulated wealth and power is a practical measure of functional coefficiency expressed as a descriptive ontology ("a" therefore "b" in every case). Leaders will be leaders and followers followers no matter what, and value will be distributed accordingly.
The distribution is measurably categorical, and a limited liability to the value accumulated imperative for provision of the general welfare as a practical measure.

The same argument can be made for a more pluralistic model, however.

Health Care Goes Critical

Now that health care legislation has become the law of the land, now it is time for an evaluative technique called, "the critical method."

The debate up to the bill's passage has been a differential between practical models: pluralist and elitist; public and private.

Democrats clearly favor a public-sector elitist model with reliance on authoritative influence and large economies of scale to control both costs and incentives. Republicans favor a private-sector model with reliance on large economies of scale that control costs and incentives with authoritative influence.

What's the difference?

Supposedly, Republicans favor a free-market pluralism, but their sentiments are with economic growth into economies of scale that control costs and incentives not by empowering free-market consumers, but empowering a consolidated corporate body. The model is decidedly elitist. It is not a pluralistic decisional model that favors a democratic decisional process. Just because it abides in the private sector does not make it a free market.

We see, then, how the differential is driven into a false, bivariate critique. It is a bivariation that, instead of simplifying the critique, renders it more complex.

If the new health care bill is modified or repealed, what is the simple and easily verifiable alternative?

The best critique going forward is both a simple and effective, bivariate differential with an easily verifiable coefficient like income (the ability to spend with discretion).

Instead of agonizing over complex evaluative measures of always debatable verifiability, the critique can be effectively reduced to whether the practical, operational modeling is pluralist or elitist in either the general or particular case with a simple and easily verifiable coefficiency right down to the individual.

The question (the problem to be solved) then becomes: are you deciding, or is someone else deciding for you?

Practical Philosophy and Structured Economic Incentives

Giving Measureable Meaning to the Moral Imperative


Analysts want there to be an algorythmic mechanics to indicate probable, testable, outcomes.

Determining variables are not always easily reduced and structured into differentials that make for reliable evaluative measures despite the assumption that all the effects are included in a regression.

Normative measures included in public policy, for example, can present with unintended consequences that confound technically descriptive, analytical models as well as normative, prescriptive models. The differential between economic models in combined operation (mixed economic models) makes for a complex analytic that becomes reduced to moral imperatives as declarative knowledge.

Reliance on prescriptive modeling for declarative knowledge is inherently biased and quickly reduces to political power for sustained application. The means is unscientific, but it is not unpredictable; that is, pure and mixed models have predictable consequences that are likely to be managed in predictable ways to sustain application of the modeling with a legitimacy of a moral imperative despite a verifiable insignificance.

While the incentives of a free-market model, for example, are easily verifiable, there is a tendency to modify the model for a non-market effect but with the "virtue" of a free-market legitimacy. The incentives modify with the model, however, and the outcome will, predictably, not be the predicted consequence of the model. There will then be unintentional consequences that, while being intentional, are easily argued to be spurious and confounding due to the complexity of a "mixed" model.

Culpability is structured into the unaccountability of the unintended consequences. A problem to be solved is then reduced to negotiating what the problem is, usually identified with conserving a moral imperative that results in an unresolvable, antagonistic differential.

The modification does not disconfirm the unmodified version. Instead, the measureable effects of the modified version, with a moral imperative to apply "virtuous" means-to-ends, supports the free market hypothesis.

Given the current status of our political-economic system, are we encouraging virtue or vice? For an equities analyst, for example, the differential can mean the difference in regulatory reform that affects margin performance. The calculus can be significantly changed based on the imperative scored into the political-economic differential equation.

Another good example is health care reform. If the solution is affordability to satisfy an imperative, three possibilities emerge: reduce costs, increase income, or both. We see, however, that the problem has been negotiated into an enormous bureaucratic scheme to provide insurance premiums, mandated to support the cost. The meaning of the imperative--delivering healthcare--is normatively the same but measurably different on an effective quantitative score.

Consolidation of industry and markets purports to increase the virtue of economic efficiency through an economy of scale to satisfy the imperative for the accumulation of capital (economic growth). The imperative is measureably achieved while the proposed effect of economic growth algorythmically cycles negative.

In the case of health care, the proposed reform will spread the risk and reduce costs through an economy of scale. The accumulation will effect growth of the insured. More funds are available for health care, and less for anything else. Capital is accumulated to achieve the scale, which is the problem--the more accumulated the less available to spend with any discretionary control over prices. The only price control is the deflationary affect on the general economy in the form of demand reduction--the inability to pay (the problem).

The distribution required to prevent a massive accumulation from being deflationary prospectively comes in the form of lower costs.

Reorganization of existing health-care costs into a mandated government accumulation will not reduce costs without cost controls, which is not a part of the program. Costs will equilibriate based on the amount of non-discretionary funding available. The general economic effect is disequilibriating.

The differential between the two practical models, free-market economics and an economy of scale, appears to be insignificant if they both yield lower costs and spread the risk. However, the accumulation has a deflationary tendency, consolidates the risk and the cost without control or an easily verifiable accountability.

Ensuring a free-market model is about providing health care at an affordable cost, equilibriating the cost to available income. Ensuring an economy of scale efficiency is about consolidating the risk into an accumulation of capital to pay the risk premium without equilibriating the cost to available income, which is the deflationary problem to be reformed.

In the former case, providers must control costs to stay in business (alpha risk). In the latter case, providers are incentivized to control the governing authority and bankrupt consumers (gamma risk). The former is pro growth with low inflation. The latter is pro inflation with low growth and provides an abusive incentive that Adam Smith proscribes by ensuring a free market in priority.

The latter results in reduction of supply and higher prices, and that is why the health care reform legislation will likely include provision for increased compensaton for providers. The problem is sustained in the form of a solution, favoring a deflationary accumulation of capital to grow the supply of insured funds available for provider cost increases.

The reduction of available income--the reduction of demand--is the risk that is supposed to be reduced by mandated health-care premiums. Instead, the risk is reorganized to look like risk reduction.

The two operational models--the pluralistic free-market model, and the model of consolidated economy of scale--is an antagonistic differential. The virtue, the strengths, of the two models are non-complimentary, the differential is in itself functionally disequilibriating, and the imperatives are categorically undefined, meaningless, variables.

Instead of encouraging virtue, we cultivate vice in priority with the legitimacy of the outcome falsely attributed to an ontology of free-market mechanics. It is every man for himself. The outcome cannot be a malign or criminal intent if we are all striving for the same reward. The winners are the "natural aristocracy" and "the right thing to do," no matter how wrong it may seem to the losers,
is "Beyond Good and Evil." Depriving the winners of their winnings is, therefore, unnatural. It is wrong and results in ontological crises, like the one we are experiencing now. The only right thing to do is to "let it be." Let the results of the free market stand. The only evil, then, according to the conservative argument, is to redistribute the wealth, and power, accumulated.

Accumulation of wealth and power, conservatives maintain, cannot be considered in any way a criminal intent. It is the right thing to do. This moral imperative is, however, categorical--it is not only the right thing to do, but a compelling endeavor that defines one's existence: no matter how immoral a value we may assign it, wealth and power will be sought and accumulated. It gives meaning, categorical value, to existence.

The categorical assignment of value is largely expressed in the sense of a distributive justice imbedded in a logic of orderly hierarchy and collective action.

The moral imperative is categorically infused with the power to organize toward a specific goal, or for specific performance, like analyzing whether banks that are organized "too big to fail" are more or less valuable to shareholders now that TARP funds--the product of a moral imperative--are being replaced with new equity.

Categorical distribution of value gives measurable meaning to the moral imperative. Since its meaning is imbedded in ethical argumentation, however, ambiguity abounds.

Unlike the empirical argumentation of the scientific method, the categorical measure of an ethical imperative is imbued with difficult-to-measure qualitative, normative values. The values are "indicated" by quantitative measures like the distribution of wealth and the exercise of power.

For example, is a one dollar vote in the marketplace equivalent to one person/one vote in the political marketplace? While the question is quantitatively testable, the meaning--the interpretation of the data--is subject to an endless qualititative ambiguity (reduced to an antagonistic analytical differential) of an unmeasurably argumentative proportion on values that are not generally, but should be, considered a function of verifiable hypotheses.

The measure of normative values is less a matter of confirmable ontology than an acceptance of faith supported by reason--the Aristotelian/Thomistic model of moral construction (teleology). It is an epistemology that natural science has rendered outmoded (the earth is not empirically flat and the sun does not empirically revolve around the earth).

The Aristotelian/Thomistic model of reasoning is critically flawed if we seek verifiably declarative knowledge and accept the predictive utility that comes with it. Despite the demonstrated utility of the scientific method, however, it does not keep us from constructing teleological, organizational models dressed up as naturalistic ontologies. It is a false epistemology intended to support the categorical assignments that achieve the moral imperative of doing the right thing. This is achieved with highly qualitative, and ambiguous, assignments of ethical value.

For example, bailing out too-big-and-complex-to fail banks was a moral imperative because it prevented a depression. The virtue of the benefit includes record foreclosures, massive unemployment and reduction of net worth redistributed to upper-class incomes.

Bailing out from the bottom up is an unconfirmed, untested, moral hazard premised on the false argument that accumulation of wealth creates growth and employment when the opposite is verifiably true. Disconfirmation of the tested hypothesis (growth creates wealth) is ironically considered by the same conservative argument to be morally superior to its confirmation, however.

Although demonstrated accumulation of wealth provides a productive incentive (something to be strived for), without growth there is little wealth to be accumulated; and as it accumulates there is little left to prevent a punitive, gamma-risk distribution on wealth that is retributively valued.

Confirmation of the wealth-creates-growth hypothesis is, then, a productive disincentive. It is a moral hazard.

The conservative argument, "accumulation of wealth causes growth" demonstrates how normative arguments become functionally complex and appear differentially hypocritical. Giving measurable meaning to moral imperatives is an evaluation of legitimacy, and as we see in the example, the functional differential is easily rendered an abstruse inscrutability that is effectively unempirical but measurably meaningful and fully functional, nevertheless.

It is not that the conservative-normative argument is an unverifiable hypothesis. It is disconfirmed (not verified) with each economic cycle into recessionary trend. That is why conservative proponents rely on the lack of a null hypothesis.

By not allowing the distribution necessary to verify it, the argument is made that the conservative-normative is verified by never being nulled. Since the best way to declare knowledge is to continuously try to disprove it, the conservative norm is falsely argued to stand the test of the null hypothesis.

The Bush tax cuts, for example, were to result in a budget surplus according to the conservative-normative hypothesis. The verifiable result is the Great Recession. Since the new adminstration will not apply an alternative, but is engaged in a reorganization of the problem from the top down, the null-hypothesis remains effectively untested and the conservative-normative gains empirical legitimacy despite continuous failure.

In the above example, the moral hazard is conversely verified by "virtue" of the intended result since accumulation of wealth and power causes a perverse incentive and a moral hazard. The predictable outcome of the practical model is, nevertheless, deemed forgiveably unintentional and will not be prevented to conserve the virtue of the verifiable benefit, avoiding the moral hazard.

Although the deprivation of the Great Recession is undesireable, according to the conservative-normative argument, it is a necessary condition (a categorical imperative). Economic growth will not occur without the moral imperative expressed as legitimately declarative knowledge: providing the incentive for growth (productivity) is caused by deprivation.

The differential is antagonistic, however, because the deprivation (the accumulation), by definition, prevents growth which is dependant on distribution.

Preventing the means of deprivation (the distribution) is a moral hazard because it will prevent the means of providing for the deprived. The differential struggles against itself to a generally beneficial and legitimate effect that requires secret, elite knowledge to fully understand.

The deprived, non-elite masses do not see the empirical, ethical value of capitalism and its cyclical processes because they do not have the secret elite knowledge to realize it. The non-elite must rely on faith in the system, and a failure of that faith is a heresy to be discouraged by political-economic sanction (deprivation). The travails of a natural, innate deprivation obstructs access to the knowledge necessary for economic success, not the exclusive deprivation of the capital.

According to the classical model of capitalism, deprivation is the virtue (the strength) of capital formation. Without it, we will ALL be much worse off than the deprivation necessary to achieve economic growth. The consequences are morally imperative and ontologically unavoidable (i.e., the accumulated value is completely non-retributive and the active pursuit of self-interest to provide for the undeprived a forgiveable consequence).

The ethical value of forgiveness plays a vital role in the logic of a righteous accumulation of wealth and power. Accumulation has both the dimension of a measurably indicated practical efficiency (the profit margin) and ethical value (the right thing to do). It should not be discouraged because it is the motive (the telos) to expand the pie.

An unforgiven debt burden at the bottom during the Great Recession, however, has unnecessarily given the profit motive an extraordinary retributive value. The extra value presents with extraordinary gamma risk that we will all find empirically, measurably, detrimental in the most meaningful way, relinquishing freedom to tyrannical ambitions that have become the structured incentives of power.

Health care reform legislation, for example, is an imperative that is structured with such an enormous complexity (the bill is over 2000 pages), that it is purely an endeavor of elite authority. Proponents would convince us that the complexity cannot be resolved by the non-elite in a free-market structure. Its passage is more a demonstration of tyrannical ambitions armed with moral imperatives than a practical measure to relieve the masses from the travails of a conservative-normative deprivation. It now awaits the empirical test, the normative differential, of a meaningful confirmation, nevertheless dependant on a normative description of power.

The normative differential has become so complex in the hands of technical expertise that it has been driven to an extraordinary level of unmanageability. The differential has become so antagonistic that reconciliation of the modeling is more a function of negotiating what the problem is than solving THE problem.

Nature is indifferent to whether we want to identify the truth. Nature asserts the truth with the force and empirical legitimacy of a categorically imperative authority. Ignoring the truth is a gamma risk that gives measureable meaning to our moral existence driven by the strength, the virtue, of our intellect to structure the power of our incentives.

Reorganizing the Risk

The first measure to be achieved is to disabuse the efficiency of avoiding the alpha risk and consolidating it, reorganizing it, into a gamma risk to be re-authored, reallocated, by elite, government authority.

Consolidation occurs to achieve an economy-of-scale efficiency to "minimize risk" and maximize capital for investment, but the real risk being avoided is the free market. The marketplace is then organized to support a bad intent, all manner of vice, that a free-market system would not otherwise tolerate.

At this point of the business cycle, for example, as the accumulation of wealth presents as a recessionary trend, the accumulated risk on that value (the gamma risk) also presents a retributive value.

Managing the retributive value is taking the form of limiting liability. The incentive to, for example, overleverage capital for a capital gain that receives favorable tax reduction while shorting economic growth at the same time fully indicates the deliberate, knowing intent to gain capital at the expense of growth. While the beneficiaries argue the gain is legitimately ontological (without mal-intent, but the product of systemic opportunity--incentives--and the legal right to pursue self-interest), the people whose debt now exceeds their assets (negative equity) and a depreciating prospect of adequate income (a lack of economic growth), the system is ostensibly organized to support a mal-intent.

Without a free-market mechanism ensured in priority, instead of minimizing it (minimizing the inherent, systemic risk to capital--the declining rate of profit), we spend a lot of time arguing about how to systematically re-organize for virtue instead of vice (minimizing the risk of moral hazards or perverse incentives). We spend most our time determining whether there is a criminal intent so that "doing the wrong thing" is a function of avoiding prosecution (whether you can get away with it or not)...something that a real free-market system prosecutes in priority by allowing for maximum exercise of taste and preferences (democracy).

Ponzi schemes, like the Madoff scandal, for example. The "good faith of a reasonable person" is not a persuasive defense of Madoff victims to the alpha risk. Returns were clearly "too good to be true." Investors, however, considered the return to be a function of wealth and privilege, not a moral hazard. The incentive to perpetrate the crime and participate in the return was not considered a moral hazard until Madoff was prosecuted; and instead of fully, and simply, considering the source of the incentive to engage in this "unreasonable" behavior, we are fully engaged in discovering the extent of the liability and the validity of the losses. The result will be legislative measures to strengthen regulatory authority that is limited to prosecuting the effect rather than minimizing the probability (the sanctity) of its occurrence (the perverse incentive). If it is not practically immoral until the perpetrator is caught and prosecuted, then getting caught and prosecuted is what is effectively immoral. A criminal intent (making a profit without producing real wealth...what we are experiencing on a macro scale) is encouraged in priority if we do not ensure a free-market mechanics before anything else.

A criminal intent is not likely to survive a free-market system in priority. What we have now, however, with right-wing support, are firms too big to fail operating to get away with all manner of fraud and abuse with the burden of proof, and the right thing to do, being on the consumer in posteriori.

Reorganizing the risk requires a transposition of philosophical priorities.

Political and economic discussion is always dominated with ethical measurements that are translated into public policy programs. These form a structured environment that provides incentives. The structure (a corporate body for example) becomes the culpable component with the measure of liability--who makes and takes the risk--being reduced to a discussion of practical philosophical values that describes and explains the cost and benefit of organizing risk in any particular way.

Technically, what is at the very fundament of reorganizing the risk is a practical philosophy that determines the way incentives are structured and the legitimate distribution of rewards and deprivations.

The question, of course, is how to measure the success of a practical philosophy imbued with normative values.

The solution posited is to ensure a pluralistic ontology that provides the highest probability for economic growth and the least possible need for teleological processes to determine the legitimacy of distributive value verified with empirically evaluative measures.

Ensuring a free-market transforms a large, complex organizational structure, like our economy, and a problem like providing health care, from being too big and complex to be solved to everyone's legitimate satisfaction into an easily verifiable hypothesis.

The market tests and retests hypotheses, micro and macro. The result is an empirical process of continuous improvement with a distributive verification of legitimate, non-retributive value that minimizes the need for government authority; compared to what we have now with an ostensibly strong demand for an authoritarian regime to manage the organization of risk.

The free market tests and retests valuations until it gets it right--until the retributive value is reduced to a level of risk tolerance that defines the peaceful and prosperous, legitimate limitations of power, which forms the substance at the philosophical fundament.

Foundation for Authenticating and Reorganizing the Risk

It is possible to re-author the risk into an organized ontology that authenticates the power of a constitutional self-determination.

Attention to a right to self-determination is not to be dismissed as a flimsy, idealistic sentiment of the Enlightenment that does not reflect the real world. It is a practical efficiency that tends to be supplanted by argued efficiencies of scale that consolidate wealth and power.

Seeing to a strong, constitutional self-determination allows markets to operate toward an effective equilibrium, not the disequilibrium we have now of a crisis proportion. The disequilibrium is not limited to an economic affect. It is also political.

Economic disequilibrium affects the political fabric in our social time and space. It creates a force that holds us where we are. It conserves the progress and fulfillment of the Enlightenment's vision of a peaceful and prosperous self-determination, pluralistically endowed with an authentic ontological means-to-ends legitimacy that is easily confirmed right down to the individual.

Conservation of a cyclically algorythmic disequilibrium (recurrent crises) is holding us back.

Does Wealth Create Jobs?

Wealth does not create jobs.

Jobs create wealth.

Jobs are not a by-product of wealth.

Wealth is a by-product of jobs.

We seem to have a significant incapacity for identifying the problem or, perhaps, we see what is falsely considered a clever attempt to force determination of the problem into a process of negotiation. In both cases, ignoring or being incapable of knowing the truth demonstrates an accumulation of wealth and power to an extreme level of incompetence.

The conservative argument that there must be a regulatory environment that favors accumulation of wealth, like the repeal of Depression-era regulations, is an empirical failure of recent verifiable proportion...the Great Recession.

The "trickle-down" hypothesis is disconfirmed. It is a verifiably false argument. It is foolish to keep presenting the argument as credible public policy, yet it is.

We should not continue to suffer the consequences of the Peter Principle, especially on a macro-economic scale.

Trickle-down economics does not create jobs, it primarily creates debt that the jobs, as a by-product, are created to pay.

The neo-classical model of capitalism creates a huge public debt. Someone must be enslaved to the debt, but since slavery is illegal, the debtor assignment (the people and their jobs being most at risk) is more elegantly determined by income class.

Describing the debt as a by-product of government intervention in free markets that creates wealth and, therefore, jobs is a skillful deception (hysteron proteron) that has evolved into a doctrinal belief that according to the true believer cannot be disconfirmed. It is a matter of principle...what we should empirically refer to as the Peter Principle.

Authenticating Risk

In the depths of our current crisis of liquidity it is necessary to identify a culpability--the cause that leads to the effect.

Identifying the cause and effect is to define the problem and the solution. It is presumed the regulatory regime will reflect the culpability as we plod forward with financial reform. Critical to reform is the ability to identify the source and target of risk--who makes it, and who takes it--which would then define the remedy if not the cure for what ails us.

Who authors the risk determines its authenticity: who makes the risk takes the risk.

So, who is authoring the risk?

Former Treasury Secretary, Paulson says we need to have a "systemic-risk regulator" with "broad authority," and a strong, well-rehearsed resolution authority to bail out banks in the future (in other words, people like him). All of his proposals confirm the too-big-to-fail model of finance. It is a bureaucratic model of public/private finance (political economy).

The bureaucracy will have the authority over the risk. That is, risk will be bureaucratically authored by an independent civil service. The results (the assignment, and presumed assumption, of risk to a class or party) will then appear genuinely unbiased, legitimate and binding (what a free market will authentically do through legitimate, ontological process, a priori).

Liquidity crisis reliably consolidates the capital and avoids the alpha risk. The effective "gravitas" is conceptualized to ontologically "pull" the elements into an organized efficiency rather than teleologically "pushed" into a deliberate structure of power.

Through cyclical trend, capital is gained without being exposed to the rigors, the virtue, of free markets which is the plurality that occurs with expansion of the pie.

In a free market, the risk is authored by the plural expansion and authenticated by the strength, the virtue, of taking the alpha risk, not avoiding it. The profit replicates the success, the virtue, through distribution of the capital gained and accumulated (through capital formation and investment). If the system is pluralistically maintained in priority, the virtue of success remains vested, the risk ontologically authored and legitimately authentic.

The authenticated risk is inalienable and ontologically fractile, ensured by a competitive multiplicity of the marketplace. The authenticity authors success and continuously innovates into the provision of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness rather than the continuously demonstrated deprivation of a consolidating capital in cyclical trends of crises.

It is time to re-author the too-big-to-fail doctrine of consolidated risk into the doctrine of authentic self-determination.

Organizing for Crisis

The previous discussion explored the President's proposal to "organize for America." So, then, what exactly has America been organized for?

America is organized for crisis. Specifically, liquidity crisis.

Managing crises is our working, practical, existential model. It is the means by which the elite gain the legitimacy of power. In the case of America, it is a legitimacy of power beyond the concept of who is legally sovereign. It is, however, inferred from the "natural law" argument that some are more fit to rule than others, and they will "naturally" take power and rule, especially as a result of crises. Thus, we have the ruling class operating with an organized ascendancy and conservation of the means of power--cyclical crises.

Without liquidity crises, the system fails the elitist model. In the current case, we see our administrative elite, both public and private, acting in concert to provide the liquidity (the trickle-down legitimacy) missing from the system. The result is a budget deficit that can only be described as "gymongous!"

Where did all that liquidity go? Was it ever there to begin with or is it just a phantom phenomenology of our minds, a Jungian apparition of existential gestalt, or a real angst of materialistic expression?

Why do we organize for liquidity crisis? If we did not want it, we would not be organized for it, right?

Liquidity crisis is a technical tool of an organizational technology...it is the hammer that hits the nail that builds the house, and so on.... It is what builds the systemic risk and the elusive liability of who "takes" the risk. Legitimately, it should be whoever "makes" it, but the corporate is organized, consolidated, to make, but not take, the risk.

The "reason" for liquidity crisis is purely technical. It is a technique for politically and economically managing risk-to-reward.

Liquidity is the tool that authors, or builds, the risk into the rewards of wealth and power.

In order to "organize for America" it is necessary to authenticate the risk.

Free Markets, Diffusion of Power, and Dissipation of Risk

What defines the limits of power? It is not just a matter of saying yes OR no, but having the power to say yes AND no. Does, for example, the proposed health care reform empower consumers with the discretion of both yes and no to deter abuse of power?

If, for example, consumers find the cost of health care to be too high, paying the insurance premium, directly or indirectly, always says yes to the cost. If insurance is mandatory, not only is saying no not an option by organized default, it is illegal.

Without being able to say yes and no (to bid the price up or down), consumers are not empowered to control the cost. Prices inflate because there is no resistance. There is no deterence value--a reciprocal value of self-determination--in determining prices. Consumers have to pay the cost that providers can claim is set by a demand ontology. The accumulation of wealth, and the concommittant power to self-determine (deter and terminate, or define the limit of power), is claimed to be ontologically determined by a free-market process (supply and demand) and, thus, exculpatory (not retributively valued and subject to gamma risk).

Regulating markets (gamma risk) is all about deterence value--providing incentives or disincentives (creating a predictable, manageable, ontology of purpose).

The best deterence is, of course, to prevent the accumulation of power. Within that structure of power is the discretion to control (deter) costs and "determine" income.

For example, the short selling of our economy through credit default swaps expanded (leveraged) the limit of power. The gamma risk that accumulates results in a well-defined, "prudential" regulatory authority. The swappers were self-determining; they knew that if the capital was not being leveraged to cause economic growth, the mortgages were bad (toxic) debt.

Self-determination is not by definition exculpatory. The determinants that shorted our economy and caused the Great Recession knew investing in CDS and CDO's would result in a recessionary trend, causing a loss for everyone else's wealth and income for their own self-determined capital gain. It is completely the opposite of a free-market ontology and the gain can not in any way be considered exculpatory, beyond a punitive tax authority to retribute the value and reverse the deflationary trend.

We see then that the limit of power is to determine income. If the ability to self-determine is limited either by the public or private sector, the power to determine, and responsibility, is alienated from the self. The process of determination is then in a constant state of regulatory reform, aimlessly searching for prudence and responsibility that has been alienated into an authoritarian regime with an affirmative power that is too big to fail.

Health care reform legislation, for example, is for consumers an alienation of power. The ability to "deter" or "terminate" the extent of power is limited to government authority based on the distribution of the risk-to-reward.

The dispropotion of low risk to high reward of a collusive consolidation makes the credible case for a public utility, like a national health insurance program.

Big profits, if not checked by price controls appropriate for something the consumer is commanded to have, can be reinvested to expand the supply and control the costs of the entire sector. With the immense consolidation of wealth and power, however, the probability it will not be corrupted is very low, something that a free-market economics prevents if ensured in priority.

Given the need to spread the risk, health insurance presents a good case for government providing what people cannot provide for themselves, (something free-market economics does very well, by the way, if income is adequately distributed to allow for it). However, solving the problem with organized consolidation (with the problem) is as irrational as consolidated organizations are likely to be, always acting with an affirmative too-big-to-fail economy of scale.

Whether the public or private sector, or in combination, the evaluation of a too-big-to-fail economy of scale is always affirmatively "yes" since its "subjects" do not, by design of the leviathan, have the power to deter, or limit, with the right to self-determination. That Constitutional right, rather than being empowered by government authority, is deterred.

A government healthcare program, for example, is by definition too big to fail. What defines its success or failure? Are the processes of power close enough to readily access the incentive to change its delivery for a facile fit to the wants and needs of individual consumers like a free-market system? The probability favors a power elite embellishing its progressively oversized sense of self, dictating consumer preferences right down to the fingernail.

Rather than encouraging the growth of consolidation, which maximizes the negative, non-productive effect of the zero-sum and the need for government, America can be credibly organized for economic growth without massive government spending and the massive tax liability to fund it. The liability, rather than accumulated and shifted to the public by large corporates into a crisis dimension, can be organized, and spread out, into a manageable ontology with a very close and easily verifiable accountability.

Without expansion of the pie, and a "disinflationary" tendency, the capital gained is not "verifiably" legitimate and needs "validation" of government authority. Using this illegitimate gain (gaining the profit without assuming the alpha risk, which is the product of the consolidated brand of growth), the investors, (by claiming an inherent, constitutional right to their property) induce a "deflationary" cyclical trend like we have now instead of economic growth with low inflation.

It should be clear, by even the most casual observation, the organizational legitimacy (the prescribed benefit) of allowing for an unobstructed "organic growth" of an ever-bigger corporate is critically flawed. The cost (massive unemployment and transfer of wealth to the investors) to benefit (big profits and salaries to the corporate) is overwhelmingly obvious but is being afforded constitutional protection. How, pray tell, can this possibly be regarded as the utilitarian ethic of promoting "the general welfare?"

This "general welfare" is supposed to "trickle down." The evidence, however, shows the welfare generally trickling up. The deficit between theory and practice literally, empirically, results in deficit spending which is explained as being the result of, as Ronald Reagan described it, government spending without the need.

If we are to rely on this kind of logic, it is not difficult to see why we face such a political-economic maelstrom. Stopping and reversing an extreme lack of good reason starts with properly identifying the problem, and the new admistration has, at this point, done that.

According to the president, it is time to "organize for America." So, then, what exactly has America been organized for?

It is no coincidence middle-class families face rebuilding their savings while too-big-to-fail corporates reap record profits. If your wealth was not plundered by this recession, it will the next one, or the next. Your wealth was not lost, it was consolidated. The value still exists, just not in your bank account. There is, however, considerable risk to this conversion and consolidation of value that is being busily managed by our two parties and our public/private corporate bureaucracy.

Where there is reward there is risk and the assigment of that risk/reward, its distribution, legitimately won or lost. We are politically organized to manage, and conserve, the risk our economy has organizationally evolved to accomplish--liquidity crisis.

Crises result from the accumulation of risk. It is, then, necessary to dissipate that risk.

Determining Who Is In Command and Control

A recent forty-percent rate increase for health insurance due to lower demand of the recessionary trend, for example, technically indicates that the market is too consolidated. Is there not anyone else in the world wanting to share in the multi-billion dollar profits at a competitive price?

The incentive to compete for Anthem's huge margin is not likely in a recessionary trend. Financing is not likely available and, even without the recessionary environment, there is enough collusion in the sector to prevent either a competitive intravention or intervention in a geographic market.

Collusion rigs the market, and banks prefer to finance the low-risk/high-reward ratio of consolidated market share, magnifying the risk into a systemic, crisis proportion. Financial support for consolidation supports the problem--the deflationary trend that reduces demand and raises prices to maintain the profit margin.

Both liberals and conservatives agree that consolidation solves the problem because it controls (commands) the risk. Instead of being an ontology beyond our control, it is rendered a manageable, cyclical algorythm which, of course, plausibly defines the problem as the solution. The problem is, then, continuously innovated to replicate the distribution of costs and benefits that cause the problem; and as the economy becomes more consolidated, effects emerge that seem to defy the "natural laws" (the ontologies) that give legitimacy to outcomes.

While raising prices in the face of falling demand seems to defy gravity, a long-term slow-to-no growth supply relative to demand reduction, along with transfer payments, in a cyclical, deflationary trend supports prices and profit margins. This stagflationary tendency of a consolidating economy, instead of the disinflationary tendency of a free-market economy, prevents a "deflationary" declining rate of profit. The "law" of supply and demand is not being defied.

Consolidation purposefully reduces supply to support prices and profits while the corporate reduces demand by creating unemployment. Stagflation indicates an economy that is too consolidated and easily predicts a deflationary trend followed by an inflationary, government infusion of capital invested to support the weak demand which, in turn, supports the profit margin. As the infused capital consolidates, the economy stagflates because the capital infused does not increase supply, but increases demand.

Just as stagflation indicates an economy that is too consolidated, and the problems that are sure to accumulate, it also indicates the solution--deconsolidate!
We should wonder why the countless hours of discussion and analyses rarely, if ever, mention deconsolidation. The discussion on "too big to fail," for example, is always about not being allowed to fail, not being too big. Is it not obvious that being "too big" is for the purpose of not failing--of avoiding the deflationary declining rate of profit in which the oversized corporate body collapses in cardiac arrest without a cyclical government infusion of new, life-giving capital by Dr. Keynes' prescription?

The oversized corporate body, instead of reducing size, is encouraged to get bigger, gormandizing on the technical largesse of preventing systemic crisis in the interest of the general welfare.

Gorging itself on the general welfare into a morbidly obese body of bureaucratic blob, the body corporate has stroked out and been recussitated so many times it presents with severe dimentia.

An oversized corporate is irrational and delusional. The People paying the captains of finance massive bonuses for massive unemployment, record foreclosures, budget deficits and, sooner than later, tax increases, is completely absurd.

The corporate expects the body of The People to be grateful for all the misery and mayhem. What appears to be irrational and delusional, according to the corporate, is the secert, elite knowlege in the "black box" that produces the inscrutible benefit of the "invisible hand."

Experiencing the price of goods and services increasing as demand declines, for example, among a host of other irrational technical inversions and unreasonable if not delusional expectations, organizing an oversized corporate renders a body politic in the throws of full-blown psychosis.

Our schizophrenic liberal vs. conservative approach to defining the problem just results in more bemusement with technical characteristics that, rather then being illogical, are upon closer inspection symptomatic verification of what exactly the problem is.

The purposeful (organized) manipulation of supply and demand essentially defines "the problem" we now face. It is offered as the solution with the concept of "organic growth" meaning: continued consolidation of the risk to be easily managed in an aggregated (crisis) proportion. The result is "organized crisis." It has a purpose (telos) with the ontological legitimacy of natural law (supply and demand, and the rights of humanity which includes the corporate "body").

A spiraling, deflationary, declining rate of profit is a classical, cyclical ontology of capitalism our executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative processes are entrusted to resist in priority, not support.

While government does operate to resist the declining rate of profit,
government, however, acting in posteriority (because, supposedly, no"body" really wants a crisis, it just naturally happens)--acting to palliate rather than prevent--tends to support a spiraling, deflationary trend that resists demand (unemployment) and supports the formation of capital (the profit margin).

Despite the populist rhetoric to resist the current trend, for example, policy has largely supported the deflationary trend, prices, and profits. Stimulus measures have overwhelmingly supported deflation of middle and lower-class assets and incomes while resisting a deflationary, declining rate of profit. It is not difficult to see how the one finances the other. The partisan wrangle over health care reform, for example, will produce the same neo-classical effect in the ostensible theatre of legitimate public process.

Anthem's insurance rates increased because it was less able to spread the risk to support the margin, what a free market essentially prevents by spreading the risk in "disinflationary" priority.

The free market avoids the declining rate of profit being a failed expectation. The impetus to rig the market to support the profit margin is supplanted with support of a robust demand structure and the impetus for economic growth, not stagflation. Anthem would be expected to reduce rates to retain or win marketshare and maintain or increase margin in an expanding marketplace, not a consolidating one.

Collusion to rig markets is illegal. Where is the prosecution in defense of free markets (to increase the supply so that the consumer has a choice to demand--bid for--equitable behavior rather than government being trusted to command it)? Instead, as in the case of health insurance, what is being offered is a big government alternative that will do little-to-nothing to control costs in the entire health care sector.

It is no secret that buying insurance will not ensure health care, but it will support the profit margin; and when care is delivered, the cost gets support.

Collusion of the public and private sectors is not illegal, and the distribution of costs and benefits cannot be considered illegitimate. Although the distributive result may be considered undesireable, the organized means is too big to fail.

The financial reform legislation in progress is vowed to eliminate the too-big-to-fail doctrine and the organized incentive (the exculpatory ontology of purpose) to use its accumulative power to a detriment.

The best way to redirect the risk of an organized consolidation of power to detrimentally decide the fate of others in zero sum is to deconsolidate--what health care and finance reform is not likely to do. The diffusion of power and risk will not be easily relinquished into a genuine model of self-determination.

The word "determination" includes the word "deter." Self-determination is where the ability to command and control has reached its allowable limit. It is possible to deter the pursuit of power beyond the allowable limit.

Managing the Unavoidable Risk

In the quest to avoid, if not eliminate, risk, we tend to organize into risk-management ontologies.

Utopian socialists, for example, envision elimination of the risk ontology that plagues capitalism by consolidating the risk into state control. It is much like what we have done to bail out firms too big to fail, but with a more equitable distribution of the benefit, absorbing the risk in an economy of scale that is ontologically too big to fail.

Economy of scale is the best model for managing risk according to mainstream, conventional wisdom.

Organizing an economy of scale is the prefered model for managing risk because it creates a too-big-to-fail ontology. The risk is routinely shifted to the system and the result is managed as an unavoidable consequence with a divisible benefit and an indivisible liability. Since the liability is a shared component and the benefit is not, the result is general systemic crises.

Systemic crises suggests an ontology is in effect, and since the distributive result is so easily predictable, mainstream analysts apologize with the "who could have known" doctrine, to go alnog with the too-big-to-fail doctrine, to maintain the exculpatory effect of the organized ontology.

The free-market process, on the other hand, if we should so choose, is both highly ontological (a highly diffused and anonymous distribution of legitimate risk that is easily managed with little-to-no need for government authority) and highly empirical (with quick and reliable accountability).

Rather than being alienating, the free-market process is organized for quick and decisive liability--exactly what big corporates do not want and are organized to efficiently avoid (the alpha risk, and with the help of government authority, the gamma risk).

Ensuring an organized plurality rather than consolidation, free-market economics ensures the organic growth necessary to spread the systemic risk. Spreading the risk in (alpha) priority rather than avoiding it and letting it accumulate into a crisis (gamma risk) proportion maximizes the legitimacy of the zero-sum to a positive, distributive effect.

The health care sector is a good example. We see the tendency to consolidate the risk into an economy of scale rather than dissipate it with a pluralistic ontology. The tendency is to direct the risk and command the cost and benefit whether public or private, and avoiding the alpha risk accumulates gamma risk, demanding an authoritarian regime to manage it. An authority, rather than consumers, determine what is produced, how, when, at what quantity, at what price, and how, when, where and to whom it is to be distributed. The freedom of both consumers and producers is reduced to a gamma-risk ontology--if we do not like it, too bad, that is just the way it is.

Freedom is reduced to fiat and gaming for the means of absolute power with the legitimacy of a populist sentiment contained in the fear of an accumulated risk. Utopian dreams become dystopic nightmares accepted as the best practice, the natural condition, of an ontological fate.

The organized ontology not only determines the distribution of the liability, but who commands and controls it.

Acquiring Market Share

Acquiring a share of a free-market, rather than mergers and buy-outs, requires replicating or improving the successful behavior that causes the empirical measure of success--the profit margin.

Replication and improvement means proliferation--expansion--of the marketplace, not the contraction of merging and acquiring markets which, for the most part, is the business of investment banks, private equity firms and hedge funds. These financial firms know very well their investment practices deflate the economy. They position with various kinds of instruments structured to gain value on the short side as the economy declines--the notorious credit default swap, for example.
The effect is an economy in command and control.

If the profit is margined on command, it is not free-market economics.

In a free market, an expanding profit margin is a measure of an expanding marketplace and demand (supply-side economics).

In a consolidated organizational environment, despite being touted as the best model for expanding supply, a contracting marketplace and a declining demand supports the profit margin (sustained capital accumulation) and resists the declining rate of profit (the distribution necessary to sustain demand and make a profit in an expanding free market). This intentional support and resistance occurs in both the short and long term. The result is a net gain for the commanders (the elite) and a net loss for the commanded (the non-elite).

While the gain is considered to be legitimately ontological by the operation of free-market economics, the gain is nevertheless retributively valued by the loss. A correction of the value is then always in demand and forms a gamma-risk ontology. Managing that risk, instead of the free marketplace, leads to a growing authoritarian regime that is equivalent to the lack of free-market legitimacy.

Mainstream economists who strongly supported the investment methods that led to the current liquidity crisis, known as the Great Recession, said these means, now the subject of heightened regulatory authority, would lead to optimal economic expansion and, therefore, no need for government. These economists explain the massive accumulation of errors as, not fully understanding how the economy equilibriates.

Notice how investments made in "dark markets" free of government regulation did not result in less need for government. Quite the contrary, too-big-to-fail firms rely on government intervention. Let's face it, the Ayn Rand philosophy is a lot of hocum if the organizational model is not there to support it.

Free markets do not operate in the dark, and the dark marketeers say they were operating with Rand's practical philosophy. They continue to advocate Rand's philosophy despite the practical failure.

Clearly, then, there is a practical effect to be achieved despite the free-market philosophy having been accepted by a controlling elite authority (and there is no reason that will change with a socialist legitimacy). We must consider that if the dark marketeers knew their methods would achieve the Great Recession, it would be necessary to operate in the dark.

Now that the free-market correction has come in the form of government authority, complaining that there is too much government intervention, which, like Ayn Rand says, causes the problem, is complete nonsense!

Government intervention does not cause itself, and if too-big-to-fail firms were really the model of free-market efficiency, it would not be necessary to operate them in the dark.

Not learning from the mistake here means that the Great Recession is no mistake. It is, as we now hear the conservative argument being delivered, the classical, free-market model of comparative advantage at work to re-adjust labor costs to third world levels where peasants just left the farm.

The problem here is not labor, it is capital. It is capital that needs the adjustment, allowing for economic expansion at the lowest possible price, rather than contraction of supply at the highest possible price with labor always trying to cause the distribution necessary to prevent crises of liquidity.

Increasing supply and controlling costs, whether forging steel or providing health care, is less about combining Ayn Rand with a too-big-to-fail efficiency than just simply accepting the model of pluralism.

Since the too-big-to-fail practice is, by definition, so obviously an organizational technology inimical to free markets, mainstream economists are now saying this "doctrine" should be abandoned to allow for failure. It is absurd, of course, because being so organized is too big for failure. The remedy is to allow for failure, not to disallow being too big.

The mainstream does not give up easily. They are apparently paid to persist in error which, of course, suggests there is no error, just fully intended consequences. The mainstream fully understands that the economy will not "equilibriate" with the investment vehicles being utilized, but "dis-equilibriate."

Now that the crisis of disequilibriation has occured, mainstream economists now argue we can benefit from the correction of valuations. Specifically: we will now benefit from the readjustment of labor costs, or a deflationary reduction of demand that increases supply without expanding the marketplace (false supply-side economics).

Rather than contracting the available supply by growing the size of a fewer number of corporate bodies, supply is added by adding to the number of firms available to supply the "growing" demand and acquire market share. The rate of profit, rather than declining, gets pluralistic support--it is growing, economic growth is occurring--without inflation or unemployment.

It is possible, then, for capital formation to occur without either the inflation liberals prefer (flooding the market with demand without increasing supply), or the unemployment conservatives opt for (starving market demand with an accumulation of capital to grow the economy which, of course, is not growth at all). Both options, of course, as we observe over and over again, cycle to progressively consolidate power, politically and economically, into one big corporate body with an evermore complete command and control acting to manage "the systemic risk."

Deciding how market share can be acquired is to decide how we manage the risk.

Expanding the Pie

Financial reform relies heavily on the technical expertise of a bureaucratic elite that span the boundary between business and government (the bureaucratic model of power and poilitical economy). It is a combined corporate (a practical, operational model) that defines the problem and, therefore, the solution.

Identifying the decisional model in operation provides a high degree of predictive utility. The bureaucratic model combines the expertise of elite authority with public process. While the results validate, rather than legitimately confirm, Hamiltonian hypotheses, like the wealth will trickle down to provide the general welfare, the validation occurs by means of legitimate due process.
The empirical legitimacy of pluralism is absorbed into the false utility of an authoritarian regime that is exclusively capable of resolving an organized complexity.

Non-elits are not only incapable of determining a proper resolution, they are incapable of criticizing the competence of the managerial elite.

Accountability under an authoritarian regime is less a function of empirical measure than a game of confidence. It is not a facile accounting that can be directly acted on in a facile manner, like in a free-market economy in which disconfirmed hypotheses fail without bringing down the whole system.

Accountability that relies on an elitist, Hamiltonian, decisional model validates hypotheses by an appeal to authority rather than confirming them by an empirically ontological process of legitimacy. The model accumulates errors and risk, and will not bring down the entire system on confidence of the very best authority (empowered by what is too big, and too important, to fail by default of system).

As it is now, for example, we have low inflation with high unemployment because the pie, rather than expanding, is consolidating. Now that there are signs of growth, the Fed is hinting at raising the interest rate which will dampen inflation, and growth. Without growth there are no jobs to "demand" the economy out of the recessionary trend. The trend will, instead, be reversed on "command."

If the economy is financed for expansion rather than consolidation, markets tend to be saturated and experience a disinflationary, rather than a deflationary, declining rate of profit. The distinction is absolutely essential.

A deflationary decline presents as inflation and unemployment with the deflation aspect being more a consolidation of assets--wealth--than reduction of prices. Disinflation, on the other hand, allows for the demand-support--the price control--necessary to keep the economy out of recession, preventing the consolidation of wealth that feeds a deflationary trend marked more by unemployment than a reduction in prices.

In a disinflationary free-market environment, rather than a deflationary consolidation of the marketplace, the market share is won with the fittest to survive left standing by popular consent (demand) of consumers (an ontological legitimacy of democratic process). Winning the market share, rather than consolidating it, then determines the profit margin, and the consumer, rather than paying whatever a big corporate commands, has the "discretionary" income available to bid prices in a disinflationary manner. Power is shifted from the corporate to the consumer, exactly what the corporate wants to avoid by consolidating the marketplace. (That is why the proposed health care plan is not likely to reduce costs, because it does not empower the consumer.)

If the regulatory authority is not empowering the consumer, contrary to the conventional wisdom of expanding economies of scale, the pie will not expand and the risk will not be dissipated but will accumulate with market share.

Cultivating "Organic Growth"

The economy, simply, must be organized for "organic growth" that is clearly identified with expansion of the pie (the proliferation of firms and dissipation of risk, not the consolidation of firms with proliferation of risk and dissipation of industry and markets).

Expansion is clearly verified with employment. It does not rely on the abstruse quanta-phenomenologies of an elite regulatory authority. By the same measure, simply organizing for "organic growth" will not be indicated by consolidation of firms (the merger and acquisition activity that precedes economic recovery) and continued economic contraction verified with unemployment.

Expanding the pie is supposed to expand the market in which to be shared, literally increasing the number of "shares" in the market to demand the increased supply. The result is growth without inflation and/or unemployment instead of the crisis of overproduction.

Overproduction is demand reduction that results from over-accumulation of the capital, or liquidity crisis. The crisis is easily, simply, resolved by not allowing industry and markets to consolidate with a false economy-of-scale efficiency argument.

It is a critical error to reform financial markets, for example, without deconsolidation of firms too big to fail. The tendency of reform is to eliminate the "failure" component and retain the "too big" component. That is a "big" mistake!

Resolving the financial sector to prevent crises requires deconsolidation. The sentiment expressed by interests close to the reform is that predicting and preventing crises is not possible, indicating that the critical size factor will not be resolved. The capital will then continue to over-accumulate, along with the errors. The result is easily predictable--crises of overproduction; and if it is easily predictable, it is just as easily, simply, preventable.

Mired in technical complexity, the critical, causal factor will be conserved through public process. The critical errors will be maintained as best practices best determined by the private sector which is, of course, being too big to fail. If, however, the only reform is to allow for failure without the resolve of a deconsolidated free-market, all that is left is the unresolved risk (what cultivating a free marketplace dissipates, or resolves, in priority). The accumulation of errors will present as catastrophic liquidity crisis and the need to prevent it in posteriority.

Maintaining the status quo by allowing the possibility of failure is not real reform. It allows for the business cycle to operate according to the classical model of capitalism which, by empirical trial, is an ontology for the consolidation of wealth and power into the very highest degree of crisis proportion. The empirical back test on this macro dynamic fully indicates that "too big to fail" will continue as the best organizational practice. Valuations will reflect the organizational practice.

Defining "organic growth" defines the problem to be solved or, in the case of financials, "resolved."

Resolution authority, which is suggested to be the primary means of financial regulation, does not suggest a free-market ontology, but an authoritarian regime that affirms the legitimacy of an elitist practical model, not pluralism.

If we want to cultivate "organic growth" of our economy, rather than firms that are too big to fail, we must switch to a pluralist model.

No change at all is certainly not the change we need if we want to expand the pie.

Growth Before Jobs?

According to Treasury Secretary, Geithner testifying before a House subcommittee on financial reform, "growth comes before jobs."

The hypothesis is that the accumulation of capital is invested to produce growth and, therefore, jobs.

With trillions of dollars having been accumulated, why is employment continuing to decline?

The logical inference, based on the working hypothesis (the practical model in operation), is that the economy is still in an accumulation phase of the business cycle.

The deprivation of the capital accumulated is considered an investment that, a la Reaganomics, will cause employment by causing unemployment--by readjusting the cost basis of the capital's value. The logical inference from that is: being unemployed is beneficial because it leads to employment.

This is what a political-economic tragi-farce looks like in the purest form of the art.

No Weak-Dollar Recovery

Organization of the economy over the last decade, and perhaps going farther back, anticipated a weak-dollar recovery as events predictably transpire (or conspire) into the current recessionary trend.

Despite the CFTC's effort to regulate futures, a weak dollar will continue to be a program price-signal to buy energy futures. The support for energy prices is deflatonary, resisting support for the dollar, recovery, and employment.

Indeed, this program trage conspires to continue the accumulation phase of the business cycle despite the mounting regulatory resistance.

Discouraging an asset class from futures contracts is easily circumvented with structured investment vehicles that do not appear on balance sheets. The program not only hides the reward of the intended deflationary effect, but the risk to that reward.

The hidden risk systemically appears as an ontological, cyclical trending that is, nevertheless, deliberately program generated.

Economic Growth: The Organized Ontology of Purpose

Expansion of the pie, or economic growth, is the "organic growth" that government regulators say they will not inhibit as they act to "resolve" our problems by regulating financial markets.

Economic growth is the touchstone for resolving our economic woes. It is a cure we can all agree on, but ideologically disagree over the organized means for ministering the medicine. The organized means is critical. It will determine whether the cure is effective. The cure, in other words, is a dependant variable. It is dependant on an organized ontology of purpose.

The ontology is an objective process that everyone, and no one, is responsible for organizationally. It is a kind of force majeur that just happens, like when free markets determine prices by collective action in the marketplace. No one person is responsible for the outcome. Prices and the distribution of the proceeds, therefore, are ontologically legitimate.

The legitimacy is dependant. It depends on no one person, or interest group, being responsible for the outcome; that is, a free market is legitimately organized with ontological purpose.

When considering the effectiveness of regulating markets, it is necessary to ask, what attention is being given to the organized ontology of purpose? Or is the purpose, considering it is the regulation of free markets, to give the marketplace an organized ontology? The latter suggests we did not have a free marketplace. Someone apparently has more power than anyone else to effect, or skew, the hypothetically legitimate outcome. The regulatory authority is, then, acting to give legitimacy to the outcome if it is not operating to ensure the legitimate process, the legitimate means (the ontology) of the outcome.

We see, then, that the legitimacy of the end (the outcome) is dependant on the legitimacy of the means. The ends is not justifying the means. If the regulatory authority is not ensuring the means is justifying the ends, it is in fact, then, an illegitimate process of the ends justifying the means. Rather than achieving an ontological purpose, the regulatory authority is exercising an organized teleology of purpose. Rather than ensuring an ontology for the legitimate exercise of power, the authority is the power being exercised. The result is not liberty, but authoritarianism.

While the current regulatory authority is indicating it will resolve what is "too big to fail," it is at the same time, however, indicating that mergers and acquisitions, or "growth" by consolidation, may be considered "winning" market share like in a free market. "Buying" market share in a cyclically deflationary trend that favors firms too big to fail may be considered a legitimately free-market ontological process.

Remember that in a free market, winning market share requires an investment with risk. M&A buys into the market with little-to-no risk because the consolidation (the economy of scale) avoids the alpha risk (the ability of consumers to sanction with the measure of the profit margin) of an expanding marketplace (a growing economy). The result is a reward (a margin of profit) by avoiding the risk. The risk is avoided, not eliminated. It is shifted to the system and presents as the systemic risk to be managed by the regulatory authority.

Not only does the profit margin not accurately reflect the measure of free-market success in a consolidation environment, but erroneously suggests the reward is disproportionate to the risk. The result is that equity becomes overvalued with an irrational exuberance that presents with cyclically volatile micro trends that accurately reflect that no one really knows what anything is worth.

Once the risk too-big-to-fail firms avoid presents in a macro-deflationary trend, if the consolidation that occurs is considered by the regulatory authority to be "organic" economic growth when it is really contraction, the error is magnified and supported with the force and legitimacy of government authority. It supports a process, a pro-cyclical trend, an organized ontology, that makes the problem worse, like we have now.

If the regulatory authority considers consolidation to be "organic growth" despite avoiding the risk, it is not promoting the needed growth that results from ensuring a pluralistic ontology of purpose. Instead, it supports an elitist ontology of purpose that relies on pro-cyclical treatments rather than the cure. The problem is foolishly applied as the solution.

Our regulatory authority supports the problem and resists the solution, perpetuating the problem and the need for government to "gain" a means-to-ends legitimacy that, if it was a genuine free market, should already be legitimate without application of government authority.

America is essentially organized to achieve a zero-sum with the legitimacy of economic expansion, whether it obtains or not, by government authority; and when growth does not obtain, the presence of government authority in the marketplace is readily available for blame and ready to pro-cyclically bailout the systemic failure. The result is an organized ontology for the purpose of processing a false legitimacy for an outcome that does not indicate the distributive efficiencies of free-market economics, but the distributive inefficiencies of economies of scale, and structural crises.

It is important to recognize the ontological aspect because it indicates a process, a procedure, that is blameworthy. A mechanical, organizational device suggests being difficult, if not impossible, to change, yielding results that just happen.

For example, liberal and conservative legislators who agree financial markets need to be more regulated cite the mortgage crisis. They agree to identify the problem as, loans were made to people who could not afford them, not as, people need to be able to afford the loans that were made.

We see, then, the problem getting regulatory support and the solution getting resistance. Rather than indicating an unclear business environment that resists economic growth, the support is clearly indicated pro capital, which is supposed to expand the pie and create jobs.

Economic expansion is at the root of problems identified to need complex and unreliable regulatory attention that will do little to reduce unemployment. Without employment (economic growth), the demand necessary to support that growth is resisted, and that in turn supports the need for government spending (accumulation of the public debt).

If the objective is to cut costs and reduce the size and influence of government, something to which a vast majority agrees, we need a regulatory authority that resists the accumulation of capital that reduces the demand necessary to support economic growth and full employment.

The regulatory authority needs to act in support of a distribution that effects economic growth. That is exactly what it had not been doing with a catastrophic cyclical effect, is not doing now, and is indicating it will not do in the future.

The regulatory authority is pro cyclical--it gets worse before it gets better from here.

Without supporting demand, economic policy cultivates cyclical trending, which is currently deflationary. The stimulus package and unemployment compensation have prevented the trend from tracking into sustained negative growth, but it has not reversed the trend because the regulatory authority is status quo.

Keynesian economics supports demand enough to resist deflation (complete economic catastrophe), but not enough to cause employment which, according to the working hypothesis, is caused by capital accumulation and distribution (investment). The capital has been formed (the accumulation) but the investment (the distribution) has not, supporting the cyclical deflationary trend.

The effect of the pro-cyclical trend (the organized ontology of purpose) is consolidation of wealth and power. The trend will not reverese until a more progressive tax code becomes imperative to pay the accumulating Keyesian debt that supports demand.

A more progressive tax code would defeat the pro-cyclical trend, so it will not happen. It will then be a function of the regulatory authority to be sure the distribution that will occur causes economic growth and effects employment--to maintain an organized ontology of purpose that cultivates economic growth.

Economy-of-Scale Efficiency: Restatement of the General Case

Instead of "economies" of scale, we should have a singular "economy" of scale being the incentivizing model of efficiency.

Rather than each individual firm seeking an economy of scale that consolidates into a too-big-to-fail ontology, we should organize with a free-market, pluralistic ontology ensuring in priority a macro-economic singularity.

With the gamma-risk ontology being organized in priority, instead of being managed in posteriority, we can proceed with a process organized for both economic growth and stability. Gaming for power becomes a function of operating within established parameters organized "a priori." An organized economy-of-scale efficiency that is too big to fail "a posteriori" will be rendered obsolete, and the abuses of power characteristic of being to big to fail will result in certain failure of the firm.

Ensuring a macro economy of scale will incentivize continuous economic growth in priority rather than continuous consolidation and economic contraction to achieve the measure of success--the profit margin.

Rather than an economy of scale being the natural model of economic efficiency that supports the exploits of a power elite, it is an ontology (a naturally occurring process) of efficiency to be ensured by the sovereign for the purpose of securing the general welfare and the domestic tranquility. It is an incentivized process purposefully applied in priority to ensure deconsolidation, rather than consolidation, of power, economic or political.

Just as absolute monarchy became the absolute sovereignty of The People organized into the absolute authority of the state, alien still but functionally, more pluralistically, dependant on The People for the source of its power, the economy-of-scale singularity consolidates the interests of The People with the ambitions of power in priority.

Just as monarchs organized mercantilism to serve their interest before The Revolution, capitalism was organized to effect a more equitable distibution of sovereign power among the mercantile elite to serve their interest by authority of the state.

The Enlightenment, like The Revolution, is both old and new.

It is time for a restatement of the general case.

Instead of organizing for an authoritarian effect, we can wisely organize for a free-market effect. The tendency to consolidate (the gamma-risk that cannot be avoided) can be harnessed to ensure an effective pluralism, and the sustainable incentive for economic expansion that comes with it, in priority.

The False Efficiency-of-Scale Argument: The General Case

Being too big to fail provides optimal efficiencies of scale. It also provides accumulation of errors and distortions, costs and abuses, on a massive scale, that cannot fail.

It is critical to understand that an organizational model that is scaled too big for failure creates risk of equally large size. Since it cannot fail, it is immune to the risk. If you are not the beneficiary of that risk, then you are "at risk" to the reward. Your savings, your home, your income is at risk of being consolidated into capital that is supposed to finance your savings, your house, and your income. It is intended to sacrifice the benefit to you for "the general welfare" which is seeing to the welfare of the rich in priority. It is a zero sum.

Being organized "too big to fail" causes risk, it does not take the risk. No. The risk is caused to consolidate assets in the form of legitimate market risk that is not at all legitimately ontological. The risk, rather, is created by an organized teleology just for the purpose of failure. It is intended to effect a reward by causing a detriment through organized means.

Being "too big to fail" effectively creates a "detrimental reliance" which is considered by law to be an abusive relationship typically associated with theft by scheme and the product of a criminal intent. The organization is the cause, the failure is the effect. The result is a profit without risk, or an illegitimate zero-sum game.

On a macro-economic scale, instead of forming the capital necessary to create jobs, being too big to fail has formed massive systemic risk and created massive unemployment.

Massive capital has been formed. So, where are the jobs?

Unfortunately, if you need a job, unemployment is the capital amassed. It has been converted and consolidated into private property. The property will not again be capital until it is used to expand the pie (what currency derivatives and credit default swaps will not do). It is a massive failure of the system, managed to a consolidated, too-big-to-fail level of incompetence (to the gamma-risk limit of power).

While the system has failed, the parts that comprise the system failure are too big to fail, and the system stubbornly persists in error.

Organizing firms so big that they cannot fail is to organize for failure, not success. It allows for the system to persist in error by managing, rather than preventing, the systemic risk. The system is then driven to a level of managerial incompetence. It is dysfuntionally organized with the "peter principle."

A free-market pluralism technically avoids the organizational problem of the "peter principle." Instead of allowing the pursuit of power to support an accumulation of errors, pluralistic organizational technologies provide a self-corrective, empirical ontology that awards power based on the merits and not an accumulation and consolidation of power itself based solely on the ability to game the system. It will resist the pursuit of power without the qualification--the merits--for having it, like a practical moral intelligence.

A free-market pluralism ensures the means of gaining power is not an end in itself, so it must be ensured in priority. Managing markets after the dirty deeds have been done ensures markets fail and produce the success of consolidating power by defeating the meritorious mechanism of free-markets.

Regulated markets with firms too big to fail do not produce a free-market effect. They do, however, give dirty deeds the legitimacy of public process and the force of public authority.

Today's organizational techniques and financial instruments become the clever innovations of tomorrow that evades the letter of the law, or deliberately encounters the ignorance of a like-minded regulatory authority.

Rather than resisting the incentive for dirty deeds, a regulatory regime that does not ensure operation of a free-market mechanism in priority supports the incentive to produce outcomes that elicit a populist sentiment. The trick then, of course, is to give the outcome legitimacy despite the negative sentiment.

Allowing firms to "grow" too big to fail because it is economically efficient supports the probability the negative effects will occur. What is to be prevented by popular demand (like having to sell your assets at a loss because you lost your job while big bankers reap record profits and salaries by investing in derivatives rather than economic growth--i.e., consolidation of industry, markets, and the wealth) will innovatively occur as unintended, ontological crises.

The argument for needed change then takes this form: it does not matter what we do, the crises that continuously consolidates wealth and power will (ontologically) occur. It is a law of nature. It is the result of natural processes that cannot be avoided; and since crises cyclically occurs no matter what, the argument that it is futile to try (a la Ayn Rand and Friedrich Nietzsche) is empirical truth.

The ontological argument for the consolidation of wealth and power is a conservative argument that is generally accepted across the ideological spectrum. It is an argument of the general case: organized consolidation (an economy of scale) is a gamma risk that can only be managed, not ontologically avoided, or prevented.

We should be quick to test this hypothesis by ensuring a free-market pluralism in priority. It will be interesting to see who objects and why.

A pluralistic ontology prevents the accumulation of power into the pursuit of a criminal intent. It is a pursuit that has been described as "crony capitalism" or "robber-barronism" in which power is accumulated from the privation, rather than the provision, of others. (The current health care debate, for example, includes insurers admitting they are so non-free-market organized that they can deny access and raise prices all they want without, by definition, market sanction. The power to sanction is the exclusive domain of the firm too big to fail the marketplace.)

Capitalism is organized to prevent economic growth in the name of expanding it.

Through an efficiency of scale, the ever-larger "growth" of a consolidating corporate body intends to defeat free-market economics (the incentive for growth) for a tyrannical effect that commands the free-market measure of success--the profit margin (but without growth). The lack of economic growth is expressed as an efficiency of scale that prevents failure and ensures success by empirical proof of the profit margin.

The corporate body must include government, and its regulatory authority, so that it does not act to produce a free-market effect by popular demand. The tyrannical, non-free-market effect (the false free-market measure of success by being too big to fail) then has the force and legitimacy of democratic, government authority (state capitalism).

It is time to reject the organized model of a too-big-to-fail efficiency. It is time to reject the false ontology that legitimizes the consolidation of wealth and power and accept a true economic, ontological scale of efficiency.

We should reject the traditional, conceptual ontology that forms the elitist model of economic efficiency in which economies of scale are the statement of the general case.

The False Efficiency-of-Scale Argument: The Particular Case of Health Care Reform

The President proposes a "health care exchange" that will create an economy-of-scale efficiency. It will simulate, he argues, the effect of a free-market economics through collective bargaining power.

Why is it necessary to simulate a free-market price through non-free-market means?

The President's exchange plan keeps the decisional process a product of consolidation which affirms the belief that centralized control is the model of efficiency despite having produced the Great Recession.

According to the President, the exchange is a proven, too-big-to-fail model of success that will benefit "The People" instead of insurance company profits.

By organizing massive bargaining power "like Wal Mart," the President says (which is organized to be "too big to fail" despite the Great Recession), We (The People) will have all the benefit of a proven organizational technology on our side to effect the change we need.

While the President argues the benefit of a too-big-to-fail organizational technology to a fare-the-well, he does not consider the detriments.

The Wal Mart Model, for example, has for many years consolidated the marketplace. While it affords a competitive price, its has meant the demise of small businesses that are our best source of employment. It is no coincidence that the demand now is for "jobs jobs jobs!"

Since Wal Mart is too big to fail, the detriment (the organizational error and distortion that is inimical to a free-market economics like lower prices but with a diminishig demand that causes delfation) is turned into a success that accumulates along with the benefit. Organizing for this kind of success, whether it is consumer retail or health care, is to also organize for massive failure that the marginal beneficiaries (like shareholders, and in the case of health care, its providers) are immune and, even worse, have a stake in conserving.

In a marketplace that is allowed to consolidate, the error (the detriment, the failure) proliferates and the benefit accumulates. In a free-market system, the benefit proliferates and the risk dissipates. Instead of our MBA graduates organizing a highly innovative, pluralistic economy, they are paid huge bonuses from the accumulated profits of organizing a consolidation of industry and markets in the name of efficient economies of scale. The result is the Great Recession, very expertly accomplished with the value of The People's debt being worth more than the value of their assets.

Is this where the organizational plan for health care is headed? The probability, based on experience of using this model, is very high. It is a risk we do not have to take.

In the case of health care, consolidation of the market will benefit all those health care professionals sitting around applauding the President's initiative when he announced putting the plan to a vote. It will conserve an accumulative benefit with an accumulative cost that deflates the economy and causes Great Recessions through consolidation of industry and markets.

Whatever cost savings can be had from an organized bid-exchange will be easily countered by the organized consolidation of the providers. The cost of health care will be perpetually parked on the ask, never on the bid.

The market will be organizationally rigged with an economy-of-scale efficiency.

When the revenue stream on potato chips runs out to support ever-increasing costs in the authoritarian name of public health and welfare, it will be something else ad infinitum. Freedom is crushed under the weight of holier-than-thou elits interested more in accumulating wealth and demonstrating power than administering the general welfare.

The benefit will be consolidated by health care providers at the expense of insurers. Costs will not be reduced, they will be a consolidated benefit--an accumulation of wealth and power that causes crises with the highest dergree of predictive utility.

The People should not allow elite authorities to persist in error.

Job Creation and Organizational Complexity

Trillion dollar bailouts caused by an economy overleveraged by trillions of dollars has made job creation so salient the master-mind Ivy Leaguers who engineered the Great Recession now have to consider how to reinvent a recovery.

Engineering huge profits and a record consolidation of wealth despite declining demand is a monumental feat of Nobel-Prize proportion. The great mind that devises the scheme for creating jobs without actually creating jobs is due to win the prize for the most complex practical modeling ever conceived. It will make Tyco Brahe's retrograde motion look like basic math.

Quantitative masterminding is what gets us into these messes. It will not get us out, but will add more complexity which, the truth be told, is the master plan.

How it is that a massive, quantum bailout did not result in an improving economy, but an economy projected to get worse, is mired in a complexity we are not allowed to credibly talk about except in the most technically indirect ways. We can talk about point-scoring or any number of other abstruse quanta until we are drawn into a hypnotic, soporific stupor, prepared to accept unemployment and recession as a positive economic force, building an immunity, a tolerance, to what ails us, making us stronger; but not this time.

Depsite "dark markets," the effects are bright as day and have solicited the undivided attention of the masses perfectly capable of knowing when they are being needlessly distracted and bamboozled with questionable quanta of empirical, objective value.

Unemployment consolidates the capital gained into wealth, or private property that does not have the status of capital till it is used to expand the economy and create jobs.

As long as jobs are not created the capital can continue being converted and consolidated into wealth (private property). Property of the jobless, including savings, is converted into capital to be reinvested (redistributed, recycled) without a redistributon of an original accumulation of wealth and value that is inflated. That inflated value is used for the distribution necessary to create jobs that pays the inflated value and, if not more important, the rising tax burden. The remaining value is safely conserved, undistributed wealth (and power to command and control the macro trend).

The value lost through unemployment is gained in the form of capital and converted into private property. Part of that converted value, imbedded in all manner of cryptically descriptive, quantitative analyses, is consolidated into permanent property. It becomes accumulated wealth that can be reconverted into the power to accumulate more wealth. It is a cyclical algorythm, a recurrent process that, over time, is cumulatively steeped in quantitative, and organizational, complexity. It masks the simplicity of the cause-effect relationship between the value created and to whom the value accumulates.

The trick is to not have to liquidate wealth and, therefore, risk it in the form of capital to effect economic growth that creates jobs. The goal is to keep capital consolidated in the form of permanent wealth that cannot be risked, or lost in a free marketplace.

The best way to eliminate alpha risk is to eliminate the free market and create (organize) a barrier that only allows access to capital (the value that creates jobs) on favorable terms that keeps the wealth consolidated. An organized complexity results that minimizes if not eliminates the risk to
accumulated wealth and power.

Without the complexity, the value of unemployment gains retributive value. There is, however, a point of diminishing returns in which the cumulative mass, the quanta, is so overaccumulated that the value must be retributed.

Accumulated retributive value has a gamma risk that cannot be avoided. The risk will not reduce, but increase with added orders of complexity. The value must be redeemed in order to conserve the means of distributive power and, more important, the moral legitimacy--the ethical distribution--of productive value. That ethical value is not only a moral sentiment, but also represents a practical, distributive value, a realpolitique, that ensures public health, safety, and welfare.

It becomes readily apparent that unemployment produces useable value. If that value is not used for productive purpose (the demand--the distribution--that fuels economic growth), despite whatever cryptic quanta may be attached (like a value point score on each dollar cut from the marginal tax rate or cut from the budget returning more than a dollar in revenue, for example, that is both absurdly too good to be true and always suffers an unobjective verification), the probability that more accumulated value can be lost than won becomes equally apparent. The trend will be reversed to conserve the power to retribute the value and control the ontological risk.

A "jobless recovery becomes a more secular "jobs recovery" when a loss to accumulated value gains a probable gamma-risk. The accumulation phase will stop and reverse to hedge the risk.

The useable value unemployment produces can take many transitional forms. Hiding in the labyrinth of a technically structured complexity, the cost and benefit is carefully dissembled to demonstrate the distributive outcome as a net benefit to the unemployed, literally banking on the ignorance of the masses.

While mainstream economists refer to unemployment as the tendency to hord employment in hard economic times (never mind, of course, that it causes hard times if that value is not invested in employment but horded in dark markets accumulating inflated value with a huge systemic risk), the unemployed see the value being horded to make someone else rich at their expense. It is not seen as a means of enhancing their value in the future, as the mainstream analytic suggests, but to diminish it in order to elevate someone else.

Rather than a Jeffersonian self-determination, the actual scenario of unemployment perfectly fits the Hamiltonian model of distributive justice: ensuring the welfare of the rich in priority ensures the general welfare.

So, as the budget deficit grows ever larger to finance the value lost to the elite in priority without the unemployed starving in the streets as beneficiaries, the employed must shoulder the tax burden of that benefit. It is argued to be a systemic ontology. It is a requirement since taxing the rich removes the capital from the marketplace necessary to create the jobs that must be sacrificed to create the jobs that must be sacrificed. It means they will also lose their jobs if they do not pay the tax burden because the model in operation requires jobs be horded to produce investment value--capital.

The employed, then, by dictate of the elitist model in operaton must pay a greater share of taxes proportionate to income than the upper income class in order to keep their jobs and not suffer being demoted to a lower class status--being on welfare.

Jobs are not created to relieve unemployment but to take on the increasing pressure for a progressive tax burden. It must be prevented at all cost to conserve the means of accumulating value, wealth, and power. It is worth the distribution (the capital) necessary to relieve the pressure because it will avoid empirically testing the regressive tax-burden hypothesis which is that it ensures economic growth. That expansion will occur to perpetuate the problem (the boom-bust cycle) with the illusion of empirically confirming the regressive-burden hypothesis by not having tested the probable cure.

There will be clever attempts at simplicity, like the "job sharing" scheme. Despite its apparent simplicity it is confounding because it is a symptomatic treatment, and when used instead of a cure, the disease and the diagnoses become evermore complex and a matter of opinion.

Let's say, for example, you have a chronic headache. "Two aspirin...call me in the morning." The remedy cycles over and over again. It keeps the patient coming back but there is a point of inflexion where the patient realizes the remedy just recycles the problem. The doctor's credibility is diminished and must come up with a better remedy or, at least a different one (and most certainly not a cure) to keep the patient coming back.

The doctor is likely to come up with a remedy with a longer cycle, but the headache comes back with less resistance to the pain. It is necessary to inflate the dosage. The inflation becomes cost prohibitive and so the remedy recycles to "take two and call me in the morning."

Without introducing a cure, the remedy must be innovated. Instead of a red pill, a blue pill. Instead of the blue pill, the red pill. These shorter termed sub-cycles can be varied enough to prevent introduction of a cure till the next generation of patients ready to begin a new macro cycle with all the values conserved.

Increasing pressure for a more progressive tax code rather than tax and budget cuts will strongly indicate the distribution required for significant job creation and a quick recovery.

The cure for that chronic headache: "progressively" apply tax pressure to the accumulus monetus locus (where the value is accumulated).