Null Hypotheses and the Value of Popular Consent

As we approach the mid-term elections, the value of a popular consent is being assessed. The assessment occurs by demonstration of public process (the empirical value of the vote) and methods designed to delimit the value and define mandates for the legitimate exercise of power.

Spending on the election process measures the value of popular consent, and in many cases wealthy candidates spend millions of their personal wealth.

What candidates are essentially buying is legitimacy that empirically defines and delimits the value of the risk (default of expectations). More specifically, expensive elections are a process for limiting the risk of liability (accountability) both public and private.

The expense tends to be a barrier to entry. While candidates are seeking public service, there is a tendency for self-service that defaults expectations. Thus the need to buy popular consent and the legitimacy of power (the extension of value) it confers. It becomes more like a game, seeing who can pick up the most pieces to apply an unpopular agenda.

A process evolves that extends the value (delimits the risk) across the public-private spectrum. Mandates are defined so that private outcomes have the force and legitimacy of public authority--or the value of popular consent. (Essentially, the legitimacy is a loosely constructed Hamiltonian hypothesis in which what is not a well-defined prohibition is loosely allowed and technically legitimate. The result is a complexity of rhetorical argument that reduces consent to the judgment of elite control, Bush v. Gore being one of the most extreme, and heavy-handed, examples. Self-fulfilled prophecies are then easily shammed as confirmed hypotheses, especially with the assistance of Citizens United.)

Mandates gain empirical value through the popular vote, confirming or disconfirming the value of previous elections. Since elections are cyclical, the risk has recurrent value that must be controlled, or governed. Current election cycles, which define the future value of the risk, are systematically controlled by the party system to present the value of a popular consent (self-determination in the representative form, having the present value of a mandate).

The most potent measure for delimiting mandates that govern a representative form of government is to null hypotheses (confirmation by disconfirmation).

If, for example, the current mandate is for reducing the budget deficit, the Republican Party is prepared to deliver the mandate without reducing the need. Expectations for deficit reduction will, then, "default." The mandate is nullified and takes the alternative, re-presentative (binomially recurrent), form by consent of the governed. Budget deficits, then, occur by default.

While President Obama says voting Republican is going backwards, he fails to describe and explain (or perhaps fails to understand) how this happens by default. Democrats have supported the need for deficits, supporting too-big-to-fail financial firms with bailouts, quantitative easing, and financial reforms that rely on the wealth to trickle down (a disconfirmed hypothesis). Democrat or Republican, creating jobs, going forward, is for the purpose of paying taxes, which reduces the demand needed to reduce deficit spending, by default of process.

Nulling hypotheses is immediately observable as we analyze the mid-term elections. Its value to limit the risk of extending unpopular (disconfirmed) mandates is readily apparent. Democrats, struggling with legislating an unpopular healthcare mandate, now face disconfirmation. Republicans, then, of course, now claim confirmation of an agenda--tax cuts for the top income class, for example--that are completely disconfirmed hypotheses. The value of the nullification is so extensive that the risk of being wrong (disconfirmed) is virtually none. The worst that can happen is a switch back to Democrats in disconfirmation of the fact accomplished.

Otherwise known as rigging the market by extension of the risk (a leveraging scheme), the value of this public disconfirmation process is, in this particular case, close to a trillion dollars.

Although the value of the Republican agenda is a confirmed detriment to the middle class, its extension will be absolutely devastating. Extension of the detriment (the risk) simply indicates (measures) one thing: a lack of legitimate consent.

The Democratic/Republican agenda raises taxes, increases deficits, and supports the tendency to deflation--confirmed hypotheses to be rejected (nullified) by the legitimate means of a popular consent.

A binomial party system is intended to derive a negative vote that disallows the empirical proof (the value) of a positive popular vote.

A two-party system is a process for nullifying alternative political hypotheses by denying access to the legitimate means of popular consent (like the crown), conserving the accumulative value (the extension) of economic risk (the value classically known as the extension of the rents, and a value we now know as QE).

Reverse Leveraging

Economic analysts generally identify a de-leveraging underway, which is the deflationary trend the Fed is planning to counter with more quantitative easing (QE). This also means that, at the same time, a re-leveraging is underway.

The first round of QE did not trickle down. Instead, like the chairman of the Fed said recently, we have a massive, economy-of-scale rush to foreclose housing properties, for example, that has led to large-scale impropriety.

Bank of America leads the predatory acquisition of property (the deleveraging underway of overvalued collateral that was securitized into debt obligations; the collateral fell below the value of debt obligation due to systemic risk). Bank of America says its bank is "investing in our communities" while it rushes to foreclose as much as possible. The foreclosures also reduce credit scores as much as possible. Bank of America can then charge the highest possible interest rate for debt needed to cover costs that continue to rise while middle-class incomes fall (the systemic, deflationary risk that Bank of America is literally banking on by directing its credit facility to support the risk, like dumping QE funds into commodities).

Evaluating the risk leads the middle class to question whether the credit score (the risk of default) determines systemic risk, or whether systemic risk determines the score.

The action of the bank scores the risk. Credit scoring not only measures risk, it determines it; and debtors are scored on risk that is attributed and paid by them, but they cannot control. Attribution without control results in retribution; and accumulated wealth that is retributively valued must be managed--manipulated--to appear as the consent (the self-determination) of the governed.

To mitigate the outrage (the retributive value) without sacrificing beneficial value accumulated from the detriment, a short sale is offered instead of a foreclosure, which is deleveraging in a different mode. The effect (the benefit-to-detriment value) is essentially the same with the homeowner suffering the loss of deflated asset value, forced then to borrow the consolidation of that value from the bank at the highest possible cost (at the lowest possible price for the bank). The zero-sum accumulation of value and subsequent debt-distribution of the benefit determines the systemic risk (credit scores confirmed by income class). For average incomes, a detriment is suffered on both the accumulation and distribution sides of the business cycle, resulting in a deepening deflationary trend.

A better option for all parties is to reverse-leverage these assets. If one in five homeowners owe more than there home is worth, that negative equity is value to be consolidated by the bank whether it is a foreclosure or a short sale.

The Fed says it is taking a close look at foreclosure procedures and practices. It will find that they are largely predatory--intended to profit by exacting the greatest detriment which supports the deflationary trend.

Since the Fed has declared war on deflation, its mission is to then prosecute the normal course of the business cycle that consolidates the wealth. If the leverage is not reversed, QE will support the deflationary trend with the added money supply actively pushing up commodity prices. The scenario, then, is engineered to be the worst possible case. Middle-class incomes and net worth (aggregate demand) reduces while commodity prices increase to support core inflation.

The Fed will get the inflation it is opting for, but it will have a deflationary effect, achieving that "oops" scenario in which the engineers claim a limitation of its tools to fix the problem. Let's keep in mind, however, that the limitation is engineered a priori--it is an expected value--to produce the effect with an exculpatory property.

If we want to reverse the deflationary trend without inflation (reverse the "direction" of the business cycle--the systemic risk literally being directed, deleveraged and releveraged, to make a profit by causing massive detriment), reverse leverage is in order.

It is critical to keep in mind that just because the business cycle is a system-wide phenomenon does not mean it is an unintended, undirected consequence (merely an observable ontology like observing the weather and making predictions). Bank of America's hasty foreclosure of Countrywide's book anticipates another round of QE since it has done little to resist the deflationary trend. Foreclosure provides the detriment to be quantitatively eased, which provides the customers needing to refinance back into the system (releveraging) with liquidity (QE) the bank will provide. The profit from supporting the detriment is huge. Countering the cyclical trend will not occur until the system has been fully positioned (directed) to deliver that huge profit which will be distributed to the top two percent of income class. The system is then set up for the next round of leveraging risk into default. That risk of default is increased as income is consolidated into the upper class, and into a crisis.

QE that reverses the leverage, positioning average incomes for solvency rather than insolvency, reverses the macro trending that deliberately recirculates debt into crises. It is just as easy and far less hazardous to recirculate liquidity into growth and rising middle-class incomes, beginning with writing down the deflated, negative equity on the books of central banks. That huge loss will be a huge gain for the middle class, and that gain will be multiplied with less debt on the micro and macro scale, reducing tax rates, deficits, and the need for government.

It is not simply a question of whether we have QE, but what we do with it. If it is going to be directed into commodities to support the deflationary trend (reducing middle-class incomes with higher prices but at lower interest rates that they, therefore, cannot successfully score), then we need political-economic technicians with both the technical means and moral capacity "for a change."

Politicians and technocrats that advocate for reverse leveraging are representing the middle class--the common good. It deserves a positive, empirical vote--the consent of the governed.

An ontological legitimacy of systemic risk/reward is not empirically verifiable until the risk is deconsolidated and a free market is ensured in priority. Reverse the leverage and a free market (consent of the governed) will emerge. Instead of being held accountable by Bank of America, being made a slave to your credit score, Bank of America will be held accountable to you.

Nothing From Something

Ex nihilo is a concept fundamental to economic theory and practice. We freely invest capital to produce what consumers want, and the reward is the profit margin. The margin is the measure, the expression, of consent to produce more (something), not less, and the capital is accumulated to do that (more or less) from the margin.

The accumulated capital, however, can be used to reduce the measure of consent by organizing economies-of-scale. Being "too big to fail" simply means being beyond popular consent. The technical measure of consent is corrupted and becomes a function of ideological (political) interpretation. While the margin objectively measures the amount of political risk (the probability the margin can and will be retributed as a measure of direct, democratic, popular consent), "the risk" is now in the gamma dimension with determinants that are not fundamental, but technically derived. Like going short to arbitrage the risk, a panic can and will occur to cover the probability the loss can be greater than zero (nothing from something).

Free-market economic theory postulates an ex nihilo legitimacy. Businesses are created from nothing to satisfy the demand of the marketplace (consumers with adequate income to "direct" the extent of the risk). Expostulated, the Great Recession, for example, provides ample evidence that the legitimacy has been reversed.

There is not enough demand to direct the extent of the risk (to keep it from going gamma). Instead, the risk is assigned by big businesses, determining the extent of probable default (your credit score, whether it is you personally or your business). The risk does not extend to create something, but to reduce (short) something as much as possible to nothing. The result, for example, is an interest rate that is nearly zero and wants to go negative (insufficient demand--your credit score--with an extensive risk of default).

Deflation does not expostulate a free-market economics. Instead, it critically demonstrates a lack of free-market legitimacy and a strong tendency to command economics.

Quantitative easing, for example, delivers long-term bonds to banks as an extension of the Federal Reserve Bank (a central authority that is both public and privately endowed). The bonds credited to banks are sold to the treasury, expanding the money supply in the form of public debt. The return on the investment (the money lent) at low rates is postulated to signal recovery which is achieved when the bonds are called back and resold to the central bank from the treasury.

Quantitative easing is not signaling recovery, but impending crises. It gives the impression of wealth ex nihilo, but it is really masking a process that tends not to "produce" something from nothing, but to "reduce" something to nothing.

QE (risk ex nihilo) needs to come in priority, not ex post facto.

Deconsolidating the risk will provide the quantitative easing necessary for economic health without the inflationary or deflationary side effects.

Ex Nihilo

When the economy gets so bad that interest rates get near zero, like we have now, the Federal Reserve Bank creates new money "out of nothing."

Keep in mind that the concept of "nothing" is really something subsequent to a large quantity of illiquidity (overconsolidated capital at a low rate of interest). It is an ex-post-facto quantity to accommodate growth with the consolidation of the value. The Federal Reserve Bank can, for example, buy long-term bonds from the Treasury Department. The demand for the bonds lowers long-term interest rates (inflates their price) to support the rate of inflation and resist a deflationary trend. Treasury resells the bonds to finance the public debt at a low rate of interest (at the highest possible price).

According to the Fed's chief financial engineer, Chairman Bernanke, it is necessary to support long-term bond prices in order to get investors interested in economic growth. Buying long-term bonds will counter the strong deflationary trend (the illiquidity of consolidated capital) by causing inflation. The lower long-term rate will make short-term borrowing more expensive. As it is now, the interest rate is so low, near zero (at a deflationary level), that money is being borrowed at cheap, short-term rates and being invested in commodities for a short-term capital gain. Not only does that support the deflationary trend, but contrary to economic theory, the added investment does not add supply to disinflate commodity prices. Instead, the investment inflates commodity prices, reducing consumer discretionary spending (final demand and employment) even more than it already is, consolidating the capital (and wealth) even more, which is the source of the problem to be solved (a lack of income due to consolidation).

Since the capital has been converted into wealth (cash, for example, gold, or some other commodity) it is no longer capital (the illiquidity or the "nothingness" part of the equation). To provide the missing liquidity (demand), the capital (the "somethingness" part of the equation) is then, subsequently, borrowed from the wealth at the highest possible price to finance the debt created by the new money. The value of the high price (the low interest rate) is quickly and easily realized by going short the long bond as the core CPI increases, which the Fed has stated to be its current objective.

The reason the quantity of value the debt represents (the consolidated capital) is said to have been created "out of nothing" is because the capital is not supposed to consolidate in a free market, but recirculate. It needs to appear that the "creation" of the new money is not "caused" by the consolidation, giving empirical value (liquidity) to the quantity of nothing (illiquidity). The implication, of course, is that there is no free-market need for the added liquidity--it is disfunctional (and that is essentially correct--there is less need if it is a free market). The added liquidity defeats the purpose of illiquidity--deflation (what the Fed is entrusted to prevent). The expected effect of deflation is consolidation--a market that is less free (the missing value the Fed is entrusted to add, ensuring open markets, by committee, of course).

The missing value of liquidity is provided through the Treasury Department's Bureau of Debt Management and the Federal Reserve Bank, converting wealth back into capital by renting it (the rate of interest). Theoretically, if the rent (the price) gets too high, then there is less "interest" in buying the debt and more interest in-vesting growth to pay it. In practice, however, like we have now, the rent keeps rising (deflation due to consolidation).

In order to gain interest in growth (to increase long-term lending rather than short-term borrowing), the Fed plans to buy (subsidize) treasury bonds to drive down (quantitatively ease) the rate of interest for debt. Raising the rent (the price) reduces the demand for short-term gain. Falling rents (a higher inflation rate and higher yields) indicates a recovery (liquidity) to spur even more investment (even higher yields), assuring deflation has been stopped and reversed. (Notice how this is a series of large, easily detectable, quantitative signals to modify--or increase the probability of--behavior. The inversion of price to yield, for example, indicates a probability of risk with an expected behavioral value, or incentive, to project economic stability.)

Since borrowing your way out of debt creates more debt to be paid (the detectable quantity being the size of the public debt, and monetary policy engineered to cause inflation to pay for it), the result is slow to negative growth...tending to zero, or nothing.

Creating money "ex nihilo," as monetarists refer to it when describing "quantitative easing," is a highly controversial means of finance because it incurs a public debt and is administered by a central banking authority. It is the perfect model of trickle-down economics as Alexander Hamilton envisioned it, giving money to wealthy bankers who are entrusted to create the wealth. Immediately we see a fatal flaw.

Instead of recirculating, or recycling, the supply of old money, new money--owned by the public in the form of public debt--is added for investment. Once the new money is invested and the new debt is incurred, the old, consolidated money is at less risk to finance government stimulus programs, for example, which is a counter-cyclical measure. Since the cyclical trend provides a net benefit to the wealthy, it is only natural for the wealthy to resist financing policies and programs that counter the trend. Even with the added money, however, the net benefit is secured in the form of public debt (at falling prices with increasing yields) rather than privately enterprised, which would mean adding GDP.

Adding GDP is disinflationary (what Bernanke says he wants to avoid in a deflationary environment by stimulating inflation) and results in a declining rate of profit (a stronger currency and, for example, lower energy and food prices which are not components of core CPI). As consumer prices decline, there is less credit risk (more available capital), and thus more demand for credit (willingness to borrow and lend) at lower rates without a quantitative subsidy on the rent (a price support that is a public debt and a tax liability). Disinflation does not result in less capital, but it does result in less consolidation of the capital and less need for debt (less probability for crises).

According to the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Bank, the first application of quantitative easing in 2009 was a success (despite a yield curve that indicates crises) by narrowing the long-short spread. Since unemployment is projected to remain high long term, the Committee said however, inflation will still be too low. To prevent deflation, another round of easing is necessary to invert the yield (a price support for the long bond to be borrowed by consumers at a lower rate). This not only means that high unemployment is an expected value, but gains support with higher consumer prices (increasing equity values as the long bond goes short). In other words, prices will rise while average incomes are falling (falling prices with increasing yields).

The austerity being commanded--technically engineered--to keep the rich rich at the expense of everybody else perfectly fits the Hamiltonian model of political-economy. The probability of a deepening crisis is not an unreasonable projection of the FOMC's assessment of the risk and the quantitative easing it says will be extended.

The model of finance ex nihilo is immediately flawed because you can't get something from nothing. It would be nice if one dollar added produced one dollar of GDP, resulting in rising incomes at full employment with low inflation, but that does not happen if average incomes must sacrifice more than a dollar to get one back.

Adding supply (low prices) requires less of trying to create something from nothing which, of course, can't be done, and more of what can be--financing the recovery from the accumulation, adding more supply rather than adding more debt and unemployment.

As we keep adding to the money supply, and the public debt becomes an ever-larger proportion of GDP, the fatal flaw of Hamiltonian modeling becomes evermore apparent. The essential values of the model--maintenance of debt through a regressive burden--must be reversed if we want to avoid crises.

Given the current mode of technical engineering, reducing the rate of interest in short-term debt increases the rate of interest in long-term investment. Sounds simple enough, but in practice, because it is debtor-financed, we are always trying to produce something by trying to reduce others to nothing. Quick foreclosure and mass consolidation (trying to get nothing from something), despite what big bankers might say, does not hasten prosperity. By the time a recovery is fully indicated (at low investment prices and peak yield), inflation will be high enough for bankers to raise interest rates, and we're back to trying to get something by reducing it as close as possible to a zero rate of interest (high investment prices at low yield, or a declining rate of profit that indicates crises).

The macro-political-economic model is engineered to continuously cycle confirmation of social status as an empirical measure of income (the ability to enjoy falling prices at increasing yields). The lower the income (the more rent you have to pay), the higher the frequency, as well as the probability, of being positioned into a zero-sum detriment (rising prices at low yields).

While it isn't possible to create something from nothing, it is possible to create a zero-sum and progressively transfer the risk of doing so to the future. (Remember, creating risk and shifting it to the future is a leveraging strategy, borrowing the reward from the future to gain, accumulate, and consolidate present value. The risk--the detriment--is borne by those who have the greatest credit risk, who are then forced to take the risk due to insufficient funds. The strategy effectively hedges the risk by causing it and distributing it based on income.) Eventually, however, the zero-sum hypothesis of general welfare becomes so absurd--so obviously, empirically, disconfirmed--that creating a dollar out of thin air is not an added dollar of risk, but the opportunity of a peaceful and prosperous pluralism monetized and multiplied into the commonwealth.

Overproduction

Capital in oversupply will continue to drive commodity prices higher. Using the supply does not draw it down but continues to accumulate the capital if it is not used to add supply. The result is the crisis of overproduction (declining demand: deflation, and rising prices: inflation).

Deflation and inflation at the same time has a whipsaw effect. Rising prices reduce available income to form "the capital." The loss suffered to form (to invest) the capital is supposed to add supply with a disinflationary effect (low inflation with full employment: falling prices and rising incomes--the opposite of the whipsaw effect).

A whipsaw effect rather than disinflation indicates that the capital is no longer owned by its investors (those who have suffered the loss). Instead, it has been usurped to derive more value than returned to the investors. Taxpayers, for example, that bailed out big financials are now beset with huge budget deficits (an accumulated tax burden). Unemployment, as well, continues to rise (loss of income per hour worked), and foreclosed homeowners need homes to live in (loss of net worth) while Wall Street continues to distribute record pay.

The value accumulated (the return on investment), directed by the common utility of self-interest, is supposed to trickle down and add supply, causing disinflation rather than deflation. Instead, however, we have rising prices (commodity inflation) causing falling demand which the Fed is expected to ease by adding to the money supply (more money to pay Wall Street bonuses and support corporate profits without growth, which supports the deflationary trend). The missing (accumulated) value is the missing demand that causes overproduction.

It is important to notice that Wall Street analysts describe and explain quantitative easing (QE) as a causal factor in order to ignore the causal relationship between corporate profits and unemployment. Supposedly, QE is supporting equity prices, not unemployment. Expostulated, however, QE is the result of unemployment which produces the value of overproduction the Fed monetizes.

It is also important to recognize that the Fed, in the current case, for example, is acting to support commodity prices. That not only checks growth and general inflation, but sets up a clearly detectable signal for recovery--declining commodity prices indicating recovery and rising interest rates with the fewest possible spurious and confounding variables. Limiting risk that is spurious and confounding (the black box of derivative finance) limits the probability that monetizing the debt supports a debtor-financed recovery which predicts a severe economic crisis (an extreme double dip).

By monetizing the missing value (the loss of income) into debt, the Fed knows the added funds will be used to inflate commodity prices, producing capital gains. This will control inflation not by adding supply (disinflation, which supports incomes while resisting inflation), but by reducing available income per unit of labor (unemployment, or the capital gained), causing "productivity gains."

Keynes and other economists noticed that instead of adding supply, we dumped soft commodities like wheat in the ocean in a time of deflationary crises, not because we did not need it, but to support the price. People were hungry not because they didn't want to work or did not work hard enough, but because they did not have the money to buy the production (the missing value). Thus, the crisis of overproduction in which demand (money) is insufficient to reduce the supply (what classical economists called "surplus value" and the value we today monetize into public debt).

The easy solution is to print the money to fill the gap created by an overaccumulation of wealth into the hands of a small proportion of people. Capital, then, is in oversupply--it has been overproduced, reinforcing the element of overproduction (a surplus) in a crisis proportion. To counter the added value, the economic rent is extended to absorb it. Although it may not be readily apparent, buying gold, or any other commodity, for example, to impulsively hedge the risk of currency devaluation is a way to extend the rent. Extra value can then be derived with a subsequent corrective wave in which distributions are arbitraged against the accumulations. Accumulation of gold, for example, will eventually be arbitraged into a short interest that inflates the value of the extended risk (the rent). The risk has then been successfully hedged and the value (the economic rent) accumulated.

As we all know, too much money is inflationary. So, we go from having too little to too much money.

While it is irrational to dump wheat in the ocean when people are hungry, or leave homes empty when homeless shelters turn people away, it is perfectly rational on the beneficiary side--on the side that owns the surplus and intends to derive value from it, but with increased gamma risk.

Today, while a dollar buys less in a post-Keynesian environment, the gamma risk to the accumulation of the capital (the irrational benefit) has been proportionately reduced. The surplus value is technically programmed into short impulsive and corrective waves; but because that value is monetized, it reappears in the form of debt, transforming the value into an ever-larger risk proportion. It is what we now call a "bubble" that under enough pressure is sure to bust.

Yes, this is all very confusing. As long as the value of the risk is derivatively compounded from the fundament, its technical value is constantly projected into a future value that is evermore complex and uncertain. Ten years ago, for example, the Bush tax cuts were projected to be currently affordable. Supposedly, without making those tax cuts permanent, the capital will not be applied to reverse the deflationary trend.

What, then, are the expectations?

For Republicans, continuing a post-Keynesian path extends the debt into continuous crises. According to Democrats, we can expect to experience crises with or without monetizing the debt, but crises are expected to be less severe if continuously monetized.

What, then, is the alternative to maintaining a continuous crisis proportion?

Since the crisis of overproduction is not a function of producing too much, but paying too little (which over-accumulates the capital, causing an insufficient demand), the alternative is to deconsolidate the capital rather than monetize the demand with debt (avoiding a debtor-financed recovery).

Consider, for example, the mortgage crisis. Mortgages (debt) increased while incomes (real credit scores) were declining. The capital to make the mortgages was formed from the income needed to pay the mortgages, not from the accumulated capital. Crises is not just probable, it is inevitable (a fully expected value).

While real credit scores were declining, mortgagees leveraged the value of homes to supplement their incomes. If lenders were not willing to loan the money missing from the incomes of average homeowners, what was slow growth throughout the Bush era would have been an era of negative growth. (Keep in mind that homeowners were solicited to leverage their assets. Bankers falsely assured the accumulative value of those assets which was solely dependant on the leverage ratio--the higher the leverage, or price, the higher the risk of loss. Instead of appreciating, the future value of the assets were really depreciating by increasing the income of homeowners through debtor financing. The result was not only loss of potential value, but the loss of principal. In the same way, it is important that the Fed avoid a debtor-financed recovery.) Of course, the accumulation finally reached a crisis proportion (6 percent negative growth by 2009) and we are now experiencing the latitude of that proportion projected to be years of slow growth and high unemployment. Whether Democratic or Republican, it is a fully expected value.

The default on all this bad debt that was deliberately made bad by declining incomes is referred to as "deleveraging." We can expect to be deleveraging for quite some time, allowing for the wealth to consolidate which will then be releveraged into debt that lacks sufficient income to be paid, resulting in the crisis of overproduction.

Overproduction, it would seem, is something we should expect. We should expect for average incomes to decline, but not the prices we pay. This is not deleveraging. It is a misrepresentation--a deceit perpetrated to consolidate value in zero-sum with the false legitimacy of forming the capital for investment.

Derivative accounts at major banks, according to Haver Analytics, is at a record $214 trillion, and the CFTC says that derivatives are the primary source of risk that unwinds (deleverages) into crises. Rather than in-vesting for the commonwealth, the capital is being used to derive value and accumulate it by positioning in-vestment (average incomes) on the detriment side of the market.

How do average incomes compete with hundreds of trillions of dollars aligned against them? Where is the benefit to average incomes of keeping financials in a too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale proportion?

Average incomes are being swindled with exclusively inscrutable, inaccessible and unaccountable financial instruments. While giving the appearance of scientific objectivity (and an exculpatory aspect to the risk), these instruments are mere props in a con game.

Technically objective "aspects" are employed (mathematically triangulated, or leveraged) not to benefit, but to beleaguer The People into the huddled masses waiting for their malefactors to save them from the fate of their natural (triangulated) existence.

Leveraging risk is not some dictate of nature. So, how does a person break out of an over-triangulated existence into a natural existence of self-determination anyway?

We have to recognize that leveraging risk is a function of organizational size: the bigger the size the bigger the risk and the probability of a deliberately exacted detriment. Thomas Jefferson had a very succinct description of this phenomenon--tyranny!

Securitizing (bundling) mortgages and consolidating banks, for example, resulted in an attempt to foreclose on everybody in an economy-of-scale proportion. Is that just a mistake like Bank of America's CEO claims, saying maintaining an economy of scale is in their customer's self-interest, or a deliberate detriment perpetrated by a company you just can't trust, but have to, with the force and legitimacy of a government-mandated, too-big-to-fail authority?

If we ensure a free and unconsolidated marketplace in priority, instead of bailing out what is too big to fail, we would have less capital consolidated and triangulated into a systemic-risk, economy-of-scale proportion and more in a small, fundamental, directly accountable, small-enough-to-fail proportion.

The risk can, and sould, be reduced to an alpha-risk proportion. There's no need to panic, it's perfectly natural...it's something we do every day without horizontal and vertical integration to network the externalities and triangulate the risk into a zero-sum detriment. Quite the contrary, causing a zero-sum detriment alienates your family, your friends, your customers.

We are being programmed to believe that organizing to produce a detriment is the nature of our humanity. Should we be locked in perpetual conflict armed with only an economy-of-scale formula for success?

The way it is now, we are condemned to an organizational model to hedge risk that is caused by the model. It is a nightmare of tautological proportion.

As a moral species, we should reasonably question the value of causing failure to produce success. If being able to impose your will on others and get what you want at someone else's expense is the measure of success, we have achieved the ultimate failure--hell on earth!

Believing that we must make others suffer the value of our success, and acting on it, confirms a hypothesis that if expostulated, and actively resisted, renders quite another natural existence.

We are not condemned to detriment unless we capitulate our natural rights to a ruling elite organized to self-fulfill their importance in an economy-of-scale proportion. The large, oversized scale is the detriment.

We should not resist the tendency to deconsolidate and relieve ourselves the angst of risk imposed by want-to-be masters and minions of mathematical manipulations. The signal that measures the extent of the risk is overwhelming--overproduction--and it must be perceived as a general benefit in order to be conserved. When the Democratic Party is described as the party of the food stamp and the Republican Party the party of the paycheck (the good only measured against the extent of the bad), we have an accurate description of overproduction as a general detriment.

Party politics results in policy that delivers insufficient paychecks and re-active measures that do not in-vest, but in-debts. Budget deficits signal a demand deficiency in the private sector. Public sector measures do not have to be debtor-financed, but invariably are to conserve the value accumulated to finance the debt. The result is a debtor-financed recovery, like we have now, setting us up for the next deflationary dip.

The Fed is genuinely attempting to avoid a debtor-financed recovery, causing a bit of a stir. With chairman Bernanke trying to create more in-vestment, financial markets are not exactly sure how to process it but are going through the expected consolidation phase of the cycle (robo-signing foreclosures, for example) nevertheless. Bank of America intends to consolidate as much as it can before in-debting in the guise of in-vesting.

"Every great society has failed when its debt gets too high" is the caveat delivered from the newly formed Republican opposition. Knowing that the funding available to pay down a public debt would have to come from the accumulation, Republicans oppose a more progressive tax code and budget deficits. Thus, reducing taxes and spending is the party's platform. Such a policy program, of course, ignores that the deflationary trend (the recession) is the result of the accumulation.

Spending cannot be reduced without cutting taxes for average incomes, quantitatively easing the crisis of overproduction without the Fed monetizing (adding to) the debt. Tax cuts for the rich will not allow a distribution from the accumulation which will reduce the debt that Republicans say is driving us into ruin.

Politically, if Democratic policy increases public debt, and Republican policy increases the need for public debt, the choice for voters (the extent of self-determination) is binomially reduced to indebtedness. Economically, with unemployment reaching to an official 10 percent and QE-2 being most likely, driving equities higher without a real recovery, the horde of corporate cash will be buying debt. Both politically and economically, the risk is being extended to average incomes whose buying power is being reduced. The result is cheap debt to be bought and sold dear with all the cost being extended to average incomes, yielding a benefit to those who have all the buying power (the ability to in-vest)--the top 2 percent of incomes.

The top 2 percent get the paycheck and everybody else gets the food stamps until the rich get the benefit/detriment they want. Everybody else suffers an extended detriment till they are assured a government authority that allows them to extract inflationary-deflationary value through private means without risk of disinflation (a free and unconsolidated marketplace) or liability for benefiting by causing a detriment in a too-big-to-fail proportion. Average incomes are forced to sacrifice their buying power to support the means of their economic distress. The result will be a double dip (rising bond prices).

Trends, meanwhile, are guided by managed futures--financial companies that manage the risk by guiding trends (impulsive and corrective waves) into a position beneficial to their books. The benefit derived from the future is, of course, overproduction (reduction of demand)--the expected value of the extended deflationary trend.

The debt being bought by the horde of cash will be sold at a profit to the unhedged risk of average incomes looking for a return at no risk. At that point, bonds go short, yielding a low return at high risk, and the value of the differential (the unexpected value) will be consolidated into "the capital." Since that capital is privately owned but has the potential for public good, it will, however, be converted into consolidated wealth (commonly owned only by the extension of debt or risk, hence the practical concept of a "debtor-financed recovery"). To turn it back into capital, its owners demand extra value (protection from risk or debt) that is borne by already-beleaguered average incomes. The value of overproduction gets support by extending the risk, the deflationary trend, and a debt that continues to accumulate both public and private.

With the wealth so accumulated, who is going to pay all the debt that supports it?

Something has to "give." A sacrifice has to be made that determines who bears the brunt of the risk. This is the gamma-risk dimension in which economic value accumulates into an unavoidable political proportion.

While overproduction suggests a disinflationary quality, it is a deflationary event. The value of the currency does not increase, but falls, pressuring commodity prices as "the capital" seeks risk protection (avoiding being turned into productive capital).

Investors--those who administer the capital--do not learn that avoiding risk causes it (just like being condemned to an organizational model to hedge risk that is caused by the model). They learn that it forms capital and they get a cut. They do not expect to be a victim of risk they are paid to reduce. They find out that the more capital accumulated, the less the available cut, just like every other working stiff. They find out that a devalued currency does not cause commodity inflation, for example, but the inflation reduces the value of the currency and increases (causes) deflationary risk (demand reduction).

Consolidation of the capital does not reduce risk, like we learn, but avoids it to the point of being unavoidable (into a crisis proportion).

Since commodity prices lack a fundamental quality, value is quantitatively derived that does not add demand (growth), but subtracts it. Growth will only occur by means of debt (a debtor-financed recovery) so that rising incomes cannot become capital, but are in service to the debt.

Growth is only to service the debt so that average incomes are in servitude rather than in-vested. Investment is not for growth, it is to service the debt, resulting in overproduction.

As long as there is a state of overproduction, there is no need to hire (deflation). The value not being paid average incomes is being used to drive up the prices of commodities (inflation). The value being gained and pocketed by the rich (unemployment and reduction of net worth) is literally "derived" from average incomes (the distributed debt). Given the source of "the capital" (the accumulated credit), everyone has a claim to its ownership and the benefit accrued. Retributing the value is not what will ruin us, but continuing to accumulate value without the necessary and proper distribution most certainly will.

It is a mistake for a power elite to equate an accumulation of gamma risk with their power. Quite the contrary, it is antithetical. It depreciates their power by eroding its legitimacy. Holding The People hostage to the threat of detriment is no threat if they are always in the throws of the detriment to be prevented. Eventually, the sacrifice required of The People is beyond the ability to give, and focus on all the hocus-pocus financing to derive the gamma will be depleted of its technical value when the value of the risk is nothing but retributive.

When the value becomes so derivative that overproduction is the value derived, the value derived becomes a function of the state (the sovereign, which is The People). Coercing yourself into a detriment, of course, makes no sense. The result is a bourgeois revolution (people like Rand Paul demanding to see the Feds books for himself, for example).

Without productivity (with overproduction), more and more people are available for the administration of the capital. The value being extracted from a loyal, bourgeois class has now reached a gamma-risk proportion. The affected class is not only familiar with the technical hocus pocus because they are administering it, but politically savvy on a level of participation concomitant with a sub-elite status, making class warfare a war progressively more difficult to win.

Republicans repeatedly remonstrate turning politics into class warfare because overproduction results in repeated and more extensive failure of bourgeoise aspirations. It is a war they cannot win.

The power elite no longer face wage earners watching widgets go by on an assembly line, but an expanding managerial elite that watch over the capital being administered to their detriment (which, again, includes the power elite despite what they may think). The bureaucratic model that has emerged combines elements of elitism and pluralism, reconciling the failed expectation of middle-class loyalty with the progressive confirmation of being members of the masses expected to sacrifice in service to the capital.

Austerity is not only an overtly expected value of the working class, but the middle class as economic growth stagflates. Productivity measures are no longer expected to increase, but decline (inflation supported by deflationary risk). "The workers," more and more, make things less and less. Progressively, a service economy emerges. Instead of making things, we serve it up in the capacity of overproduction (overaccumulated wealth and power, or an oversupply of debt).

Class becomes progressively bifurcated into servers and served (debtors and creditors). Risk is reduced to the deprived and those that have the capacity to deprive by means of overproduction (the overextension of credit risk).

Eventually, overproduction will lose its class-conflict value of zero-sum deprivation. Supply will eventually be technologically pulled into value that is not a quantity of reduced demand. Overproduction will gain the value of disinflationary capacity. It will be a function of oversupply rather than insufficient demand which causes the crises of deflation and inflation.

(Remember that accumulation of capital causes deflation, and the way to prevent a declining rate of profit is inflation--a quantitative measure. Despite unemployment, prices rise against the existing supply to support, and extend into the future, the value of overproduction through an overextension of credit--what we now call "quantitative easing.")

Quantitative measures affect the quality of the risk. When the risk reaches the gamma proportion, both the quantity and the quality are ontologically determined (categorically imperative) in direct proportion. There is no avoiding "the risk" at that point. The risk is fully taken and prepared for self-determination endowed by The Creator (ourselves)--power we have always had but lacked the determination to use.

Testing the Limits

Instead of testing how much disinflationary risk is possible, we are always testing the extent of deflationary risk. It not only delimits class distinction, but tests the extension of power with a demonstration of economic deprivation. Of course, too much extension leads to mass protests in the streets like we have now.

A person, or a class of people, know they are powerful if they can apply a detriment and get away with it. Confirmation of power is not only avoiding prosecution, but avoiding any and all means of retributing the derived benefit (like a tax liability). By extending the risk, the limit of power is empirically tested (like what price can be charged in the marketplace) and means are thus innovated to extend it.

Power extends risk. The more it is extended, the higher the risk you can lose it all. Thus, it is important to accurately measure the limit (like measuring the gamma-risk proportion) whether the administration of power is democratically direct (like the self-determination of a free-market system) or totalitarian.

(Measurement is a perceptual--epistemological--phenomenon. Modern psychology, for example, refers to a "signal detection theory" that describes and explains how we "know" a measured quantity is the size or shape to indicate a proper action, or whether a proper action has been taken. Prices signal buy and sell decisions, for example, and budget deficits signal a high gamma-risk proportion that requires political decisions that extend well beyond the individual's ability to control it.)

A free-market economy is the most direct form of democracy. It is fast and simple with an empirically verifiable means of popular consent immediately available down to the most intimate detail. Income and pricing is the empirical measure of consent, providing the incentive (the signals) for continuous improvement. Both productivity (price) and quality (including taste and preference, which includes moral quality) improve to the satisfaction of each and every individual (to the greatest possible extent without sacrificing freedom--the sovereignty of "We the People"--to "the powerful").

Absolutely essential to a pure democracy (like a free-market economy) is to ensure the means of empirical valuation--income and pricing--without any barriers. It keeps the means and ends of power verifiably legitimate and democratically directed toward a fully achievable, peaceful prosperity.

Housing prices, for example. How is it that the most "commonly" held asset class (store of value) has been deflated while other asset classes, like commodities, have not?

The least commonly held asset classes inflate with the deflated value of the common classes. Supposedly, the detriment exacted produces a common benefit, however: the inflated value is converted into capital to be invested in economic growth to create the income to buy the over-supply of houses. The deflated price is a "buy" signal, but unfortunately the buyers are on the sell, or foreclosure side of the market.

Positioning the counter-party, in this case the homebuyer, on the detriment side of the market is a zero-sum deliberately executed to convert value and consolidate the benefit. Market-makers want us all to believe that fate determines the arbitraged value--you ended up on the wrong side of the market because that's just the way it happens (it is just the way the market-makers want it to happen).

The only way to beat the law of averages is to rig the market. Arbitraged value relies on the risk being successfully hedged. The hedge anchors the risk to a low average value, and the reward to a high average value. Average homeowners and their net worth are anchored to this arbitraged manipulation in which the accumulated value is derived and accumulated in a better-than-average, zero-sum proportion.

The over-proportion is a highly detectable signal of wealth and power. It is verifiably better than middle class (better than average), but only if it can be maintained in disproportion; and the way to do that is to extend the risk well beyond the mean. That extension is accomplished by manipulating the market mechanism through financial asset management.

Before the accumulated value is trickled down, it is converted into wealth (the demonstrated difference between the "haves" and the "have-nots"), delimiting class distinction to those that are deprived, and those that have the power to deprive. If the value needed to in-vest common value is held in the inflated price of gold, for example, what kind of assignment do we give the moral value of buying gold rather than vesting the common good?

Remember that the current practical model (the Hamiltonian model that Thomas Jefferson so strongly opposed) advances it is morally imperative we take care of the rich in priority. Thus, the theory of trickle-down economics; and controversial as it may be, it is still the practical model in use, Democratic Party rhetoric notwithstanding.

Here we are, at this point in our political-economic history, with about 70 million baby-boomers going into retirement. They must maximize the return on their in-vestment against the overwhelming power of, for example, flash traders (hedge funds whose business is to convert and consolidate in-vested value).

Average retirees perceive the risk pluralistically modeled. Socialized to expect a free-market mechanism, in-vested incomes are easy marks for what appears a risk inherent only to high finance. Our homes, for example. If we thought they were a stable store of value as a common asset class...we were wrong! All the analytical consideratons needed to properly assess the "extent" of the risk have been delimited to the devilish domain of left-wing, communist rhetoric that will destroy the right to private property and civil society. That deprivation is not coming from the left, but from the right.

Believing in the moral value of investing the commonwealth is not a communist manifesto, not unless you think our founders were communists. Just because we must challenge the limits of deprivation being tested in the name of prosperity (which is what capitalists claim communism does, and with good evidence to support it) does not mean we are traveling down the road of populist perdition. We are exercising the Constitutional power of our self-determination in opposition to tyranny whether communist, capitalist, or whatever ideological "ist" you want to give it.

Look again at the flash trading phenomenon. It tests the limits of converting capital into consolidated wealth at an ever higher frequency--in a flash! We have made a quantum leap of probable instability with the power of empirical measurement and a technological capacity that far exceeds our moral sophistication. Wealth and power has become so over-accumulated that it no longer sees any need for any sort of subtlety, confident that being a robber baron with the moral sentiments of a malevolent tyrant is what we all aspire to and so give countenance.

Look at what the SEC and the CFTC have concluded. The May 6 flash-crash incident was the result of one large trader with enough accumulated capital to decide everybody's fate. While tyranny is exactly what a free market is not, that is not what the regulatory authority has to say about it because, as we are all socialized to believe (and especially regulators who are former employees of Goldman Sachs), an economy of scale is more efficient--thus proven.

According to regulators, there was "no uniform circuit breaker" to prevent the flash crash. That is because a free market model assumes that value is not consolidated enough to need a breaker. That means (just in case they can't figure it out) the capital needs to be deconsolidated to ensure a free market.

While there are Federal laws that specifically identify the ability to unilaterally determine markets as an illegal activity, they are not being enforced. It is illegal because markets are supposed to operate with a free-market (commonwealth) legitimacy in which no one entity can alone influence the direction of markets.

Since the flash crash is an obvious case of too much market power, the legal and regulatory authority is apparently captive. Government authority is not only captive to the perpetrators but to the theory that consolidation is not to be discouraged despite that it encourages the criminal element to freely operate at the expense of everyone else.

It seems we can consider the extent of the risk to be, at this point, fully tested and anyone that does not have a multi-billion dollar hedge fund is at risk. A free-market, analytical model does not predict such an environment.

At the supra-macro level, however, the free-market model does have a predictive utility. As risk is manipulated to yield a continuously better-than-average return, the gamma risk builds into a crisis proportion. The accumulation is not limitless--it will pluralize...the mean will be achieved, but it does not have to be catastrophic. We can choose a pluralistic model, and achieve the mean, in priority.

Testing for the allowable extent of consolidated risk, a free-market is disconfirmed; and as the yield curve goes flat, providing even more confirmation that we can crash in a flash, a double dive keeps gaining probability.

Despite all the new regulatory plumbing to prevent a liquidity clog in all that hidden, derivative plumbing that keeps Wall Street all pumped up with capital until it busts, we can fully expect, nevertheless, an over-extended crisis mode of classic overproduction.

The tolerances (the longitude and latitude) of deflationary risk will continue to be tested in a post-Keynesian policy space.

Testing the limits is to test hypotheses, which should not be limited to an either/or, dichtomous variation, but the full range of possibilities that will reduce as well as predict the probability of crises.

Capital Conversion

In theory, capital is formed by sacrificing savings and consumption. Personal wealth is converted into capital to be used as a common, public good by investing in economic growth. Everybody benefits from the investment.

When the wealth was consolidated into the crown, for example, it was in the crown's best interest to extend the wealth by in-vesting commoners. If the wealth expands, there is less pressure to share the wealth in zero-sum, thus reducing the risk and ensuring political stability.

With rising expectations and ambitions to be powerful like the king, political stability was not assured, however.

Emerging with the demand for a commonwealth form of government was the realization that the capital must be measurably deprived to prevent rising expectations. In order to "live like a king," the commoner MUST sacrifice to achieve it.

Eventually, the means to distribute wealth without actually sharing it evolved into the kind of capital conversion in practice today, which also requires controlling the accumulation of risk without really reducing it. Risk is to be avoided and is not "the risk" we learn about in business school--pluralistically modeled and reduced with the conversion of wealth into capital. The discrepancy (the dissonance) instills (socializes) the middle class with false expectations which is realized as the capital is converted back into wealth in a crisis proportion.

The business cycle forces the sacrifice necessary to supply the accumulation of wealth. Therefore, the accumulation is not deliberately expropriated by a power elite, but naturally distributed to the best and the brightest (which too often turns out to be the most greedy and morally bankrupt, wanting to operate in zero-sum). Redistribution of the accumulation by government authority unnaturally confiscates the wealth (like the king did) and causes the crisis proportion (the gamma risk) experienced in the marketplace.

Capitalists, of course, claim that the capital is never really a public good. Title to private property is never relinquished when it is put to public use (when it is converted to capital). Title however can be "lost" in the marketplace and that is "the risk" we all commonly take when we use (rent) the capital (like what happens when you have to sell your property to cover your debt).

All the capitalist has to do to take title to the extension of the wealth is the extension of rents (inflation), converting net worth into capital in order to expand the pie by, paradoxically, reducing it (deflation). The result is the "paradox of thrift" in which we must sacrifice consumption in order to expand the pie with the formation of capital.

If you want to gain more capital (more wealth) all you have to do is extend the rent; but overextension puts the capital at risk. It is then necessary to invoke a moral hazard: if the surplus is confiscated and retributed, economic growth will not occur which, for example, in our current case, is exactly what we need to counter the negative growth caused by an overaccumulation of capital. Supposedly, the more capital accumulated, the more economic growth, but the opposite occurs, presenting a significant political risk to the legitimacy (the confirmation) of the working hypothesis (the assumptions) that support the practical model.

Everybody, supposedly, is better off than they would have been without the conversion. Thus, the conversion is a public good. It is Strong Pareto Optimal (SPO) with a highly indivisible benefit that we refer to as the general welfare, and the welfare is measured by the accumulation of wealth (economic growth).

Considering we are in the throws of what is described as The Great Recession...what happened?

The numbers verify a highly divisible benefit and a Non-Pareto-Optimal (NPO) condition. Anti-austerity protesters march in Europe in the tens of thousands, for example, to resist capital formation that is retributively valued (NPO) in a gamma-risk proportion (yielding a highly divisible benefit that puts the general welfare at risk).

Both in the U.S. and Europe there is a strong impulsive wave of gamma risk that represents the value of the risk accumulated in zero-sum. There is a beta-risk volatility as the risk proportion resolves into a corrective wave, suggesting a free-market, ontological ("undirected") legitimacy in operation. The apparent ontology provides legitimacy of the outcome despite being NPO. (Remember that we are all equally free to lose our property in the marketplace. The ability to manage this "risk" determines who wins and loses--your income--not by "direct" force, but by self-determined means played out in the marketplace.)

While the correction--a distribution on the accumulation of capital that is Weak Pareto Optimal (WPO) at best--will occur, it will be monetized so that the distributive value of wealth (the proportion of risk) is conserved. The risk, then, is not reduced, it is averted and recycled into the next crisis which re-consolidates the value of the previous distribution (the corrective wave).

Not often, but on occasion a business analyst will describe our current envirnmonment as both deflationary and inflationary. Since the terms are polar opposites, it seems contradictory for them to occur together, but they do.

Why they are occurring together is why it is rarely presented for popular discussion. When inflation and deflation occur together a free-market, pluralistic model does not have a predictive utility. A free market avoids inflation by adding supply and deflation by adding the employment needed to add the supply. The effect is supposed to be disinflationary--full employment with low inflation.

We have, however, prices that continue to rise along with unemployment, which converts the capital back into wealth with the added value that would otherwise be the disinflationary effect. The accumulation of this otherwise distributive value also accumulates risk (alpha risk) which is destined to be retributed if not consolidated into government control (gamma risk).

Without government intervention, the risk will not be consolidated and redistributed to conserve the process of converting capital formation (a public good) into an exclusive accumulation of private property. (The bailout, for example, of too-big-to-fail, overaccumulated financial firms is described as "the public good"). The accumulation causes crises, however, and public debt to provide for "the public good" which the capital is supposed to otherwise provide. Instead of providing, the capital is deliberately deprived--directed into a variety of complex investment vehicles--and recycled in the form of debt (the business cycle).

Only after consolidation of the value converted from capital into private property is there a recognition of capital being a public good for the provision of the commonwealth (a pluralistic form of government that relies on self-determination and dispenses with allegiance to elite power). The People are then "subjected" to the public good of the capital by paying tribute to it in the form of a regressive tax burden. (Keep in mind that the Federal income tax code is highly regressive above $500,000 per year, empirically delimiting who is subject to the extent of the risk.) The People then "pledge" to a social contract that turns the republic into a measure for their exploitation in the name of avoiding it (the extent of the risk).

Once the wealth is converted back into capital with the legitimacy of being SPO (despite having derived added value from the previous wave, leaving the majority less well off and protected), the capital demands it be paid economic rent, which inflates its value with a deflationary effect, like we have now. The rent is not enough, however, and it becomes extended with extra value derived in innovative ways to make the risk so extensive that government is required to consolidate it (absorb it) as a public good.

Instead of ensuring the provision of the public good (the capital), government is then necessary to deprive it, which is then mistaken, post hoc, as causing the deprivation, bankrupting our nation.

Free trade agreements, for example, are not causing inflation, deflation and unemployment. Consolidation of the capital is, but how often do we hear it being identified as the problem? About as often as we have effective solutions.

The sacrifice of The People is indeed conserved. It will eventually present with the full value of our self-determination. We just have to decide that the time is now.

For all those Wall Street employees about to lose their jobs, and anyone that has any kind of job or any kind of income, we should not be complacent, but sure to actively resist consolidation of industry and markets because the inflation-deflation monster can, and will, come for you.