Quantum Risk and Relative Value

When economists attribute the accumulation of value that is the Great Recession to "market makers" not properly pricing risk, they are referring to its relative value.

An effective zero-rate of interest indicates we are still in a recessionary trend, which empirically measures the relative price of risk going forward. Relative, future value is slow growth (unemployment) with high inflation (a rising rate of profit).

When we price-in effects that occur in in late order, and discount the probable risk to the present, however, relative, future value tends to be mispriced. The result is a quantum that is retributively valued.

Yes, we can expect slow growth, but contrary to the zero-rate, the slow growth occurs with high inflation because capital, industry, and markets are overconsolidated to achieve "efficiency" (a benefit with a detriment that is undervalued--value that retributes, in late order, in the form of crises). Consolidation is so efficient, in fact, that interest rates are effectively zero.

Too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale banks know that the profit gained derives from the relative value of the risk. That is, they know that the profit causes detriment in late order, but at the time it is marked to the market it is considered economic gain (growth). Transfer of the detriment inflates the relative value of the equity because it does not price-in the retributive value until the catastrophe later occurs.

Economic growth for Q-1 was slower than expected and profits "surprisingly" high because the risk in transfer is undervalued and presents as high-frequency phase inversions (so-called, "unexpected" quantum risk, marked to the market in late order, which is a timing function).

The growth that did occur was not attributed to the risk-detriment, which is purposely made to appear ideopathic, non-local, and thus non-retributive, quantum value.

Quantum Self-Determination and Relative Value of the Risk

While self-determination is a philosophical concept, it has real, relative value. The value related to it is the legitimacy of the outcome.

When, for example, Paul Ryan says his religious conviction warrants his budget plan to render us all with the legitimate value of self-determination, he is saying that the outcome (status position, a la Ayn Rand) is a function of personal responsibility. The capacity to be in a position to avoid the risk is endowed by the creator (by nature).

In other words, to erroneously price the relative value of the risk is a function of status--it is endowed by natural (divine) right and demonstrated by how much power (self-determination) a person has to affect the marketplace.

(Keep in mind that Catholicism rejects the notion of "divine right" but, of course, Ryan only refers to the value conserved in historical perspective in the form of a natural right. It is also important to note that the "affective" value of the self in the marketplace is as much, if not more, psychological than a measure of tangible assets. As previously discussed, the quantum value to be retributed effectively measures how powerful, or affective, a person is, and remember, a corporation, supposedly, is a person.)

Affectation is a function of character, and participating in the marketplace is a function of personal responsibility; all of which are qualitative measures that have a philosophical construction to produce quantitative value or outcomes. If, for example, we do not conform to the tastes and preferences of the job creators in the marketplace (a quantitative, empirical, objective reality to be tested), we will not get jobs (the outcome of the empirical test, which is an objective reality freely chosen by those subordinate to the job creators). So, as Paul Ryan explains, advocating for job creation, we need to conform to the dictates (the demand for efficiency) in the marketplace, and because the outcome (the rent paid and the equitable value consumed) is self-determined it is non-retributive.

Although political-economy tends to operate within the ambiguity (the relative value) of a philosophical environment (Paul Ryan's antinomian interpretation of moral hazard, for example, being as good if not technically better than the Pope's, which rejects the notion of objective reality by determination of divine right), the empirical result (the objective reality) is technically predictable and much less ambiguous.

If the value is not relative to observation, it is not subject to interpretation and changing attribution. When the Pope says the sun revolves around the earth, and Paul Ryan says that welfare for the rich makes us all richer, empiricists are nothing but dangerous heretics who pervert absolute truth with the relative value of a changing attribution.

The differential between political-economic philosophy and science is a perennial struggle between absolute and relative value. This ongoing struggle over who has the right to determine what objective reality is (status) is conserved in historical perspective.

Following the Enlightenment and the emergence of empiricism, the ethic of thinking about the self has become a function of its verifiable determination, which identifies "the risk."

Embracing the philosophy of relative, empirical value (consumer pricing, tastes and preferences, for example) poses significant risk to those who claim to be our natural rulers. Self-determination is risky business, and to reduce the risk (which, remember, cannot be reduced, but can be accumulated) businesses consolidate the risk of self-determination and its relative value at the macro level.

Self-Retributive Value and Efficient-Markets Theory

If labor value, for example, is a cost to be diminished, then policy and programs, both public and private, tend to discount (mis-price) whether income is adequate to sustain economic growth. The technical effect is an accumulation of value that is self-retributive at the macro level.

A fully accountable and completely culpable valuation of the risk accumulates despite all attempts to technically alienate the cause from the empirically verifiable (scientifically philosophical) effect in the name of economic efficiency. So, we are experiencing a phase transition with big banks, for example, more profitable during the first two years of the Obama administration than throughout the entire Bush administration, and a current "objective" that is operantly more political than economic.

Despite Dodd-Frank and Affordable Health Care, the economic outcome (the "new normal") has not fundamentally changed from Bush to Obama. Technically, the objective is consolidation of industry and markets to allow for its authoritative management with the predictable effect being risk that does not properly mark to the market. (Remember that in a free market, risk is immediately retributive--political--and it is the objective of efficient-markets theory to technically transfer political risk into the hands--the timing--of elite management. So, you see, while the risk has self-retributive value, the value is affectively mis-attributed--it is mis-priced and timed to cause maximum detriment with minimal, political risk.) The predictable, self-retributive effect is an affective disorder: psychotically making the same mistake over and over again and referring to it as "normal."

Temporal sequence is technically critical for the philosophical constructions that describe and explain the empirical values that are attributable to the self and re-present as self-retributive value in a macro, gamma-risk dimension. While the Great Depression was for the average income nothing but blue sky, for the top one-tenth of one percent of income class the detriment that occurred later--the timing--was the opportunity to live what Romney and Ryan call "the American dream" and "the path to prosperity."

Rather than preoccupied with the dream to be acquired we are consumed with the angst of the dystopia that is required.

A utopian vision in which exacting detriment for public consumption is the relative value of success is just insane!

There is no perverse incentive or moral hazard acquired if we question the utility of success that demonstrates by means that are technically adverse and catastrophically self-retributive. Right-wing reactionaries regard the critique of success (self-interest) as class warfare (a moral hazard) because it calls into question the utility of risk systemically organized and consolidated to distribute detriment (the rent to be paid, or retributed) according to income classification.

If we want to understand why Treasury secretary Paulson abandoned the moral hazard that is supposed to be inherent to efficient-markets theory, we have to understand what measures the value.

Power is self-retributive, quantum risk relatively valued in a political (gamma-risk) dimension. Its "relative" valuation is a function of self-interest, and not knowing what affects your self-interest (fundamental attribution error) is a moral hazard. When a misattribution occurs, you have no one to blame but yourself--the value is self-retributive. You have earned the price to be paid and the price indicates not only your position to adversely possess the risk (your status), but the correction needed to reduce the rent according to value that is relative to self-interest both on a micro and macro scale.

In '08, the Treasury secretary abandoned the moral hazard that defines the legitimacy of the working model. Although the theory that supports the model extends to your self-interest and mine, both political parties continue to maintain its application despite working with a disconfirmed hypothesis, which defies the fundamental ethic, or moral imperative, of thinking.

Working with a disconfirmed hypothesis without fear of reprisal (disconfirmation) demonstrates power that retributes to the self in the form of positive law. Unnatural, or epistemically unethical as it may appear to be to those of us who do not share in the secret knowledge of objective reality, Paulson saw the light in "08, conforming to the demands (the self-retributive quantum risk) of "efficient markets."

Self-retributive value essentially measures (confirms or disconfirms) the "systemic risk" that the Treasury and the Fed acted to avoid in '08-'09 with philosophical abandon. It is value that measures the "too-big-to-fail" dimension fundamental to the power that accumulates in an economy-of-scale proportion.

To maintain the efficiency hypothesis of efficient-markets theory, and keep the value self-retributive (the measure of being powerful), analysts focus on the effect as a moral hazard rather than the cause. Not allowing for failure is the risk to be avoided rather than the "too-big" (gamma-risk) dimension. We are supposed to ignore that the moral hazard (government intervention) will not occur if firms are not too big, which means, ironically, that failure (the moral hazard) is the measure of success. It is not just a mistake, mind you, it is a deliberate, fundamental misattribution.

The system can't admit failure (firms causing mass detriment do not fail if they are too big) because it is the means by which we attain success.

Since "the bigger you are the better" is a foregone conclusion because it is the measure of success, it can't be considered a moral hazard. Fundamental attribution error occurs and the systemic risk to be avoided is psychotically considered to be normal. The extent to which the normative value diverges from objective reality is the self-retributive value that will reconcile in a systemic, catastrophic proportion, which demonstrates power.

The lack of failure is symptomatic (it technically indicates) the cause...being "too big" to fail, but out of self-interest, the moral hazard is maintained as morally imperative because it is the American dream.

Rather than being the application of a moral imperative, as Romney and Ryan explain it, self-interest is the hazard to be avoided. Instead of being the fundamental virtue that paves the path to prosperity, self-interest is the path to austerity, accumulating the retributive value that demonstrates power.

Without the accumulation and distribution of relative value, power does not demonstrate as a moral hazard. Accumulation of retributive value is what technically measures the extension of the risk--it measures how high the rent can go, which measures how powerful you are "on demand." Demand, of course, requires income, and so in order to demonstrate power in the marketplace on a macro scale (to "make markets") an accumulation of relative value (value to be retributed) is required in an insanely dystopic, self-retributive proportion.

(You see how this systematic psychopathy works: dystopia is adversely utopian and utopia is perversely dystopian. Good is bad and bad is good. Risk-off is risk-on, and on is off so that the fundamental, relative value of the risk--the price to be paid or retributed--is "surprisingly" always at an unpredictable premium. Understand, as well, that a self-retributive proportion is not exactly a self-correcting mechanism. It is more of a deliberate, cognitive process in which the value to be retributed is technically directed in the form of self-determination. In other words, it is more a deontology than an ontology of the risk proportion.

Relative value is complex, especially when reconciled with absolute values and principles. By definition it is subject to interpretation, and one person's interpretation is as good as another's, depending on how much power you have, and much of that depends on the technical tools at your disposal "on demand," or relative to market conditions.

It is not hard to see why relative value is reduced to an ethical construction. Deviation from the norm is a moral hazard not only because it conforms objective reality to the empirical power--the predictive utility--of the truth, but because it protects the delusion of power from inclusion in objective reality.

By means that test for the truth back from the future, today's power elite determine, or confirm, a retributive sense of self that is maintained out of proportion with predictive utility, which gives the appearance of having the empirical value--the power--of natural law. The relative value being attributed to self-interest--that selfishness is the only absolute, ethical value--only has the appearance of being non-retributive, and thus ethically stable, by natural right and positive law.)

To keep us in this dystopian dream of technical success we have technical measures that an MBA, for example, acquires to back test for it.

Assuring the utopia Romney and Ryan want us all to have the opportunity to participate in is the job of futures speculators. Proprietary trading divisions of big banks, including private-equity firms like Bain Capital and various other types of hedge-fund firms (which combine to form what we call "systemic risk"), back-time the value of the risk from a point chosen in the future. The reason market analysts advise not to try and time the market is because the market is retributively timed to your position.

(By identifying the probability of success--with an effective quantum value of zero--you have been warned by the professionals of the relative risk, and so it is "buyer beware." Probability of success is common knowledge, and with this exculpatory sense of non-retributive value that is self-retributive, you see, there were no criminal referrals, for example, from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Nor have there been any referrals from congressional committees that, along with Romney, have described the Great Recession as an economy-of-scale crisis proportion that occurred, and continues to occur, because firms were not allowed to fail, not because they are too big, which technically indicates the moral hazard that Dodd-Frank is supposed to prevent, caveat emptor.)

These technical indicators are based on the current position of investors now, and the outcome is a retribution of the value in that position. It is not a projection of future value. It is not a prediction, it is a technical manipulation that is philosophically maintained as self-retributive value at the micro level, which transfers into self-retributive value (caveat emptor) at the macro level, clearly observable as self-inflicted detriment that transforms into political risk that is never properly valued. Instead, it is "the dream" that we all aspire to participate in (but not without being informed of probable success--the quantum risk and relative value).

Technical extension of the affect is accomplished by cognitive means. Perceiving the detriment as an observable benefit is unreasonable. The affect becomes a cognitive disorder. Relative value of the risk (self-retribution) becomes the observable problem to be solved, not the solution.

Following a crisis only rivaled by the Great Depression (using Reagan's economic program without the marginal-tax increases needed to reduce the retributive risk), we now very clearly observe, a binomial, political process, in real time, bureaucratically engaged to manage retributive, economic value. We see how the political process is used to temporize the retributive value without risk to the accumulative, late-order effect of an expanding margin in zero-sum (the political risk) at the expense of labor value. The risk is entirely political, and because we are seeing it in real time (at a higher, monetized rate of interest that is not, for example, interrupted with world war), the value, rather than assumed in the future, is being dangerously consumed (retributed) at its present, current value.

Without general war occupying the financial space, for example, we see critical space being occupied by a prudential, populist pluralism derisively described by the elite as "class warfare." A large mass of peaceful, populist sentiment, if not redirected from welfare, warps the policy space to drive us toward recovery without catastrophic events, like world war, marking the passage of time.

Since consumer demand is the primary premise for economic policy and programs, it seems there would be more care taken to support it, keeping demand strong enough to keep us out of recession, but that is not the kind of consumer demand the financial sector focuses on.

Financials exercise control of consumer demand by demanding and consuming risk. Risk is arbitraged into consumption by posing its deprivation as added supply. As demand falls, both prices and supply rise under speculative pressure that determines the retributive value of the risk, characteristically mispricing it because the accumulated value is considered non-retributive.

As prices are speculatively demanded (with value that is too consolidated, or "too big to fail") against a rising supply (which hordes labor value in the form of consolidated wealth), demand is too weak to consume the supply (which is a sure cure for shortages, allowing the oversupply to be sold at inflated prices, which reduces demand without a declining profit). Due to welfare, however, the demand is not so weak that the effective quantum value (the affective price of the risk) is deflationary (full-blown, classic overproduction with a self-retributive declining rate of profit). Instead, the result is stagflation, like we have now.

With the quantum "risk" fixed in a long-wave distribution to manage the perception of its value (the price to be paid) with relative certainty, the prospect of achieving the American dream, for most people, is always just below the horizon.

Raising the Rent on Student Loans

Consolidation of the capital raises the rent for consumers. Market participants pay a higher and higher price for participation until the rent reaches a crisis proportion.

Student debt has reached a gamma-risk dimension. The solution, rather than economic, naturally derives politically to retribute the accumulated value.

Students are going gamma, and in this new age of virtual reality, the radical element has gained a technological edge.

Despite being bonded to debt, what students are sure to buy with it is the technology that allows ideas to be freely radical. Instead of an Orwellian dystopia in which technology is used to keep us in bondage, technology emerging in the gamma dimension will pull the risk into a facile adversion of objective reality that will be reacted to as an unnatural perversion.

Consolidation of the marketplace, you see, requires market participants consolidate to occupy and manage the space that contains the quantum called "the risk" in order to buy shares in the space that contains the reward.

According to efficient-markets theory, the reason students are subordinate (debtors by occupation) is because they have willingly acquired too much debt, which prevents buying shares in the reward. Now that they have to pay the price (the rent) they're just whining about it like a bunch of brats that want something for nothing.

Wall Street's reaction to the Occupiers is, "get a job!" Ironically, however, in accordance with efficient-markets theory, reactionaries are using the supply of money added (de novo) to create jobs buying up so-called "peak oil" contracts (ex nihilo). By selling surplus supplies at shortage prices, so the theory goes, capital is gained to add the supply, which creates jobs.

The reason jobs are not being added, however, is because efficient-markets theory is nothing but a big fat fraud. It is racketeering--looting by occupation.

(Remember, surplussing value by reducing demand does not add supply. It is classic overproduction, which is deflationary...that means you are more likely to lose a job than get one.)

Efficient-markets theory (consolidated management of capital) suggests that there is a significant element of chance and self-determination toward the outcome. There is very little chance, however, that students either lack the capacity to act in their self-interest or are just unlucky enough to be caught in a deflationary phase of the business cycle.

According to efficient markets, students are completely responsible for the debt (the retributive value) accumulated because it has been legitimately determined in the marketplace. With market efficiency (by hook or, buyer beware, by crook), the value is thus non-retributive.

Consolidated management of capital, however, defeats a free-market legitimacy that is anything but non-retributive. Keeping capital in an economy-of scale proportion by supporting predatory enterprises like Bank of America who say its large scale keeps consumer costs down, there is always a new and innovative way to raise the rent the consumer must pay in order to participate.

Rather than consume the retributive value (the rent--the immediate, facile accountability) inherent to free-market economics (buying market share by innovatively reducing prices and increasing quality), capital is consolidated to efficiently manage markets in a deflationary, high-rent proportion (gaining market share at the highest possible price). The higher rent demands markets be "made" more efficient, and so by "making markets" more liquid (what the Fed derivatively does in collusion with big banks in dark markets, for example), we cultivate growth (expand the profit margin).

"Making markets" (manipulation that is otherwise illegal) avoids liquidity crises, which means the capital is too consolidated, and so we consolidate it even more to avoid the risk. While making the market more efficient is supposed to avoid it, consolidating it even more just causes the risk to be avoided--a declining rate of profit due to overproduction, or the rent to be paid, retributively valued in an accumulated proportion that maintaining a free market in priority would otherwise prevent.

Without consolidation, you see, the marketplace is disinflationary rather than deflationary, which demands firms add supply, and the labor value needed, to expand the marginal profit. Instead of consumer compliance on command, capital deconsolidates to comply with consumers on demand, causing economic expansion with full employment and low inflation...but, of course, this (the good life retributively valued on demand) is not what we have.

According to consolidated capitalism, not complying with the demands of efficiently managed markets, is self-retributive. Hence, the value (the price to be paid on command) can't be attributed to anyone or anything but your "self" (i.e., it is non-retributive). Instead of reducing the price and adding the value (the supply) to be retributed on demand, like in a free market, which maximizes participation by controlling the price (the rent) to be paid, if you aren't willing to pay the price on command, that's your business (and your fate) freely chosen.

Fate is nothing but the product of self-determination conforming to the naturally occurring conditions (the demands) of the marketplace. Students are subordinated to debt because they want to better themselves, and there is no better way to do that (and avoid "the risk"), capitalists say, than submit to the marketplace "on demand." (Value produced and consumed on demand is, in theory, non-retributive, but in practice the value always proves to be catastrophically retributive because this is really value efficiently managed "on command." Its accumulative, economy-of-scale dimension--its efficiency, understand, makes command an exigency of market demand, keeping the risk from going gamma.) What students gain in the form of critical, analytical skill to resist conformity is countered with the insurgency of debt. The more conforming you are, the more income you are likely to make to pay the debt, which effectively reduces your rent (increases your status into the top one percent).

(One-percenters, however, need to keep in mind that efficient-markets theory is a fraud perpetrated on 99.9 percent of us.)

Fate is indeed going to conform to the demands of the marketplace. Change we really need is likely to occur because students did not determine the economic situation they are in--peonage! Like 99 percent of us, students are apt to tempt a change of fate when freedom becomes "just another word for nothing left to lose."

Fully armed with the philosophy of freedom and self-determination, a population deprived is more apt than any to demand it, increasingly motivated to free the market of consolidated capital on demand.

Students have been turned into peons. They have come to realize, like the rest of us, that paying off large loans (the result of deficient income) reduces the demand necessary to drive the economy and demand jobs to pay the rent (the loans). This, you see, is not by chance, it is not a naturally occurring risk.

The path to peonage (what the Romney-Ryan budget calls "The Path to Prosperity") is by deliberate design. This is what consolidated capitalism (Bain Capital, for example) is and does--it makes peons out of most market participants and forces them to consolidate to retribute the value. (This is where the risk becomes transitionally phased into adversity and its direction--its management--gains impulsive, probablistic, quantum value that is fully assumed in priority. See the previous articles on economic rent.)

The consolidation required to retribute the value and control the risk is readily available through deconsolidated means--social media. Change is literally in the palm of your hand.

Perversion of the "self" by means of consolidation is easily reconciled with the virtual reality that we all know objectively exists by adverse possession (what it means to say, for example, "let's take the government back"). All we have to do is repossess it with our invisible hands, tweeting, copying, cutting and pasting a virtual reality into objective context.

Student unions (consolidation of the value) will begin vectoring the risk for its adverse possession, causing a phase transition (from bondage to freedom) that is only natural.

Raise My Rent (The Fully Assumed Risk of Loss)

When the President announces increased margin requirements for energy speculators, by executive authority of the CFTC, he is raising the rent. There is a fully assumed risk of loss that has been pulled into current account, but we have to remember that speculators are flush with cash.

With repeal of Glass-Steagill the financial sector consolidated and Wall Street speculators literally have money to burn (money used to cause economic problems consolidation is supposed to avoid if not prevent). Functioning as one big investment bank (which is an organizational model that led to the Great Depression and the Glass-Steagill Act), money is being borrowed from the Fed at near-zero rates because the Great Recession has demanded it to pay the rent.

Increasing the margin requirement makes a highly exclusive market an even more exclusive domain, which raises the rent, not on speculators, however, but on the victims of the Great Recession who have had enough already!

Raising the margin requirement for Bank of America and Goldman Sachs does not in any way retribute the value accumulated. Instead, the capital formed from the overextended, deflationary risk (the liquidity crisis) of '08-09 is being horded to squeeze more and more rent out of the 99 percent using the Fed's current accounts. This, you see, is not banking--it is not a business model designed to meet consumer demand in the marketplace, adding liquidity to buy homes, refrigerators and dishwashers--it is racketeering. It is a bunch of gangsters dressed in pretty suits, looking prim and proper, going to church on Sunday.

Rather than making markets that are more distributive (more efficiently risk averse), we have markets being made more accumulatively retributive. The Great Depression, for example, was the price (the rent) inevitably paid to retribute the accumulated risk-value.

Despite our quest for dominion, nature will retribute value on demand. This does not mean our fate is determined in priority, however. We choose whether the fully assumed risk of loss is organized and managed to express in a catastrophic proportion or not by identifying moral hazards, which are best determined by empirical method rather than, for example, Ayn Rand's Aristotelian logic, which leads us to a theory of markets efficiently structured to administrate from the top down rather than empirically "on demand" like in a free market.

(Remember that maintaining a free market in priority economically retributes value in small, political proportions rather than large, catastrophic proportions that demand executive administration of power to control the rent on command. See the article, "The Bureaucratic Model of Power and Political Economy" on this website.)

We have the power to determine our natural fate in the future, and this power is being used with a quantum expertise that cannot be in any way considered ontologically exculpatory and non-retributive. Quite the contrary, our future is highly predictable, and rather than being beyond good and evil, it is an objective reality deontologically determined, loaded with moral value that is empirically verifiable and completely culpable.

Supposedly, futures markets are operating to manage the assumption of risk (loss) by hedging it, but what we see is the risk being manufactured (recreated or transformed) in the dark to predictably occur (transfer) in the future to make a profit (the process referred to as "creative destruction"). Capital is gained (that should not be taxed because it kills jobs) by timing the market with predictive efficiency--thus, the theory of "efficient markets," which is administered, not "on demand" by We the People, but by means of executive authority.

Empirically, "We" have found out again and again that administration by executive authority, even when posed as free-market efficiency, accumulates value to be retributed. We rediscover, again and again, why the Revolution occurred--because economic risk managed by executive authority is always catastrophic!

Efficient-markets theory has been such an obvious failure that even right-wing conservatives have gone radical (which indicates the risk is going gamma). Despite the Tea Party movement, for example, we don't have Revolutionary results because the power structure is too consolidated, which makes the value accumulated even more retributive and the risk even more catastrophic if we don't move to deconsolidate it in priority.

Margin requirements and position limits do not deconsolidate the risk, and if this is the best we can expect, then the risk of loss is fully assumed without failure of expectation.

(Remember that failed expectations are essentially the quantum value of the risk proportion. If efficient markets are supposed to reduce retributive value but the result is the Tea Party movement, the risk, rather than being managed in small, divisible, non-catastrophic quanta, is being intentionally managed as catastrophic, indivisible, quantum value that technically indicates the objective.

The gamma-risk proportion is a fully assumed value, and so, with all due reason, proponents of consolidation argue, it is best to manage it with skillful, technical efficiency, which is the domain of higher authority.

We expect the risk to go gamma and determine how the rent is paid on command. As an expected value, elite authority legitimately determines how the risk is attributed, which determines how the value objectively retributes emerging from a crisis proportion.

After the Great Depression, for example, value retributed in the form warfare and began distributing in the form of welfare to avoid the accumulation of a risk proportion that led to the Great Recession. Since, obviously, welfare alone, and monetizing the debt that occurs, doesn't work, deconsolidation is apparently the missing value. With the Reagan revolution, however, more value was given efficient-markets theory in which the accumulation of value--America being "a place where a person can still get rich," as Reagan described it--is considered non-retributive.)

From the Great Depression, the value of the risk retributed until the Reagan revolution. By the end of the Clinton administration the correction was fully reversed with the repeal of Glass Steagill, allowing risk-value to again more fully consolidate through executive management using the "theory of efficient markets."

(Since how big a business grows is the measure of success, the economy never fully deconsolidated after WWII. Despite knowing the risk, large corporates actively pursued inorganic growth. The predictable result is inflation and unemployment that requires the acumen and arcanum of an administrative, technical elite to manage with efficiency.)

Using this theory of "efficient markets," in keeping with the working model of consolidated capitalism, markets are made to be volatile and prone to crises, creating the opportunity to make money. Supposedly, operating with so-called market efficiency, plenty of money is made to pay the rent--paying off the public debt, for example, which is repeatedly disconfirmed because it always, knowingly, overextends the rent into large-scale risk proportions, adding to the budget deficit. Being risk-prone, by default, shifts the fully assumed risk of loss to a time determined by exclusive market activity (the efficiency), which consolidates market value, makes markets accumulatively more retributive, and predictably more risk prone.

While risk cannot be rendered non-retributive, there is a point at which the risk is non-transferable. It is the risk fully assumed in priority.

Non-Transferable Risk

The fully assumed risk of loss (transformed into predictable use value, using "risk-transfer vehicles," for example) is the retributive value that capitalism considers to be non-retributive.

As value is being conserved in historical perspective, quantum mechanics reveals there is a phase transition that accompanies a change of state (like a resurgence of market consolidation before deconsolidation occurs). A fundamental, existential reality is revealed in which, instead of being and nothingness, there is being and somethingness to which all things retribute.

(When conceptualizing retributive value and non-transferable risk, consider, for example, the Pythagorean, base-ten number system. Analytically, the number 10 is pluralistically meaningful while, at the same time, holistically, it is the quatum, non-transferable value 0 from which the relative value of all the other numbers derive and to which they all retribute.

Retributive value is empirical, comparative value in which to measure, or reference, objective reality. It is the value that politically and economically measures the angst of our natural existence, tested by the strength--the virtue--of moral intelligence that exists in priority along with the fully assumed risk of loss.

Catholicism, for example, conceptualizes the fully assumed risk of loss as "original sin." It is value that represents the human condition in priority and the suffering a person knows will be bourne by living a moral existence.)

In the late 19th and early 20th Century, robber barons told us that capitalism marked the end of history in its consolidated state. John D. Rockefeller, for example, considered a free market to be "wasteful and inefficient" if it is not consolidated into elite management and control. Two world wars later, we reconsidered the value of managing reality in the image of elite objective and deconsolidated the risk proportion with the Glass-Steagill Act, which rendered the value to be retributed divisibly smaller and less catastrophic, more like a free market.

(Keep in mind that the objective was not to eliminate poverty but to make it less severe. Social Security, for example, is administered to manage the retributive value--the angst, the affective, psychological condition that foments the revolutionary spirit and transforms the fully assumed risk of loss into objective reality.)

While retributive value is a psychological component of risk, it has real, quantum value that can be measured and managed. When big business consolidates to manage risk (what is called "networking the externalities"), the efficiency produced is in the form of retributive value that capitalists want to ignore, and raise my rent.

Ignorance is bliss until you realize the risk (the price, or rent, to be inevitably paid as a consequence of action taken). When conservatives react by vilifying liberal reactionaries for waging class warfare, the quantum value to be retributed is not being ignored. It is being binomially managed in the gamma-risk dimension to conserve the accumulated value of the risk in historical perspective.

(Remember that while capitalism operates with ownership of private property, we don't really own nature. It owns us. We just rent it. When we use natural resources--labor, for example--to a detriment, because it is bought and paid for and so we can use it any way we see fit, and nature exacts retribution, we pay the rent.

The risk of loss is fully assumed. It is not a matter of if, but when, and managing the value to be retributed is a political function; something that a free market, for example, manages with a risk ontology that is free, open, and operates with immediate accountability. In opposition is a government apparatus that slowly cycles and recycles the risk proportion with limited accountability and late-order effects that can be described and explained with changing attributions.

With an authoritarian, political-economic regime--rather than simply buying or not buying in the marketplace to politically sanction by means of adverse selection, which has the effect of converging natural and positive law--market participants are presented with causal, risk factors that appear ideopathic, non-local, and thus non-retributive. The unknown quantity of causality is managed politically in the gamma dimension where it gains causal attribution, and regardless of the attribution, typically ideological, the rent will be paid on demand.

The attributive value will transform into retributive value, and without recognizing the quantum value that primarily causes the effects, we can always claim ignorance, if not stupidity, when bad things happen, like the Great Recession, without apparent attribution. Ideopathy then reduces to the absurd where psychopathy thrives as declarative knowledge of objective reality, occupying space in the gamma dimension where value is not in any way protected from its fully assumed risk of loss, but progressively more likely.)

The political management that occurs is an extension of "networking the externalities" so that when the consequences are shifted for future consumption it is not immediately apparent to consumers that the rent has been raised. Distracted with all the political gaming to apply attribution, consumers are subjected to fundamental attribution error and the accumulation of error will be impulsively managed into a corrective wave that will pay the rent. If we bank on ignorance, if not stupidity, we are sure to get what is coming to us in an oversized proportion.

It is not necessary to accumulate retributive value into an oversized proportion by organizing to avoid it. Since the risk of loss is fully assumed, it is best to manage the risk and let the corrective wave occur in a smaller risk-dimension.

In the alpha-risk dimension, a free market manages the corrective wave in small proportions. Risk, rather than being eliminated by objective, is conserved in a freely transferable and non-catastrophic state, free of phase transitions (sudden inversions) that affectively distort the position and the probable, future value of the risk with irrationally impulsive waves (greed, fear, and the resulting anxiety of avoiding the fully assumed risk of loss).

Non-catastrophic market risk requires the direct, integral value it yields not be derivative in late order and considered non-retributive. It cannot be allowed to consolidate and exchange in exclusive markets where the value derived gains a non-retributive attribution because nobody knows how it works except the experts--the people that cause risk events and thus are always positioned to profitably avoid, and verify, the retributive value.

In a free market, the value produced and consumed is immediately retributive with little or no error of attribution, and what error does impulsively occur is quickly corrected to conserve the reward (the value) integral to the risk. Rather than accumulatively derived and fully assumed in late order, the risk is fully consumed (fully retributive) in a short-order, non-catastrophic proportion.

Without fundamental attribution error, risk aversion transforms into risk adversion--the risk has a real, immediate, and objectively verifiable measure. It has adverse value to which capitalism has a natural aversion and so consolidates to give the value a non-retributive attribution that distributes the expected adversity (the price to be paid) in late order (fully assumed to occur sometime in the future). Anxiously, we know risk events will occur...but when?

Creating uncertainty over the timing creates an irrational, impulsive psychology of the risk proportion. Risk that is not politically managed with a free-market ontology tends to impulsively consolidate and overextend in order to avoid it, which is a fundamental misattribution of the risk proportion.

As soon as capital is allowed to consolidate, the error of attribution occurs. The fundamentals, while being descriptively maintained as declarative knowledge about the way things really work, appear to work in unpredictable, non-fundamental ways. The unpredictability is the timing factor (phase inversions) within the occupied space, which is the "opportunity" (phase inversions transformed into phase adversions) that Mitt Romney refers to when he describes and explains what it means to be free in America.

Phase Adversion

It is easy to predict the location of the detriment at any particular time if you have the power (the freedom) to cause it. By being organizationally risk-averse, capitalists tell us, risk is not eliminated but it is possible to render it less adverse if we organize to reduce the rent--specifically, if we render labor value competitively disinflationary against rising prices by consolidating the capital. It is no coincidence that this increases deflationary risk, which provides the opportunity to cause the risk supposedly being averted and the property adversely possessed.

Consolidation does not make risk more averse (more avoidable and the rent more affordable), but it does make it more adverse. It is prone to crises proportions in which debt (retributive value) is surplused and managed through an over-extension of monetary and fiscal policy. The overextension causes inversions that phase the market risk into adversity (you know the old saying...just hold your losses until the correction occurs but, of course, the correction won't occur until you have realized your losses).

Occupying the available policy space, the effects of monetary and fiscal policy gain a causal attribution, and so the reaction is more risk prone than averse. Error accumulates, having an overall effect that is adversely selective. The system is designed for failure, which for the capitalist is the opportunity to "make money."

Despite being "the job creators," capitalists admit that they are not in business to create jobs, but to make money. The more money they make, they say, by causing unemployment (adversity), the more jobs will be aversely created (working more for less to avoid being unemployed) as capital is consolidated to avoid the adversity. Eventually the derived value (the cause) becomes so retributive that government gets into the job-creation business and inflates the money supply (the effect), creating jobs in the form of debt, which makes money through rising prices (higher rent).

The more consolidated the capital is, the more value can be extracted from labor (unemployment) while continuing to raise prices (inflation). Deliberately structuring value to derive from detriment is why modern economists measure labor value as consumer demand--a phase transition that has attributional value.

If labor value is identified as "expropriated," then the analysis admits that the rent is too high. Economists, however, want to argue that the rent is too low with the objective of raising it in compliance with their sponsors (the consumer) on demand.

Since the value is managed by objective, the effect is neo-classically described as "structural unemployment" because value that derives from adversity is non-retributive if it naturally occurs in predictable (and thus expected), algorithymic cycles.

Businesses (like Bain Capital) naturally cut costs (with money borrowed from the discount window) to expand the margin, and so when we hear that the current rate of unemployment is the "new normal" (i.e., it has entered a new phase) it is naturally endowed. It is an expected value along with the value adversely possessed and accumulated in the top income class who, as consumers, expect full compliance with their tastes and preferences on demand.

It is no coincidence that the "job creators" demand labor pay more rent than it can afford, which has the predictable effect of declining consumer demand. The diminished capacity for self-determination (rising prices against declining income) is not a risk of loss fully assumed, but is because consumers choose to overleverage their incomes.

We are all consumers, but most of us spend ourselves into adversity (trying to achieve class mobility without the income that determines it). Assets are adversely possessed by default, and consolidation naturally occurs, because consumers demand more than they can afford to buy. Net worth naturally diminishes because the rent is too low, not because it is too high, and so we need the Romney-Ryan plan, which is sure to raise my rent!

If labor value is considered consumer demand, the analysis can ignore the integral value of labor to derive the benefit. Debt accumulates because consumers are spendthrifts (because they demand it), not because labor is not paid enough to consume what is produced. Consumer theory of labor value tends to attribute the source of accumulated value (inflation and unemployment) to profligate consumer spending (quantum self-determination), not the detriment deliberately exacted in the form of hyper-extended debt, which measures to the penny the value (the distribution) needed for "consumers" to truly self-determine.

According to the proponents of managing markets with an economy-of-scale efficiency (the "efficient markets" theory), inventories are not deliberately managed to command high prices. (The theory of efficient markets, remember, according to Greenspan, for example, does not allow for fraud but, nevertheless, led to a massive accounting fraud and the Great Recession.) Supply gets low because consumers demand it with debt. The argument can then be made that labor is extended too much value and that consolidation of industry and markets is necessary to control consumer demand (by raising the rent). Businesses gain an economy-of-scale efficiency (and cause inflation and unemployment that capitalists blame on government intervention) to conserve scarce resources (with prices rising at a higher rate than labor is paid to demand it), not to conserve the accumulation of wealth that derives from the adversity (by causing default).

Never mind that consolidating power and raising the rent causes default. What the king did in the name of divine right we now do (inversely) in the name of natural law and market efficiency, conserving the retributive value in historical perspective.

The system we have now, called capitalism, has been structured to turn criminals into kings. Often referred to as gangster capitalism, the implication is that the structure lacks moral content. If we just had the moral content, supposedly, then we will structure for the moral content capitalism requires to be the benign and benevolent form of organization that it is touted to be. There is really nothing structurally wrong with the way capitalism tends to organize, so the argument goes, it's just a phase we're going through toward full maturity and self-determination.

(Keep in mind that the measure of power--the capacity to self-determine--is the retributive value. For the king, if the value consolidated is not retributive, he is not powerful, and the measure of that is the demand to demonstrate it when, for example, his subjects become restless, revolutionary, and want to occupy his space.

The reason the Fed is opaque--its proceedings during the 2009 financial crisis being, for example, highly redacted for public consumption--is because the value it produced is highly retributive. Allowing information to be freely accessed is to share power, which is why it is structured for its classified consumption with the force and legitimacy of public authority.)

Structurally there is the incentive to cause detriment--it is necessary to consolidate (conform) in order to be successful. The moral sentiment that capitalism requires at the macro level is lost to providing for one's family, for example. The value of probable detriment is accumulated at the quantum, micro-level of calculated risk (heuristic self-determination) which requires buying-in to the philosophy of risk that postulates consolidation is the model of efficiency (expands the pie) and deconsolidation is a moral hazard that causes deflation and unemployment.

Realizing that deconsolidation causes disinflation (rising buying power) and rising employment (the need for less government) requires a kind of quantum leap in the moral realm--a structural unification of theory and practice (a transitional, phase adversion) our political-economic system is conceptually modeled, according to ideological principles, to prevent.

Moral sentiment is a string-like entanglement. A probable, structural change at the general, relative level is constantly implied by the moral position observed at the quantum level, and is essentially what is meant by "the risk of loss fully assumed" in the gamma dimension.

When value accumulates and consolidates, instead of actually applying democracy, a free market is used to apply a false ontology. The outcome is the result of consumer demand, but not necessarily popular consent.

In order to prudently regulate in a free market, the prudent regulator requires income, and the more income acquired the more ability to regulate--to govern--with a prudence that is self-determined.

There is quantum incentive at the macro level to determine the self in conformity with the perceived, relative, value of the risk. Conformity to that value is used to falsely confirm the critical, relative-quantum value of popular consent (the naturally occurring gamma risk) in which the risk of loss is fully assumed.

The relative-quantum value to be controlled to the point of critical mass is the prudential regulator who when allowed to be radically free will adversely phase the status quo into current account. It is necessary, then, to keep the account transitionally phased into probable value, which the Fed, for example, along with the CFTC, assures is a risk of loss fully assumed in the future.

We are forever being offered two possible choices--regulation or deregulation. Again we see the necessity of reducing policy to a binomial space...a dummy variable that over time ensures the stakes (the risks and rewards) are systematically structured to be conserved.

With the risk of loss always fully assumed but never fully consumed, there is the appearance of stability through probable change. Being cast into a binomial variation, quantum change occurs over time while occupying the same space. Consolidating risk into that space, rather than expanding it in the alpha dimension, only renders the appearance of stability. Although it is not an objective reality, the outcome of the dummy variation has both the deliberative, prudential legitimacy of a due process while, at the same time, the risks and the rewards are conservatively self-regulated by limiting the possible, policy options.

Binomially limiting the options to more regulation or less ignores the quantum value (the risk proportion) of the prudent regulator. It allows for change without ensuring the capacity for self-determination (self-governance) in the alpha dimension.

Deregulation, keep in mind, does not yield alpha risk. The risk consolidates even more unregulated, gaining higher entropic value, becoming evermore entangled with the need for government. Thus the need to locate one's self-interest there, occupying the space of good offices to command and control risk rather than prudently demand and regulate it, democratically, in the marketplace, entangled only with individual tastes and preferences, directly applied with low entropic value.

Deconsolidation will result in deregulation by empowering the prudent regulator in priority.

The alpha quantum is a function of deconsolidating the risk proportion, not its regulated and deregulated consolidation. Once the alpha phases in, its value will locate over time within the space occupied by government. The fully assumed risk of loss will be functionally adverse--resisting, rather than supporting, rising rents.

Rent to Own (Positive Law and Adverse Possession)

Working with a confirmed hypothesis, businesses have learned to manage inventory to maximize the marginal profit with what technically appears to be on-demand economics, but without adding a marginal product. The objective is not to deprive, but to provide what the market demands, and the price paid (the rent, or marginal profit) depends on the strength of demand.

Not adding a product to expand the margin is not demand-side economics. It is supply-side economics. Instead of adding to the profit margin by selling more of a popular good or service, the margin expands by managing the available supply so it appears demand exceeds supply, which is inflationary. Since buying power is reduced by raising the price to be paid, the technical effect is a persistent deflationary trend that creates the demand for adding to the money supply to pay it.

Objectively, business managers know that adding a marginal product is deflationary. The reason it is not disinflationary is a function of technical objective. Deflation positions most of the population (99.9 %) to take the risk. It is a function of adverse selection that confirms status position and demonstrates positive power.

Hypothetically, status is a function of natural law. As Ayn Rand describes it, "A is A." Our leaders, naturally selected, like Loyd Blankfein or Ken Lay, who demonstrate power by possession, empirically confirm their status by means of adversity while, at the same time, appearing to possess the power to command natural resources and surplus value (hording labor and consumer income) for the public good.

The value surplused is not detrimental if it is measurably beneficial. So when Goldman Sachs surpluses labor, and Enron surpluses power off the grid, the value it has is confirmed by the margin of profit consumed and is effectively surplused to prevent shortage.

Surplusing value to prevent shortage is only natural and non-retributive. If you want to use the value surplused to create more value, it is necessary to rent it from the owner, which naturally conserves the value in a legal and properly positive (economic), non-retributive (non-political) proportion. To deprive property by political retribution is to adversely possess it--it is categorically immoral (detrimental) because it defies natural law.

Natural law is confirmed by becoming positive law. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, is all about property rights and retributive value. Civil liability (the amount to be retributed) is a measurable monetary sum. It is positive, empirically verifiable value, and where value is derived from detriment, the value is retributed to conserve it, restoring the plaintiff to his or her original position.

In the marketplace, however, where the natural laws of supply and demand rule, title to property can be taken by adverse possession.

In the marketplace, both the benefit and the detriment can be adversely possessed. When, for example, you pay twice as much for gas as you did a year ago, due to supply-demand (natural law), your income has been adversely possessed. The benefit derived from the adversity is only natural, and so retributing the value is unnatural. The value would be adversely dispossessed (a moral hazard) because the beneficiaries are naturally selected (capable of positioning themselves) to manage it to everyone's benefit (which means you have been adversely positioned to possess the detriment). Since you are not the beneficiary, and thus you lack the income to command a favorable position to otherwise demand it in the marketplace, the accumulation of the benefit is naturally endowed and legally positive--the value is non-retributive.

Non-retributive value is a characteristic of consolidated capitalism posing as free-market economics, and free-market economics, remember, is charged with retributive (political) value. It is the adversity (immediate accountability) that big corporates avoid by means of consolidation, occupying space in the alpha (economic) dimension where the power of self-determination obtains.

The concept of non-retributive value falsely operates with the legitimacy of natural law to render the outcome logically positive. The adversity (the rent, or the price to be paid as a measurable consequence of the choices we make and the action taken) has the appearance of objective, ontological reality--specifically, supply-demand characteristics that naturally determine the distribution of income to demand it, which determines an unavoidable (non-retributive) risk ontology.

Increasing supply without the income to demand it (wages and salaries paid to produce it) results in a declining rate of profit (overproduction). The reason this results in crises (creates destruction) is because the objective (the rent, or the actual price to be paid) is really to deprive (which in actuality is retributively valued and emotionally charged with the natural right to self-determine). The actuarial risk of deprivation is logically negative, not positive, and it is the plight of plunderers to convince the plundered of the providence naturally endowed by the creator.

The creator, naturally, is the "job creator" who rents to own the "self" to which only you have legal title but that the capital, by natural condition, will adversely possess "on demand" in the marketplace to add supply and expand the margin by raising the rent.

Idle labor (on-demand value that determines the power of your self in the marketplace) is the product being marginally added, and as we know, unemployment is sure to make money (increase the money supply to keep inventory low on demand, which by natural law commands the highest possible price). As long as inventory is kept low and demand high at low rent (at a zero rate of interest in your self--the value of labor), the predictable result is rising income for the upper class. We technically achieve "The Path to Prosperity" (and remember, you are personally responsible for your "self," and if you don't share in the prosperity, operantly conditioned, you don't have anyone to blame but yourself).

The path to prosperity is pathologically paved with the "self" properly conditioned.

The Romney-Ryan plan resists employment without supporting a declining rate of profit, but as we know, the value accumulated is highly retributive (it attributes too much value, and yet not enough, to the self, and the contradiction is quite literally pathological--it is "self" destructive). The technical tricks just trap us into a crisis proportion. All the value created increases the probability of its destruction, which according to Romney and Ryan is what makes us the land of opportunity. When we default, it is the opportunity to make money, consolidating the inventory overproduced to be resold at a profit on demand.

(We see, then, that labor is managed as inventory on demand. It is a product managed to be overproduced, deconsolidated and pluralistically added as a marginal product to disinflate the price and reduce the economic rent of the job creators. If the only opportunity available, on demand, is at the Triangle Waist Company, for example, because jobs are hard to come by, the land of opportunity is nothing but dystopia. What is confirmed is destruction created on demand, and the loss--bolting the exits, with no way out, but personally responsible because no one forced you to work there--is fully assumed and ontologically determined.

The inventory being managed was not just the shirts but the employees. The job creators considered the laborers to be their private property--inventory to be managed as they saw fit, and as long as the inventory was managed to be in oversupply, which is the result of overproduction, the value created was the status conferred and confirmed by the value destroyed.)

Today's business managers are more apt to keep inventories low and on demand than ever before to resist deflation. Oil refineries, for example, are shuttered to support the price of gasoline against falling income and declining demand. With less demand, the risk is managed and distributes to technically achieve a classic effect (unemployment) without destroying the benefit (the marginal rate of profit in which the risk of loss is fully assumed--naturally adverse--if the demand is not there to drive it). Risk is effectively positioned to gain and gross value (the marginal profit) by adding to the supply of its accumulated proportion (capital gained).

Since gaining capital (the adverse risk) is the measure of success, a central bank interprets it as risk reduction because it is adding GDP (income distributed to the top one percent) in the form of value added. At the same time, the bank knows that the income distribution is deflationary, and so adding to the money supply supports the capacity to make money against falling demand (a price support), which would otherwise be an adversion of the risk.

(The trick, you see, is to add support without gaining resistance. The trap, however, is that, in reality, support cannot be added without resistance. The more value added, the more retributive it becomes, not less; and as the risk becomes more and more adverse, the liquidity is trapped into detriment--what financiers call "a liquidity trap."

While the effects are materially manifest, the tricks and traps are psychologically affective. Risk is a phenomenology of the mind. The risk to capital has a classical effect, but is operantly conditioned.)

This so-called risk reduction by adding risk-value, however, ("risk off" that is really "risk on") is a quantum derived from the income of the lower classes, effectively conserving its valence. Although the capacity for the lower classes to self-determine and prudently regulate is effectively reduced, psychologically, participants are conditioned to believe the reduction is an open-market activity and a function of personal responsibility despite being applied through highly exclusive operations.

The more determined you are the more likely your self becomes objective reality, and as long as the marketplace is free and open, self-determination is less a function of pathological preclusion than a sign of personal freedom and responsibility.

Technically achieving a free-and-open market in priority ensures the value of the risk is retributively stable. In a free market, we all rent to own, not just a chosen few operantly conditioned by a committee of their peers.

A free-and-open market, keep in mind, is a highly complex entanglement of quantum value. It tends to consolidate and manage the probable outcomes (the infinite possibility of the self) by technical objective.

The technical complexity of the free market is demonstrated by trying, for example, to write laws that regulate it. Health care and financial reform legislation is over 4,000 pages because the decision to buy and sell is so complex--so conditional--that it is an infinite set of "if-then" statements. Frankly, it is foolish to even try...it is downright pathological! Nevertheless, more and more laws are piled up into an inchoate mass of body politic to form a reality that is virtually unknown to all but the highest bidder on demand.

Comprised of an army of lawyers and technical analysts, objective reality is less and less free and open and more and more determined by committee to regulate the retributive value. Really, there is even less control over risk-value since, despite all the effort, risk is, nevertheless, ontologically determined and not rent free.

The Open Market by Committee

While the value of the risk is managed through the Fed's Open Market Committee, much of what determines the direction of the risk occurs in the dark. What the law does not prohibit it positively allows and the investment vehicles derived from creating accounts are considered, unregulated, the positive product of natural law.

Derivatives are complicated because they are designed to spread the risk. They become entangled with the broader economy and create efficiencies (a predictive utility) in ways that only the experts are likely to understand. These markets look "dark" (and unpredictable) to most people because they do not understand how they work.

Dark-market investment devices are too complicated to regulate, efficient-market theorists explain, and if they are, the efficiency is lost. Regulating markets results in an inchoate body of law that cannot approximate all the contingencies. The result is beta volatility--a high level of uncertainty that causes crises (but we wouldn't know it if it is in the dark). So "let it be." Let the market (nature) decide what is right and wrong, good or bad, and doing so is logically positive--it prudently regulates the marketplace with the efficiency and moral legitimacy of natural law.

Defying nature is a moral hazard, it's a sin, and the consequences (crises and the higher rent that results) is the price that must inevitably be paid. Probable adversity is best managed in unregulated markets where liquidity is added to prudently minimize the risk, maximize profit, and gain the capital to pay the rent (which, with the help of the Fed, is being paid with a high rate of unemployment). When the rent is properly paid, the wealth distributes (it trickles down) and the result is economic stability. That is, when the rent is paid to the job creators to create jobs (low taxes and high subsidies like we have now), title is taken to the wealth created in the form of income, which consumers then prudently regulate as private property, positively supported by the law in a free and open market.

When, for example, gasoline prices rise and demand becomes more efficient, the price can rise even more. The price to be paid, however, is not determined by consumers at the gas pump, but in dark markets where participation is determined by how much rent is paid--by income class: whether you are a lord or a tenant.

Lords collect the rent, and tenants naturally pay it until government taxes the benefit (reducing subsidies, for example) to pay the rent. That, conservatives say, is unnatural. It increases the consumer's cost, distorts the capacity to prudently regulate, and thus creates the need for an inchoate mass of positive law that is fundamentally illogical and adversely selective, which explains why supply-demand fundamentals don't work to control prices.

The capacity to prudently regulate is taken from consumers and buried within the bowels of big government. Rather than having freedom in priority, it is something that "We" rent from government, like we did with the king before the Revolution. The result is a bureaucratic form of governance that diminishes the democratic dimension to render a government less representative, and more autocratic, in the republican form.

The risk goes gamma (more political than economic) when government occupies the alpha dimension of the prudent regulator. When we see government being sold to the highest bidder (the economic dimension that government usurps and adversely possesses by overextension), which determines who pays the rent, it is business trying to reoccupy the space that allows for self-determination. Big business is not trying to usurp power, conservatives contend, but trying to restore our "selves" to our natural condition in which "We the People" prudently and positively regulate our destinies freely and openly in the marketplace by the rule of law.

Government is best that governs least because a free market is self-regulating. When this natural condition is violated by positive law (a 2000 page law to regulate a market, for example), the probability of being favorably positioned to avoid the risk is even more entangled.

Severability of the health care act demonstrates how market participants can be adversely selected to possess the risk. If by judicial review the act is severed, insurers adversely possess the risk by decree. The same thing happens when risk is processed in dark markets. If you can't see the risk coming because you are not a classified participant, you are adversely selected to possess it.

It is impossible to prudently regulate (or self-determine in a free and "open" market) what you can't see until it is too late (what economists refer to as late-order effects and physicists refer to as quantum entanglement). The prudent regulator is then consumed with immediate, economic survival (the point at which the risk is "taken" and its value consumed in a quantumly entangled zero-sum). Self-determination begins to quantumly appear at that point (the point at which the risk of loss was fully assumed) and occupy the space that determines the direction of the risk.

It is critical to understand that the kind of quantum entanglement that occurs by consolidating risk into large-scale exchanges, like Wall Street, falsely operates without the risk of loss fully assumed in priority within that occupied space. The risk cannot be avoided--it is entangled and will converge with "objective" reality despite reactionary efforts (beyond good and evil) to apply the utilitarian, philosophical claptrap that always seemed to work in the past.

The risk proportion, which conservatives falsely claim is an overextension of government authority, cannot be forever extended, and once the analysis admits that government is the effect and not the cause, the fully assumed risk of loss changes dimension. Beta risk transforms into gamma risk, and this shift in the paradigm has an adverse affect on reactionary philosophy. The conceptual model that forms practical hypotheses, and directs the risk ontology into a self-fulfilled, risk tautology, gains empirical value. What had tested as natural philosophy and positive law (beyond good and evil) is repeatedly verified as negative, illogical, and immoral.

Trying to extend the debt indefinitely (the quantum verification of the fully assumed risk by constantly inflating the risk into the future) always results in highly uncivil behavior (the knowledge of good and evil) inherited from the past. By technically verifiable means we come to know the utilitarian philosophy of self-interest is not really the philosophy of selfishness at the base of our natural existence. We come to realize that self-satisfaction is less about depriving others than providing, and debt is less about collecting the rent owed you, adversely possessed, than forgiving the debt you owe to others.

(Remember that deprivation by adverse selection is extended, and possessed, in the form of debt. Extending the economic rent with the philosophy that it provides a generally beneficial utility causes deprivation and creates value that is highly retributive. Instead of expanding the pie, it contracts with adverse effects--causing inflation, unemployment, and demand for government--to provide the benefit of gaining capital.

It is important to undestand what this practical model of beneficial deprivation is intended to technically accomplish. It is intended to create retributive value--our objective reality by means of default, or its adverse possession.

By depriving capital, more capital and wealth can be gained by depriving it, or not. Providing, or not, understand, demonstrates power, or the discretion to determine the self.

While as much power can be derived from providing as depriving, there is a psychological component--the retributive value. The trespass that occurs is the moral value that capitalist theory tends to give an ontological description--the evil is really good, adversely selected and positively possessed by natural right. Depriving that which derives from one's constitutional nature is to deprive what a person is naturally entitled to, and as Adam Smith said, keeping all that a person is entitled to is morally imperative, and thus non-retributive.

That selfishness is non-retributive is the secret knowledge that we often hear conservatives refer to. There is a reality independent of our perception, and those who gain the material measure of success in pursuit of life, liberty and happiness come to realize that truth. They are self-actualized...they know the actuarial component of the risk--the image of self in the position of status--and are naturally selected to manage it and conserve its value in the form of debt, paradoxically pressed to protect its non-retributive value from its adverse possession.)

The way things are now, conservatives tell us, is what makes America strong and free. The risk applied (swapped and adversely possessed) in dark markets is a free-market innovation, and innovation drives growth. Yes, profit margins have grown and the capital accumulated has been converted into private property, keeping the top one percent strong through the organized deprivation (consolidation and economic contraction) of wealth (discretionary spending) and power (income).

The deprivation (the capital), however, presumes a free market in which the risk of loss is fully assumed. Capitalists, then, reasonably organize to protect themselves from the market's risk by consolidating it in a rent-to-own proportion. The power to prudently regulate is rented back to market participants on condition of complete submission to the job creators. The marketplace is so consolidated that this rent-to-own proportion extends to even the unemployed who may be required to pass a lifestyle test to secure the income needed to, ironically, self-determine.

Employers look at credit scores to determine the quality of prospective employees not only because it indicates reliability, but compliability. Willingness to pay the debt (the rent) is rewarded to operantly condition the labor force with the values of the job creators. The more consolidated the marketplace the more labor is put in a rent-to-own (gamma-risk) dimension that appears to be willing submission. The willing dimension is, of course, a non-retributive attribute in theory (in the first order) but empirically increases the probability of actuarial risk (in late order) that requires political management and government intervention in practice.

The more consolidated the marketplace becomes, the more accumulated the risk, and because the free market is fully presumed, the deprivation that occurs is considered to be self-deprivation (with the risk of loss fully assumed). Equilibrium becomes the quality of equal opportunity, and income (the quantity in which to measure self-determination and prudentially regulate the marketplace) becomes the virtue of inequality.

With a free market fully presumed, the risk of loss is, also, fully assumed. That is, despite organized means to avoid the risk, it cannot, in reality, be avoided.

With the risk of loss fully assumed, the quantity in which to measure self-determination and prudentially regulate the marketplace naturally tends to the virtue of equality and the sovereignty of its prudential regulator--the self. There is always a tendency toward a quantum singularity (low entropy) that delimits the quality of a meaningful existence (the good life).

If the incentive is to prevent distribution of value in order to accumulate it (i.e., to accumulate value with its organized deprivation), then the risk can be fully expected to gain a value of disequilibrium. That is, the risk of loss (the probability of not maintaining the disequilibrium) is fully assumed with a high degree of certainty unless, of course, it is organized to prevent its deconsolidation.

With the incentive to accumulate value unregulated (which accumulates the fully assumed risk of loss into a catastrophic proportion), consumer demand (the capacity to accumulate income and apply a disproportionate amount of risk), not how hard you work, for example, determines value.

Conservatives claim that unregulated accumulation of risk is prudent because the equilibrium provides a productive incentive (class mobility--rising income or the ability to self-determine). The outcome being experienced, however, is angst (the measurable, accumulated risk of the existential self).

Declining opportunity and income is directly measured by the level of angst on a quantum scale (down to the individual). The lack of self-determination (the angst) comes with a system organized for inflation and unemployment (accumulation of power from the value of labor--declining consumer demand--which is the accumulated risk-value of unemployment and rising prices). If people are not self-determined, then what is preventing it.

The system we have has been organized to reward causing detriment, and the value it yields, instead of being non-retributive, is inherently retributive. Its economic value is politically charged, and the more political it is the more consolidated and adversely detrimental the capital becomes.

The rent (the inevitable price to be paid) is raised to higher and higher levels to conserve the value against accumulative supply. The inevitable result, in historical perspective, is the fully assumed risk of loss--adverse possession.

With value always being consolidated to conserve it in historical perspective, capitalism is a rent-to-own system of finance.

The path to plunder is the path to prosperity, and the price to be paid is the sacrifice made.

Empirical Value and Objective Reality (Natural Law and Adverse Selection)

If you can make money by printing it (creating new accounts at the central bank to finance, for example, bad debts by overextending the rent) then you are less likely to make money by adding supply (which would reduce the supply of bad debt--and the need for government intervention--with sufficient income to demand it against disinflationary pressure). The TARP, for example, was an account created to manage the empirical value of the detriment created by the objective reality of financial panic.

The financial crisis of 2008 was an objective reality that, according to efficient-markets theory, was not supposed to happen.

The crisis, supposedly, was not predicted (and depending on how you measure it, non-retributive) because markets were efficiently unregulated and allowed to consolidate (which is supposed to reduce the need for government). Empirically, however, the quantum value of the detriment (the demand for government) is confirmed.

The supposedly unpredicted (and thus non-retributive) value the crisis produced was an accumulation of risk. That is, risk (unforeseen and thus unavoidable), not a well-defined business plan, created the new accounts (the public debt) necessary to abate the financial crisis of '08. According to the apologies of efficient-markets theory and the free consolidation of financial markets, the reason the risk got so big is because our economy is really big, which is really a measure of success despite the failure.

"De novo" monetary expansion (which empirically measures the gamma-risk proportion) occurred to control inherent market risk, providing a benefit (the bailout) that right-wing reactionaries now say is risk created "ex nihilo." It is no accident that, as the result of the crisis, any entity not too big to fail predictably consumes the risk by adverse selection (where the risk goes gamma and the consumer is consumed with debt, both public and private, on demand). The adversion, understand, is an extension of the rent.

Raising the economic rent by extension (by late-order effect) is the technical means by which your "self" is taken possession by the capital invested. What is "in" vested, understand, is your "self," positioned to take the risk, which becomes the evidence that measures your objective, self-determined reality.

Capital invested (and the gain--the adverse possession of your "self"--which is non-retributive and thus should not be taxed) poses as being determined by natural selection (as the President critically explained, for example, in reference to the Romney-Ryan budget plan). Your status position--the space you naturally, and thus non-retributively, occupy--is not by the deliberate determination of a power elite (who are naturally selected by avoiding the detriment you thus naturally, and thus positively, possess by law), but by the power of your own personal responsibility--on demand (by positive possession) and thus not attributable to anyone but yourself.

Your "self" is fully assumed to always be at risk "on demand" in a free market. "Demand" defines the empirical value of the risk and delimits your current status, positioned to occupy the space you know (you empirically experience) as objective reality. If the market is defeated by, for example, consolidation of financial markets so that the economy is working to finance banks rather than banks working to finance jobs, the empirical value of the risk that defines your "self" is determined by technical objective. The reality is whatever is being demanded (having the money to command risk and self-determine), and as long as the objective is to technically create new accounts instead of new jobs, the wealth created (the power to self-determine) is not new (de novo-ex nihilo) but derived by being adversely positioned for the detriment (the risk commanded by adverse selection).

Creating new accounts to monetize the debt is a kind of rent-to-own scheme fraught with adversity. The more rent you pay, the deeper you are in debt, but eventually the debtor ends up owning the bank, becoming objective reality (positive law) by adverse possession. A retributive reality will occur by means of adverse selection (natural law), conserving the value in historical perspective.

By creating new accounts (by creating more debt to finance the bad debt, which historically conserves the value derived), big business makes more money by expanding the supply of money because the expansion reduces the capacity to demand it (it causes the problem the new debt is supposed to resolve). The falling demand positions small business to consume the extended risk (Without first-order deconsolidation, deflationary risk increases the economic rent in late order, and at that point we are fully consumed dealing with the new crisis in the gamma-risk dimension. The "JOBS Act" the President just signed will do little to reduce the rent. It will not deliver us from the gamma dimension because the policy space is preoccupied with economy-of-scale modeling--the efficient-markets theory, that was used in the 1990's to repeal Glass-Steagall, for example.) Instead of a peaceful and prosperous pluralism on demand, monetary expansion yields the capacity to command it, and as history confirms, rulers are likely to expand the economic rent beyond the capacity of subjects to pay it, which then requires it be paid on command--an act of congress, for example.

The empirical value of demand economics is that adding supply makes it cheaper to buy than to plunder your way to prosperity. Unfortunately, however, the trend of monetizing the path to general prosperity has been reversed since the Reagan revolution.

If general prosperity is the objective, ensuring the welfare of the rich in priority is empirically disconfirmed. In the spirit of the Reagan revolution, however, Romney and Ryan, despite testing negative over and over again, nevertheless insist Reaganomics is "The Path to Prosperity."

As empirical value accumulated, it was necessary to interrupt the Reagan revolution with a distribution of the value in order to conserve it. Combining efficient-markets theory with a more progressive tax burden, an expansion occurred that resulted in a balanced budget.

The Clinton-era expansion operated with horizontal and vertical integration, however, to technically achieve the objective. While organizing to produce economy-of-scale profits can produce a lot of value to distribute by objective, it nevertheless accumulates retributive value in the gamma-risk dimension where it is technically managed on command.

Volatility during the Clinton administration was explained as "overdiversification," but nothing was done to resist it in priority because it does not fit (confirm) the working model (the objective reality) we have now. By commanding the necessary tax revenue that Ryan and Romney abhor, the "Clinton economy" relied on economy-of-scale profits (the creative-destruction inherent to allowing firms consolidate) to fiscally manage the externalities.

Despite the command dimension inherent to it, efficiently managing financial markets, for example, to surplus value (and reduce demand), and then tax the capital gained to balance the budget (and cause a distribution on command), relies on the empirical value of the popular vote to confirm it, nevertheless. The demand dimension is conserved and expresses as cumulative, gamma risk, which, paradoxically, conserves the need to command it as objective reality.

Bush v. Gore (confirming that value is conserved in historical perspective) reversed the counter-revolutionary trend to yield the record debt--the empirical value and the objective reality--we have today.

Economic growth in the 1990's was supported by taxing the accumulated surplus (what Republicans still hypothesize results in an economic crisis, like the Great Recession, which can be reversed, they say, by making the tax code more regressive so we don't punish the job creators). Value was not prevented from consolidating (and is not being resisted now) because it was being (and will be again) used to pay the rent.

Although using a model that empirically conserves the accumulated value, both Clinton and Obama have been branded as "socialists" because taxing the rich does not conform to an aristocratic identity. Instead, their brand of efficient markets serves to disconfirm an objective reality that has always been confirmed by conforming to the dictates of natural law, from which positive law (the Constitution, for example) is derived and our rights empirically endowed.

"We" are not legally sovereign (occupying space in our natural condition) if the right to self-determine does not verifiably obtain, and the empirical value of that objective is not verified if the value attained is taxed (adversely selected) by the sovereign to pay the rent.

Progressing the tax rate smooths out the stochastic oscillator that cyclically confirms power and status. Instead of positioning the lower classes to take the risk by adverse selection, power is structured to operate in a more on-demand dimension.

By not taxing the lower classes and overextending the rent, there is sufficient demand to resist the crisis of overproduction, but without deconsolidation it will not be prevented. The budget balanced in the 90's, and it will again, because adding supply on demand reduced government spending without reducing the capital gained to pay the rent (contrary to the Republican hypothesis).

Instead of a risk proportion that creates value from demand destruction, and constructs the command dimension as the probable, objective reality, a more effectively progressive tax code governs the job creators (and makes money) on demand. Contrary to the aristocratic image of reality, the rulers become the ruled when alpha risk occupies the objective, policy space.

What is disconfirmed for the majority of citizens, however, is confirmation of elite power and authority. Welfare for the rich tests positive again and again--it does ensure the path to prosperity. It would be illogical to throw it out because it works.

Keeping value consolidated means you have to rent it to use it, it is not an entitlement. You are renting the economic space you occupy and you can be evicted by the owners at any time to confirm the value of your objective reality.

Making Money On Demand

According to Romney and Ryan, a lower, more regressive tax burden pays the rent. The budget passed by the House will raise middle-class taxes (what Ryan calls "broadening the base") so that the top income class can have a lower rate and make money.

Hypothetically, policies and programs that support income at the top, like a regressive tax burden, frees capital for investment and increases supply, paving the path to prosperity.

Added supply controls inflation and unemployment. By creating supply, income rises against falling prices (disinflation), which controls the price on demand (governance when you need it) and reduces unemployment by adding the income needed to demand it. Adding the supply of income on demand without having to tax it or print it avoids the crisis of overproduction (deflation). By reducing gamma risk to the alpha dimension, price control is technically achieved with limited government intervention. Government will reduce if there is less demand for it.

(According to Rep. Ryan and the Republican Party delegation, cutting government adds supply. Since the demand for government derives from slow, economic demand, however, which is the result of no added supply--classically referred to as overproduction and a term Ryan and company ideologically ignore--arguing that the effect yields the cause lacks good intellectual value. Specifically, it lacks empirical value that, ironically, is at the very foundation of Enlightenment philosophy that the Tea Party delegation is supposed to represent.

Occupying policy space with ideological rhetoric adds to the problem to be solved. Practical solutions ideologically derived from both parties are exacerbating, which is why Congress is so unpopular.

The binomial solution we have now suggests that we can have big government and rising public debt or small government and rising private debt. In both cases, ideologically derived, the risk-value is conserved, not avoided. Money is "made" by creating debt in a Hamiltonian fashion, which destroys demand and the means for each and every one of us to self-determine.

As long as money is made to ensure "We" can not control our destiny on demand in a too-big-to-fail proportion, we cannot be held personally responsible for it. Instead, we then rely on government to be responsible for our destiny, technically achieving a gamma-risk dimension that renders the "self" in the image of the "job creators" who, both public and private, as we see over and over again, treat us like inventory managed in pursuit of an objective reality that is verifiably not our own.

With the means to self-determine, we verify, rather than ideologically validate, whether the rent paid is good and adequate consideration by controlling the price we are willing to pay on demand, not mandated to pay by means either public or private in an economy-of-scale proportion.)

Price control without destroying the means to demand it (inflation and unemployment) requires adding supply--it requires a distribution from the accumulation of capital to demand it, preventing the need to inflate the money supply (which reduces demand) to make money. Overproduction is then a function of disinflation--rising consumer income against falling prices, providing sufficient income to pay the rent and form the capital necessary to reduce beta-risk volatility and the need to politically manage it in a gamma-risk proportion.

Without an on-demand distribution, a redistribution occurs (taxing and spending) to resist deflation (a declining rate of profit). As income falls against rising prices (and taxes), instead of being distributive on demand, value (the rent to be paid) becomes retributive on command. Prices are not controlled by supply but by destroying the capacity to demand it (the capacity to buy something at a particular price OR NOT).

(Remember, not demanding something controls the price. So, when we don't demand health care and the price keeps rising it means the free market has been defeated. If the price is being supported so that it will not lower to meet demand, the "market" is broken, and if we fix it by mandating we buy health insurance--adding demand without adding supply--we break it even more!

Consumers need to understand what consolidated capitalists want us to ignore: consolidation of industry and markets, health care or anything else, commands the price, creating value by destroying demand. The destruction is what consolidated capitalists refer to as "efficient markets." Unparadoxically, by defeating the means to technically achieve market efficiency, consolidation supports the price and destroys the power of consumers to self-determine on demand.

While we tend to perceive demand destruction as a dead-weight loss in which everybody loses, the destruction creates value. A marginal profit is added without actually adding a marginal product, as in a free market, because consumers do not have the income to demand it. Instead, the power to self-determine and its market value--its power to modify behavior by popular consent--is consolidated on command.

Economy-of-scale does not make markets more efficient. Demand efficiency is swapped for command proficiency. Popular demand, or rule, is reduced--in many ways seduced--to technically achieve a command dimension that poses as popular consent.

Popular rule is a value Hamiltonians famously favored over slavery, for example. By paying labor a wage or salary, big business, which at the time of the Revolution was considered by Republicans to be abusive like the king, reduces retributive value and turns the swap--a subsistence wage--into the personal responsibility of the wage earner. The detriment is transformed into value derived--the creative destruction that haunts us today--without fear of retribution because we are all Constitutionally endowed with self-determination.)

Destroying demand creates the supply, and the value--the prosperity--added. Since creating value by destroying it is a zero-sum game, the accumulated value expected to "trickle down" (which is a concept Alexander Hamilton used to describe the utility of big bankers and big business that Jeffersonians objected to) gains retributive value and is then managed as political, rather than economic risk. Gaining political value, the risk goes gamma to manage a continuous failure of expectations (the hypotheses tested) that with a republican form of government is empirically confirmed, or not, by popular vote.

The popular vote, whether economically with dollar votes in the marketplace or politically by casting votes in an election, is an empirical measure that is supposed to objectively measure reality. Voters are frustrated that reality is being objectively determined to make money in zero-sum more by means of validation than verification.

On the economic side, we are determined by an economy-of-scale efficiency that makes money by commanding the price. On the political side, we have a government that commands we engage in economic activity, or not, to support the price and command the margin of profit without adding a marginal product. Both validate a too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale proportion, validating the problem as the solution on command rather than verifying the means to self-determine and responsibly solve our problems, and make money, on demand.