Empirical Value and Collective Action

The twist component of a broader-and-flatter burden relates to collective action.

Capitalism tends to focus on the individual because the aggregate value of collective action in the marketplace demands empirically verifiable accountability. In a free market, propriety is measured with market share and the profit margin. A business that provides a product you demand but can't trust is likely to lose market share and suffer a declining rate of profit in the alpha dimension if the consumer has a choice on demand. The marketplace, with the risk of loss fully assumed on demand, is self-determined--fully empowered with pluralistic, deconsolidated, proprietary risk.

It is instructive here to compare the alpha decline with the declining rate of profit experienced in the gamma-risk dimension where risk is consolidated to avoid it.

The alpha presents non-catastrophic, disinflationary risk; the gamma presents a catastrophic, deflationary, systemic-risk proportion that "demands" government intervention.

When the risk goes gamma, government acts with collective authority to affirm the mal-distribution of wealth and power--the detriment to be consumed on command--as legitimately earned with risk in the free market. Collective action is used to scapegoat the liability--the detriment to be consumed on demand--and assumes the risk proportion in the form of a late-order effect with the force and legitimacy of "due" public "process."

The effect is a rising tax burden that Romney and Ryan claim must not be the burden of the "job creators." If we show impropriety and burden the creators, they will retribute the risk in the form of deflation.

To appease the gods of wealth and power, we must be sure and not tax them to minimize the risk of deflation--the declining rate of profit (the retribution) it will surely cause. When the decline occurs (the risk of loss is fully assumed), we apparently have not provided proper tribute. The tax rate, according to the best and the brightest, is not regressive enough--not enough tribute (sacrifice, or detriment in the form of austerity) has been paid to the creators.

Empirically, then, given the evidence of a declining rate of profit, it is unnatural to tax the creators of wealth and power, which we are sure to do in order to keep the capital cycling into accumulation. When the capital fails to recycle, the eternal hope and promise of being on the path to prosperity ends, along with capitalism.

Eventually, along the "Path to Prosperity," the burden becomes evermore regressive--working for free while paying off student loans, for example, which accumulates even more value to be retributed (and collectively consumed, which adds demand for government) in the form of systemic risk. Yes, indeed, objective reality will most assuredly assert itself, and empirically verify our self-determination, despite the perception of it.

(It is important to understand that added demand for government does not add risk. This is a technical error that twists policy analyses into the objective of "risk reduction."

By trying to reduce added risk, programs become a complex mass of temporal fallacies that naturally result in failed expectations. Failure is then corrected for by adding to the complexity, not the risk.

When technical failure occurs, it is not because risk is added, but ignored in the aggregate, having been transformed into a gamma-risk dimension where legitimacy is a function of collective action in a politically post-hoc proportion.

The quantity valued as "risk" is always coefficiently conserved despite that the reward, by hook or by crook, can be added. Accumulated wealth, and power structured to increase the reward with low risk, accumulates risk, it does not add it.

Added value does not have to include added risk. In a free-market, the risk taken is non-catastrophically coefficient with the reward. Value can be added non-zero-sum with a deconsolidated distribution of the risk proportion.

With the quantum "risk" conserved in a non-catastrophic, unconsolidated, alpha-risk dimension, reward is driven by the incentive to innovate and expand the economy to make a profit.)

In the gamma-risk dimension, the empirical value of collective action is consumed in the form of false inductions. A progressive tax burden, for example, is attributed to supporting deflationary risk when it actually resists it, and while government distributions of accumulated wealth keeps capitalism from collapsing into Randian nihilism, government intervention is really the effect, not the cause, of the accumulation and the declining rate of profit.

Technically, with all manner of false induction, policies and programs, public and private, are an inchoate mass of errors that predictably fail expected, normative values like supply-demand and risk-reward. When supply exceeds demand and prices continue to rise, and reward is higher with lower risk, the economy-of-scale efficiency required to achieve these unnatural results are described as "the new normal."

By consolidating the means of propriety and the empirical value of collective self-determination, we induce the risk being avoided.

To avoid proprietary risk (not reduce it), capitalism claims to conserve the value of self-determination while, at the same time, destroying the power to demand it. Destroying demand is counter-intuitive if we "normally" want to make a profit, but modeled with an economy-of-scale efficiency it proportionally increases the power to command the margin by consolidating the marketplace in the name of reducing risk.

(Risk avoidance is not risk reduction. This is a technical error. When Goldman Sachs models to hedge macro risk while Bank of America redlines homes into foreclosure, credit-default-swaps are not a hedge but a profit-making vehicle that derives value from detriment in a systemic, synthetically aggregated proportion. Although it may seem that profiting from the misery of others lacks propriety, what are you going to do about it?

Remember, what is synthetic about the aggregate is the value "created," not the risk. The benefit is derived from the loss, not created--the risk of loss is fully assumed in priority. It is a false benefit that accumulates retributive value in the aggregate, which is empirical value used to synthesize an ontological argument that values the risk as collective action in the marketplace.

Since the aggregate--the sum of the squares--is where the ontological truth resides, from which derives the axiom that the technicals never lie, the truth can nevertheless be synthesized. Truth can be technically manipulated, like when Barklays manipulates the LIBOR.

Lies are derived from the truth. When a bank manipulates rates it produces a technical benefit, but in the aggregate the risk of loss is fully assumed. So, who trusts Barklays to do the right thing with all that accumulated capital anyway?

By allowing banks to be so big they can manipulate the technicals and move markets to produce a surprise premium--which is a surprise only to those who consume the detriment--we are, supposedly, reducing risk with an economy-of-scale efficiency. Remember, "In God We Trust." The trust will be accounted for in the aggregate according to free-market theory, but according to efficient-markets theory markets need to be consolidated to reduce the risk of a declining rate of profit.)

The risk is not reduced. In fact, it is accumulated into the risk being avoided, which accumulates more risk. While Ivy-League, business school graduates consider this to be a clever means of commanding detriment with the appearance of being on demand, it is, in objective reality, a technical failure that demands a political resolution--collective action.

By means of demand destruction (the slow demand we have now, for example), consolidation of capital is supposed to make us more competitive by achieving economy-of-scale efficiency, but it really reduces competition and proprietary risk. It reduces detriment that consumers otherwise exact on the so-called "best and the brightest" in the marketplace, unconsolidated, on demand.

(Capitalists tend to question the value of moral intelligence. They tend to the philosophy of Ayn Rand, for example, in which intelligence is merely a function of taking and keeping power in a free market. Morality is a function of controlling relative value on command, not on demand.

A philosophy of risk that discounts moral intelligence is exactly what the capitalist is looking for, relying on the ontology of the outcome to guide our sense of morality, technically demonstrated in the aggregate. The ontology--objective reality--is not something that can be changed, nor should we try, but just let it be.

While exacting detriment in zero-sum is relatively easy, maintaining dominance in a free market without consolidating the risk requires more intelligence than the so-called best and the brightest have on command. Instead of expanding the economy, and the capacity to self-determine, they spend a lot of energy "creating" a false ontology that excludes the value of moral intelligence, subscribing to Rand's Objectivism, for example. Creating value non-zero-sum requires the incentive--the risk--of moral intelligence on demand.

In a free market there is more to be accounted for than just the self. It requires a level of moral intelligence that efficient-markets theory unintelligently assumes in the aggregate with a post-hoc lack of priority.)

Demand is value that empirically measures the available amount of affective, collective action (retributive value) that determines the probable direction of the risk. While capitalism considers the capacity for exacting detriment on demand to be clever, having to produce a profit with full, market accountability requires a level of intellectual capacity that the best and brightest endeavor to avoid in order to survive.

When capital and markets are unconsolidated, and a free market occupies political space in an economic, alpha dimension, the best and the brightest are determined on demand. According to elite, conservative theory, however, like that of Alexander Hamilton (to which both liberals and conservatives subscribe), turning the power structure on its head is the recipe for political-economic dystopia. (See, for example, the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and Edmund Burke.)

In order to be self-determined (like the king), the elite must destroy the capacity to demand propriety. This means, contrary to our American heritage, defeating the free-market mechanism (and embracing a philosophy such as Ayn Rand's Objectivism, for example), and when the critique of capitalism is that the technicals indicate it is operating without a free-market legitimacy, the critics are axiomatically declared to be communists seeking to destroy the soul of our individuality, but consider what it means to destroy demand.

Broader and Flatter...With a Twist

Tax reform sounds great. It is the perfect plank for political succession promising an economy that is the picture of health...broader, flatter, leaner and meaner, but with a twist.

Broadening the burden and flattening the tax rate is the path to prosperity because, according to Romney and Ryan, it encourages us all to become rich and self-determined. In other words, to avoid being taxed it is necessary to be productive, but there's a twist. It is necessary, for example, to increase productivity with fewer employees, which will increase the capacity for self-determination by reducing it for others who are then taxed because they are not productive.

Right-wing conservatives claim we have a public debt that exceeds aggregate productivity because the top income class pays most of the income tax. The solution, then, they say, is to increase the burden for 99 percent of incomes in decline and reduce it for 1 percent of incomes rising in zero-sum.

According to conservative philosophy, the zero-sum increases productivity. Distribution of value in zero-sum (the 40 percent lost so far with the Great Recession, for example) provides the incentive for a net gain (the nearly 300 percent gain for the upper class). It "creates" more value than put into it. That is, the zero-sum incentive adds value that does not otherwise exist, but instead of adding value what is really added is an accumulation of risk that would not otherwise exist. This is what conservatives call "supply-side economics."

(It is important to understand that a free market keeps risk diffused. Risk is safely and soundly fully assumed and consumed ad hoc in non-catastrophic, unconsolidated proportions. It operates with a pluralistic model that is technically confirmed with unaccumulated risk, exactly the opposite of what we have now in a too-big-to-fail proportion that demands complex regulatory authority to keep the risk from deconsolidating.

The risk of loss is fully assumed but can be transformed and consumed in a catastrophic proportion. When risk gains a systemic proportion--when it goes gamma--a free market is not being allowed to operate and attempts to describe and explain the distribution of risk-reward as the product of free-market mechanics, post hoc, is a fraud, fully indicated by the technicals.)

Creating value that does not otherwise exist is the virtue of capitalism, conservatives contend, and react strongly to criticism that claims it creates more problems than it solves in zero-sum. There is truth to both positions. Capitalism, for example, increases productivity exponentially, but as the critique maintains, productivity that consumers can't afford to buy, and starving in the streets amid plenty, is hardly an improvement, providing the incentive for collective action (class warfare). To reduce the tendency for warfare (not increase it as conservatives contend) we have liberal policies and programs to conserve (correct for and retrace the value of) the elite hypothesis. The incentive to collectively act is coopted, bureaucratically structured to routinely task the externalities so the risk never goes fully gamma with the application of an elitist model.

When the externalities become too austere and counter-productive, we have the liberal alternative to the much-needed, trickle-down economic incentive that produces the slow GDP and high unemployment we have now. While it should be clear that neither really solves the problem, but retraces it, we keep doing the same thing over and over in impulsive and corrective waves, both long and short, which has a psychological, anchoring effect. The implication (the phenomenological effect) is that it can't get any better than what we have, which supports the hypothesis that history ends with capitalism.

The austerity required to cure shortages and increase productive incentive is, as we all know, premised on the trickle-down hypothesis. While it is continuously disconfirmed in the aggregate (the formula essentially being, give a little and take a lot long term), trickle-down theory still dominates the economic and political landscape.

Analyses of trickle-down economics seems cliche' at this point in history, but it is the essential principle for providing productive incentive. Capitalism claims that we will not be productive, but live like uncivilized animals locked in brutal conflict over scarcity, if we are not provided the organized incentive, the civility, to continuously add supply.

Capitalists claim they are not brutal bandits but benevolent beneficiaries of an economy that is always innovating new ways to improve the quality of life for everyone. The quality of life improves and people become more civil (or more demanding, which is a risk that is controlled by causing detriment that reduces demand) because we all want to get rich and be self-determined (like the king). Class mobility (which is as much a functional fear of non-conformity) provides productive incentive that is dependant on the amount of wealth (the detriment) that trickles-down, or distributes, to allow for self-determination on demand.

Trickle-down economics is a political scheme in the guise of economic necessity. It is not about adding supply but controlling demand.

The twist is that the more conforming, or dependant on civil authority whether public or private, the more self-determined we supposedly are, which results in cognitive dissonance. This kind of psychological disorder expresses as the binomialism that keeps our political system anchored to a relative benefit provided by the incentive to produce the relative value of the detriment. The value of the benefit is dependant on the severity of the detriment.

For the vast majority (the non-elite) there is a significant dependancy that capitalism refers to as "economic incentive," which is as much a political as an economic function. As history unfolds, the majority realizes that the self is determined by a few want-to-be kings (plutocrats) and the incentive to support the elite is fundamentally compromised with a false attribution that must be applied with the force and legitimacy of public authority.

With the illusion of progress on demand, we toggle between liberal and conservative reactions. Both parties propose and apply solutions to problems created by the other party's policy program. By continuously reinventing the problem, power is conserved in the name of continuous improvement, typically in the form of regulation and deregulation. The solution to the welfare state (the capacity to demand the oversupply and cause the need for employment to cure shortages) is trickle-down economics, and the cure for the austerity that commands it is the welfare state so that the problem, rather than the solution (free-market economics ensured by the state in priority), is always in demand.

When combined with the Laffer curve (now referred to as "The Pledge" to not increase taxes), supply-side economics is supposed to balance the budget with the added value (which cannot be taxed without causing slow productivity, like we have now, with record budget deficits). As Reagan found out, for example, the budget doesn't balance and the deficit deepens.

The broader-based income the Laffer curve demands be taxed is in decline while the value added goes untaxed, which accounts for the added supply (overproduction). Instead of being a general benefit, the added supply is transformed into a categorical detriment for "mass" consumption. Risk gains an unavoidable, aggregate, systemic proportion, and the economy is a whole lot leaner and a whole lot meaner, which accounts for big government spending while revenues decline.

What increases with the Romney-Ryan plan is not jobs. Instead, prices rise against declining demand (a detriment is exacted in the form of a proposed benefit), and because supply is added with fewer workers at lower cost on demand (the new normal), deflation, not jobs, occurs "on demand." The added supply appears to indicate the economy is more productive when it really isn't (i.e., productivity per worker rises while capacity to demand the supply--income--is falling with the result being low GDP, or slow aggregate demand). The result is technical failure and the Fed responds with something like "Operation Twist" (selling short-term debt to buy long-term debt) to increase the demand for productivity that pays the debt.

More demand for long debt (supported with a higher price) reduces the long-term rate to create a yield inversion that indicates the risk to be avoided--deflation (fewer jobs and declining demand). Capital will then move into the higher rate to deflate speculative demand in speculative markets (since it really isn't being used to add supply), reducing the price of oil, for example, which will indicate a recovery on demand.

The inversion--the twist--is the new normal. It now signals recovery, but conserved in historical perspective, in a twisted way, still technically indicates a deflationary trend.

Ending the stagflationary trend with a "Twist" provides more money to demand jobs and pay the debt, but demand will be diminished to pay the debt, especially when applied with a broader tax burden. The twist is that recovery means applying the austerity conservatives say is in demand to create jobs.

Again, understand, jobs are not created, they are demanded. The concept of the "job creators" is a lot of pretentious hokum. It is a psychotic delusion constructed into objective reality with practical theories, like supply-side theory, the Laffer curve, and efficient-markets theory (repeal of Glass-Steagall) that technically fail. These elite hypotheses are hokum to poke 'em. They are designed and implemented to technically achieve (confirm) what we have now--stagflation with the solution being deflation by popular demand. Deflation occurs with the force and legitimacy of the popular vote--fifty-plus-one and the vast majority are bust on demand with repeated command performances.

Performances include, for example, the song and dance over class warfare--a perennial command performance in which the king asserts that all he possesses belongs to everyone collectively. Demand is "collected" (horded) for safe keeping (horded to prevent shortages and hedge the risk). For those who applaud his performance, all the wealth is consumed, and those who would divide the kingdom naturally possess all the risk. All those who know the wisdom of the king will surely share in the wealth created in his name and held in common (job creation on demand).

As we know, however, the king's concept of common wealth became the concept of the "commonwealth" but with the pretense of kingly aspiration conserved in historical perspective. Capitalists are sure that history ends with its regime of power because it is more pluralistic, but as it was with the king, power consolidates to maintain alpha dominance, and because having more power than everyone else is not enough, power is tested by exacting detriment to demonstrate its extent.

Competition among elites can be extremely brutal for the non-elite who must consume the detriment because it is more likely a test for pain rather than pleasure. Real test of power is not getting people to do things they want, but what they don't want, like being austere in a consumer society. When once the consumption occured on command, detriment is now exacted with more elegance on demand so that its consumption appears to be the product of popular consent, self-determined and ontologically derived by collective action in a free and open marketplace.

Today, the test of tolerance is more likely to be in the form of a burden described as broader and flatter...with a twist.

Synthetic Risk

No such thing, and a model constructed to simulate synthetic risk will technically fail because it does not model objective reality. It models a psychotic delusion of the self--that you are so powerful you can create something out of nothing.

Risk cannot be synthesized (but it can be mispriced). It exists in priority and presents on demand (being undervalued to create an overvalued effect). Creating CDS's with the self-delusional concept of creating risk is to demand it with the technical objective of not consuming it yourself but timing it to transfer to others in the form of detriment. The value, in the aggregate, despite the delusion of grandeur (of being too big to fail), is self-retributive and not too bright.

What Jamie Dimon and JP Morgan's risk modelers didn't know, despite being the smartest people in the room, is that fractal, risk modeling does not create risk (nor does it spread the risk, which is what they say they are doing to everyone's benefit), it accumulates risk. What is created is a too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale proportion that is more likely to fail the larger it gets.

We have to keep in mind that avoiding the too-big-to-fail dimension with a discussion about firms that are "too complex and interconnected to fail" is really the same thing. The risk that catastrophically accumulates, which is why Dimon is under scrutiny, is the result of over-consolidation, which undervalues the risk and means the solution is deconsolidation--exactly what controlling authorities both public and private fail to talk about because it is the risk that is really being avoided.

As I keep pointing out, again and again, trying to avoid the fully assumed risk by synthesizing it for someone else is self-retributive. Hedging risk for profit in the name of protecting your firm from the risk of loss is pure nonsense. The hedge is then the risk to be avoided--stupid!

The problem here is that the so-called best and the brightest are not the smartest people in the room...they are the dumbest! The reality of their superiority is completely synthetic and results in real risk to be consumed on demand by both "us" and "them."

Deconsolidation will keep risk properly valued--it will keep it from being arbitraged and mistakenly considered to be added, or created, by avoiding it.

Deregulation, which is the substitute for deconsolidation, is what led to the Great Recession. It is also the policy program posited by Romney, along with the austerity program of Ryan, to price the risk, and the price will be essentially set by manipulating the tax code in the name of much-needed reform to "reduce" the risk of job "creators."

Remember, however, risk cannot be "reduced" and jobs are not "created" but produced on demand--proprietary value that Romney and Ryan want to tax and cut with a broader burden and a flatter rate.

Technical Success (Deflation On Demand)

Technical failure since '08 has been a technical success. Forcing trillions of dollars into default and consolidating the value on demand is the American dream. Even the king couldn't exact massive detriment like that. Not on demand. He could never get away with that. He had to command it.

Indeed, as Reagan described it, "America is a place where a person can still get rich."

A place where you can get rich at the expense of others and get away with it--indeed, a place where causing massive misery is regarded as the virtue of high intelligence, morally imperative, and the success we all dream of (on demand)--is truly exceptional. It is, as Romney and Ryan explain it, the land of opportunity, which is curiously, at this point, being attributed to Obama's failure, as economist Paul Krugman points out, so that Republican policies and programs continue to be a technical success.

Stagflation is the natural result of consolidation "on demand" (i.e., considered to be the most efficient, risk-averse way to manage markets toward optimal productivity) whether it is the Romney-Ryan plan or the Obama plan. Either way, debt is monetized to consume the supply and resist unemployment with the result being, however, rising prices, which supports unemployment and is a technical failure depending on the objective. New money is added that is mistaken for added risk because it is being used to support profits (on demand) against overproduction in dark, speculative markets--swapping debt instruments that eventually commands default and demands the bailout Dodd-Frank is supposed to prevent.

Mistaking added money for added risk is not fundamental error, like falsely arguing high oil prices are supported by demand when demand is falling. That is just fraud and racketeering perpetrated by a bunch of gangsters who control our economy to profit by causing massive detriment (deflation) in the name of free-market economics (on demand). While expansion is the expected value of inflation, the actual value has been deflation. That does not mean risk has been added, but misdirected (timed and transferred) to redefine the probable value of the detriment. It is not a technical failure, but successful application of the risk assessment.

Failure of the risk assessment is a technical failure that derives from fundamental attribution error. While it is correct to say that the technicals are independent of timing, and so they never lie in the aggregate, the proportion of the risk and the relative space it occupies at any particular time (in the alpha, beta, or gamma-risk dimensions) can be, and is, often misconstrued, resulting in technical failure.

It is important to understand that risk cannot be created or destroyed. Its value is fully assumed in priority and consumed on demand. Whether we like it or not, risk cannot be reduced, but it can be accumulated and distributed--timed to transfer with what appears to be an unavoidable aggregate that must be managed on command to demand the supply.

The value to be demanded (retributed) presents as empirical value--the rate of taxation. As the value demanded accumulates (surplus value) the tax rate increases, and if the burden is regressive, the more value there is to be demanded (overproduction).

Reversal of a stagflationary trend--with stagflation regarded as a phase transition by most economists--is technically indicated by a rising rate of taxation. The period of stagflation following the oil shock in the 70's, for example, increased pressure to raise the marginal rate. Although resisted by the Reagan administration, the marginal rate rose, nevertheless, to reduce budget deficits, and later, during the Bush and Clinton administrations, the marginal rate rose even more to end the stagflationary phase, which transitioned into a boom phase of the business cycle, yielding budget surpluses that resisted a declining rate of profit.

In the current environment, as the rate of taxation rises--with more than ten years of an effectively regressive tax burden and even more to come if Romney and Ryan have their way--the rate of profit will decline, and resisting the declining rate of profit is job one. When there is no one left to pay the debt but the top quintile of income classification, the economic trend will reverse to pay the rent--what a Romney campaign slogan describes as "Putting Jobs First."

Failure to support the profit margin with a declining, marginal rate of taxation is, by natural condition, a technical success because it empowers more consumers with more discretion to spend. Stagflation ends, keeping in mind that a declining, non-marginal rate will support profits just fine, but without all the detriment like the "fiscal cliff" we now face. Resisting a declining, marginal rate prevents us from burying ourselves in detriment in the name of self-interest, which according to Romney and Ryan is a technical failure.

Technical failure and success is a function of working/analytical modeling. Constructing a model to legitimize the outcome, post hoc, as a technical success is not intended to have predictive utility.

Analyses used to predict economic trending is probably wrong not because it is in the aggregate random and unpredictable, but because it is intended to misdirect market participants into affirming adverse possession of the risk. This can be easily accomplished by moving markets contrary to technically indicated trends, which is a manipulation that can only be accomplished with a highly consolidated capital that operates with the effect of concentrated power--exactly what a free market is not!

Models not intended to be confirmational, but affirmational, are prone to technical failure. Not only are they not intended to be predictive, but because they are intended to confirm class identity with empirical value, the aggregate value consumed is ingeniously modeled to appear as value ontologically derived. This false ontology is the gamma-risk proportion--it is highly unstable and predictably catastrophic.

A predictive model is likely to operate as an independent, objective reality. The Romney-Ryan plan, for example, is supposed to be the path to prosperity, and predictably it is for the top-income classification. Since the evidence is verifiably positive by confirming a verifiable detriment for everybody else, the detriment is modeled as a naturally occurring, objective reality, a la Ayn Rand, in the aggregate. The outcome is commanded by nature, and so it is foolish--"intellectually lazy" as Ryan describes it--to resist it on demand. It is in this way that technical failure is modeled as technical success, and why we keep making the same mistakes, like regressing the tax burden to make the people that pay it more prosperous, over and over again.

One sure measure of success is the rate of taxation. A regressive tax burden indicates technical success if you want to be king (and technically conserves the power to stay king) since the king exacts the burden and subjects pay it. Keep in mind as well, the higher the burden (the more austerity exacted on demand to pay the debt--what the king referred to as extension of the rent), the more power technically indicated.

For a power elite, the closer the economy is to technical failure, the closer we are to technical success in the name of much-needed austerity to pay our debts and keep the king(s) (the "job creators") fully liquid and in command. The more failure (the more capital invested in credit-default swaps, for example, to extend the rent), the more success to be derived.

Today, rent is extended by consolidation of capital, which is described as free-market efficiency. Using the "demand" dimension of the marketplace, deflation (reduction of net worth, a 40 percent reduction for 99 percent of Americans as the result of the Great Recession, for example) occurs with an on-demand legitimacy and permutations of popular rule by elite authority.

Whether the objective reality is considered to be capitalist, socialist, or communist, consolidation of power (value attributed to the king in the form of taxation) is considered to be the most efficient way to limit the risk, paradoxically, by accumulating it (value to be retributed). The king (government authority) is not rendered less powerful by an accumulation of capital, but more powerful. Is this a technical failure or a technical success?

While capitalism has pluralized the possible number of would-be rulers who supposedly operate with more productive efficiency with less government, why is there so much demand for government, and higher taxes?

Limited government, remember, technically indicates a working, pluralistic model. Limited government on command does not cause freedom, it is the measurable effect on demand.

Lowering the marginal rate on command, like Romney and Ryan propose, will not reduce the demand for higher taxes. Instead, demand to tax will increase while the supply to meet demand (high profits supported by monetized debt) accumulates at the margin. The marginal rate, then, will naturally rise to meet demand. The risk of loss is fully assumed on demand despite all attempts to broaden the base and flatten the rate on command.

Since the Romney-Ryan plan is technically doomed to fail, it is necessary to invoke Rand's Aristotelian philosophy of risk. It is the latest version of conservative philosophy that posits the poor are too rich and the rich too poor because the tax rate is too progressive.

A lower marginal rate, according to conservative philosophy, makes us more productive, in fact, so productive that we have more supply, like housing, than we can demand, and the cure for that is, curiously, to be more productive.

Building more houses that consumers can't afford to buy is not the objective reality of curing shortages, understand, but deflation on demand. What is "produced" is the crisis of liquidity that private equity capitalizes on, demanding the rate of taxation be regressed to conserve the value derived from the detriment.

Voters need to understand that complex credit instruments swapped in derivatives markets are intended to deflate the economy on demand. It is a highly technical endeavor intended to make markets technically appear to be in control of our fate "on demand" by legitimate means of self-determination.

Swapping credit for risk-value in capital markets in the form of credit-default swaps, however, is not something the vast majority of voters are directly involved in. Technically, "We" are not in a position to determine the value derived in the image of the "self" as our founders envisioned it, but instead "We" are being positioned to consume the risk on command authority in the guise of the general welfare.

Securing the general welfare means controlling the macro-risk proportion--crises in the aggregate realm of technical analayses in which only the so-called "best and the brightest" are capable of managing into technical failure. The rest of us, about 99 percent of us, don't have the technical knowledge to manage the risk, and when it is a technical failure, "We" are too stupid and ignorant--or as Ryan describes it, "intellectually lazy"--to understand it for the success it really is in the realm of objective reality.

Romney and Ryan are prepared, I understand, to turn technical failure into technical success, but only if "We" let them.

Technical Failure

Labor has been working more for less because productivity has been gained with fewer workers. The derivative is consolidated income (value "lost") needed to demand the supply.

The value derived (the detriment exacted) has created our too-big-to-fail banks that the President says we need to provide capital world wide even after demonstrating derivative practices that still threaten global economic stability. Both the Obama administration and Congress support the accumulation of risk (value fully intended to be "lost") that comes with the use of efficient-markets theory.

Support for the theory predicts technical failure. The administration wrongly thinks bigger is better, explaining that unemployment is best reduced by eliminating subsidies that export jobs and import low-wage goods, which explains why regulatory authority has not been used to curtail speculative demand in futures markets (because it provides capital world wide to demand cheap labor) and why prices continue to rise against declining demand. Demand is so slack that even low-wage goods are becoming unaffordable, however, and the Chinese experience what it means to be capitalist--the crisis of overproduction.

When goods and services can't be bought at any price because income is too consolidated from exporting jobs (reducing demand against rising prices), reducing subsidies that support the export of labor value assumes the export will be reduced enough to increase demand. Instead, what will happen, because income is so consolidated, prices will be pushed up in speculative markets with the anticipated demand, which will reduce demand against rising prices.

By technical objective, high prices against a rising supply stagflates the economy (the problem to be solved in the aggregate) to resist the declining rate of profit. Paradoxically, when capital is allowed to consolidate into a too-big-to-fail (gamma-risk), aggregate proportion to resist deflation (a declining rate of profit), the more support the problem to be solved gets.

The more the fully assumed risk of loss (the alpha risk) is resisted and accumulated, the more probable it will occur in a gamma-risk proportion, and this catastrophic accumulation of risk is technically indicated by an accumulating supply against rising prices. (Notice it was just the opposite for consumers in the USSR. Shortages occurred against low prices with the result being an accumulation of political, gamma risk. Notice that in both cases alpha risk has been allowed to consolidate in order to avoid the direct accountability of free-market economics that requires less need--less demand--for government.) The result is high inflation and unemployment--the problem we have now.

Reducing the problem of overproduction to job-export subsidies lacks good analytical skill. We have these subsidies because power is too consolidated to resist it, and this power derives from consolidating capital into a too-big-to-fail proportion. Again, the problem is not that value is surplussed to avoid shortages, the problem is that the value is consolidated as productivity rises. The "change we really need" is resistance to consolidation, not support, and the problem expresses at the micro as well as the macro level.

Economists tend to ignore macro risk because "it just happens" as the result of micro-risk assessments. Objectively, however, macro risk is ignored because it is the primary means of exacting the detriment.

Risk is micro managed into a macro-risk proportion to, supposedly, avoid it. The result, however, is the crisis of overproduction, which is nonsensically attributed to low productivity and why analyses technically fail on a regular basis.

Macro risk is considered largely a function of probability. Since it is not a risk proportion that we can predict or control (time and transfer in the aggregate), it is a function of statistical probability that essentially measures the level of our ignorance. What we cannot know is attributed to randomness which, of course, explains the frequency of technical failure and the "surprise" reversals that, despite being ignored, are anticipated well in advance to produce value (accumulated wealth and power) from the detriment.

Since, remember, random events are by definition beyond our means of technical direction, the outcome is non-retributive (non-anthropogenic). The best we can do is analyze micro events, but that does not necessarily indicate the probable risk in the aggregate like when we consolidate the risk to efficiently manage markets to hedge the macro risk.

Instead of being reinvested to support the capacity to demand the supply, consolidation of capital (storing value to prevent shortages and the large-scale, macro risk associated with it) is used, for example, to parabolically over-price shares of facebook's IPO on demand. Technically, this "makes" a few people exceedingly rich with "new money" to demonstrate that capitalism really does work in the face of rising prices and slow, consumer demand.

Interesting that facebook's value is priced on a service consumers don't have to pay to use. If it was, the demand would not exist to support the price because it has been systematically disintegrated and the value derived consolidated into a volatile risk dimension that demands the value by fiat, not by the invisible hand of aggregated, collective, consumer power on demand.

Collective power on demand is akin to communism. It is the opposite of capitalism, so we have to be sure to ignore aggregate, collective power (the alpha-risk dimension of the invisible hand) and focus on the power of the individual hand.

Capitalism focuses on the entrepreneur that consolidates power and elegantly traps liquidity (the power to collectively self-determine) in dark markets in the guise of the invisible hand (i.e., with the constant perpetration of a fraud). A demand legitimacy operating within the command dimension is the gamma risk--it is the opposite of a free market, relying on government intervention to manage the aggregation of risk post hoc, which is then falsely reasoned to be the cause of the aggregate detriment that is really the natural effect (the empirically verifiable result) of the value accumulated.

Attributing risk to value accumulated on demand in a command dimension is fundamentally unstable and requires the force and legitimacy of public authority. The attribution transforms alpha risk into gamma risk by technical objective, and because of the inherent contradiction, whether capitalist or communist (destroying freedom in order to have it or conserve it), the working model will technically fail in the aggregate when the risk goes fully gamma.

(Understand that the gamma risk is more than just policy uncertainty that results from government intervention. The gamma dimension is where the fully assumed risk of loss occurs. It is not a probability, it is a sure thing that capitalism wants to ignore with the attribution of inculpable, aggregated value. The value, however, is fully culpable, and ignoring it is, technically, what accumulates the alpha into a gamma-risk dimension.)

Disintegration of the productive value (labor's integral value to the formation of the capital invested that is not retributed) presents as systemic risk that economists say we cannot control, and so it is always out of control, which demands markets be efficiently managed, post hoc, to control the externalities. Systemic risk (the aggregate sum of micro motives liberally pursued) is described as a naturally occurring, free-market phenomenon that is not caused by making markets, but markets are made, instead, to control, or efficiently manage, the effect (risk that accumulates with disintegration of the value). Objectively, then, the macro trend is stagflationary because productivity is high against declining demand.

High productivity against falling demand yields the objective value of unemployment. This value is consolidated to form the systemic risk (high profits against a slow economy) that modern economics technically considers to be, in the aggregate, ontologically derived.

Technically, the value consolidated is not derived, however. It is integral value that has been dis-integrated (destroyed) to yield (create) the value consolidated by technical objective. It is the creative-destruction that Romney, Ryan, and Rand describe as our natural condition, and so not resisting it is categorically imperative because nature demands it whether we like it or not. Letting too-big-to-fail firms like GM fail is the right thing to do because it consolidates the risk proportion to be efficiently managed.

Private equity firms, and banks that are too big to fail, reactionaries generally agree, are not immoral monsters feeding on the misery of others. The capital accumulated turns the detriment into surplus value--it turns the loss into profit, which resists shortages, but not with a disinflationary trend that would reduce the supply and increase productive incentive. Instead, the resistance is in the form of an inflationary trend (oversupply at high prices) that has a deflationary, macro effect that we tend to ignore (because we, supposedly, can't control it) until the numbers verify it, like we have now.

Currently, for example, we have a sharp correction in oil prices because it is overproduced at the relative price, but according to mainstream, market analysts, the price is falling because the dollar is rising against the Euro. While weak demand at high prices will account for the correction to the penny, analysts will not admit to overproduction being the problem with the result being technical failure and a stagflationary economy ad infinitum.

(If you recall, back in '09 after oil crashed to around $40 per barrel under deflationary pressure, and the Fed pumped in a load of money to resist the declining rate of profit, pop, technical analysis touted a rising oil price as a signal for economic recovery. Of course, like I said, this is wrong, and the Obama administration later said the economy was really worse than it had expected when the technicals failed to predict the direction of the trend.

The technicals fail to predict the trend because the capital is too consolidated for the laws of supply and demand to behave as expected. Instead, like I said then, because the risk proportion is going fully gamma, a falling oil price signals recovery...something that a Recovery Act will not do, what a JOBS Act will not do, but what expansion of the monetary supply to deconsolidate the risk will do in short order.)

Temporal fallacy is critical for maintaining technical failure. When too-big-to-fail banks operate unregulated and bankrupt millions of Americans (with no liability because it is an uncontrollable, aggregate effect described as market efficiency), regulation is legislated to make the market more efficient. When regulation does not cure the problem, but may in fact support it because it is a symptomatic treatment, the lack of resistance is attributed to the effect (regulation) and not the cause.

The marketplace is then deregulated, rather than deconsolidated, to solve the problem with the efficiency of markets. With regulation again in demand to make markets more efficient (Dodd-Frank, for example), the value of the risk proportion (the too-big-to-fail tautology) is conserved.

Conservation of the risk in a catastrophic (aggregative) proportion demands command authority. It demands, for example, the regulatory authority (the bureaucratic model) of the Federal Reserve (manipulation of the money supply). Reducing deflationary risk to prevent a declining rate of profit requires adding to the money supply (aggregating risk on command) with the result being the stagflation we have now, which can, of course, be blamed on the Fed acting (by fiat, or non-market means) to treat the symptoms (the effects) to conserve the cause. With this kind of deductive reasoning (the tautology), considering that the problem persists whether we regulate or deregulate, consolidation is never the problem but always considered to be the regulated or unregulated solution.

With weak demand the Fed will naturally keep interest rates at record lows, and the funds available (the supply of money added) will be used to bid up the oversupply, which weakens demand against high prices. Technically, the marketplace is being efficiently managed into failure, parlously perched on the precipice, just one nudge away from being pushed into a full-blown deflationary trend.