When the risk is too consolidated, there is deflationary risk. Without a distribution (deconsolidation), the risk becomes extensive, or systemic. An extension of the risk occurs, distributing risk without the reward. The economy is in a defensive (crisis) mode with no one willing to "take the risk" simply because there is no risk to take--it is consolidated.
Entrepreneurs seek protection from the detriment extending from the consolidation instead of seeking growth: cutting costs, hording cash and labor, which makes the risk more extensive. Thus the old saying, "you can cut your way to a profit but not growth," meaning a distribution is in demand but accumulation is being supplied (commanded to apply, extended from the consolidation of the risk).
The oversupply of risk meant trouble for the king who wanted to know the extent of the risk (the assessment of value). Since the risk is consolidated into the sovereign power of the crown, the king not only owns the assets, but the liabilities--and to what extent.
Hedging the systemic risk caused by the crown (the accumulation) meant distributing reward with the risk. The market value then determined whether entrepreneurs would take the risk (implying consent of its source being from the crown's authority), which then delimited the extent of systemic risk (the king's liability).
American colonists took a big risk to challenge the crown's legitimacy to rule, to command, the distributional coefficiency of risk and reward. The crisis that occurred was a critique of sovereign power--it was more than deflationary (economically defensive), it was revolutionary (politically offensive). Thus was born the political-economic extension of the risk in a consolidated form.
We now face the spectre of global consolidation where the market is free from the sovereign power--the natural laws--of The People, providing an operational gestalt of supra-sovereignty, and global extension of the risk.
Without deconsolidation of the risk, the need for government just gets "bigger" from here in order to control the over-extension of risk.
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Saturday, August 28, 2010
Extent of Risk
In a defensive mode (having value to protect from loss), analysts assess the extent of the risk. It is both a function of keeping accounts and retributing the value to its source (including the value of any liability to the risk).
The chairman of the Federal Reserve says, for example, he will extend the extended policy of monetary easing. Bernanke says resisting deflation is job one.
Deflation presents the highest degree of risk, extending to every aspect of the economy, especially the accumulation of gamma risk that is already over-accumulated.
Our concept of risk incunabulates from the accumulated wealth of royalty. They also accumulated risk with the reward, and it was necessary to measure the extent of the risk in order to keep the wealth accumulated without discouraging the incentive to produce it, much like we do today, trading reduced risk for distribution of the reward. The trick, of course, is to reduce the extent of the risk without a proportional distribution which, of course, as the king found out, does not happen without certain, inevitable, risk.
Gamma reduction of the risk (reducing the risk of losing the ability to command and control it) is job one. It has priority or the power will be lost to a lower class (like progressives) just like the king had to share power with the bourgeoisie--a process in which the king's wealth was transformed into capital, which was transformed into the wealth of nations, displacing the rights of the king with a ruling class empowered with the natural right of The People (its subjects) to sovereign power, effectively reducing the liability of the risk.
The volume of risk, however, remains the same irrespective of the shape of the vessel that contains it and manages it to a current value.
It is necessary, then, to evaluate and delimit the extent of the risk--to keep account of assets and probable liability of their accumulation, which is largely a statistical function.
Statistical learning is fundamental to cognition, and in the human species, measuring the probability of the risk--delimiting permanence, identifying the enduring elements of generalized risk--becomes an epistemic gestalt. The objective of "taking the risk" is more than just the sum of its parts. The gestalt has to be structured into a system of rules and boundaries to delimit the objective to the reward. It must fit the level of risk, which if consolidated, clearly defines the reward (class) for all to see (the empirical measure, and the current value, of the risk) in the midst of an otherwise infinite number of probable outcomes (the interpretive property of cognition).
When the needed distribution does not occur to reduce the risk, there is an extension of the risk, increasing the number of probable outcomes (interpretations of the risk). The amount and distributional proportion of risk remains the same. It is the interpretation of the risk that changes with a resulting volatility of its current value, referred to as market sentiment, falsely inferring a popular consent, accumulating value arbitrated from the risk when a distribution is what is needed.
English royalty utilized a device called a "writ of extent" which ordered an assessment of property in payment of debt to the crown. Vestige of that writ survives in the form of defaults and foreclosures, securitized debt, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps. Just today, for example, CDS's on treasury securities increased to thirty percent which, of course, is perfect nonsense. While the value of the securities is elastic, the probability of default, unlike the king, is zero. The measure is an interpretation of the extent of the risk that gives it valuable volatility--value arbitraged, or derived, from the interpretation of the risk. If it measures anything, it indicates the willingness of a consolidated capital to remain illiquid.
The illiquidity extends the real value of the risk, just as it did for the king--keeping the source of the value subjected to the current interpretation of its value.
Illiquidity is a crisis mode of capitalism. It is being deliberately extended to derive current value to the point of liability. The amount of accumulated liability is being regulated by the Fed which will continue to resist deflation with inflationary policy.
While a depression will not occur (avoiding a critique of social value--delimiting solutions to the generalized interpretation of the risk), the effect is extended to dissipate the risk of liability without deconsolidating the risk from the gamma proportion. It is the Fed's job to manage the proportion of this risk, "accommodating" an interpretation that produces value without risk of liability--a privilege enjoyed by the king, accounting for the extent of the risk.
The chairman of the Federal Reserve says, for example, he will extend the extended policy of monetary easing. Bernanke says resisting deflation is job one.
Deflation presents the highest degree of risk, extending to every aspect of the economy, especially the accumulation of gamma risk that is already over-accumulated.
Our concept of risk incunabulates from the accumulated wealth of royalty. They also accumulated risk with the reward, and it was necessary to measure the extent of the risk in order to keep the wealth accumulated without discouraging the incentive to produce it, much like we do today, trading reduced risk for distribution of the reward. The trick, of course, is to reduce the extent of the risk without a proportional distribution which, of course, as the king found out, does not happen without certain, inevitable, risk.
Gamma reduction of the risk (reducing the risk of losing the ability to command and control it) is job one. It has priority or the power will be lost to a lower class (like progressives) just like the king had to share power with the bourgeoisie--a process in which the king's wealth was transformed into capital, which was transformed into the wealth of nations, displacing the rights of the king with a ruling class empowered with the natural right of The People (its subjects) to sovereign power, effectively reducing the liability of the risk.
The volume of risk, however, remains the same irrespective of the shape of the vessel that contains it and manages it to a current value.
It is necessary, then, to evaluate and delimit the extent of the risk--to keep account of assets and probable liability of their accumulation, which is largely a statistical function.
Statistical learning is fundamental to cognition, and in the human species, measuring the probability of the risk--delimiting permanence, identifying the enduring elements of generalized risk--becomes an epistemic gestalt. The objective of "taking the risk" is more than just the sum of its parts. The gestalt has to be structured into a system of rules and boundaries to delimit the objective to the reward. It must fit the level of risk, which if consolidated, clearly defines the reward (class) for all to see (the empirical measure, and the current value, of the risk) in the midst of an otherwise infinite number of probable outcomes (the interpretive property of cognition).
When the needed distribution does not occur to reduce the risk, there is an extension of the risk, increasing the number of probable outcomes (interpretations of the risk). The amount and distributional proportion of risk remains the same. It is the interpretation of the risk that changes with a resulting volatility of its current value, referred to as market sentiment, falsely inferring a popular consent, accumulating value arbitrated from the risk when a distribution is what is needed.
English royalty utilized a device called a "writ of extent" which ordered an assessment of property in payment of debt to the crown. Vestige of that writ survives in the form of defaults and foreclosures, securitized debt, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps. Just today, for example, CDS's on treasury securities increased to thirty percent which, of course, is perfect nonsense. While the value of the securities is elastic, the probability of default, unlike the king, is zero. The measure is an interpretation of the extent of the risk that gives it valuable volatility--value arbitraged, or derived, from the interpretation of the risk. If it measures anything, it indicates the willingness of a consolidated capital to remain illiquid.
The illiquidity extends the real value of the risk, just as it did for the king--keeping the source of the value subjected to the current interpretation of its value.
Illiquidity is a crisis mode of capitalism. It is being deliberately extended to derive current value to the point of liability. The amount of accumulated liability is being regulated by the Fed which will continue to resist deflation with inflationary policy.
While a depression will not occur (avoiding a critique of social value--delimiting solutions to the generalized interpretation of the risk), the effect is extended to dissipate the risk of liability without deconsolidating the risk from the gamma proportion. It is the Fed's job to manage the proportion of this risk, "accommodating" an interpretation that produces value without risk of liability--a privilege enjoyed by the king, accounting for the extent of the risk.
Thursday, August 26, 2010
Economic Gestalt
Few hedge-fund firms that relied on technical patterns to predict behavioral trends are left standing. They have been bowled over by the fiats of consolidated risk management that can easily reverse, if not eliminate, expected coefficients, rendering what appear to be stochastic events that yield the "value" of surprise.
Obviously, the value of the surprise-premium is based solely on perception of the risk. That perception is conceived, or modeled, from experience of past events. If the events were ontologically derived, the stochastic models would predict the current value of the risk based on the probability of future events, but only "if."
A nearly trillion-dollar stimulus and next-to-nothing interest rates should be plenty counter-cyclical, for example, but...surprise!
All you have to do to fake-out the Fibonaccis is act with a high order of accumulated capital, consolidated risk, and order of intention. Without deconsolidation of the capital, and risk, the golden ratios are so much gooey glop with as much inelasticity as tapioca pudding.
Keynesian management of the risk is supposed to render a depressionary cycle obsolete. Surprise! The capital has become so consolidated that all it takes is a high order of intention to force our economy all the way back to a time when a "writ of extent" was financially fashionable.
All that has to be done to force the economy into a depression is to keep hording cash at the top, like the king could, leaving his "subjects" with nothing but the bare essentials, if that, and all the wealth, and risk, consolidated into the empirical sovereignty of the crown.
This economic gestalt is built into the perception of accumulated wealth, and the fiat distribution of risk, as a right or privilege not apparent by the sum of individual parts into a whole.
Something has value if the king commands it. Currently, the king (the gestalt of wealth and power) says employment does not have value. It is not worth spending his money on, which produces value for the king at his subject's expense. So, the sheriff is busy about, assessing the extent of the risk.
The king is so intoxicated with his power--his divine, providential right--that he does not realize what the sheriff's assessment is actually measuring. It is the gamma risk--the economic gestalt that at the time of mercantilism converged divine right with the natural rights of man, and diverged the coefficiency of power into a more pluralistic "extension" of the risk.
This process of convergence and divergence is still in procession, but with highly organized, technical means to slow its progress. The order of intent is highly sophisticated, making it appear that free society has reached the pinnacle of organizational efficiency by consolidation of its power (and the risk that comes with it).
The more latently gestalt the risk becomes, the more it accumulates until it breaks. Crisis, however, does not have to be at the pinnacle of operant conditioning, but a precognition that measures the extent of the risk with the highest order of intent.
The successful management of risk is the ability to predict and effect the behavior of others. It is a fundamental human endeavor that is defined, measured and delimited by the organized accumulation and distribution of power.
The gestalt is a delimiter of risk management, limiting problems to their appropriate solutions by delimiting the generalized concept of what the risk is. It compels a cognitive species to mirror the success accomplished by the freedom to choose, structured into a currency of value for all to see, indivisibly appreciating what is a divisibly immeasurable source of value.
Obviously, the value of the surprise-premium is based solely on perception of the risk. That perception is conceived, or modeled, from experience of past events. If the events were ontologically derived, the stochastic models would predict the current value of the risk based on the probability of future events, but only "if."
A nearly trillion-dollar stimulus and next-to-nothing interest rates should be plenty counter-cyclical, for example, but...surprise!
All you have to do to fake-out the Fibonaccis is act with a high order of accumulated capital, consolidated risk, and order of intention. Without deconsolidation of the capital, and risk, the golden ratios are so much gooey glop with as much inelasticity as tapioca pudding.
Keynesian management of the risk is supposed to render a depressionary cycle obsolete. Surprise! The capital has become so consolidated that all it takes is a high order of intention to force our economy all the way back to a time when a "writ of extent" was financially fashionable.
All that has to be done to force the economy into a depression is to keep hording cash at the top, like the king could, leaving his "subjects" with nothing but the bare essentials, if that, and all the wealth, and risk, consolidated into the empirical sovereignty of the crown.
This economic gestalt is built into the perception of accumulated wealth, and the fiat distribution of risk, as a right or privilege not apparent by the sum of individual parts into a whole.
Something has value if the king commands it. Currently, the king (the gestalt of wealth and power) says employment does not have value. It is not worth spending his money on, which produces value for the king at his subject's expense. So, the sheriff is busy about, assessing the extent of the risk.
The king is so intoxicated with his power--his divine, providential right--that he does not realize what the sheriff's assessment is actually measuring. It is the gamma risk--the economic gestalt that at the time of mercantilism converged divine right with the natural rights of man, and diverged the coefficiency of power into a more pluralistic "extension" of the risk.
This process of convergence and divergence is still in procession, but with highly organized, technical means to slow its progress. The order of intent is highly sophisticated, making it appear that free society has reached the pinnacle of organizational efficiency by consolidation of its power (and the risk that comes with it).
The more latently gestalt the risk becomes, the more it accumulates until it breaks. Crisis, however, does not have to be at the pinnacle of operant conditioning, but a precognition that measures the extent of the risk with the highest order of intent.
The successful management of risk is the ability to predict and effect the behavior of others. It is a fundamental human endeavor that is defined, measured and delimited by the organized accumulation and distribution of power.
The gestalt is a delimiter of risk management, limiting problems to their appropriate solutions by delimiting the generalized concept of what the risk is. It compels a cognitive species to mirror the success accomplished by the freedom to choose, structured into a currency of value for all to see, indivisibly appreciating what is a divisibly immeasurable source of value.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Orders of Intention
Behavioral scientists describe a high and low order of intention when explaining behavior. The more capacity for anticipating the future, if not engineering it, the higher the order of intent.
Anticipation of future value gives current value to the risk. Future value is usefully present, represented as probable risk. Critique of the economic system, which is concomitant to a high level of gamma risk, currently has the expression of probable deflationary risk, for example.
As the economy spirals down, anticipating the future value of the risk, its current value (foreclosures and reduction of net worth) appears to lack a high order of intention and appears to generate an indivisible, "systemic" risk. The exculpatory valuation of the risk is, however, a systemic fraud.
Perpetrating an exculpatory valuation of the risk has an intent of the very highest order, intending to convert and consolidate value by causing a detriment (the current value of the recession and the deflationary trend). So, Goldman Sachs, for example, a chief engineer of the current value, recently downgraded the economy. That value was well anticipated, converted and consolidated well in advance of the current downward trend that it will falsely claim it is now a victim, just like everybody else.
In order to reverse the deflationary trend quickly and effectively, firms like Bank of America and Goldman Sachs must be liquidated and the consolidated value retributed to pluralize the financial system, "currently" being deliberately starved of liquidity, causing a massive, systemic detriment that is intended to be consolidated and used against The People they call their customers. It is a massive fraud, inimical to a civil society in the most primal sense, to be resisted with the highest order of intention.
Bond prices, for example, are high because the accumulation of value moved there. Prices move higher wherever the accumulated value goes, causing a bubble (boom and bust volatility that consolidates value). The problem is not the bubble, it is the accumulation of the value (and the consolidation of the risk). It needs to be de-consolidated so that the current value of the risk can never be in a command mode (limiting freedom, causing the need for government).
The ability to command prices is by definition a high order of intent, and in a free-market economy in which prices are demanded, not commanded by an overaccumulated economy-of-scale valuation, it is criminal.
Isn't it interesting, given the expected value of the risk being bleak at best going forward, we currently have Republicans giving speeches about how they can save us from Democrats, who were saving us from Republicans. Just exactly what is the order of intention here? What is the "real" current value of the risk?
Anticipation of future value gives current value to the risk. Future value is usefully present, represented as probable risk. Critique of the economic system, which is concomitant to a high level of gamma risk, currently has the expression of probable deflationary risk, for example.
As the economy spirals down, anticipating the future value of the risk, its current value (foreclosures and reduction of net worth) appears to lack a high order of intention and appears to generate an indivisible, "systemic" risk. The exculpatory valuation of the risk is, however, a systemic fraud.
Perpetrating an exculpatory valuation of the risk has an intent of the very highest order, intending to convert and consolidate value by causing a detriment (the current value of the recession and the deflationary trend). So, Goldman Sachs, for example, a chief engineer of the current value, recently downgraded the economy. That value was well anticipated, converted and consolidated well in advance of the current downward trend that it will falsely claim it is now a victim, just like everybody else.
In order to reverse the deflationary trend quickly and effectively, firms like Bank of America and Goldman Sachs must be liquidated and the consolidated value retributed to pluralize the financial system, "currently" being deliberately starved of liquidity, causing a massive, systemic detriment that is intended to be consolidated and used against The People they call their customers. It is a massive fraud, inimical to a civil society in the most primal sense, to be resisted with the highest order of intention.
Bond prices, for example, are high because the accumulation of value moved there. Prices move higher wherever the accumulated value goes, causing a bubble (boom and bust volatility that consolidates value). The problem is not the bubble, it is the accumulation of the value (and the consolidation of the risk). It needs to be de-consolidated so that the current value of the risk can never be in a command mode (limiting freedom, causing the need for government).
The ability to command prices is by definition a high order of intent, and in a free-market economy in which prices are demanded, not commanded by an overaccumulated economy-of-scale valuation, it is criminal.
Isn't it interesting, given the expected value of the risk being bleak at best going forward, we currently have Republicans giving speeches about how they can save us from Democrats, who were saving us from Republicans. Just exactly what is the order of intention here? What is the "real" current value of the risk?
Sunday, August 22, 2010
Expected Value of the Risk
Going forward, what is the expected value of the risk?
With the Great Recession empirically defining social class by income (the ability to increase net worth), for any investor that is not in the top two quintiles, trying to increase your income is largely a function of protecting it from the "systemic risk."
The strategy will be defensive for all income classes. We all have to protect ourselves from the high accumulation of gamma risk. We are all looking to government to protect us from its overaccumulation.
The more value accumulated (the higher your net worth), the more able to protect yourself from the gamma risk exposure (the ability to "cover" your losses and stay solvent). Too-big-to-fail banks should be insolvent, but the government defended their creditworthiness at the expense of millions of people.
By what standard are The People legitimately deprived of adequate income and housing?
The ontology of the business cycle--the process of free-market mechanics--is argued to be the objective determinant of distributive value (who takes the risk, who accumulates the reward, and why).
So, then, it is absolutely critical to objectively (non-ideologically) answer the question: are we operating with a free market?
Risk that is fully valued in a gamma proportion (relying on government protection) indicates the opposite of a free market.
If the market is not free, what do we have to do to make it free?
If there is one thing we should rely on government to protect and defend in priority, as our founders envisioned and we still regard with both an idealistic and Constitutional measure, is to ensure freedom. That especially includes ensuring a free-and-unconsolidated marketplace in priority--exactly what defending and protecting consolidated, too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale firms is not.
An economy-of-scale deprivation is not to be politically, legitimately, protected and defended, but that is exactly what We The People have. All that does is consolidate the gamma risk, causing the instability that our founders sought to avoid--causing the need for government (the king, or that is, the consolidation of sovereign power and the consolidation of risk).
The expected value of "the risk" is reduced to a political evaluation--a critique--that formulates a confirmable hypothesis despite all attempts not to. "The risk" of a confirmable hypothesis is improvement, something the socio-economic elite will politically avoid at all cost, including a more progressive tax code.
It is not the progression of the tax code that is the determining variable, but what We expect to do with the value accumulated.
With the Great Recession empirically defining social class by income (the ability to increase net worth), for any investor that is not in the top two quintiles, trying to increase your income is largely a function of protecting it from the "systemic risk."
The strategy will be defensive for all income classes. We all have to protect ourselves from the high accumulation of gamma risk. We are all looking to government to protect us from its overaccumulation.
The more value accumulated (the higher your net worth), the more able to protect yourself from the gamma risk exposure (the ability to "cover" your losses and stay solvent). Too-big-to-fail banks should be insolvent, but the government defended their creditworthiness at the expense of millions of people.
By what standard are The People legitimately deprived of adequate income and housing?
The ontology of the business cycle--the process of free-market mechanics--is argued to be the objective determinant of distributive value (who takes the risk, who accumulates the reward, and why).
So, then, it is absolutely critical to objectively (non-ideologically) answer the question: are we operating with a free market?
Risk that is fully valued in a gamma proportion (relying on government protection) indicates the opposite of a free market.
If the market is not free, what do we have to do to make it free?
If there is one thing we should rely on government to protect and defend in priority, as our founders envisioned and we still regard with both an idealistic and Constitutional measure, is to ensure freedom. That especially includes ensuring a free-and-unconsolidated marketplace in priority--exactly what defending and protecting consolidated, too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale firms is not.
An economy-of-scale deprivation is not to be politically, legitimately, protected and defended, but that is exactly what We The People have. All that does is consolidate the gamma risk, causing the instability that our founders sought to avoid--causing the need for government (the king, or that is, the consolidation of sovereign power and the consolidation of risk).
The expected value of "the risk" is reduced to a political evaluation--a critique--that formulates a confirmable hypothesis despite all attempts not to. "The risk" of a confirmable hypothesis is improvement, something the socio-economic elite will politically avoid at all cost, including a more progressive tax code.
It is not the progression of the tax code that is the determining variable, but what We expect to do with the value accumulated.
Friday, August 20, 2010
The Hardship of Assuming the Risk
The Hamiltonian model of political-economy is designed so that the non-elite assume the risk.
As more and more Americans "take" a hardship withdrawal from their savings accounts, they have effectively taken the risk the "market makers" avoided.
Remember that capitalism does not define savings as capital--it is private property. It does not become capital until it is put to work, and in the current case--conforming to the classical, Hamiltonian model--to consolidate the wealth.
The risk taken by consolidated, economy-of-scale firms like Goldman Sachs and Bank of America is the gamma risk--the risk that accumulates with the capital, causing a redistribution of the wealth (that evil thing that conservatives say is a moral hazard), but from the bottom to the top (what conservatives say is a moral imperative).
Wealth does not have to accumulate at the top to be transformed into capital. It can be managed from a plurality of savings accounts owned by The People (the capital).
The capital can be managed for the benefit of, rather than the detriment (the risk) to, The People's accounts.
Too big to fail, economy-of scale firms that consolidate the risk, and redistribute that risk to do economic harm for their benefit, are a public menace! Their assets need to be liquidated and retributed to the source of the value accumulated. That is what is required to stop and reverse (resolve) the source of the current crisis, and future crises which the framers of financial reform--the Democratic faction of "the party"--have assured The People will occur (see the article, "Recursion of the Risk" at griffithlighton.blogspot.com).
As more and more Americans "take" a hardship withdrawal from their savings accounts, they have effectively taken the risk the "market makers" avoided.
Remember that capitalism does not define savings as capital--it is private property. It does not become capital until it is put to work, and in the current case--conforming to the classical, Hamiltonian model--to consolidate the wealth.
The risk taken by consolidated, economy-of-scale firms like Goldman Sachs and Bank of America is the gamma risk--the risk that accumulates with the capital, causing a redistribution of the wealth (that evil thing that conservatives say is a moral hazard), but from the bottom to the top (what conservatives say is a moral imperative).
Wealth does not have to accumulate at the top to be transformed into capital. It can be managed from a plurality of savings accounts owned by The People (the capital).
The capital can be managed for the benefit of, rather than the detriment (the risk) to, The People's accounts.
Too big to fail, economy-of scale firms that consolidate the risk, and redistribute that risk to do economic harm for their benefit, are a public menace! Their assets need to be liquidated and retributed to the source of the value accumulated. That is what is required to stop and reverse (resolve) the source of the current crisis, and future crises which the framers of financial reform--the Democratic faction of "the party"--have assured The People will occur (see the article, "Recursion of the Risk" at griffithlighton.blogspot.com).
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Looking for the Fundamentals
As we look to solve our deflationary, demand crisis in a post-modern age, classical properties of capitalism emerge as fundamental properties of the current crisis.
Classically, the current crisis is described as too much surplus value. As long as value remains in surplus (hording cash and labor, like we are now), the crisis gains strength and results in overproduction (the amount of value in surplus). If the surplus is not circulated, the value accumulates risk--it gains a gamma-risk proportion, and becomes retributively valued.
A fundamental quality of gamma risk is the systemic critique. Currently, for example, it is critical to define the systemic risk associated with capitalism as either classical or neo-classical. At this point, it is clear that the neo-classical form yields classical results.
Despite neo-classical measures since The Great Depression, anyone below the upper class is at systemic risk. In other words, the system is designed for the lower class to "take" the risk--they are the debtor class, they pay the debt and if they default it is scored as a bad credit "risk" (the systemic risk).
"The risk" is fundamentally established as a divisible risk when it is really an indivisible, collective phenomenon always demanding its reduction--its diffusion--by means of social cooperation. In both the classical and neo-classical form, the risk is consolidated into the gamma dimension, always commanding its distribution by social classification (income) derived from the fundament.
Since the command dimension of consolidated risk is derived from the fundament, it is characterized as a naturally evolved state of capital formation that empirically confirms the elitist tendency of power distribution. When the critique looks to the fundament for the legitimacy of power, the reaction is to present the accumulation of power as ontologically derived--it is "won" by freedom expressed in the marketplace.
Commanding a redistribution of income freely won in the marketplace is unnatural and always causes a crisis, the free-market hypothesis maintains.
Alright then... what do you say we deconsolidate the risk and see what develops by means of free-market mechanics--with "the risk" individually derived and commanded in the form of liberty. What We (The People) will have is a surplus of value that is not the empirical measure of crises (demand deflation), but the measure of a peaceful and prosperous pluralism (diffusion of risk) derived, and legitimately maintained, from the Constitutional fundament of power.
Classically, the current crisis is described as too much surplus value. As long as value remains in surplus (hording cash and labor, like we are now), the crisis gains strength and results in overproduction (the amount of value in surplus). If the surplus is not circulated, the value accumulates risk--it gains a gamma-risk proportion, and becomes retributively valued.
A fundamental quality of gamma risk is the systemic critique. Currently, for example, it is critical to define the systemic risk associated with capitalism as either classical or neo-classical. At this point, it is clear that the neo-classical form yields classical results.
Despite neo-classical measures since The Great Depression, anyone below the upper class is at systemic risk. In other words, the system is designed for the lower class to "take" the risk--they are the debtor class, they pay the debt and if they default it is scored as a bad credit "risk" (the systemic risk).
"The risk" is fundamentally established as a divisible risk when it is really an indivisible, collective phenomenon always demanding its reduction--its diffusion--by means of social cooperation. In both the classical and neo-classical form, the risk is consolidated into the gamma dimension, always commanding its distribution by social classification (income) derived from the fundament.
Since the command dimension of consolidated risk is derived from the fundament, it is characterized as a naturally evolved state of capital formation that empirically confirms the elitist tendency of power distribution. When the critique looks to the fundament for the legitimacy of power, the reaction is to present the accumulation of power as ontologically derived--it is "won" by freedom expressed in the marketplace.
Commanding a redistribution of income freely won in the marketplace is unnatural and always causes a crisis, the free-market hypothesis maintains.
Alright then... what do you say we deconsolidate the risk and see what develops by means of free-market mechanics--with "the risk" individually derived and commanded in the form of liberty. What We (The People) will have is a surplus of value that is not the empirical measure of crises (demand deflation), but the measure of a peaceful and prosperous pluralism (diffusion of risk) derived, and legitimately maintained, from the Constitutional fundament of power.
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