Productivity and Objective Reality

According to right-wing conservatives, the stagflationary trend we have now can be attributed to low productivity. The reason value is consolidated in the top one-percent of income class is because the tax rate is too progressive. If the tax rate is more regressive, they say, capital will distribute and GDP will rise because the rent will be lower.

Regressive taxation models an elitist philosophy of the risk assessment: the more money you have the less the risk. The working model essentially works like this: When facebook's IPO, for example, is suddenly not such a good buy afterall, people that have the most money are alerted before the market opens and everybody else discovers objective reality (the price) after the detriment (the risk) has been applied (converted into a cash reward). The risk distributes by classification to conserve the distribution of the reward at the expense of everybody else, just like a more regressive tax code will do.

According to Romney and Ryan, the poor are too rich and the rich are too poor (up is down and down is up, just like in the stock market), and they plan to fix that with a more regressive tax burden, adding to the supply of capital for economic growth and debt reduction.

Essentially, for the rich, the rent is much lower with a more regressive tax burden, but it raises the rent for 99 percent of consumers who are then less able to demand the supply. (Remember that the capacity to demand in the marketplace raises the rent. A high degree of income distribution not only demands supply and productivity but productive propriety. See articles on proprietary risk on this website.) The accumulation of supply is then used as evidence that capitalism adds supply, which is a fraud (an impropriety).

(Facebook's IPO was diluted with additional shares after a lot of hype that gave the appearance of strong demand. When the demand wasn't there to support the price, essentially because the money to demand it is too consolidated, confidence was lost, but the value accumulated was not, just like what happens in the real economy. It is a confidence game...you know, what criminals do to rook people out of their money.)

In the real economy, supply is added only to suggest strong demand (capitalism doesn't really want strong demand because it demands propriety). The suggested demand supports the price against real, declining demand (the Enron effect just like in speculative markets), allowing a rising supply to be sold at high-demand prices, which is supposed to be unnatural (i.e., improper).

(We see here how economics technically functions with natural philosophy. Many of our most notable founders, and Adam Smith, for example, based their philosophy on what they observed in nature. Some of our founders were members of secret societies because they were empiricists, persecuted for questioning the absolute truth of caesaropapal power and Aristotelian logic.

The more empirical ethic of our founders is in opposition to the Aristotelian logic that Ayn Rand, for example, favors as being more representative of our founding philosophy. Romney and Ryan favor Rand's political-economic philosophy because using empirical analyses readily reveals the Romney-Ryan plan to be complete garbage! It is a philosophy of risk that belongs on the trash heap of disconfirmed hypotheses.

Continuing to use a plan that always fails to work as expected is highly improper--i.e., completely unnatural and inherently unstable. It is a product of ignorance that Mason's, for example, consider to be the ultimate evil--what a free market will not tolerate by confirmation if the market is not allowed to verifiably consolidate and result in the instability we have now.

When the marketplace becomes so consolidated that firms are too big to fail, and the Ivy-League solution is to ignore the "too big" dimension and allow for failure because it efficiently manages the marketplace by ensuring the crisis to be avoided, a reasonable person can only question the empirical value of the technical objective.

Obviously, the risk needs to be de-consolidated, not more consolidated, if safety and soundness is the real objective. If we want to allow for failure, obviously it is impractical to allow firms to be "too big" to fail.

If low inflation and high employment is the empirical measure of success, what we are doing now is a dismal failure. The Ivy-League alternative, the Romney-Ryan plan, will extend and reinforce technical failure clearly indicated with empirical measures.

When supply increases, the oversupply can be geometrically confirmed with the relative price. Price naturally falls, or disinflates, to confirm, or indicate, the oversupply, and if it doesn't, something is wrong and will be verified with, for example, a deflationary crisis that will surely result in a declining rate of profit if not supported with debt or some other form of redistribution.

Inflation, understand, is not the result of too much money chasing too few goods, but overconsolidation of the capital--too much money bidding up oversupply against declining consumption due to unemployment, or overproduction.)

An accumulating supply and high prices suggest high productivity, but the objective reality is that supply is being added because income is too consolidated to demand it. When income becomes highly consolidated, prices are pulled up to where the demand is, not pushed up with income distributed to a more productive workforce that, with rising unemployment, is less likely to buy at any price.

Value surplussed and consolidated does not substitute for the reduced distribution of demand (income). (Remember that the crisis proportion is not the surplussing of value but its consolidation. When it becomes too big to fail, the capital becomes irrationally short term and self-retributive.) Instead, the surplus value (the capital) is used to push up prices in speculative markets. Profit margins are not the product of consumer demand, but speculative demand, which adds to declining consumer demand and accumulates risk into a systemic, crisis (gamma-risk) dimension (the opportunity for private equity firms to capitalize on the detriment, which is attributed to cyclical, market forces).

An accumulation of risk occurs with speculative demand. Supply accumulates with slowing consumer demand against rising prices to create a volatile, beta-risk environment.

In the beta-risk dimension, the risk is arbitraged (swapped for cash value in highly exclusive, "dark" markets) with complex risk-timing-and-transfer devices (derivatives) like credit-default swaps. This is where the risk is transferred for its classified consumption and transforms into political, gamma risk.

The risk goes gamma (and becomes highly unstable) because consumers do not directly participate to determine the outcome, like in a free market, despite being told that their fate is the result of self-determination. Instead their fate is swapped for cash value (net worth is cashed out in the form of private equity that Romney so admires as the American dream come true) as the credit consumed to self-determine (to make demands in the marketplace) is forced into default.

Since the accumulated capital is not used to reduce unemployment, but pushes prices up against an accumulating supply (which accumulates risk-value in the form of debt), the result is overproduction. The slow economy (and the debt that accumulates to demand the supply at high prices--the risk to be reduced and the value, or detriment, thus produced to be consumed) is then blamed on low productivity.

Attributing overproduction to low productivity is not objective reality, however, which misprices the risk (essentially because it is supposed to be in reduction, not accumulation), and because the risk is managed with economy-of-scale efficiency (making markets) as per efficient-markets theory, the error of fundamental attribution accumulates into a politically unstable (too-big-to-fail) gamma-risk proportion that is evermore likely to fail.

Low productivity (unemployment) is the effect, not the cause of overproduction, just like high debt (demanding supply) does not cause low GDP, low GDP (no income to demand the accumulating supply) causes high debt.

Temporal fallacies are integral to the fraud that perpetrates through efficient-markets theory, having a risk-timing-and-transfer effect that operates with error of fundamental attribution. If there is only the appearance of a free market, then the differential between the fraud and objective reality can be structured to time and transfer risk with a calculated complexity that suggests free-market mechanics.

Complex, arcane interaction of monetary-fiscal policy and corporate practices are represented as a free market efficiently managed to maximize pursuit of the the American dream. It makes it look like fate is a function of probability, and thus inculpable, when it really isn't.

When buyers and sellers meet, trying to overprice their interest to the detriment of the other party, the vice of self-interest is transformed into the Pareto-optimal virtue of risk-value legitimately determined with free and open interaction. If by chance, for example, labor cannot sell its supply at any price due to a macro-risk proportion, the detriment, and the benefit derived, is a function of probable risk. Timing is the determinant, and if you consume the detriment, well, that's just life. In other words, the distributive value is ontological and non-retributive.

It is no coincidence, however, that millions of Americans lost half their net worth, and lost their jobs only to be rehired at half the price in a so-called recovery, in pursuit of the American dream. The value lost became private equity poised to buy distressed assets (to capitalize on, or benefit from, the detriment). These assets are timed to transfer risk-value and transform the value (the stuff of the American dream) into the capacity to command the marketplace with efficiency, and we see the effect of this consolidated power (the power to determine our selves like the king, which is the aristocratic, Hamiltonian, Romney-Ryan version of the American dream) in every aspect of economic life.

If market participants are trying to measure the value of facebook's IPO, for example, retail investors have to consider the source of the risk, and transposing cause with effect is a fatal error. The technicals fail when high concentrations of consolidated capital can "make the market" on command, which is a fundamental error of attribution.

Markets are not supposed to produce profits on command with a post-hoc legitimacy, but attributed to consumers who make the market productive, ad-hoc, on demand. The marketplace is supposed to be self-determined by consumers, not pre-determined by producers who then argue the value produced is demanded, or determined, by consumers when the price to be paid, or the value rented back, post hoc, to consume the product is in the form of accumulated debt.

If the relationship between production and consumption is disintegrated by consolidation of the capital, the marketplace can be, and is, rationalized, post hoc, to meet supply with demand and bring buyers and sellers together with what is claimed to be the integrity of a legitimately determined price. Reintegration is then the opportunity to derive value referred to as "making the market more efficient" with, supposedly, ad-hoc self-determination.

After the fact has been accomplished, with the distribution having been, presumably, self-determined, a battery of babbling barristers are retained to confabulate a post-hoc legitimacy of the risk. With all manner of mindless chatter (like a mocking bird that instinctively rattles off a continuous repertoire of songs that mocks objective reality), the value derived from the detriment gains an integral attribution, post hoc, by arguing the shared benefit of maintaining coherent rules that govern the possession of private property as a public good, without which the liberty to legally and properly dispossess it will surely perish.

Market makers make it look like cause is effect to make trade-based value transfers (a technique criminals use to launder illicit funds) look legitimately earned. With technical manipulation of market mechanics that investors use to predict the value of the risk, market makers can make it appear that something has value when it doesn't and vice-a-versa.

Transposing cause and effect misprices the risk and the difference is the vig that insiders use to manipulate the technical indicators with both massive volume and high frequency trading. Keep in mind, as well, that making markets is explicitly legal. It is encouraged by Dodd-Frank to provide maximum liquidity for financial markets.

It is absolutely essential to understand that positive law (supposedly derived from natural law that postulates markets--based on objective, empirical observation--naturally consolidate to reduce risk) is applied to maximize financing for the accumulation of the risk to be avoided. Dodd-Fank explicitly supports (by objective) the big, consolidated, accumulated proportion that determines the direction of the risk and positions most Americans (the American dream) for its adverse possession whether you are an investor or not.

Pricing the recent facebook IPO, for example, supposedly derives from the technicals--natural laws like supply-demand. The IPO was rigged so that an oversupply of shares were sold at a premium price with retail investors, due to a technical failure, complaining that they were left in the dark. Then, in the light of day, the value of the IPO quickly lost 12% of its value the next open.

The 12% is not "lost," it is, technically, retributive value that a free-market ensures is equitably shared in priority, not in posteriori where the equity is distributed by administrative authority. The business model (efficient management of markets, or efficient-markets theory) fits the deliberate intent to sell high supply at low supply prices on command, which is a fraud, and fraud is a crime.

Market prices are legitimately determined on demand, not command. If command is the determinant, and a free market is said to determine the distribution of risk-value, a fraud has been knowingly and willingly perpetrated, which is a crime. Prosecution will not occur, however, because perpetration of this fraud (creating facebook and having big-daddy-war-bucks overprice it with consolidated wealth and power) is the American dream (the objective that defines what reality is).

Implicit to efficient-markets theory is that the objective of the managers aligns with the vast majority of Americans. In the case of the facebook IPO, what was good for Morgan Stanley and all the insiders (who are about one percent) is the self-interest of everybody else. This "objective reality" supposedly exists in both the political and economic dimensions because it represents the popular vote, and in both, it is up to elite authority to determine what that is and best represent self-interest, with efficiency, in the marketplace. According to right-wing reactionaries, for example, class warfare is a false construction of reality--there is no value to be retributed because our self-interest is aligned (fully assumed) in the marketplace, and Mark Zuckerberg proves that "everybody has a fair shot."

When Romney claims his private equity experience qualifies him to be president, he is implicitly saying that the objective (the incentive to act in self-interest) is properly aligned with the general welfare, just like the interests of private equity managers are aligned with its shareholders.

In reality, then, cutting debt by reducing spending and broadening the tax base (austerity) keeps the American dream alive, which makes us more productive. The creators of facebook, however, keep in mind, relied on debt to create the product and the wealth being consumed. It was not the product of austerity--it was not the product of depriving, but providing facile resources for creative innovation incubated in a higher education environment.

Reducing debt with a more regressive tax code will not add GDP. It will not increase productivity as Romney and Ryan say it will. Instead, it will increase the demand for debt (the risk supposedly being avoided). It will raise the rent and push the stagflationary trend into deflation, which for the vast majority of Americans destroys the dream by objective (by default) to create value for property owners--shareholders like Mitt Romney in the form of private equity.

(Plutocrats learned not to make the mistake the king made. Allowing your subjects to own property so that they will be more productive renders the power of self-determination. The objective of productive value becomes more readily retributive, like in a free market.

In order to maintain power it is necessary to efficiently manage markets and organize the inherent political risk to validate the need for elite authority to command the risk. This organized tautology has the pretense of a risk ontology, appearing to have the value of empirical confirmation derived from natural law, but it is a fraud perpetrated by transforming the value into positive law.

When the liquidity of the vast majority of Americans is trapped into detriment, the law is very positive about the disposition of the negative value. Debt--the liquidity required to own property, or the rent to be paid--is naturally transformed into its adverse repossession, confirming the value of its natural possessor.)

While stagflation is always a long way from full employment at competitive prices (disinflation), it is always just a stone's throw away from the opportunity to consolidate even more wealth and power (the fully assumed risk of loss) by default (deflation).

(Remember, nature--objective reality, the fully assumed risk of loss--does not care if we are too ignorant or arrogant to recognize and correct for fundamental attribution error, and if we persist in error, allowing it to accumulate, the error will, inevitably, unavoidably, correct with a catastrophic proportion of accumulated risk referred to as "the gamma risk." Yes, we are self-determined, and allowing risk to objectively accumulate into self-retributive value is just crazy!

Constructing predictive models without including the retributive value can result in, for example, a sudden, $2 billion loss at a major bank. Being too-big-to-fail, remember, means that the business model, with the missing value, creates the opportunity to consolidate wealth--the income--needed to demand the supply. So, you see, the value is not "lost." It is never lost. The risk is always conserved by nature in one form or another, and nature does not care if big, self-satisfied capitalists are too arrogant to admit that they cannot command nature by making demands in the marketplace. They are mere mortals like everybody else, and when demands are made, they know very well, in a free market, they can be rejected--that is, they can be disciplined to accept the demands of others to make a profit, which is exactly "the risk" capitalists want to avoid.

Consolidating risk to control it on command is what business economists refer to as efficient-markets theory. It is a business model for reducing the risk by creating "synergies." The model, however, does not reduce risk, it transfers it...it transforms it into detriment for its classified consumption, forming the basis for class warfare to retribute, or reintegrate, the "lost" value.

Risk avoidance is falsely referred to as reduction by creating synergies, which is nothing but horizontal and vertical integration to network the externalities. Supposedly, the synergies make us more productive by, primarily, dis-integrating labor and productivity, which means, objectively, there is not enough value distributed to consume the value produced; and when supply accumulates along with unemployment, labor is falsely accused of being unproductive.

The contradiction technically indicates a disintegration of value that capitalism does not want to admit because the solution is obviously to reintegrate the value--or deconsolidate the risk. This means the rulers are subordinated to the ruled in the marketplace on demand, which according to business economists, without creating synergies, is the model of inefficiency.)

It is important to understand that business economists deliberately attribute value derived (the marginal profit) to integral value. Objectively, however, the value is derived from dis-integral value. As long as the working model of productive efficiency operates with this objective failure, cyclical crises (overproduction) will always present as objective reality. Problems like inflation and/or unemployment never resolve but are continuously transformed (recycled) into what only appears to be our natural condition by default.

Treating value that is derived as being integral is a technique for legitimizing the application of the risk. Saying, for example, that the Fed is keeping interest rates artificially low is to attribute our problems to action that derives from application of the risk.

Interest rates are low because unemployment is too high. There is a deliberate, technical failure that occurs that does not identify value integral to productivity. Instead, it is identified as value derived so that productivity does not depend on the value imparted to labor (remembering that plutocrats learned not to make the same mistake the king made--instead of allowing the risk to go plural, the risk is allowed to go gamma, which demands command authority).

Value to be consumed does not derive from capital, it derives from labor. Policies and programs, like the Romney-Ryan plan, that reverse this fundamental attribution results in technical failure. Raising interest rates against rising unemployment, for example, is sure to result in a depression and a declining rate of profit.

It's hard to make a profit when the objective is to accumulate all the value (the labor) needed to demand it in reality.

Unemployment (hording labor value) accumulates capital--the savings (the austerity) needed to keep interest rates low like they are. Productivity is not the missing value. The value missing is the employment needed to demand productivity.

The Path to Austerity

Considering where we are now, the classical model of capitalism--the plan (the objective reality) Romney and Ryan have for us--is the path to austerity.

The result of the Romney-Ryan plan is always the classic crisis of overproduction. Stagflation prevents the crisis proportion (the retributive value of objective reality) from presenting all at once (something that a free market will do by preventing, rather than ensuring, the crisis proportion). Although you may not be the stag consumed in the latest hunt, the detriment will cycle around to you and yours if you are not always trying to gain value that is highly retributive--value that is not in your self-interest because it adds value only by reducing the capacity to consume it (i.e., it produces self-retributive value).

Diminished consumer capacity may seem counter-intuitive if we want to resist a recessionary trend, but according to Romney and Ryan a more regressive tax burden and cutting programs that support consumption (which resists overproduction) is the path to prosperity. These two, prominent features of the Romney-Ryan plan will have a deflationary effect. Instead of the path to prosperity, it is the path to austerity, and they know it.

Of course, reactionaries cannot be intellectually honest about the so-called path to prosperity because it entails a benefit that derives from detriment. Knowingly and willingly "making markets" to cause detriment (which Dodd-Frank explicitly identifies as a legal and proper means of efficiently managing risk) is impolitic. So it is necessary to rationalize the detriment as being somehow in everyone's self-interest, which includes the reactionary philosophy of risk (the economy-of-scale, too-big-to-fail theory of making markets more efficient to reduce risk) that underscores Dodd-Frank.

Keep in mind that economic demand is dependant on income (what is paid out to apply the risk). Income is how we all make demands in the marketplace (and it is no coincidence that jobs added after the Recovery Act are at half the price). If you don't like the way Bank of America does business, then you stop demanding it by switching to a smaller, community bank that, by the way, is subordinate to banks so big they can determine its fate by applying a macro-risk proportion.

Banks too big to fail have the oversized capacity to self-determine (determining your fate and mine) in a macro (gamma-risk) proportion. Oversized firms then say the result (application of self-interest) has the force and legitimacy of a naturally occurring (alpha-risk) ontology. The result not only has the force of nature, understand, but moral authority--objective reality verified by market forces, which confirms class identity, and application of its self-interest, with moral force.

Claiming a free-market legitimacy, big banks will force the economy into default like in the Great Depression, which keeps Bank of America, for example, in demand to hedge the risk. For depositors, however, the hedge (identifying their self-interest with the morality--the assumed beneficence--of the hedger) is a false positive.

Depositors misprice the risk in a too-big-to-fail proportion. They feel like their self-interest is better served by an economy-of-scale despite that consolidated firms will dump deposits into hedge-fake funds to adversely possess those funds.

By "making the market" in the name of free-market economics, Bank of America and Goldman Sachs convert your self-interest (your funds) into theirs, and this act of conversion occurs without presumption of abuse (with moral authority) because, remember, self-interest is the only objective reality, the only measure, in which to judge the propriety of the outcome. The value lost is not ("poof") evaporated, it has been converted, it has been dispossessed. Your assets are turned into detriment, which is managed to reduce the risk of loss (retributing value you have gained or earned back to the so-called "job creators") with economy-of-scale efficiency (being paid back out at half the price, which stagflates the risk proportion and conserves the value of the risk in historical perspective). Value earned in the form of wages and salaries is, according to capitalist theory of efficient markets (in Hamiltonian perspective), best managed to add supply (and reduce the risk of social instability) if legally and properly possessed by morally mindless maniacs touted to be the best and the brightest.

Elite recruits are prepared to exact detriment with the efficiency of emotional detachment that derives from a lack of empathy characteristic of a detached, elite status and a psychopathic personality. People that borrowed against their homes and have massive debt against negative equity are considered, for example, looters and freeloaders when suggesting they need a bailout, but when Goldman Sachs and Bank of America use depositor funds against them, and as big banks leveraged up to 100%, the bailout that occurred was "the general welfare." The marketplace was efficiently managed in the image of the psychopathic personality, designed (and maintained in aristocratic, Hamiltonian perspective) to satisfy itself in everybody's self-interest.

(People capable of exacting the austerity needed to support the profit margin without compunction are highly valued, and so they are paid extravagant salaries and bonuses, and because the lack of moral intelligence is considered a high level of clever competence, they are qualified to be President. This too is a case of mispricing risk. Like depositors, half the voting population considers right-wing, reactionary philosophy to fit their social status. They fully assume the risk of loss is less likely if they buy-in to a status that in reality positions them to take the risk--willingly assuming the role of the stag in the hunt.)

Depositors seeking to reduce the fully assumed risk of loss wrongly assume that investing with too-big-to-fail banks reduces the risk. Government will always bail "us and them" out to avoid a depression while small banks will be allowed to fail, according to plan, which allows people like Romney to feast while we famine. The capacity for self-determination conservative philosophy is so concerned with will be made much less likely for "us," and much more likely for "them," according to plan.

While ninety-nine percent of American incomes are falling against rising prices, Romney and Ryan think less purchasing power is the cure. According to this plan (the classic crisis of overproduction) prices deflate with income. It is a sure cure for stagflation, but results in general default, which is the opportunity to consolidate the wealth even more than it is. The risk consolidates into an even bigger too-big-to-fail proportion that even most of the top one percent are not fit enough to survive, but remember, the path to austerity is paved with nothing but good intentions.

(When prices deflate, remember, like in the Great Depression, supply increases because most people cannot afford to buy at any price. While the Romney-Ryan plan, following repeal of Glass-Steagill, is sure to cure shortages and reduce prices, the cure is worse than the disease.)

The vast majority of us (99.9 percent) have to seriously question how conservative philosophy, and reactionary policies and programs, serve our self-interest. Whether positioned at the top or the bottom, self-interest will be disabused, and so we all have to consider whether pricing the risk into default (conserving more value than paid out, or austerity) is really (objectively) in anyone's self-interest. We have to honestly consider where the difference between prices and what is paid out (the risk-value) really goes.

When a financial crisis occurs, the value described as being "lost" does not simply ("poof") evaporate into a cloud of vapor never to be accounted for. The value of the differential (the risk-value) cycles around--it is timed, precipitating as accumulated wealth and the accumulated power to politically sanction in the marketplace with an inequitable proportion of the alpha risk.

It is important to understand that the large proportion (the economy of scale) transforms the alpha into beta and gamma risk. Rather than value to be retributed (the inequity) being hypothetically ("poof") gone, the value is transformed into volatile, accumulative risk, and because it is considered to not exist when it really does, the value of the risk is mispriced--the value is self-retributive (it raises the rent).

Ivy-League economists are apt to posit the "poof" hypothesis while at the same time maintaining that value is essentially the ability of consumers to demand--buy and sell, or arbitrage--the risk. Overproduction, then, measures the value "lost" (evaporated), not expropriated. On the one hand, the value does not exist, on the other, it exists to arbitrage the risk, which yields value. Hmmm...wonder why the two quantum (existence and non-existence) occuppy the same space? Could it be that "objective" truth, a la Ayn Rand, is being bought by the highest bidder, which is, essentially, to arbitrage the risk?

As the marketplace becomes more and more consolidated to avoid alpha risk, both producers and consumers rely on government to resist crises of overproduction. In the gamma-risk dimension, producers rely on government to resist the declining rate of profit while consumers rely on government to provide the demand (adequate income) to consume what is produced. (Remember, businesses are in business to make profits, not jobs to demand the production).

Attributing risk-value to consumer demand disintegrates the integral value (the objective reality) of labor and production. While conservatives are concerned with adhering to objective reality (a la Ayn Rand), there is considerable value given to ignoring it with the result being analytical errors that identify the solution (deconsolidation of industry and markets and reintegration of labor value) to be the problem.

Again, keep in mind, fundamental attribution error is a symptom of psychoses. Elite authority that refuses to recognize objective reality to satisfy itself is the Objectivism that Rand describes. It is the psychosis of a paranoid, delusional cohort that can't see far enough beyond its subjective self to acknowledge an objective reality independent of it. (Fear of class warfare, for example, is a self-retributive value that is fundamentally attributed to a counter-revolutionary conspiracy, but really, elites are conspiring against themselves. The detachment from reality is so severe that they convince themselves of a threat that is really nothing but their "self." McCarthyism is the most extreme reaction to value that can be attributed only to their own devices--what they pathologically perceive to be application of self-interest.) With the self being the only subject for observation, delusion is reality and reason is subjected to confirming its value by conforming to it.

(So when Caesar gave his power divine attribution, non-conformity, or challenging the objective of that reality, was discouraged with overwhelming detriment, like being crucified; or when the Pope declared a geocentric universe, and empiricists were excommunicated or burned at the stake as demonic sorcerers, the objective reality was absolute, or unchanging, but the reality of the objective, which can easily change, was to confirm the value of the self.

When political risk consolidates, which a free market prevents in priority and why capitalism tends to an economy-of-scale proportion, confirmation, rather than demonstrating truth, is a demonstration of power that strives for moral absolution by reducing the risk of being challenged, but without actually reducing it. Instead, the risk increases. It accumulates into a crisis proportion that redefines the reality of the objective, not objective reality, as caesaropapal power regimes always confirm with an accumulation of retributive value.)

Since, for example, disintegrating the value of labor and the value of production creates profits at the expense of creating jobs, the overproduction that occurs is attributed to government intervention in the free market. While it is readily apparent that a profit can't be made if there is not enough money circulating to pay it, reactionaries nevertheless maintain that government programs assisting the needy, which adds income to support profits, is supporting slackers and looters.

Government, according to right-wing reactionaries, discourages productivity. Thus we have a high rate of debt-to-GDP, which means we do not have a crisis of overproduction, but a crisis of low productivity. When productivity is low, prices are high, and when combined with transfer payments, a debt crisis ensues with markets becoming illiquid and even more unproductive.

Debt is incurred to demand the production because, reactionaries explain, taxing the profit (the measure of productivity) transfers the risk to the "job creators" who demand they be without risk. The capacity to demand production is taxed away with the result being oversupply, or excess productive capacity.

If we want businesses to create jobs, and the income to demand the supply, the economy must be allowed to consolidate into tax-free "efficient markets." Job creators must be allowed to add supply just like it was before the Great Depression. Without government regulation (like Glass-Steagill, for example), growth will be roaring just like it did in the 20's.

According to conservatives, it wasn't until government intervened that we experienced overproduction (declining demand) in an extended crisis proportion like the Great Depression. Demand deflated because the value supporting it was suddenly ("poof") gone. The value (the income necessary to demand production and resist overproduction) was not objective reality, which is a fundamental misattribution that still plagues us.

Obviously, the value (the purchasing power) was real, but subordinated to debt, which according to conservatives is a problem if government intervenes to adversely alter the natural course of things that confirms objective reality. Liberal redistribution of the value accumulated (changing the objective without deconsolidation of the risk) in reality prolongs the crisis it poses to prevent, just as conservatives say it does, resulting in low productivity and high prices (stagflation) like we have now.

The difference now is that the debt is monetized, and instead of deconsolidation, monetarism is used to resist the declining rate of profit, which supports the economy-of-scale crisis proportion it purports to prevent by "making markets" more "efficient."

As long as debt is publicly managed to support the profit margin (prices) against falling income for the vast majority of consumers, there is too much demand for taxing the job creators who then pay the rent with less employment. Contrary to Keynesian theory, relying on public debt does not add supply, it adds debt and increases taxes. It perpetually keeps us on the path to austerity because it reduces productive incentive (increases excess capacity) with easy money.

Monetary easing is used to consolidate industry and markets with a deflationary effect. The economy consolidates even more to avoid the risk rather than expand with a disinflationary effect.

Rather than the expected inflationary objective of supporting prices and the margin of profit to increase excess capacity (i.e., to cause unemployment), monetarism that operates with a disinflationary, pluralistic objective deconsolidates the risk into a non-catastrophic, alpha-risk dimension. Since pluralistic expansion reduces the opportunity to consolidate the wealth (buying out distressed assets under deflationary pressure like Bain Capital), for people like Mitt Romney, disinflation, not deflation, is the risk to be avoided.

Conservatives, like Romney and Ryan, say we should go back to the good ole days when everybody goes bankrupt and relies on the J.P. Morgans of the world to bail us out. Back to the days when our assets were consolidated and sold back with debt consolidated from our net worth...the days before government intervention, when overproduction was nothing but blue sky and an expanding life of leisure.

Until government stepped in, capitalism was pure and simple. The path to austerity was easily paved with the promise of prosperity, properly dispossessed by private means. A person could borrow his way to prosperity with even the most marginal existence, not dissimilar to the liquidity trap set up for homeowners in the latest deflationary crisis. The only difference now is that we have detriment being exacted by means both public and private--banks bloated with consolidated value conserved with government intervention.

The result of low productivity, rising prices and the debt needed to pay it is the stagflation we have now, reactionaries explain, but the description does not square with reality. It is a fiction, a fundamental misattribution that fits a narrow, subjective, self-concept of reality that Ayn Rand calls "Objectivism."

Stagflation and Risk Reduction

In order to conserve accumulated value it is necessary to reduce risk. Much of the risk reduction that occurs is to describe and explain the legitimacy of the value accumulated, which forms a philosophy of risk.

In the case of capitalism, the philosophy of risk is shaped to conform to the self-interest of the capitalist by technical objective.

As capitalists try to figure out what there self-interest is and reduce the risk, markets are efficiently managed with an exclusive expertise that defies the democratic principle of free markets--self-determination.

Confidence in the fundamental legitimacy of the outcome by technically defeating it in one's self-interest requires considerable philosophical funambulism. The normative narrative is twisted and turned every which way to keep the outcome believably legitimate, and since fundamental, conservative values must be consistently maintained to be credible despite the detriment (the austerity required, for example, and the stagflation to exact it with minimal risk), legitimacy of the risk-value is maintained with complex, technical analyses and financial programming.

Finance is so complex that it is managed by committee, not the marketplace. The complexity, understand, is by design, which is then reasoned to be the product of pluralism.

Complexity is attributed to an undirected, risk ontology (like the indomitable complexity of a free market) despite it being the result of consolidating into a too-big-to-fail proportion. Instead of being pluralistically determined, the market is "made" less pluralistic to both force the detriment (stagflationary austerity) and protect too-big-to-fail firms from the risk (a declining rate of profit by exacting austerity from financial crises) at the same time.

The philosophy of risk is turned into an organized tautology (a false inducement, or misattribution, of the evidence to support the hypothesis). To protect yourself from the risk of an economy-of-scale efficiency, it is necessary to be too-big-to-fail. It is necessary to cause the risk to protect yourself from it. Self-interest, instead of being the object of reasonable authority, is insanity by technical objective.

Conforming to what capitalists figure to be their self-interest (and thus yours and mine by attribution), markets are consolidated to avoid risk, and to avoid the contradiction of a free-market legitimacy it is referred to as "making markets more efficient." Risk, instead of quantum, retributive value that keeps everybody honest with unconsolidated liquidity, is swapped in dark markets to achieve a stagflated, late-order, detrimental effect that, as we have recently observed, once again, is the result of illiquidity.

Capitalism consolidates industry and markets to make them more efficient, and being more efficient, of course, is in everyone's self-interest. It is a value, a strength, a measure, by which we all reasonably organize our lives to achieve our objectives, ensuring the measure of success by reducing the risk of failure.

Out of self-interest, capital is organized to reduce self-retributive risk (to make the marketplace less risk-prone, which sounds like a good thing), but the affect is objectively antithetical. When the marketplace becomes illiquid, participants are overwhelmingly affected with detriment that is an accumulation of value not in the self-interest of the capitalist, which means the efficiency is technically more, not less, self-retributive.

While what's good for Bank of America and Goldman Sachs is supposedly good for America, the detriment (the austerity on demand) is, technically, not my self-interest, your self-interest, or theirs. Conversely, despite what "they" may think, and what shareholders are told, what's bad for most of "us" (whether in America, France, Germany, Russia...) is also bad for "them" (firms that are too big to fail, whether communist, socialist, or capitalist). Without ensuring a free market in priority, the economy stagflates (the rent increases with all manner of technical expertise) to feed the greed.

Where the technicals fundamentally fail, philosophy takes over (risk reduction by changing purpose or objective, and keep in mind that the objective can change at any time on command if the marketplace is not sure to demand it). The detriment is good...it makes us stronger..."more efficient." Avoiding the probability of the detriment (illiquidity) is a moral hazard, and in keeping with this normative narrative, the economy stagflates to diffuse and defuse the risk proportion by accumulating it even more. The natural result (the risk ontology) is the classic crisis of overproduction, which is a moral strength, remember, because it makes us more austere.

The strength of capitalism is that it subordinates us to debt. It makes us more austere. It confirms middle-class values--virtue in the face of adversity--that makes America great and, according to Romney and Ryan, ensures the path to prosperity.

The path to prosperity is all about avoiding moral hazards--reducing risk, and while exacting austerity to ensure the welfare of the rich may seem immoral, it really isn't. Objective reality, as Ayn Rand explains it, is the only morality. The way it should be is the way it is--it is objective reality, Rand explains, no matter how hard we try to technically change the objective.

Rand, Romney, and Ryan agree, there is no utopia, there is only self-interest. Since it is the only value we can all objectively agree on, its pursuit is the only moral occupation. We are all objectively self-determined, and when the value (the measure of one's strength and determination) becomes self-retributive, it is then necessary to be virtuous (demonstrate strength). For most of us this means accepting subordination (the virtue of austerity), relying on the job creators to determine the value of the self (without retribution) on demand in the marketplace with the highest efficiency and, thus, moral obligation.

Stagflation of the American Dream

Romney and Ryan claim their philosophy of risk models the American dream.

Stagflation, however, indicates a bogus, supply-side economics in operation. It is a deceit (a fraud) that deliberately yields high margins at the expense of demand. It models the risk of the Romney-Ryan plan, promising the path to prosperity despite demonstrating a path to disparity for the last twelve years.

High margins at the expense of demand does not increase supply. Instead, it models the classic crisis of overproduction. It gives the appearance of expansion when the economy is really contracting (the stagflation we have now). Despite knowing the model has a classic, detrimental effect, it yields big profits for long-short hedge funds, and big banks that lend long but sell short.

The long-short technique is a risk-timing-and-transfer device that traps liquidity into crisis, liquidating assets according to class. This classic model is sure to confirm class identity with empirical value--the ability to pay.

If you can't pay the debt (money borrowed to consume and keep the economy from overproduction--i.e., money borrowed to pay the rent) your assets will be consumed on demand (to pay the rent). You will be at fault, personally responsible for debt organized into default by people who lend money not for economic expansion (to add supply) but for the purpose of demanding consumption of the fully assumed risk proportion.

Although being held responsible for detriment deliberately caused by others yields value that is highly retributive, stagflating the accumulated risk assumes the loss over time in a long wave interrupted by small, impulsive waves. Free-market mechanics appears to determine the value derived from the risk with all of us participating in a kind of stag hunt, positioning for the kill with equal opportunity, consuming the value necessary for economic growth on demand.

Romney and Ryan claim their policy program--Reaganomics--will give all of us the capacity to share in the hunt, and even if it does, keep in mind, the hunt is self-consuming because the value added relies on producing detriment, not avoiding it. Reaganomics just turns most of us into easy game.

Recalling the era of Reaganomics, ensuring the "American dream"--a place where people can still get rich, as Reagan described it--resulted in a more progressive tax burden. The tax rate progresses to control public debt and reduce the probability retributive risk will present in the form of overproduction, which for the capitalist represents value that is self-retributive.

To reduce the self-retributive value, risk is transferred to the future in the form of debt, and while the risk is mitigated with a progressing tax rate, the value is conserved long by selling the accumulative debt short. The long-short technique keeps the risk-value stagnant and the organized means of producing it conserved.

Efficient-markets theory emerged during the Clinton administration, administering the long-short technique with a more progressive tax code. Progressing the code paid the rent, but the technique conserves the value of overproduction, and in order to ensure that your firm is not the stag in the hunt, consolidation occurred to "efficiently" avoid the risk.

The risk avoided, however, produces self-retributive value that is efficiently managed by swapping it--extending it long into the future in the form of credit-default insurance.

By using capital accumulated to buy credit-default swaps, the economy is sold short, which pre-dicts the value of the risk going long. The crisis of overproduction extends well into the future, stagflating the American dream, accumulating retributive value.

For capitalists, the trick is to conserve the value going long with the appearance of it being generally beneficial, or at least philosophically legitimate, in the short run.

The organizational technology being used to conserve the value of the risk is consolidation with the theory that markets efficiently manage themselves. Of course, the problem with this risk-management model is that self-retributive risk accumulates by constantly swapping it long for short-term value. The long-short technique makes it appear supply is being added, and risk is being reduced, with economy-of-scale efficiency when, actually, retributive value is being added.

While ensuring a free market in priority will reduce the retributive value of the risk to its proper, non-crisis proportion, that's not what we're doing. Instead, we are consolidating industry and markets and calling it "market efficiency."

Instead of reducing risk and making the American dream more opportune, we are efficiently making the market to reduce the risk of the value retributed--the American dream.

Stag(flation) Hunt

The hunt for value is like a stag hunt--the classic, game theory simulation in which, essentially, the players optimally position for the reward by anticipating the position of the other players.

In the stag hunt, the players are acting with intention. Each player is angling to reduce errors to gain the reward. In the stagflation hunt, the players, in the same way, fully intend to minimize the fully assumed risk of loss.

In the stagflation hunt, however, the players deny full culpability. The value derived is determined by market conditions which, subsequently, determines the market position of the players. This is a temporal fallacy. It is a deliberate, post-hoc play (an attribution) that positions other market participants to take the risk in late order (without retribution), and then the risk-value consumed is considered to be legitimately derived from free-market interaction and non-retributive.

If the value derived is retributed (taxed or regulated to transfer the value to parties that did not earn it in the hunt, and thus reduce the value of the detriment), the value is misattributed and causes error. The error affects the fundamentals and the risk assessment. It causes systemic risk (added complexity) that all the players must adjust to. So we run with the herd, or reposition for adversity, to avoid being trampled, and by trying to avoid the risk we are corralled into detriment.

Since the added complexity is incorrectly considered added risk, more error is added by trying to reduce it, and the risk goes gamma. Alpha risk (self-interest that prudently regulates, or retributes value in the marketplace) becomes self-retributive--it becomes detrimental. Calculating the quantum value that is self-interest is now so complex that "the risk" is shifted (it transfers) to elite expertise.

Risk managers take control of our self-interest, efficiently managed through market activity, operating in the dark with the legitimacy of it all being too complex for mass participation. Without direct participation in the alpha dimension, however, free-market legitimacy is abandoned for "market efficiency."

What doesn't transfer with the risk is responsibility. When participants gain more detriment than benefit, it is their own fault, and according to Romney and Ryan, this is the opportunity to participate in the American dream. Default (strength or weakness in the marketplace by natural condition) is the opportunity to benefit from the detriment of others, always on the hunt for new opportunities (poaching in the dark).

Efficient-markets theory is a deliberate process, deriving value from detriment while claiming the outcome is the result of the invisible hand in a free market. If we are trying to assess the risk etiology using the predictable result of the working model, a free market is not the logical conclusion, especially if stagflation is the effective result.

Achieving "the American dream" by saving it from itself, using policies and programs that yield the current economic environment, lacks good intellectual value. We have to consider that the stagflationary environment Romney and Ryan say is crushing the American dream is the same program as the previous administration, using efficient-markets theory.

According to Romney and Ryan, the Obama administration does not believe in free-market economics, which is essentially true if it continues to apply efficient-markets theory. With this theory being the only choice among the alternative brands, voters are binomially positioned for the risk, democratically determined.

(This is called "phantom branding." If you buy a Quicky Burger instead of a Speedy Burger because it made you sick, while it may seem like you are sanctioning Speedy Burgers, you have to consider whether they are made by the same company to avoid the risk. When markets "efficiently" consolidate, consumers have to sue to sanction or go without consumption on demand.)

The vast majority are the stag, and the rest are the hunters, and we all know what happens to the stag...it is consumed by the hunters, and that's the American dream, deliberately pursued by natural right and non-retributive.

Value derived from commodities speculation has had a predictable effect--slow demand at high prices. If you are in the top income class, you're living the American dream--stagflation. Income is high at the lowest possible cost, with plenty of supply to be consumed on demand.

When we see, for example, the CFTC raise the rent on energy speculators after the hunt is over, the value (the stag) has been consumed. The accumulated value will be used to pay the margin requirement and position limits busted with phantom branding (mergers and acquisitions to afford the margin). The hunt will continue with fewer hunters and a larger herd.

So what is your likely position in this game?

In pursuit of the American dream, will you be running with the hunters or the herd?

Despite the Romney-Ryan vision of "the dream," objectively, we are all in the hunt. Description of the "Obama economy" is the dream stagflated, binomially determined, but the risk of loss is fully assumed with value that is accumulatively retributive, if it wasn't, Romney and Ryan wouldn't be so worried about a moral hazard that obtains with present value.

Quantum Risk and Relative Value

When economists attribute the accumulation of value that is the Great Recession to "market makers" not properly pricing risk, they are referring to its relative value.

An effective zero-rate of interest indicates we are still in a recessionary trend, which empirically measures the relative price of risk going forward. Relative, future value is slow growth (unemployment) with high inflation (a rising rate of profit).

When we price-in effects that occur in in late order, and discount the probable risk to the present, however, relative, future value tends to be mispriced. The result is a quantum that is retributively valued.

Yes, we can expect slow growth, but contrary to the zero-rate, the slow growth occurs with high inflation because capital, industry, and markets are overconsolidated to achieve "efficiency" (a benefit with a detriment that is undervalued--value that retributes, in late order, in the form of crises). Consolidation is so efficient, in fact, that interest rates are effectively zero.

Too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale banks know that the profit gained derives from the relative value of the risk. That is, they know that the profit causes detriment in late order, but at the time it is marked to the market it is considered economic gain (growth). Transfer of the detriment inflates the relative value of the equity because it does not price-in the retributive value until the catastrophe later occurs.

Economic growth for Q-1 was slower than expected and profits "surprisingly" high because the risk in transfer is undervalued and presents as high-frequency phase inversions (so-called, "unexpected" quantum risk, marked to the market in late order, which is a timing function).

The growth that did occur was not attributed to the risk-detriment, which is purposely made to appear ideopathic, non-local, and thus non-retributive, quantum value.

Quantum Self-Determination and Relative Value of the Risk

While self-determination is a philosophical concept, it has real, relative value. The value related to it is the legitimacy of the outcome.

When, for example, Paul Ryan says his religious conviction warrants his budget plan to render us all with the legitimate value of self-determination, he is saying that the outcome (status position, a la Ayn Rand) is a function of personal responsibility. The capacity to be in a position to avoid the risk is endowed by the creator (by nature).

In other words, to erroneously price the relative value of the risk is a function of status--it is endowed by natural (divine) right and demonstrated by how much power (self-determination) a person has to affect the marketplace.

(Keep in mind that Catholicism rejects the notion of "divine right" but, of course, Ryan only refers to the value conserved in historical perspective in the form of a natural right. It is also important to note that the "affective" value of the self in the marketplace is as much, if not more, psychological than a measure of tangible assets. As previously discussed, the quantum value to be retributed effectively measures how powerful, or affective, a person is, and remember, a corporation, supposedly, is a person.)

Affectation is a function of character, and participating in the marketplace is a function of personal responsibility; all of which are qualitative measures that have a philosophical construction to produce quantitative value or outcomes. If, for example, we do not conform to the tastes and preferences of the job creators in the marketplace (a quantitative, empirical, objective reality to be tested), we will not get jobs (the outcome of the empirical test, which is an objective reality freely chosen by those subordinate to the job creators). So, as Paul Ryan explains, advocating for job creation, we need to conform to the dictates (the demand for efficiency) in the marketplace, and because the outcome (the rent paid and the equitable value consumed) is self-determined it is non-retributive.

Although political-economy tends to operate within the ambiguity (the relative value) of a philosophical environment (Paul Ryan's antinomian interpretation of moral hazard, for example, being as good if not technically better than the Pope's, which rejects the notion of objective reality by determination of divine right), the empirical result (the objective reality) is technically predictable and much less ambiguous.

If the value is not relative to observation, it is not subject to interpretation and changing attribution. When the Pope says the sun revolves around the earth, and Paul Ryan says that welfare for the rich makes us all richer, empiricists are nothing but dangerous heretics who pervert absolute truth with the relative value of a changing attribution.

The differential between political-economic philosophy and science is a perennial struggle between absolute and relative value. This ongoing struggle over who has the right to determine what objective reality is (status) is conserved in historical perspective.

Following the Enlightenment and the emergence of empiricism, the ethic of thinking about the self has become a function of its verifiable determination, which identifies "the risk."

Embracing the philosophy of relative, empirical value (consumer pricing, tastes and preferences, for example) poses significant risk to those who claim to be our natural rulers. Self-determination is risky business, and to reduce the risk (which, remember, cannot be reduced, but can be accumulated) businesses consolidate the risk of self-determination and its relative value at the macro level.

Self-Retributive Value and Efficient-Markets Theory

If labor value, for example, is a cost to be diminished, then policy and programs, both public and private, tend to discount (mis-price) whether income is adequate to sustain economic growth. The technical effect is an accumulation of value that is self-retributive at the macro level.

A fully accountable and completely culpable valuation of the risk accumulates despite all attempts to technically alienate the cause from the empirically verifiable (scientifically philosophical) effect in the name of economic efficiency. So, we are experiencing a phase transition with big banks, for example, more profitable during the first two years of the Obama administration than throughout the entire Bush administration, and a current "objective" that is operantly more political than economic.

Despite Dodd-Frank and Affordable Health Care, the economic outcome (the "new normal") has not fundamentally changed from Bush to Obama. Technically, the objective is consolidation of industry and markets to allow for its authoritative management with the predictable effect being risk that does not properly mark to the market. (Remember that in a free market, risk is immediately retributive--political--and it is the objective of efficient-markets theory to technically transfer political risk into the hands--the timing--of elite management. So, you see, while the risk has self-retributive value, the value is affectively mis-attributed--it is mis-priced and timed to cause maximum detriment with minimal, political risk.) The predictable, self-retributive effect is an affective disorder: psychotically making the same mistake over and over again and referring to it as "normal."

Temporal sequence is technically critical for the philosophical constructions that describe and explain the empirical values that are attributable to the self and re-present as self-retributive value in a macro, gamma-risk dimension. While the Great Depression was for the average income nothing but blue sky, for the top one-tenth of one percent of income class the detriment that occurred later--the timing--was the opportunity to live what Romney and Ryan call "the American dream" and "the path to prosperity."

Rather than preoccupied with the dream to be acquired we are consumed with the angst of the dystopia that is required.

A utopian vision in which exacting detriment for public consumption is the relative value of success is just insane!

There is no perverse incentive or moral hazard acquired if we question the utility of success that demonstrates by means that are technically adverse and catastrophically self-retributive. Right-wing reactionaries regard the critique of success (self-interest) as class warfare (a moral hazard) because it calls into question the utility of risk systemically organized and consolidated to distribute detriment (the rent to be paid, or retributed) according to income classification.

If we want to understand why Treasury secretary Paulson abandoned the moral hazard that is supposed to be inherent to efficient-markets theory, we have to understand what measures the value.

Power is self-retributive, quantum risk relatively valued in a political (gamma-risk) dimension. Its "relative" valuation is a function of self-interest, and not knowing what affects your self-interest (fundamental attribution error) is a moral hazard. When a misattribution occurs, you have no one to blame but yourself--the value is self-retributive. You have earned the price to be paid and the price indicates not only your position to adversely possess the risk (your status), but the correction needed to reduce the rent according to value that is relative to self-interest both on a micro and macro scale.

In '08, the Treasury secretary abandoned the moral hazard that defines the legitimacy of the working model. Although the theory that supports the model extends to your self-interest and mine, both political parties continue to maintain its application despite working with a disconfirmed hypothesis, which defies the fundamental ethic, or moral imperative, of thinking.

Working with a disconfirmed hypothesis without fear of reprisal (disconfirmation) demonstrates power that retributes to the self in the form of positive law. Unnatural, or epistemically unethical as it may appear to be to those of us who do not share in the secret knowledge of objective reality, Paulson saw the light in "08, conforming to the demands (the self-retributive quantum risk) of "efficient markets."

Self-retributive value essentially measures (confirms or disconfirms) the "systemic risk" that the Treasury and the Fed acted to avoid in '08-'09 with philosophical abandon. It is value that measures the "too-big-to-fail" dimension fundamental to the power that accumulates in an economy-of-scale proportion.

To maintain the efficiency hypothesis of efficient-markets theory, and keep the value self-retributive (the measure of being powerful), analysts focus on the effect as a moral hazard rather than the cause. Not allowing for failure is the risk to be avoided rather than the "too-big" (gamma-risk) dimension. We are supposed to ignore that the moral hazard (government intervention) will not occur if firms are not too big, which means, ironically, that failure (the moral hazard) is the measure of success. It is not just a mistake, mind you, it is a deliberate, fundamental misattribution.

The system can't admit failure (firms causing mass detriment do not fail if they are too big) because it is the means by which we attain success.

Since "the bigger you are the better" is a foregone conclusion because it is the measure of success, it can't be considered a moral hazard. Fundamental attribution error occurs and the systemic risk to be avoided is psychotically considered to be normal. The extent to which the normative value diverges from objective reality is the self-retributive value that will reconcile in a systemic, catastrophic proportion, which demonstrates power.

The lack of failure is symptomatic (it technically indicates) the cause...being "too big" to fail, but out of self-interest, the moral hazard is maintained as morally imperative because it is the American dream.

Rather than being the application of a moral imperative, as Romney and Ryan explain it, self-interest is the hazard to be avoided. Instead of being the fundamental virtue that paves the path to prosperity, self-interest is the path to austerity, accumulating the retributive value that demonstrates power.

Without the accumulation and distribution of relative value, power does not demonstrate as a moral hazard. Accumulation of retributive value is what technically measures the extension of the risk--it measures how high the rent can go, which measures how powerful you are "on demand." Demand, of course, requires income, and so in order to demonstrate power in the marketplace on a macro scale (to "make markets") an accumulation of relative value (value to be retributed) is required in an insanely dystopic, self-retributive proportion.

(You see how this systematic psychopathy works: dystopia is adversely utopian and utopia is perversely dystopian. Good is bad and bad is good. Risk-off is risk-on, and on is off so that the fundamental, relative value of the risk--the price to be paid or retributed--is "surprisingly" always at an unpredictable premium. Understand, as well, that a self-retributive proportion is not exactly a self-correcting mechanism. It is more of a deliberate, cognitive process in which the value to be retributed is technically directed in the form of self-determination. In other words, it is more a deontology than an ontology of the risk proportion.

Relative value is complex, especially when reconciled with absolute values and principles. By definition it is subject to interpretation, and one person's interpretation is as good as another's, depending on how much power you have, and much of that depends on the technical tools at your disposal "on demand," or relative to market conditions.

It is not hard to see why relative value is reduced to an ethical construction. Deviation from the norm is a moral hazard not only because it conforms objective reality to the empirical power--the predictive utility--of the truth, but because it protects the delusion of power from inclusion in objective reality.

By means that test for the truth back from the future, today's power elite determine, or confirm, a retributive sense of self that is maintained out of proportion with predictive utility, which gives the appearance of having the empirical value--the power--of natural law. The relative value being attributed to self-interest--that selfishness is the only absolute, ethical value--only has the appearance of being non-retributive, and thus ethically stable, by natural right and positive law.)

To keep us in this dystopian dream of technical success we have technical measures that an MBA, for example, acquires to back test for it.

Assuring the utopia Romney and Ryan want us all to have the opportunity to participate in is the job of futures speculators. Proprietary trading divisions of big banks, including private-equity firms like Bain Capital and various other types of hedge-fund firms (which combine to form what we call "systemic risk"), back-time the value of the risk from a point chosen in the future. The reason market analysts advise not to try and time the market is because the market is retributively timed to your position.

(By identifying the probability of success--with an effective quantum value of zero--you have been warned by the professionals of the relative risk, and so it is "buyer beware." Probability of success is common knowledge, and with this exculpatory sense of non-retributive value that is self-retributive, you see, there were no criminal referrals, for example, from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Nor have there been any referrals from congressional committees that, along with Romney, have described the Great Recession as an economy-of-scale crisis proportion that occurred, and continues to occur, because firms were not allowed to fail, not because they are too big, which technically indicates the moral hazard that Dodd-Frank is supposed to prevent, caveat emptor.)

These technical indicators are based on the current position of investors now, and the outcome is a retribution of the value in that position. It is not a projection of future value. It is not a prediction, it is a technical manipulation that is philosophically maintained as self-retributive value at the micro level, which transfers into self-retributive value (caveat emptor) at the macro level, clearly observable as self-inflicted detriment that transforms into political risk that is never properly valued. Instead, it is "the dream" that we all aspire to participate in (but not without being informed of probable success--the quantum risk and relative value).

Technical extension of the affect is accomplished by cognitive means. Perceiving the detriment as an observable benefit is unreasonable. The affect becomes a cognitive disorder. Relative value of the risk (self-retribution) becomes the observable problem to be solved, not the solution.

Following a crisis only rivaled by the Great Depression (using Reagan's economic program without the marginal-tax increases needed to reduce the retributive risk), we now very clearly observe, a binomial, political process, in real time, bureaucratically engaged to manage retributive, economic value. We see how the political process is used to temporize the retributive value without risk to the accumulative, late-order effect of an expanding margin in zero-sum (the political risk) at the expense of labor value. The risk is entirely political, and because we are seeing it in real time (at a higher, monetized rate of interest that is not, for example, interrupted with world war), the value, rather than assumed in the future, is being dangerously consumed (retributed) at its present, current value.

Without general war occupying the financial space, for example, we see critical space being occupied by a prudential, populist pluralism derisively described by the elite as "class warfare." A large mass of peaceful, populist sentiment, if not redirected from welfare, warps the policy space to drive us toward recovery without catastrophic events, like world war, marking the passage of time.

Since consumer demand is the primary premise for economic policy and programs, it seems there would be more care taken to support it, keeping demand strong enough to keep us out of recession, but that is not the kind of consumer demand the financial sector focuses on.

Financials exercise control of consumer demand by demanding and consuming risk. Risk is arbitraged into consumption by posing its deprivation as added supply. As demand falls, both prices and supply rise under speculative pressure that determines the retributive value of the risk, characteristically mispricing it because the accumulated value is considered non-retributive.

As prices are speculatively demanded (with value that is too consolidated, or "too big to fail") against a rising supply (which hordes labor value in the form of consolidated wealth), demand is too weak to consume the supply (which is a sure cure for shortages, allowing the oversupply to be sold at inflated prices, which reduces demand without a declining profit). Due to welfare, however, the demand is not so weak that the effective quantum value (the affective price of the risk) is deflationary (full-blown, classic overproduction with a self-retributive declining rate of profit). Instead, the result is stagflation, like we have now.

With the quantum "risk" fixed in a long-wave distribution to manage the perception of its value (the price to be paid) with relative certainty, the prospect of achieving the American dream, for most people, is always just below the horizon.

Raising the Rent on Student Loans

Consolidation of the capital raises the rent for consumers. Market participants pay a higher and higher price for participation until the rent reaches a crisis proportion.

Student debt has reached a gamma-risk dimension. The solution, rather than economic, naturally derives politically to retribute the accumulated value.

Students are going gamma, and in this new age of virtual reality, the radical element has gained a technological edge.

Despite being bonded to debt, what students are sure to buy with it is the technology that allows ideas to be freely radical. Instead of an Orwellian dystopia in which technology is used to keep us in bondage, technology emerging in the gamma dimension will pull the risk into a facile adversion of objective reality that will be reacted to as an unnatural perversion.

Consolidation of the marketplace, you see, requires market participants consolidate to occupy and manage the space that contains the quantum called "the risk" in order to buy shares in the space that contains the reward.

According to efficient-markets theory, the reason students are subordinate (debtors by occupation) is because they have willingly acquired too much debt, which prevents buying shares in the reward. Now that they have to pay the price (the rent) they're just whining about it like a bunch of brats that want something for nothing.

Wall Street's reaction to the Occupiers is, "get a job!" Ironically, however, in accordance with efficient-markets theory, reactionaries are using the supply of money added (de novo) to create jobs buying up so-called "peak oil" contracts (ex nihilo). By selling surplus supplies at shortage prices, so the theory goes, capital is gained to add the supply, which creates jobs.

The reason jobs are not being added, however, is because efficient-markets theory is nothing but a big fat fraud. It is racketeering--looting by occupation.

(Remember, surplussing value by reducing demand does not add supply. It is classic overproduction, which is deflationary...that means you are more likely to lose a job than get one.)

Efficient-markets theory (consolidated management of capital) suggests that there is a significant element of chance and self-determination toward the outcome. There is very little chance, however, that students either lack the capacity to act in their self-interest or are just unlucky enough to be caught in a deflationary phase of the business cycle.

According to efficient markets, students are completely responsible for the debt (the retributive value) accumulated because it has been legitimately determined in the marketplace. With market efficiency (by hook or, buyer beware, by crook), the value is thus non-retributive.

Consolidated management of capital, however, defeats a free-market legitimacy that is anything but non-retributive. Keeping capital in an economy-of scale proportion by supporting predatory enterprises like Bank of America who say its large scale keeps consumer costs down, there is always a new and innovative way to raise the rent the consumer must pay in order to participate.

Rather than consume the retributive value (the rent--the immediate, facile accountability) inherent to free-market economics (buying market share by innovatively reducing prices and increasing quality), capital is consolidated to efficiently manage markets in a deflationary, high-rent proportion (gaining market share at the highest possible price). The higher rent demands markets be "made" more efficient, and so by "making markets" more liquid (what the Fed derivatively does in collusion with big banks in dark markets, for example), we cultivate growth (expand the profit margin).

"Making markets" (manipulation that is otherwise illegal) avoids liquidity crises, which means the capital is too consolidated, and so we consolidate it even more to avoid the risk. While making the market more efficient is supposed to avoid it, consolidating it even more just causes the risk to be avoided--a declining rate of profit due to overproduction, or the rent to be paid, retributively valued in an accumulated proportion that maintaining a free market in priority would otherwise prevent.

Without consolidation, you see, the marketplace is disinflationary rather than deflationary, which demands firms add supply, and the labor value needed, to expand the marginal profit. Instead of consumer compliance on command, capital deconsolidates to comply with consumers on demand, causing economic expansion with full employment and low inflation...but, of course, this (the good life retributively valued on demand) is not what we have.

According to consolidated capitalism, not complying with the demands of efficiently managed markets, is self-retributive. Hence, the value (the price to be paid on command) can't be attributed to anyone or anything but your "self" (i.e., it is non-retributive). Instead of reducing the price and adding the value (the supply) to be retributed on demand, like in a free market, which maximizes participation by controlling the price (the rent) to be paid, if you aren't willing to pay the price on command, that's your business (and your fate) freely chosen.

Fate is nothing but the product of self-determination conforming to the naturally occurring conditions (the demands) of the marketplace. Students are subordinated to debt because they want to better themselves, and there is no better way to do that (and avoid "the risk"), capitalists say, than submit to the marketplace "on demand." (Value produced and consumed on demand is, in theory, non-retributive, but in practice the value always proves to be catastrophically retributive because this is really value efficiently managed "on command." Its accumulative, economy-of-scale dimension--its efficiency, understand, makes command an exigency of market demand, keeping the risk from going gamma.) What students gain in the form of critical, analytical skill to resist conformity is countered with the insurgency of debt. The more conforming you are, the more income you are likely to make to pay the debt, which effectively reduces your rent (increases your status into the top one percent).

(One-percenters, however, need to keep in mind that efficient-markets theory is a fraud perpetrated on 99.9 percent of us.)

Fate is indeed going to conform to the demands of the marketplace. Change we really need is likely to occur because students did not determine the economic situation they are in--peonage! Like 99 percent of us, students are apt to tempt a change of fate when freedom becomes "just another word for nothing left to lose."

Fully armed with the philosophy of freedom and self-determination, a population deprived is more apt than any to demand it, increasingly motivated to free the market of consolidated capital on demand.

Students have been turned into peons. They have come to realize, like the rest of us, that paying off large loans (the result of deficient income) reduces the demand necessary to drive the economy and demand jobs to pay the rent (the loans). This, you see, is not by chance, it is not a naturally occurring risk.

The path to peonage (what the Romney-Ryan budget calls "The Path to Prosperity") is by deliberate design. This is what consolidated capitalism (Bain Capital, for example) is and does--it makes peons out of most market participants and forces them to consolidate to retribute the value. (This is where the risk becomes transitionally phased into adversity and its direction--its management--gains impulsive, probablistic, quantum value that is fully assumed in priority. See the previous articles on economic rent.)

The consolidation required to retribute the value and control the risk is readily available through deconsolidated means--social media. Change is literally in the palm of your hand.

Perversion of the "self" by means of consolidation is easily reconciled with the virtual reality that we all know objectively exists by adverse possession (what it means to say, for example, "let's take the government back"). All we have to do is repossess it with our invisible hands, tweeting, copying, cutting and pasting a virtual reality into objective context.

Student unions (consolidation of the value) will begin vectoring the risk for its adverse possession, causing a phase transition (from bondage to freedom) that is only natural.