Empirical Value and Collective Action

The twist component of a broader-and-flatter burden relates to collective action.

Capitalism tends to focus on the individual because the aggregate value of collective action in the marketplace demands empirically verifiable accountability. In a free market, propriety is measured with market share and the profit margin. A business that provides a product you demand but can't trust is likely to lose market share and suffer a declining rate of profit in the alpha dimension if the consumer has a choice on demand. The marketplace, with the risk of loss fully assumed on demand, is self-determined--fully empowered with pluralistic, deconsolidated, proprietary risk.

It is instructive here to compare the alpha decline with the declining rate of profit experienced in the gamma-risk dimension where risk is consolidated to avoid it.

The alpha presents non-catastrophic, disinflationary risk; the gamma presents a catastrophic, deflationary, systemic-risk proportion that "demands" government intervention.

When the risk goes gamma, government acts with collective authority to affirm the mal-distribution of wealth and power--the detriment to be consumed on command--as legitimately earned with risk in the free market. Collective action is used to scapegoat the liability--the detriment to be consumed on demand--and assumes the risk proportion in the form of a late-order effect with the force and legitimacy of "due" public "process."

The effect is a rising tax burden that Romney and Ryan claim must not be the burden of the "job creators." If we show impropriety and burden the creators, they will retribute the risk in the form of deflation.

To appease the gods of wealth and power, we must be sure and not tax them to minimize the risk of deflation--the declining rate of profit (the retribution) it will surely cause. When the decline occurs (the risk of loss is fully assumed), we apparently have not provided proper tribute. The tax rate, according to the best and the brightest, is not regressive enough--not enough tribute (sacrifice, or detriment in the form of austerity) has been paid to the creators.

Empirically, then, given the evidence of a declining rate of profit, it is unnatural to tax the creators of wealth and power, which we are sure to do in order to keep the capital cycling into accumulation. When the capital fails to recycle, the eternal hope and promise of being on the path to prosperity ends, along with capitalism.

Eventually, along the "Path to Prosperity," the burden becomes evermore regressive--working for free while paying off student loans, for example, which accumulates even more value to be retributed (and collectively consumed, which adds demand for government) in the form of systemic risk. Yes, indeed, objective reality will most assuredly assert itself, and empirically verify our self-determination, despite the perception of it.

(It is important to understand that added demand for government does not add risk. This is a technical error that twists policy analyses into the objective of "risk reduction."

By trying to reduce added risk, programs become a complex mass of temporal fallacies that naturally result in failed expectations. Failure is then corrected for by adding to the complexity, not the risk.

When technical failure occurs, it is not because risk is added, but ignored in the aggregate, having been transformed into a gamma-risk dimension where legitimacy is a function of collective action in a politically post-hoc proportion.

The quantity valued as "risk" is always coefficiently conserved despite that the reward, by hook or by crook, can be added. Accumulated wealth, and power structured to increase the reward with low risk, accumulates risk, it does not add it.

Added value does not have to include added risk. In a free-market, the risk taken is non-catastrophically coefficient with the reward. Value can be added non-zero-sum with a deconsolidated distribution of the risk proportion.

With the quantum "risk" conserved in a non-catastrophic, unconsolidated, alpha-risk dimension, reward is driven by the incentive to innovate and expand the economy to make a profit.)

In the gamma-risk dimension, the empirical value of collective action is consumed in the form of false inductions. A progressive tax burden, for example, is attributed to supporting deflationary risk when it actually resists it, and while government distributions of accumulated wealth keeps capitalism from collapsing into Randian nihilism, government intervention is really the effect, not the cause, of the accumulation and the declining rate of profit.

Technically, with all manner of false induction, policies and programs, public and private, are an inchoate mass of errors that predictably fail expected, normative values like supply-demand and risk-reward. When supply exceeds demand and prices continue to rise, and reward is higher with lower risk, the economy-of-scale efficiency required to achieve these unnatural results are described as "the new normal."

By consolidating the means of propriety and the empirical value of collective self-determination, we induce the risk being avoided.

To avoid proprietary risk (not reduce it), capitalism claims to conserve the value of self-determination while, at the same time, destroying the power to demand it. Destroying demand is counter-intuitive if we "normally" want to make a profit, but modeled with an economy-of-scale efficiency it proportionally increases the power to command the margin by consolidating the marketplace in the name of reducing risk.

(Risk avoidance is not risk reduction. This is a technical error. When Goldman Sachs models to hedge macro risk while Bank of America redlines homes into foreclosure, credit-default-swaps are not a hedge but a profit-making vehicle that derives value from detriment in a systemic, synthetically aggregated proportion. Although it may seem that profiting from the misery of others lacks propriety, what are you going to do about it?

Remember, what is synthetic about the aggregate is the value "created," not the risk. The benefit is derived from the loss, not created--the risk of loss is fully assumed in priority. It is a false benefit that accumulates retributive value in the aggregate, which is empirical value used to synthesize an ontological argument that values the risk as collective action in the marketplace.

Since the aggregate--the sum of the squares--is where the ontological truth resides, from which derives the axiom that the technicals never lie, the truth can nevertheless be synthesized. Truth can be technically manipulated, like when Barklays manipulates the LIBOR.

Lies are derived from the truth. When a bank manipulates rates it produces a technical benefit, but in the aggregate the risk of loss is fully assumed. So, who trusts Barklays to do the right thing with all that accumulated capital anyway?

By allowing banks to be so big they can manipulate the technicals and move markets to produce a surprise premium--which is a surprise only to those who consume the detriment--we are, supposedly, reducing risk with an economy-of-scale efficiency. Remember, "In God We Trust." The trust will be accounted for in the aggregate according to free-market theory, but according to efficient-markets theory markets need to be consolidated to reduce the risk of a declining rate of profit.)

The risk is not reduced. In fact, it is accumulated into the risk being avoided, which accumulates more risk. While Ivy-League, business school graduates consider this to be a clever means of commanding detriment with the appearance of being on demand, it is, in objective reality, a technical failure that demands a political resolution--collective action.

By means of demand destruction (the slow demand we have now, for example), consolidation of capital is supposed to make us more competitive by achieving economy-of-scale efficiency, but it really reduces competition and proprietary risk. It reduces detriment that consumers otherwise exact on the so-called "best and the brightest" in the marketplace, unconsolidated, on demand.

(Capitalists tend to question the value of moral intelligence. They tend to the philosophy of Ayn Rand, for example, in which intelligence is merely a function of taking and keeping power in a free market. Morality is a function of controlling relative value on command, not on demand.

A philosophy of risk that discounts moral intelligence is exactly what the capitalist is looking for, relying on the ontology of the outcome to guide our sense of morality, technically demonstrated in the aggregate. The ontology--objective reality--is not something that can be changed, nor should we try, but just let it be.

While exacting detriment in zero-sum is relatively easy, maintaining dominance in a free market without consolidating the risk requires more intelligence than the so-called best and the brightest have on command. Instead of expanding the economy, and the capacity to self-determine, they spend a lot of energy "creating" a false ontology that excludes the value of moral intelligence, subscribing to Rand's Objectivism, for example. Creating value non-zero-sum requires the incentive--the risk--of moral intelligence on demand.

In a free market there is more to be accounted for than just the self. It requires a level of moral intelligence that efficient-markets theory unintelligently assumes in the aggregate with a post-hoc lack of priority.)

Demand is value that empirically measures the available amount of affective, collective action (retributive value) that determines the probable direction of the risk. While capitalism considers the capacity for exacting detriment on demand to be clever, having to produce a profit with full, market accountability requires a level of intellectual capacity that the best and brightest endeavor to avoid in order to survive.

When capital and markets are unconsolidated, and a free market occupies political space in an economic, alpha dimension, the best and the brightest are determined on demand. According to elite, conservative theory, however, like that of Alexander Hamilton (to which both liberals and conservatives subscribe), turning the power structure on its head is the recipe for political-economic dystopia. (See, for example, the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and Edmund Burke.)

In order to be self-determined (like the king), the elite must destroy the capacity to demand propriety. This means, contrary to our American heritage, defeating the free-market mechanism (and embracing a philosophy such as Ayn Rand's Objectivism, for example), and when the critique of capitalism is that the technicals indicate it is operating without a free-market legitimacy, the critics are axiomatically declared to be communists seeking to destroy the soul of our individuality, but consider what it means to destroy demand.

Broader and Flatter...With a Twist

Tax reform sounds great. It is the perfect plank for political succession promising an economy that is the picture of health...broader, flatter, leaner and meaner, but with a twist.

Broadening the burden and flattening the tax rate is the path to prosperity because, according to Romney and Ryan, it encourages us all to become rich and self-determined. In other words, to avoid being taxed it is necessary to be productive, but there's a twist. It is necessary, for example, to increase productivity with fewer employees, which will increase the capacity for self-determination by reducing it for others who are then taxed because they are not productive.

Right-wing conservatives claim we have a public debt that exceeds aggregate productivity because the top income class pays most of the income tax. The solution, then, they say, is to increase the burden for 99 percent of incomes in decline and reduce it for 1 percent of incomes rising in zero-sum.

According to conservative philosophy, the zero-sum increases productivity. Distribution of value in zero-sum (the 40 percent lost so far with the Great Recession, for example) provides the incentive for a net gain (the nearly 300 percent gain for the upper class). It "creates" more value than put into it. That is, the zero-sum incentive adds value that does not otherwise exist, but instead of adding value what is really added is an accumulation of risk that would not otherwise exist. This is what conservatives call "supply-side economics."

(It is important to understand that a free market keeps risk diffused. Risk is safely and soundly fully assumed and consumed ad hoc in non-catastrophic, unconsolidated proportions. It operates with a pluralistic model that is technically confirmed with unaccumulated risk, exactly the opposite of what we have now in a too-big-to-fail proportion that demands complex regulatory authority to keep the risk from deconsolidating.

The risk of loss is fully assumed but can be transformed and consumed in a catastrophic proportion. When risk gains a systemic proportion--when it goes gamma--a free market is not being allowed to operate and attempts to describe and explain the distribution of risk-reward as the product of free-market mechanics, post hoc, is a fraud, fully indicated by the technicals.)

Creating value that does not otherwise exist is the virtue of capitalism, conservatives contend, and react strongly to criticism that claims it creates more problems than it solves in zero-sum. There is truth to both positions. Capitalism, for example, increases productivity exponentially, but as the critique maintains, productivity that consumers can't afford to buy, and starving in the streets amid plenty, is hardly an improvement, providing the incentive for collective action (class warfare). To reduce the tendency for warfare (not increase it as conservatives contend) we have liberal policies and programs to conserve (correct for and retrace the value of) the elite hypothesis. The incentive to collectively act is coopted, bureaucratically structured to routinely task the externalities so the risk never goes fully gamma with the application of an elitist model.

When the externalities become too austere and counter-productive, we have the liberal alternative to the much-needed, trickle-down economic incentive that produces the slow GDP and high unemployment we have now. While it should be clear that neither really solves the problem, but retraces it, we keep doing the same thing over and over in impulsive and corrective waves, both long and short, which has a psychological, anchoring effect. The implication (the phenomenological effect) is that it can't get any better than what we have, which supports the hypothesis that history ends with capitalism.

The austerity required to cure shortages and increase productive incentive is, as we all know, premised on the trickle-down hypothesis. While it is continuously disconfirmed in the aggregate (the formula essentially being, give a little and take a lot long term), trickle-down theory still dominates the economic and political landscape.

Analyses of trickle-down economics seems cliche' at this point in history, but it is the essential principle for providing productive incentive. Capitalism claims that we will not be productive, but live like uncivilized animals locked in brutal conflict over scarcity, if we are not provided the organized incentive, the civility, to continuously add supply.

Capitalists claim they are not brutal bandits but benevolent beneficiaries of an economy that is always innovating new ways to improve the quality of life for everyone. The quality of life improves and people become more civil (or more demanding, which is a risk that is controlled by causing detriment that reduces demand) because we all want to get rich and be self-determined (like the king). Class mobility (which is as much a functional fear of non-conformity) provides productive incentive that is dependant on the amount of wealth (the detriment) that trickles-down, or distributes, to allow for self-determination on demand.

Trickle-down economics is a political scheme in the guise of economic necessity. It is not about adding supply but controlling demand.

The twist is that the more conforming, or dependant on civil authority whether public or private, the more self-determined we supposedly are, which results in cognitive dissonance. This kind of psychological disorder expresses as the binomialism that keeps our political system anchored to a relative benefit provided by the incentive to produce the relative value of the detriment. The value of the benefit is dependant on the severity of the detriment.

For the vast majority (the non-elite) there is a significant dependancy that capitalism refers to as "economic incentive," which is as much a political as an economic function. As history unfolds, the majority realizes that the self is determined by a few want-to-be kings (plutocrats) and the incentive to support the elite is fundamentally compromised with a false attribution that must be applied with the force and legitimacy of public authority.

With the illusion of progress on demand, we toggle between liberal and conservative reactions. Both parties propose and apply solutions to problems created by the other party's policy program. By continuously reinventing the problem, power is conserved in the name of continuous improvement, typically in the form of regulation and deregulation. The solution to the welfare state (the capacity to demand the oversupply and cause the need for employment to cure shortages) is trickle-down economics, and the cure for the austerity that commands it is the welfare state so that the problem, rather than the solution (free-market economics ensured by the state in priority), is always in demand.

When combined with the Laffer curve (now referred to as "The Pledge" to not increase taxes), supply-side economics is supposed to balance the budget with the added value (which cannot be taxed without causing slow productivity, like we have now, with record budget deficits). As Reagan found out, for example, the budget doesn't balance and the deficit deepens.

The broader-based income the Laffer curve demands be taxed is in decline while the value added goes untaxed, which accounts for the added supply (overproduction). Instead of being a general benefit, the added supply is transformed into a categorical detriment for "mass" consumption. Risk gains an unavoidable, aggregate, systemic proportion, and the economy is a whole lot leaner and a whole lot meaner, which accounts for big government spending while revenues decline.

What increases with the Romney-Ryan plan is not jobs. Instead, prices rise against declining demand (a detriment is exacted in the form of a proposed benefit), and because supply is added with fewer workers at lower cost on demand (the new normal), deflation, not jobs, occurs "on demand." The added supply appears to indicate the economy is more productive when it really isn't (i.e., productivity per worker rises while capacity to demand the supply--income--is falling with the result being low GDP, or slow aggregate demand). The result is technical failure and the Fed responds with something like "Operation Twist" (selling short-term debt to buy long-term debt) to increase the demand for productivity that pays the debt.

More demand for long debt (supported with a higher price) reduces the long-term rate to create a yield inversion that indicates the risk to be avoided--deflation (fewer jobs and declining demand). Capital will then move into the higher rate to deflate speculative demand in speculative markets (since it really isn't being used to add supply), reducing the price of oil, for example, which will indicate a recovery on demand.

The inversion--the twist--is the new normal. It now signals recovery, but conserved in historical perspective, in a twisted way, still technically indicates a deflationary trend.

Ending the stagflationary trend with a "Twist" provides more money to demand jobs and pay the debt, but demand will be diminished to pay the debt, especially when applied with a broader tax burden. The twist is that recovery means applying the austerity conservatives say is in demand to create jobs.

Again, understand, jobs are not created, they are demanded. The concept of the "job creators" is a lot of pretentious hokum. It is a psychotic delusion constructed into objective reality with practical theories, like supply-side theory, the Laffer curve, and efficient-markets theory (repeal of Glass-Steagall) that technically fail. These elite hypotheses are hokum to poke 'em. They are designed and implemented to technically achieve (confirm) what we have now--stagflation with the solution being deflation by popular demand. Deflation occurs with the force and legitimacy of the popular vote--fifty-plus-one and the vast majority are bust on demand with repeated command performances.

Performances include, for example, the song and dance over class warfare--a perennial command performance in which the king asserts that all he possesses belongs to everyone collectively. Demand is "collected" (horded) for safe keeping (horded to prevent shortages and hedge the risk). For those who applaud his performance, all the wealth is consumed, and those who would divide the kingdom naturally possess all the risk. All those who know the wisdom of the king will surely share in the wealth created in his name and held in common (job creation on demand).

As we know, however, the king's concept of common wealth became the concept of the "commonwealth" but with the pretense of kingly aspiration conserved in historical perspective. Capitalists are sure that history ends with its regime of power because it is more pluralistic, but as it was with the king, power consolidates to maintain alpha dominance, and because having more power than everyone else is not enough, power is tested by exacting detriment to demonstrate its extent.

Competition among elites can be extremely brutal for the non-elite who must consume the detriment because it is more likely a test for pain rather than pleasure. Real test of power is not getting people to do things they want, but what they don't want, like being austere in a consumer society. When once the consumption occured on command, detriment is now exacted with more elegance on demand so that its consumption appears to be the product of popular consent, self-determined and ontologically derived by collective action in a free and open marketplace.

Today, the test of tolerance is more likely to be in the form of a burden described as broader and flatter...with a twist.

Synthetic Risk

No such thing, and a model constructed to simulate synthetic risk will technically fail because it does not model objective reality. It models a psychotic delusion of the self--that you are so powerful you can create something out of nothing.

Risk cannot be synthesized (but it can be mispriced). It exists in priority and presents on demand (being undervalued to create an overvalued effect). Creating CDS's with the self-delusional concept of creating risk is to demand it with the technical objective of not consuming it yourself but timing it to transfer to others in the form of detriment. The value, in the aggregate, despite the delusion of grandeur (of being too big to fail), is self-retributive and not too bright.

What Jamie Dimon and JP Morgan's risk modelers didn't know, despite being the smartest people in the room, is that fractal, risk modeling does not create risk (nor does it spread the risk, which is what they say they are doing to everyone's benefit), it accumulates risk. What is created is a too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale proportion that is more likely to fail the larger it gets.

We have to keep in mind that avoiding the too-big-to-fail dimension with a discussion about firms that are "too complex and interconnected to fail" is really the same thing. The risk that catastrophically accumulates, which is why Dimon is under scrutiny, is the result of over-consolidation, which undervalues the risk and means the solution is deconsolidation--exactly what controlling authorities both public and private fail to talk about because it is the risk that is really being avoided.

As I keep pointing out, again and again, trying to avoid the fully assumed risk by synthesizing it for someone else is self-retributive. Hedging risk for profit in the name of protecting your firm from the risk of loss is pure nonsense. The hedge is then the risk to be avoided--stupid!

The problem here is that the so-called best and the brightest are not the smartest people in the room...they are the dumbest! The reality of their superiority is completely synthetic and results in real risk to be consumed on demand by both "us" and "them."

Deconsolidation will keep risk properly valued--it will keep it from being arbitraged and mistakenly considered to be added, or created, by avoiding it.

Deregulation, which is the substitute for deconsolidation, is what led to the Great Recession. It is also the policy program posited by Romney, along with the austerity program of Ryan, to price the risk, and the price will be essentially set by manipulating the tax code in the name of much-needed reform to "reduce" the risk of job "creators."

Remember, however, risk cannot be "reduced" and jobs are not "created" but produced on demand--proprietary value that Romney and Ryan want to tax and cut with a broader burden and a flatter rate.

Technical Success (Deflation On Demand)

Technical failure since '08 has been a technical success. Forcing trillions of dollars into default and consolidating the value on demand is the American dream. Even the king couldn't exact massive detriment like that. Not on demand. He could never get away with that. He had to command it.

Indeed, as Reagan described it, "America is a place where a person can still get rich."

A place where you can get rich at the expense of others and get away with it--indeed, a place where causing massive misery is regarded as the virtue of high intelligence, morally imperative, and the success we all dream of (on demand)--is truly exceptional. It is, as Romney and Ryan explain it, the land of opportunity, which is curiously, at this point, being attributed to Obama's failure, as economist Paul Krugman points out, so that Republican policies and programs continue to be a technical success.

Stagflation is the natural result of consolidation "on demand" (i.e., considered to be the most efficient, risk-averse way to manage markets toward optimal productivity) whether it is the Romney-Ryan plan or the Obama plan. Either way, debt is monetized to consume the supply and resist unemployment with the result being, however, rising prices, which supports unemployment and is a technical failure depending on the objective. New money is added that is mistaken for added risk because it is being used to support profits (on demand) against overproduction in dark, speculative markets--swapping debt instruments that eventually commands default and demands the bailout Dodd-Frank is supposed to prevent.

Mistaking added money for added risk is not fundamental error, like falsely arguing high oil prices are supported by demand when demand is falling. That is just fraud and racketeering perpetrated by a bunch of gangsters who control our economy to profit by causing massive detriment (deflation) in the name of free-market economics (on demand). While expansion is the expected value of inflation, the actual value has been deflation. That does not mean risk has been added, but misdirected (timed and transferred) to redefine the probable value of the detriment. It is not a technical failure, but successful application of the risk assessment.

Failure of the risk assessment is a technical failure that derives from fundamental attribution error. While it is correct to say that the technicals are independent of timing, and so they never lie in the aggregate, the proportion of the risk and the relative space it occupies at any particular time (in the alpha, beta, or gamma-risk dimensions) can be, and is, often misconstrued, resulting in technical failure.

It is important to understand that risk cannot be created or destroyed. Its value is fully assumed in priority and consumed on demand. Whether we like it or not, risk cannot be reduced, but it can be accumulated and distributed--timed to transfer with what appears to be an unavoidable aggregate that must be managed on command to demand the supply.

The value to be demanded (retributed) presents as empirical value--the rate of taxation. As the value demanded accumulates (surplus value) the tax rate increases, and if the burden is regressive, the more value there is to be demanded (overproduction).

Reversal of a stagflationary trend--with stagflation regarded as a phase transition by most economists--is technically indicated by a rising rate of taxation. The period of stagflation following the oil shock in the 70's, for example, increased pressure to raise the marginal rate. Although resisted by the Reagan administration, the marginal rate rose, nevertheless, to reduce budget deficits, and later, during the Bush and Clinton administrations, the marginal rate rose even more to end the stagflationary phase, which transitioned into a boom phase of the business cycle, yielding budget surpluses that resisted a declining rate of profit.

In the current environment, as the rate of taxation rises--with more than ten years of an effectively regressive tax burden and even more to come if Romney and Ryan have their way--the rate of profit will decline, and resisting the declining rate of profit is job one. When there is no one left to pay the debt but the top quintile of income classification, the economic trend will reverse to pay the rent--what a Romney campaign slogan describes as "Putting Jobs First."

Failure to support the profit margin with a declining, marginal rate of taxation is, by natural condition, a technical success because it empowers more consumers with more discretion to spend. Stagflation ends, keeping in mind that a declining, non-marginal rate will support profits just fine, but without all the detriment like the "fiscal cliff" we now face. Resisting a declining, marginal rate prevents us from burying ourselves in detriment in the name of self-interest, which according to Romney and Ryan is a technical failure.

Technical failure and success is a function of working/analytical modeling. Constructing a model to legitimize the outcome, post hoc, as a technical success is not intended to have predictive utility.

Analyses used to predict economic trending is probably wrong not because it is in the aggregate random and unpredictable, but because it is intended to misdirect market participants into affirming adverse possession of the risk. This can be easily accomplished by moving markets contrary to technically indicated trends, which is a manipulation that can only be accomplished with a highly consolidated capital that operates with the effect of concentrated power--exactly what a free market is not!

Models not intended to be confirmational, but affirmational, are prone to technical failure. Not only are they not intended to be predictive, but because they are intended to confirm class identity with empirical value, the aggregate value consumed is ingeniously modeled to appear as value ontologically derived. This false ontology is the gamma-risk proportion--it is highly unstable and predictably catastrophic.

A predictive model is likely to operate as an independent, objective reality. The Romney-Ryan plan, for example, is supposed to be the path to prosperity, and predictably it is for the top-income classification. Since the evidence is verifiably positive by confirming a verifiable detriment for everybody else, the detriment is modeled as a naturally occurring, objective reality, a la Ayn Rand, in the aggregate. The outcome is commanded by nature, and so it is foolish--"intellectually lazy" as Ryan describes it--to resist it on demand. It is in this way that technical failure is modeled as technical success, and why we keep making the same mistakes, like regressing the tax burden to make the people that pay it more prosperous, over and over again.

One sure measure of success is the rate of taxation. A regressive tax burden indicates technical success if you want to be king (and technically conserves the power to stay king) since the king exacts the burden and subjects pay it. Keep in mind as well, the higher the burden (the more austerity exacted on demand to pay the debt--what the king referred to as extension of the rent), the more power technically indicated.

For a power elite, the closer the economy is to technical failure, the closer we are to technical success in the name of much-needed austerity to pay our debts and keep the king(s) (the "job creators") fully liquid and in command. The more failure (the more capital invested in credit-default swaps, for example, to extend the rent), the more success to be derived.

Today, rent is extended by consolidation of capital, which is described as free-market efficiency. Using the "demand" dimension of the marketplace, deflation (reduction of net worth, a 40 percent reduction for 99 percent of Americans as the result of the Great Recession, for example) occurs with an on-demand legitimacy and permutations of popular rule by elite authority.

Whether the objective reality is considered to be capitalist, socialist, or communist, consolidation of power (value attributed to the king in the form of taxation) is considered to be the most efficient way to limit the risk, paradoxically, by accumulating it (value to be retributed). The king (government authority) is not rendered less powerful by an accumulation of capital, but more powerful. Is this a technical failure or a technical success?

While capitalism has pluralized the possible number of would-be rulers who supposedly operate with more productive efficiency with less government, why is there so much demand for government, and higher taxes?

Limited government, remember, technically indicates a working, pluralistic model. Limited government on command does not cause freedom, it is the measurable effect on demand.

Lowering the marginal rate on command, like Romney and Ryan propose, will not reduce the demand for higher taxes. Instead, demand to tax will increase while the supply to meet demand (high profits supported by monetized debt) accumulates at the margin. The marginal rate, then, will naturally rise to meet demand. The risk of loss is fully assumed on demand despite all attempts to broaden the base and flatten the rate on command.

Since the Romney-Ryan plan is technically doomed to fail, it is necessary to invoke Rand's Aristotelian philosophy of risk. It is the latest version of conservative philosophy that posits the poor are too rich and the rich too poor because the tax rate is too progressive.

A lower marginal rate, according to conservative philosophy, makes us more productive, in fact, so productive that we have more supply, like housing, than we can demand, and the cure for that is, curiously, to be more productive.

Building more houses that consumers can't afford to buy is not the objective reality of curing shortages, understand, but deflation on demand. What is "produced" is the crisis of liquidity that private equity capitalizes on, demanding the rate of taxation be regressed to conserve the value derived from the detriment.

Voters need to understand that complex credit instruments swapped in derivatives markets are intended to deflate the economy on demand. It is a highly technical endeavor intended to make markets technically appear to be in control of our fate "on demand" by legitimate means of self-determination.

Swapping credit for risk-value in capital markets in the form of credit-default swaps, however, is not something the vast majority of voters are directly involved in. Technically, "We" are not in a position to determine the value derived in the image of the "self" as our founders envisioned it, but instead "We" are being positioned to consume the risk on command authority in the guise of the general welfare.

Securing the general welfare means controlling the macro-risk proportion--crises in the aggregate realm of technical analayses in which only the so-called "best and the brightest" are capable of managing into technical failure. The rest of us, about 99 percent of us, don't have the technical knowledge to manage the risk, and when it is a technical failure, "We" are too stupid and ignorant--or as Ryan describes it, "intellectually lazy"--to understand it for the success it really is in the realm of objective reality.

Romney and Ryan are prepared, I understand, to turn technical failure into technical success, but only if "We" let them.

Technical Failure

Labor has been working more for less because productivity has been gained with fewer workers. The derivative is consolidated income (value "lost") needed to demand the supply.

The value derived (the detriment exacted) has created our too-big-to-fail banks that the President says we need to provide capital world wide even after demonstrating derivative practices that still threaten global economic stability. Both the Obama administration and Congress support the accumulation of risk (value fully intended to be "lost") that comes with the use of efficient-markets theory.

Support for the theory predicts technical failure. The administration wrongly thinks bigger is better, explaining that unemployment is best reduced by eliminating subsidies that export jobs and import low-wage goods, which explains why regulatory authority has not been used to curtail speculative demand in futures markets (because it provides capital world wide to demand cheap labor) and why prices continue to rise against declining demand. Demand is so slack that even low-wage goods are becoming unaffordable, however, and the Chinese experience what it means to be capitalist--the crisis of overproduction.

When goods and services can't be bought at any price because income is too consolidated from exporting jobs (reducing demand against rising prices), reducing subsidies that support the export of labor value assumes the export will be reduced enough to increase demand. Instead, what will happen, because income is so consolidated, prices will be pushed up in speculative markets with the anticipated demand, which will reduce demand against rising prices.

By technical objective, high prices against a rising supply stagflates the economy (the problem to be solved in the aggregate) to resist the declining rate of profit. Paradoxically, when capital is allowed to consolidate into a too-big-to-fail (gamma-risk), aggregate proportion to resist deflation (a declining rate of profit), the more support the problem to be solved gets.

The more the fully assumed risk of loss (the alpha risk) is resisted and accumulated, the more probable it will occur in a gamma-risk proportion, and this catastrophic accumulation of risk is technically indicated by an accumulating supply against rising prices. (Notice it was just the opposite for consumers in the USSR. Shortages occurred against low prices with the result being an accumulation of political, gamma risk. Notice that in both cases alpha risk has been allowed to consolidate in order to avoid the direct accountability of free-market economics that requires less need--less demand--for government.) The result is high inflation and unemployment--the problem we have now.

Reducing the problem of overproduction to job-export subsidies lacks good analytical skill. We have these subsidies because power is too consolidated to resist it, and this power derives from consolidating capital into a too-big-to-fail proportion. Again, the problem is not that value is surplussed to avoid shortages, the problem is that the value is consolidated as productivity rises. The "change we really need" is resistance to consolidation, not support, and the problem expresses at the micro as well as the macro level.

Economists tend to ignore macro risk because "it just happens" as the result of micro-risk assessments. Objectively, however, macro risk is ignored because it is the primary means of exacting the detriment.

Risk is micro managed into a macro-risk proportion to, supposedly, avoid it. The result, however, is the crisis of overproduction, which is nonsensically attributed to low productivity and why analyses technically fail on a regular basis.

Macro risk is considered largely a function of probability. Since it is not a risk proportion that we can predict or control (time and transfer in the aggregate), it is a function of statistical probability that essentially measures the level of our ignorance. What we cannot know is attributed to randomness which, of course, explains the frequency of technical failure and the "surprise" reversals that, despite being ignored, are anticipated well in advance to produce value (accumulated wealth and power) from the detriment.

Since, remember, random events are by definition beyond our means of technical direction, the outcome is non-retributive (non-anthropogenic). The best we can do is analyze micro events, but that does not necessarily indicate the probable risk in the aggregate like when we consolidate the risk to efficiently manage markets to hedge the macro risk.

Instead of being reinvested to support the capacity to demand the supply, consolidation of capital (storing value to prevent shortages and the large-scale, macro risk associated with it) is used, for example, to parabolically over-price shares of facebook's IPO on demand. Technically, this "makes" a few people exceedingly rich with "new money" to demonstrate that capitalism really does work in the face of rising prices and slow, consumer demand.

Interesting that facebook's value is priced on a service consumers don't have to pay to use. If it was, the demand would not exist to support the price because it has been systematically disintegrated and the value derived consolidated into a volatile risk dimension that demands the value by fiat, not by the invisible hand of aggregated, collective, consumer power on demand.

Collective power on demand is akin to communism. It is the opposite of capitalism, so we have to be sure to ignore aggregate, collective power (the alpha-risk dimension of the invisible hand) and focus on the power of the individual hand.

Capitalism focuses on the entrepreneur that consolidates power and elegantly traps liquidity (the power to collectively self-determine) in dark markets in the guise of the invisible hand (i.e., with the constant perpetration of a fraud). A demand legitimacy operating within the command dimension is the gamma risk--it is the opposite of a free market, relying on government intervention to manage the aggregation of risk post hoc, which is then falsely reasoned to be the cause of the aggregate detriment that is really the natural effect (the empirically verifiable result) of the value accumulated.

Attributing risk to value accumulated on demand in a command dimension is fundamentally unstable and requires the force and legitimacy of public authority. The attribution transforms alpha risk into gamma risk by technical objective, and because of the inherent contradiction, whether capitalist or communist (destroying freedom in order to have it or conserve it), the working model will technically fail in the aggregate when the risk goes fully gamma.

(Understand that the gamma risk is more than just policy uncertainty that results from government intervention. The gamma dimension is where the fully assumed risk of loss occurs. It is not a probability, it is a sure thing that capitalism wants to ignore with the attribution of inculpable, aggregated value. The value, however, is fully culpable, and ignoring it is, technically, what accumulates the alpha into a gamma-risk dimension.)

Disintegration of the productive value (labor's integral value to the formation of the capital invested that is not retributed) presents as systemic risk that economists say we cannot control, and so it is always out of control, which demands markets be efficiently managed, post hoc, to control the externalities. Systemic risk (the aggregate sum of micro motives liberally pursued) is described as a naturally occurring, free-market phenomenon that is not caused by making markets, but markets are made, instead, to control, or efficiently manage, the effect (risk that accumulates with disintegration of the value). Objectively, then, the macro trend is stagflationary because productivity is high against declining demand.

High productivity against falling demand yields the objective value of unemployment. This value is consolidated to form the systemic risk (high profits against a slow economy) that modern economics technically considers to be, in the aggregate, ontologically derived.

Technically, the value consolidated is not derived, however. It is integral value that has been dis-integrated (destroyed) to yield (create) the value consolidated by technical objective. It is the creative-destruction that Romney, Ryan, and Rand describe as our natural condition, and so not resisting it is categorically imperative because nature demands it whether we like it or not. Letting too-big-to-fail firms like GM fail is the right thing to do because it consolidates the risk proportion to be efficiently managed.

Private equity firms, and banks that are too big to fail, reactionaries generally agree, are not immoral monsters feeding on the misery of others. The capital accumulated turns the detriment into surplus value--it turns the loss into profit, which resists shortages, but not with a disinflationary trend that would reduce the supply and increase productive incentive. Instead, the resistance is in the form of an inflationary trend (oversupply at high prices) that has a deflationary, macro effect that we tend to ignore (because we, supposedly, can't control it) until the numbers verify it, like we have now.

Currently, for example, we have a sharp correction in oil prices because it is overproduced at the relative price, but according to mainstream, market analysts, the price is falling because the dollar is rising against the Euro. While weak demand at high prices will account for the correction to the penny, analysts will not admit to overproduction being the problem with the result being technical failure and a stagflationary economy ad infinitum.

(If you recall, back in '09 after oil crashed to around $40 per barrel under deflationary pressure, and the Fed pumped in a load of money to resist the declining rate of profit, pop, technical analysis touted a rising oil price as a signal for economic recovery. Of course, like I said, this is wrong, and the Obama administration later said the economy was really worse than it had expected when the technicals failed to predict the direction of the trend.

The technicals fail to predict the trend because the capital is too consolidated for the laws of supply and demand to behave as expected. Instead, like I said then, because the risk proportion is going fully gamma, a falling oil price signals recovery...something that a Recovery Act will not do, what a JOBS Act will not do, but what expansion of the monetary supply to deconsolidate the risk will do in short order.)

Temporal fallacy is critical for maintaining technical failure. When too-big-to-fail banks operate unregulated and bankrupt millions of Americans (with no liability because it is an uncontrollable, aggregate effect described as market efficiency), regulation is legislated to make the market more efficient. When regulation does not cure the problem, but may in fact support it because it is a symptomatic treatment, the lack of resistance is attributed to the effect (regulation) and not the cause.

The marketplace is then deregulated, rather than deconsolidated, to solve the problem with the efficiency of markets. With regulation again in demand to make markets more efficient (Dodd-Frank, for example), the value of the risk proportion (the too-big-to-fail tautology) is conserved.

Conservation of the risk in a catastrophic (aggregative) proportion demands command authority. It demands, for example, the regulatory authority (the bureaucratic model) of the Federal Reserve (manipulation of the money supply). Reducing deflationary risk to prevent a declining rate of profit requires adding to the money supply (aggregating risk on command) with the result being the stagflation we have now, which can, of course, be blamed on the Fed acting (by fiat, or non-market means) to treat the symptoms (the effects) to conserve the cause. With this kind of deductive reasoning (the tautology), considering that the problem persists whether we regulate or deregulate, consolidation is never the problem but always considered to be the regulated or unregulated solution.

With weak demand the Fed will naturally keep interest rates at record lows, and the funds available (the supply of money added) will be used to bid up the oversupply, which weakens demand against high prices. Technically, the marketplace is being efficiently managed into failure, parlously perched on the precipice, just one nudge away from being pushed into a full-blown deflationary trend.

Productivity and Objective Reality

According to right-wing conservatives, the stagflationary trend we have now can be attributed to low productivity. The reason value is consolidated in the top one-percent of income class is because the tax rate is too progressive. If the tax rate is more regressive, they say, capital will distribute and GDP will rise because the rent will be lower.

Regressive taxation models an elitist philosophy of the risk assessment: the more money you have the less the risk. The working model essentially works like this: When facebook's IPO, for example, is suddenly not such a good buy afterall, people that have the most money are alerted before the market opens and everybody else discovers objective reality (the price) after the detriment (the risk) has been applied (converted into a cash reward). The risk distributes by classification to conserve the distribution of the reward at the expense of everybody else, just like a more regressive tax code will do.

According to Romney and Ryan, the poor are too rich and the rich are too poor (up is down and down is up, just like in the stock market), and they plan to fix that with a more regressive tax burden, adding to the supply of capital for economic growth and debt reduction.

Essentially, for the rich, the rent is much lower with a more regressive tax burden, but it raises the rent for 99 percent of consumers who are then less able to demand the supply. (Remember that the capacity to demand in the marketplace raises the rent. A high degree of income distribution not only demands supply and productivity but productive propriety. See articles on proprietary risk on this website.) The accumulation of supply is then used as evidence that capitalism adds supply, which is a fraud (an impropriety).

(Facebook's IPO was diluted with additional shares after a lot of hype that gave the appearance of strong demand. When the demand wasn't there to support the price, essentially because the money to demand it is too consolidated, confidence was lost, but the value accumulated was not, just like what happens in the real economy. It is a confidence game...you know, what criminals do to rook people out of their money.)

In the real economy, supply is added only to suggest strong demand (capitalism doesn't really want strong demand because it demands propriety). The suggested demand supports the price against real, declining demand (the Enron effect just like in speculative markets), allowing a rising supply to be sold at high-demand prices, which is supposed to be unnatural (i.e., improper).

(We see here how economics technically functions with natural philosophy. Many of our most notable founders, and Adam Smith, for example, based their philosophy on what they observed in nature. Some of our founders were members of secret societies because they were empiricists, persecuted for questioning the absolute truth of caesaropapal power and Aristotelian logic.

The more empirical ethic of our founders is in opposition to the Aristotelian logic that Ayn Rand, for example, favors as being more representative of our founding philosophy. Romney and Ryan favor Rand's political-economic philosophy because using empirical analyses readily reveals the Romney-Ryan plan to be complete garbage! It is a philosophy of risk that belongs on the trash heap of disconfirmed hypotheses.

Continuing to use a plan that always fails to work as expected is highly improper--i.e., completely unnatural and inherently unstable. It is a product of ignorance that Mason's, for example, consider to be the ultimate evil--what a free market will not tolerate by confirmation if the market is not allowed to verifiably consolidate and result in the instability we have now.

When the marketplace becomes so consolidated that firms are too big to fail, and the Ivy-League solution is to ignore the "too big" dimension and allow for failure because it efficiently manages the marketplace by ensuring the crisis to be avoided, a reasonable person can only question the empirical value of the technical objective.

Obviously, the risk needs to be de-consolidated, not more consolidated, if safety and soundness is the real objective. If we want to allow for failure, obviously it is impractical to allow firms to be "too big" to fail.

If low inflation and high employment is the empirical measure of success, what we are doing now is a dismal failure. The Ivy-League alternative, the Romney-Ryan plan, will extend and reinforce technical failure clearly indicated with empirical measures.

When supply increases, the oversupply can be geometrically confirmed with the relative price. Price naturally falls, or disinflates, to confirm, or indicate, the oversupply, and if it doesn't, something is wrong and will be verified with, for example, a deflationary crisis that will surely result in a declining rate of profit if not supported with debt or some other form of redistribution.

Inflation, understand, is not the result of too much money chasing too few goods, but overconsolidation of the capital--too much money bidding up oversupply against declining consumption due to unemployment, or overproduction.)

An accumulating supply and high prices suggest high productivity, but the objective reality is that supply is being added because income is too consolidated to demand it. When income becomes highly consolidated, prices are pulled up to where the demand is, not pushed up with income distributed to a more productive workforce that, with rising unemployment, is less likely to buy at any price.

Value surplussed and consolidated does not substitute for the reduced distribution of demand (income). (Remember that the crisis proportion is not the surplussing of value but its consolidation. When it becomes too big to fail, the capital becomes irrationally short term and self-retributive.) Instead, the surplus value (the capital) is used to push up prices in speculative markets. Profit margins are not the product of consumer demand, but speculative demand, which adds to declining consumer demand and accumulates risk into a systemic, crisis (gamma-risk) dimension (the opportunity for private equity firms to capitalize on the detriment, which is attributed to cyclical, market forces).

An accumulation of risk occurs with speculative demand. Supply accumulates with slowing consumer demand against rising prices to create a volatile, beta-risk environment.

In the beta-risk dimension, the risk is arbitraged (swapped for cash value in highly exclusive, "dark" markets) with complex risk-timing-and-transfer devices (derivatives) like credit-default swaps. This is where the risk is transferred for its classified consumption and transforms into political, gamma risk.

The risk goes gamma (and becomes highly unstable) because consumers do not directly participate to determine the outcome, like in a free market, despite being told that their fate is the result of self-determination. Instead their fate is swapped for cash value (net worth is cashed out in the form of private equity that Romney so admires as the American dream come true) as the credit consumed to self-determine (to make demands in the marketplace) is forced into default.

Since the accumulated capital is not used to reduce unemployment, but pushes prices up against an accumulating supply (which accumulates risk-value in the form of debt), the result is overproduction. The slow economy (and the debt that accumulates to demand the supply at high prices--the risk to be reduced and the value, or detriment, thus produced to be consumed) is then blamed on low productivity.

Attributing overproduction to low productivity is not objective reality, however, which misprices the risk (essentially because it is supposed to be in reduction, not accumulation), and because the risk is managed with economy-of-scale efficiency (making markets) as per efficient-markets theory, the error of fundamental attribution accumulates into a politically unstable (too-big-to-fail) gamma-risk proportion that is evermore likely to fail.

Low productivity (unemployment) is the effect, not the cause of overproduction, just like high debt (demanding supply) does not cause low GDP, low GDP (no income to demand the accumulating supply) causes high debt.

Temporal fallacies are integral to the fraud that perpetrates through efficient-markets theory, having a risk-timing-and-transfer effect that operates with error of fundamental attribution. If there is only the appearance of a free market, then the differential between the fraud and objective reality can be structured to time and transfer risk with a calculated complexity that suggests free-market mechanics.

Complex, arcane interaction of monetary-fiscal policy and corporate practices are represented as a free market efficiently managed to maximize pursuit of the the American dream. It makes it look like fate is a function of probability, and thus inculpable, when it really isn't.

When buyers and sellers meet, trying to overprice their interest to the detriment of the other party, the vice of self-interest is transformed into the Pareto-optimal virtue of risk-value legitimately determined with free and open interaction. If by chance, for example, labor cannot sell its supply at any price due to a macro-risk proportion, the detriment, and the benefit derived, is a function of probable risk. Timing is the determinant, and if you consume the detriment, well, that's just life. In other words, the distributive value is ontological and non-retributive.

It is no coincidence, however, that millions of Americans lost half their net worth, and lost their jobs only to be rehired at half the price in a so-called recovery, in pursuit of the American dream. The value lost became private equity poised to buy distressed assets (to capitalize on, or benefit from, the detriment). These assets are timed to transfer risk-value and transform the value (the stuff of the American dream) into the capacity to command the marketplace with efficiency, and we see the effect of this consolidated power (the power to determine our selves like the king, which is the aristocratic, Hamiltonian, Romney-Ryan version of the American dream) in every aspect of economic life.

If market participants are trying to measure the value of facebook's IPO, for example, retail investors have to consider the source of the risk, and transposing cause with effect is a fatal error. The technicals fail when high concentrations of consolidated capital can "make the market" on command, which is a fundamental error of attribution.

Markets are not supposed to produce profits on command with a post-hoc legitimacy, but attributed to consumers who make the market productive, ad-hoc, on demand. The marketplace is supposed to be self-determined by consumers, not pre-determined by producers who then argue the value produced is demanded, or determined, by consumers when the price to be paid, or the value rented back, post hoc, to consume the product is in the form of accumulated debt.

If the relationship between production and consumption is disintegrated by consolidation of the capital, the marketplace can be, and is, rationalized, post hoc, to meet supply with demand and bring buyers and sellers together with what is claimed to be the integrity of a legitimately determined price. Reintegration is then the opportunity to derive value referred to as "making the market more efficient" with, supposedly, ad-hoc self-determination.

After the fact has been accomplished, with the distribution having been, presumably, self-determined, a battery of babbling barristers are retained to confabulate a post-hoc legitimacy of the risk. With all manner of mindless chatter (like a mocking bird that instinctively rattles off a continuous repertoire of songs that mocks objective reality), the value derived from the detriment gains an integral attribution, post hoc, by arguing the shared benefit of maintaining coherent rules that govern the possession of private property as a public good, without which the liberty to legally and properly dispossess it will surely perish.

Market makers make it look like cause is effect to make trade-based value transfers (a technique criminals use to launder illicit funds) look legitimately earned. With technical manipulation of market mechanics that investors use to predict the value of the risk, market makers can make it appear that something has value when it doesn't and vice-a-versa.

Transposing cause and effect misprices the risk and the difference is the vig that insiders use to manipulate the technical indicators with both massive volume and high frequency trading. Keep in mind, as well, that making markets is explicitly legal. It is encouraged by Dodd-Frank to provide maximum liquidity for financial markets.

It is absolutely essential to understand that positive law (supposedly derived from natural law that postulates markets--based on objective, empirical observation--naturally consolidate to reduce risk) is applied to maximize financing for the accumulation of the risk to be avoided. Dodd-Fank explicitly supports (by objective) the big, consolidated, accumulated proportion that determines the direction of the risk and positions most Americans (the American dream) for its adverse possession whether you are an investor or not.

Pricing the recent facebook IPO, for example, supposedly derives from the technicals--natural laws like supply-demand. The IPO was rigged so that an oversupply of shares were sold at a premium price with retail investors, due to a technical failure, complaining that they were left in the dark. Then, in the light of day, the value of the IPO quickly lost 12% of its value the next open.

The 12% is not "lost," it is, technically, retributive value that a free-market ensures is equitably shared in priority, not in posteriori where the equity is distributed by administrative authority. The business model (efficient management of markets, or efficient-markets theory) fits the deliberate intent to sell high supply at low supply prices on command, which is a fraud, and fraud is a crime.

Market prices are legitimately determined on demand, not command. If command is the determinant, and a free market is said to determine the distribution of risk-value, a fraud has been knowingly and willingly perpetrated, which is a crime. Prosecution will not occur, however, because perpetration of this fraud (creating facebook and having big-daddy-war-bucks overprice it with consolidated wealth and power) is the American dream (the objective that defines what reality is).

Implicit to efficient-markets theory is that the objective of the managers aligns with the vast majority of Americans. In the case of the facebook IPO, what was good for Morgan Stanley and all the insiders (who are about one percent) is the self-interest of everybody else. This "objective reality" supposedly exists in both the political and economic dimensions because it represents the popular vote, and in both, it is up to elite authority to determine what that is and best represent self-interest, with efficiency, in the marketplace. According to right-wing reactionaries, for example, class warfare is a false construction of reality--there is no value to be retributed because our self-interest is aligned (fully assumed) in the marketplace, and Mark Zuckerberg proves that "everybody has a fair shot."

When Romney claims his private equity experience qualifies him to be president, he is implicitly saying that the objective (the incentive to act in self-interest) is properly aligned with the general welfare, just like the interests of private equity managers are aligned with its shareholders.

In reality, then, cutting debt by reducing spending and broadening the tax base (austerity) keeps the American dream alive, which makes us more productive. The creators of facebook, however, keep in mind, relied on debt to create the product and the wealth being consumed. It was not the product of austerity--it was not the product of depriving, but providing facile resources for creative innovation incubated in a higher education environment.

Reducing debt with a more regressive tax code will not add GDP. It will not increase productivity as Romney and Ryan say it will. Instead, it will increase the demand for debt (the risk supposedly being avoided). It will raise the rent and push the stagflationary trend into deflation, which for the vast majority of Americans destroys the dream by objective (by default) to create value for property owners--shareholders like Mitt Romney in the form of private equity.

(Plutocrats learned not to make the mistake the king made. Allowing your subjects to own property so that they will be more productive renders the power of self-determination. The objective of productive value becomes more readily retributive, like in a free market.

In order to maintain power it is necessary to efficiently manage markets and organize the inherent political risk to validate the need for elite authority to command the risk. This organized tautology has the pretense of a risk ontology, appearing to have the value of empirical confirmation derived from natural law, but it is a fraud perpetrated by transforming the value into positive law.

When the liquidity of the vast majority of Americans is trapped into detriment, the law is very positive about the disposition of the negative value. Debt--the liquidity required to own property, or the rent to be paid--is naturally transformed into its adverse repossession, confirming the value of its natural possessor.)

While stagflation is always a long way from full employment at competitive prices (disinflation), it is always just a stone's throw away from the opportunity to consolidate even more wealth and power (the fully assumed risk of loss) by default (deflation).

(Remember, nature--objective reality, the fully assumed risk of loss--does not care if we are too ignorant or arrogant to recognize and correct for fundamental attribution error, and if we persist in error, allowing it to accumulate, the error will, inevitably, unavoidably, correct with a catastrophic proportion of accumulated risk referred to as "the gamma risk." Yes, we are self-determined, and allowing risk to objectively accumulate into self-retributive value is just crazy!

Constructing predictive models without including the retributive value can result in, for example, a sudden, $2 billion loss at a major bank. Being too-big-to-fail, remember, means that the business model, with the missing value, creates the opportunity to consolidate wealth--the income--needed to demand the supply. So, you see, the value is not "lost." It is never lost. The risk is always conserved by nature in one form or another, and nature does not care if big, self-satisfied capitalists are too arrogant to admit that they cannot command nature by making demands in the marketplace. They are mere mortals like everybody else, and when demands are made, they know very well, in a free market, they can be rejected--that is, they can be disciplined to accept the demands of others to make a profit, which is exactly "the risk" capitalists want to avoid.

Consolidating risk to control it on command is what business economists refer to as efficient-markets theory. It is a business model for reducing the risk by creating "synergies." The model, however, does not reduce risk, it transfers it...it transforms it into detriment for its classified consumption, forming the basis for class warfare to retribute, or reintegrate, the "lost" value.

Risk avoidance is falsely referred to as reduction by creating synergies, which is nothing but horizontal and vertical integration to network the externalities. Supposedly, the synergies make us more productive by, primarily, dis-integrating labor and productivity, which means, objectively, there is not enough value distributed to consume the value produced; and when supply accumulates along with unemployment, labor is falsely accused of being unproductive.

The contradiction technically indicates a disintegration of value that capitalism does not want to admit because the solution is obviously to reintegrate the value--or deconsolidate the risk. This means the rulers are subordinated to the ruled in the marketplace on demand, which according to business economists, without creating synergies, is the model of inefficiency.)

It is important to understand that business economists deliberately attribute value derived (the marginal profit) to integral value. Objectively, however, the value is derived from dis-integral value. As long as the working model of productive efficiency operates with this objective failure, cyclical crises (overproduction) will always present as objective reality. Problems like inflation and/or unemployment never resolve but are continuously transformed (recycled) into what only appears to be our natural condition by default.

Treating value that is derived as being integral is a technique for legitimizing the application of the risk. Saying, for example, that the Fed is keeping interest rates artificially low is to attribute our problems to action that derives from application of the risk.

Interest rates are low because unemployment is too high. There is a deliberate, technical failure that occurs that does not identify value integral to productivity. Instead, it is identified as value derived so that productivity does not depend on the value imparted to labor (remembering that plutocrats learned not to make the same mistake the king made--instead of allowing the risk to go plural, the risk is allowed to go gamma, which demands command authority).

Value to be consumed does not derive from capital, it derives from labor. Policies and programs, like the Romney-Ryan plan, that reverse this fundamental attribution results in technical failure. Raising interest rates against rising unemployment, for example, is sure to result in a depression and a declining rate of profit.

It's hard to make a profit when the objective is to accumulate all the value (the labor) needed to demand it in reality.

Unemployment (hording labor value) accumulates capital--the savings (the austerity) needed to keep interest rates low like they are. Productivity is not the missing value. The value missing is the employment needed to demand productivity.

The Path to Austerity

Considering where we are now, the classical model of capitalism--the plan (the objective reality) Romney and Ryan have for us--is the path to austerity.

The result of the Romney-Ryan plan is always the classic crisis of overproduction. Stagflation prevents the crisis proportion (the retributive value of objective reality) from presenting all at once (something that a free market will do by preventing, rather than ensuring, the crisis proportion). Although you may not be the stag consumed in the latest hunt, the detriment will cycle around to you and yours if you are not always trying to gain value that is highly retributive--value that is not in your self-interest because it adds value only by reducing the capacity to consume it (i.e., it produces self-retributive value).

Diminished consumer capacity may seem counter-intuitive if we want to resist a recessionary trend, but according to Romney and Ryan a more regressive tax burden and cutting programs that support consumption (which resists overproduction) is the path to prosperity. These two, prominent features of the Romney-Ryan plan will have a deflationary effect. Instead of the path to prosperity, it is the path to austerity, and they know it.

Of course, reactionaries cannot be intellectually honest about the so-called path to prosperity because it entails a benefit that derives from detriment. Knowingly and willingly "making markets" to cause detriment (which Dodd-Frank explicitly identifies as a legal and proper means of efficiently managing risk) is impolitic. So it is necessary to rationalize the detriment as being somehow in everyone's self-interest, which includes the reactionary philosophy of risk (the economy-of-scale, too-big-to-fail theory of making markets more efficient to reduce risk) that underscores Dodd-Frank.

Keep in mind that economic demand is dependant on income (what is paid out to apply the risk). Income is how we all make demands in the marketplace (and it is no coincidence that jobs added after the Recovery Act are at half the price). If you don't like the way Bank of America does business, then you stop demanding it by switching to a smaller, community bank that, by the way, is subordinate to banks so big they can determine its fate by applying a macro-risk proportion.

Banks too big to fail have the oversized capacity to self-determine (determining your fate and mine) in a macro (gamma-risk) proportion. Oversized firms then say the result (application of self-interest) has the force and legitimacy of a naturally occurring (alpha-risk) ontology. The result not only has the force of nature, understand, but moral authority--objective reality verified by market forces, which confirms class identity, and application of its self-interest, with moral force.

Claiming a free-market legitimacy, big banks will force the economy into default like in the Great Depression, which keeps Bank of America, for example, in demand to hedge the risk. For depositors, however, the hedge (identifying their self-interest with the morality--the assumed beneficence--of the hedger) is a false positive.

Depositors misprice the risk in a too-big-to-fail proportion. They feel like their self-interest is better served by an economy-of-scale despite that consolidated firms will dump deposits into hedge-fake funds to adversely possess those funds.

By "making the market" in the name of free-market economics, Bank of America and Goldman Sachs convert your self-interest (your funds) into theirs, and this act of conversion occurs without presumption of abuse (with moral authority) because, remember, self-interest is the only objective reality, the only measure, in which to judge the propriety of the outcome. The value lost is not ("poof") evaporated, it has been converted, it has been dispossessed. Your assets are turned into detriment, which is managed to reduce the risk of loss (retributing value you have gained or earned back to the so-called "job creators") with economy-of-scale efficiency (being paid back out at half the price, which stagflates the risk proportion and conserves the value of the risk in historical perspective). Value earned in the form of wages and salaries is, according to capitalist theory of efficient markets (in Hamiltonian perspective), best managed to add supply (and reduce the risk of social instability) if legally and properly possessed by morally mindless maniacs touted to be the best and the brightest.

Elite recruits are prepared to exact detriment with the efficiency of emotional detachment that derives from a lack of empathy characteristic of a detached, elite status and a psychopathic personality. People that borrowed against their homes and have massive debt against negative equity are considered, for example, looters and freeloaders when suggesting they need a bailout, but when Goldman Sachs and Bank of America use depositor funds against them, and as big banks leveraged up to 100%, the bailout that occurred was "the general welfare." The marketplace was efficiently managed in the image of the psychopathic personality, designed (and maintained in aristocratic, Hamiltonian perspective) to satisfy itself in everybody's self-interest.

(People capable of exacting the austerity needed to support the profit margin without compunction are highly valued, and so they are paid extravagant salaries and bonuses, and because the lack of moral intelligence is considered a high level of clever competence, they are qualified to be President. This too is a case of mispricing risk. Like depositors, half the voting population considers right-wing, reactionary philosophy to fit their social status. They fully assume the risk of loss is less likely if they buy-in to a status that in reality positions them to take the risk--willingly assuming the role of the stag in the hunt.)

Depositors seeking to reduce the fully assumed risk of loss wrongly assume that investing with too-big-to-fail banks reduces the risk. Government will always bail "us and them" out to avoid a depression while small banks will be allowed to fail, according to plan, which allows people like Romney to feast while we famine. The capacity for self-determination conservative philosophy is so concerned with will be made much less likely for "us," and much more likely for "them," according to plan.

While ninety-nine percent of American incomes are falling against rising prices, Romney and Ryan think less purchasing power is the cure. According to this plan (the classic crisis of overproduction) prices deflate with income. It is a sure cure for stagflation, but results in general default, which is the opportunity to consolidate the wealth even more than it is. The risk consolidates into an even bigger too-big-to-fail proportion that even most of the top one percent are not fit enough to survive, but remember, the path to austerity is paved with nothing but good intentions.

(When prices deflate, remember, like in the Great Depression, supply increases because most people cannot afford to buy at any price. While the Romney-Ryan plan, following repeal of Glass-Steagill, is sure to cure shortages and reduce prices, the cure is worse than the disease.)

The vast majority of us (99.9 percent) have to seriously question how conservative philosophy, and reactionary policies and programs, serve our self-interest. Whether positioned at the top or the bottom, self-interest will be disabused, and so we all have to consider whether pricing the risk into default (conserving more value than paid out, or austerity) is really (objectively) in anyone's self-interest. We have to honestly consider where the difference between prices and what is paid out (the risk-value) really goes.

When a financial crisis occurs, the value described as being "lost" does not simply ("poof") evaporate into a cloud of vapor never to be accounted for. The value of the differential (the risk-value) cycles around--it is timed, precipitating as accumulated wealth and the accumulated power to politically sanction in the marketplace with an inequitable proportion of the alpha risk.

It is important to understand that the large proportion (the economy of scale) transforms the alpha into beta and gamma risk. Rather than value to be retributed (the inequity) being hypothetically ("poof") gone, the value is transformed into volatile, accumulative risk, and because it is considered to not exist when it really does, the value of the risk is mispriced--the value is self-retributive (it raises the rent).

Ivy-League economists are apt to posit the "poof" hypothesis while at the same time maintaining that value is essentially the ability of consumers to demand--buy and sell, or arbitrage--the risk. Overproduction, then, measures the value "lost" (evaporated), not expropriated. On the one hand, the value does not exist, on the other, it exists to arbitrage the risk, which yields value. Hmmm...wonder why the two quantum (existence and non-existence) occuppy the same space? Could it be that "objective" truth, a la Ayn Rand, is being bought by the highest bidder, which is, essentially, to arbitrage the risk?

As the marketplace becomes more and more consolidated to avoid alpha risk, both producers and consumers rely on government to resist crises of overproduction. In the gamma-risk dimension, producers rely on government to resist the declining rate of profit while consumers rely on government to provide the demand (adequate income) to consume what is produced. (Remember, businesses are in business to make profits, not jobs to demand the production).

Attributing risk-value to consumer demand disintegrates the integral value (the objective reality) of labor and production. While conservatives are concerned with adhering to objective reality (a la Ayn Rand), there is considerable value given to ignoring it with the result being analytical errors that identify the solution (deconsolidation of industry and markets and reintegration of labor value) to be the problem.

Again, keep in mind, fundamental attribution error is a symptom of psychoses. Elite authority that refuses to recognize objective reality to satisfy itself is the Objectivism that Rand describes. It is the psychosis of a paranoid, delusional cohort that can't see far enough beyond its subjective self to acknowledge an objective reality independent of it. (Fear of class warfare, for example, is a self-retributive value that is fundamentally attributed to a counter-revolutionary conspiracy, but really, elites are conspiring against themselves. The detachment from reality is so severe that they convince themselves of a threat that is really nothing but their "self." McCarthyism is the most extreme reaction to value that can be attributed only to their own devices--what they pathologically perceive to be application of self-interest.) With the self being the only subject for observation, delusion is reality and reason is subjected to confirming its value by conforming to it.

(So when Caesar gave his power divine attribution, non-conformity, or challenging the objective of that reality, was discouraged with overwhelming detriment, like being crucified; or when the Pope declared a geocentric universe, and empiricists were excommunicated or burned at the stake as demonic sorcerers, the objective reality was absolute, or unchanging, but the reality of the objective, which can easily change, was to confirm the value of the self.

When political risk consolidates, which a free market prevents in priority and why capitalism tends to an economy-of-scale proportion, confirmation, rather than demonstrating truth, is a demonstration of power that strives for moral absolution by reducing the risk of being challenged, but without actually reducing it. Instead, the risk increases. It accumulates into a crisis proportion that redefines the reality of the objective, not objective reality, as caesaropapal power regimes always confirm with an accumulation of retributive value.)

Since, for example, disintegrating the value of labor and the value of production creates profits at the expense of creating jobs, the overproduction that occurs is attributed to government intervention in the free market. While it is readily apparent that a profit can't be made if there is not enough money circulating to pay it, reactionaries nevertheless maintain that government programs assisting the needy, which adds income to support profits, is supporting slackers and looters.

Government, according to right-wing reactionaries, discourages productivity. Thus we have a high rate of debt-to-GDP, which means we do not have a crisis of overproduction, but a crisis of low productivity. When productivity is low, prices are high, and when combined with transfer payments, a debt crisis ensues with markets becoming illiquid and even more unproductive.

Debt is incurred to demand the production because, reactionaries explain, taxing the profit (the measure of productivity) transfers the risk to the "job creators" who demand they be without risk. The capacity to demand production is taxed away with the result being oversupply, or excess productive capacity.

If we want businesses to create jobs, and the income to demand the supply, the economy must be allowed to consolidate into tax-free "efficient markets." Job creators must be allowed to add supply just like it was before the Great Depression. Without government regulation (like Glass-Steagill, for example), growth will be roaring just like it did in the 20's.

According to conservatives, it wasn't until government intervened that we experienced overproduction (declining demand) in an extended crisis proportion like the Great Depression. Demand deflated because the value supporting it was suddenly ("poof") gone. The value (the income necessary to demand production and resist overproduction) was not objective reality, which is a fundamental misattribution that still plagues us.

Obviously, the value (the purchasing power) was real, but subordinated to debt, which according to conservatives is a problem if government intervenes to adversely alter the natural course of things that confirms objective reality. Liberal redistribution of the value accumulated (changing the objective without deconsolidation of the risk) in reality prolongs the crisis it poses to prevent, just as conservatives say it does, resulting in low productivity and high prices (stagflation) like we have now.

The difference now is that the debt is monetized, and instead of deconsolidation, monetarism is used to resist the declining rate of profit, which supports the economy-of-scale crisis proportion it purports to prevent by "making markets" more "efficient."

As long as debt is publicly managed to support the profit margin (prices) against falling income for the vast majority of consumers, there is too much demand for taxing the job creators who then pay the rent with less employment. Contrary to Keynesian theory, relying on public debt does not add supply, it adds debt and increases taxes. It perpetually keeps us on the path to austerity because it reduces productive incentive (increases excess capacity) with easy money.

Monetary easing is used to consolidate industry and markets with a deflationary effect. The economy consolidates even more to avoid the risk rather than expand with a disinflationary effect.

Rather than the expected inflationary objective of supporting prices and the margin of profit to increase excess capacity (i.e., to cause unemployment), monetarism that operates with a disinflationary, pluralistic objective deconsolidates the risk into a non-catastrophic, alpha-risk dimension. Since pluralistic expansion reduces the opportunity to consolidate the wealth (buying out distressed assets under deflationary pressure like Bain Capital), for people like Mitt Romney, disinflation, not deflation, is the risk to be avoided.

Conservatives, like Romney and Ryan, say we should go back to the good ole days when everybody goes bankrupt and relies on the J.P. Morgans of the world to bail us out. Back to the days when our assets were consolidated and sold back with debt consolidated from our net worth...the days before government intervention, when overproduction was nothing but blue sky and an expanding life of leisure.

Until government stepped in, capitalism was pure and simple. The path to austerity was easily paved with the promise of prosperity, properly dispossessed by private means. A person could borrow his way to prosperity with even the most marginal existence, not dissimilar to the liquidity trap set up for homeowners in the latest deflationary crisis. The only difference now is that we have detriment being exacted by means both public and private--banks bloated with consolidated value conserved with government intervention.

The result of low productivity, rising prices and the debt needed to pay it is the stagflation we have now, reactionaries explain, but the description does not square with reality. It is a fiction, a fundamental misattribution that fits a narrow, subjective, self-concept of reality that Ayn Rand calls "Objectivism."