Public Policy and the Current Value of the Risk

We are so far from the commonwealth it is not likely to obtain a presence of value anytime soon. Sure, we talk about conserving the value of self-determination and self-reliance grounded in the fundament of self-interest as if it obtains. Empirically, however, we have become so reliant on externalized, expert management of the risk that self-interest is more an amusing apparition of speculative philosophical inquiry than a practical measure of either the means or ends of its application.

Reducing our self-interest to the application of public policy is to render it so collectively large and complex that it is, paradoxically, out of our hands.

Recognizing the natural tendency to pluralism resolves the paradox peacefully and prosperously. The binomial organizational model employed to obtain the current value of popular consent, however, is a false empiric. The two-party system is a false pluralism designed to impede the natural progression of the commonwealth.

In order for the risk to gain the current value of the commonwealth we must abandon theories and practices that only appear to confirm its presence.

When, for example, the causes of economic crises suffer fundamental attribution error, we suffer a lack of expertise we rely on to effect good public policy; and since the means of achieving popular consent is reduced to a dummy variable, the error recursively accumulates with the semblance (the false inference) of a popular consent. The pluralism of the commonwealth (and the fundamental wisdom of a popular consent that manages the risk to a commonly peaceful prosperity) becomes progressively more distant (and The People more collectively reliant in the name of conserving the value of self-interest). It creates a class of people evermore reliant on the extensive management of the risk. The self-interest of The People (the commonwealth) is evermore alienated (extended) from the fundament.

When the risk is extended to you, you still have the power, the freedom, to not take it in your self-interest. The power elite literally banks on the probability you will take (consent to) the risk, however, and not demand the wealth be more common in your self-interest. The dichotomy is so well extended--the probability you will take the risk so high, the probability of the gamma risk being extended to the power elite is equally low.

When hedge funds, for example, bought long but sold short, the risk was extended to the common interest without the reward--thus the term "hedging the risk." Now that the hedge has converted value into systemic risk (the gamma risk proportion and the object of public policy), the capital gained is prepared to consolidate the risk into current value through venture capital, merging and acquiring distressed assets that resulted from hedging the risk. Venture capitalists now argue, of course, they are providing for the common wealth by providing liquidity (buying distressed assets).

As the gamma continues to accumulate, validating the elite hypothesis that The People do not know what their self-interest really is, the wealth is commonly consolidated and redistributed. The People's wealth is retailed at a profit and the risk extended, with interest, in the form of credit. The profit plus interest equals the inability to pay the economic rent (classically referred to as the extension of the rents). The result is economic crises that extends (is managed and conserved, merged and acquired into an economy-of-scale) in your self-interest as a matter of public policy.

Now that the President has outlined the probable direction of public policy that will determine the extent of the risk, the wealth is being prepared to trickle down. Most of the current value needed to reverse the recessionary trend will be applied to mergers and acquisitions.

While M&A is touted as being a precursor to economic recovery, the capital acquired at low interest rates will be used to consolidate the marketplace rather than pluralize it. Bank of America's M&A division, for example, is poised to pounce on distressed assets, which is what they mean when they advertise "we are investing in our communities."

Democrats have a trickle-down plan for economic recovery. It is a matter of public policy, whether Democrat or Republican, to direct and extend the risk from the top down with the objective of controlling the common element of risk--the systemic risk. Policy is designed to fail-safe the system for continuous conversion and consolidation of value in the form of private property, merged and acquired to extend the current value of the risk at the expense of the commonwealth.

An economy in a state of being merged and acquired is not pro-growth. It produces current value by extending the value (the risk) of unemployment and slow growth (limited supply). Supporting this plan is a matter of public policy--achieving an economy-of-scale efficiency (mergers and acquisitions). It is a false common-wealth efficiency.

The President was not heard saying economy-of-scale consolidation is inimical to the commonwealth. Rather, it is generally accepted that consolidating risk you must take when extended (the certain value of the risk) is good public policy. You are then forced to rely on government authority to relieve the extent of risk (the individual's only "salvation" as the President described it, implying what our self-interest really is applied from the top down); and it will not be a relief, as Republicans argue, to reduce government reliance without first eliminating the need (the extent of the risk).

The current value of the risk is politically rendered but economically motivated. It is gamma risk. Relief (risk) is reduced to a zero-sum with a high order of intention (empirically verified by income-class distinction) that is considered the collective (extended) consent of the governed. It has the force and legitimacy (the current value) of public policy and authority.

Risk, politically extended by means of public policy, confirms income class and the current value of the risk.