Sunday, January 29, 2012

Historical Determinism by Objective

Instead of our economic problems technically correcting (as K and E-Wave theory suggests, for example), we support them with a battery of elite recruits disposed to technically demonstrating an ideological, or philosophical, objective. Although a highly technical civil service has developed to objectively manage risk (existential angst), ideological loyalty still prevails over intellectual prowess which, technically, accounts for most of the risk (the angst).

The reason we don't simply let economic problems cycle into a natural correction as Hayek suggests, for example, but actively manipulate the means to ends like Keyenes suggested, is because we don't want to take the risk that our natural existence is the angst to be prevented. So, we manage the angst by objective, measuring the probable risk ontology with reactive, normative values that tend to an ideological bias that confirms the angst of our natural existence.

The Fed, for example, has at this point declared that its objective to maximize employment is technically impossible. Monetary policy, it says, does not determine the rate of employment (the extent of economic angst), but it does determine, with near-zero rates, if economy-of-scale financials (organized to avoid risk and reduce economic angst) fail or not.

Federal Reserve programs do little to ensure employment, but by ensuring too-big-to-fail institutions do not fail (essentially providing the liquidity they consolidate), Fed programs are effectively limited to preventing massive unemployment in late order (serving only to reduce the retributive value). By objective, keeping the distributive value of the risk in historical perspective, the accumulation (and the potential for crises that measures the inherent, or integral, value to be retributed) is contained.

Instead of keeping markets open, we see, then, a tendency to keep markets closed in a too-big-to-fail proportion to manage the risk. Instead of the bottom-up, free-market accountability of the prudent regulator that needs only limited government authority, what occupies the policy space is accumulated risk with an unlimited need for government authority. Risk is managed by objective from the top down to prevent even more civil unrest than we have now, but without sacrificing the benefit of unemployment.

(The benefit that unemployment provides is the deflationary risk that turns the equity of the average income into debt, which creates the retributive value that needs to be regulated to keep the value consolidated. Increasing debt to equity--liquidating the assets of the middle class, which requires adding liquidity in the form of debt to buy it back at a profit--consolidates wealth and power and at the same time gives the middle class, especially the unemployed, the "objective" identity of being an unproductive, fiscal liability. Since, however, the business activity that creates and services the debt is measured as GDP, the liability is managed, by objective, as an asset, and that objective identity is the difference between the need for limited and unlimited government authority.)

The Fed, as of the date of this publication, says its technical objective is to prevent liquidity crises, which are highly probable if employment does not dramatically improve (and remember, controlling the angst--the unrest--this causes becomes the objective--the reality--that technically defines the risk, and that valuation technically results in even more consolidation of power, not the deconsolidation we technically need). While the Fed cannot predict economic outcomes, because if it did, it must then admit to rigging the market (and thus a de-ontology), it can nevertheless determine the extent of crises that ontologically derive from free-market activity. If, however, the free market is allowed to consolidate, the Fed acts to support an ontology (a natural, undetermined outcome) that does not exist.

A fraud systematically perpetrates, and although the economy-of-scale efficiency is supposed to reduce risk, it is the cause of general anxiety (and psychoses described as "class warfare") in a too-big-to-fail (gamma-risk) proportion.

(Keep in mind that while ontology refers to a lack of objective--that nature yields predictable outcomes without purpose--economics is a "science" that is largely concerned with management by objective. This does not mean, however, that the "objective reality" of economic outcomes is not ontological. Most of the analysis found on this website is devoted to describing and explaining an ontology of risk that is politically motivated while technically assumed to be derived from natural forces that are undetermined.

Exploiters objectively become philanthropists because, paradoxically, they are naturally thrifty; and the meek, then, naturally inherit the earth because nature, unparadoxically, is objective.)

It is not difficult to see the technical problem here. First of all, predicting the outcome can sham for its deliberate determination. Risk can be managed toward an objective, and then it can be argued that avoiding the risk is the result of predicting it, not managing it (or "making markets") to position it for someone else. In the vernacular of private equity, this is the so-called ontology of "creative-destruction." Investors naturally seek (freely enterprise) to create, or derive, value (the marginal profit) by destroying the integral value of labor put into it (the opportunity to self-determine, or prudently regulate) in the free marketplace.

Markets are made to freely enterprise a marginal profit, and technically, with more than enough historical evidence to support it (the Great Recession and a persistent high rate of unemployment being the latest confirmation), the value created from the risk (the detriment) is risk prone, not averse, by objective.

Unemployment is the objective, and value (risk) is derived from the detriment (the objective). So, when the Fed says its mandate to control the rate of employment is technically impossible, its mandate has been effectively trimmed to fit the objective. (The Fed does not control the banks, the banks control--they own--the Fed by extension in a too-big-to-fail proportion, and thus they own the "Open Market" by committee.) The policy space, then, is fully occupied by an elite authority empowered to privately enterprise the risk that yields the value to be regulated.

We see, then, how the accumulated value is being historically determined by objective. The authority needed to regulate an accumulation of risk-value, that goes back to our founding, is expected to be a function of elite identity, and that identity manages our objective reality (who gets what, when and how) in historical perspective.

Although, since the Revolution, "We" are all equally self-determined, historically, however, we are all predictably determined by our natural ability to manage the risk that, nevertheless, ontologically presents. So, as Alexander Hamilton explained it, for example, it is reasonable for us all to assume the risk will always be managed by objective of elite authority.

According to reactionaries, then, while we can fully expect The Revolution to live long, the result (the value derived from the risk), historically, will always be conserved. What reactionaries don't admit, however, is that the distribution of the value depends on the objective, which could very well be not depending on the so-called "job creators" to predict the outcome with limited liability, but "We the People" determining the outcome with full accountability in the representative form.

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