Value Conserved in Historical Perspective

A lot of what we refer to as politics today centers on rhetoric that conserves value in historical perspective. It is necessary to maintain the philosophy of risk from which value legitimately derives and occupies policy space over time.

Binomialism, as we have discussed before, is critical to occupying policy space over time. Eventually, however, the philosophy of the risk's legitimate value and the organizational technology that has evolved to control it converges over time to occupy the same space, which essentially conserves the value in historical perspective.

When Newt Gingrich attacks Romney from the left, for example, he is no less right-wing reactionary than he was before. What we see, rather, is the spectrum converging, being compressed to occupy the same space in order to remain reactionary in a binomial fashion. If Gingrich is a socialist then Obama must be farther left than we all thought although the President's policies and programs, at this point in our political-economic history, clearly occupy space to the right of center.

Despite the perennial appearance of a necessary, populist shift of the right to the left, a binomial determination nevertheless conserves value (the stakes) in historical perspective.

Despite the Square Deal, the New Deal, the Civil Rights Act, or the marginal rhetoric of Gingrich, the historical objective does not really change much. The distribution of the total risk proportion largely remains the same. The top one percent organized the Revolution, organized the government, and continues to labor over consolidating value into a revolutionary (reactionary) proportion that, as far as the political-economic elite are concerned, always presents the opportunity (the reaction) to consolidate power even more.

Do we not hear policymakers advocating the practicality of bipartisanship--consolidating the competition--to solve our problems? Yet, at the same time, partisans vote the party line to maintain a philosophy of risk in historical perspective until finally we have a compromise that essentially conserves the risk proportion with distributive value that conserves the problem in the form of a solution. (The stakes, you see, are to prevent the increasing frequency of opportunity--crises--from resulting in a proactive deconsolidation rather than a continuous, reactionary consolidation of power.) As power consolidates with each crisis (which is the incentive for revolutionary change and measures the total risk proportion), institutions are strengthened, technically organized to produce the probable effects that cause the need for consolidated power (what is referred to as an "organizational tautology" in previous articles). Within these institutions is held the organizational memory that conserves, or stores, value in historical perspective, being switched on or off to conserve the stakes over time in a crisis proportion that must be laboriously networked (bureaucratically organized) to maintain.

Back in Adam Smith's day, entrepreneurs did most of the organizational work, which included organizing labor, but laborers worked for the crown who owned the means of production outright or by the extension of debt (the rent). Laborers, including the entrepreneurial class, were royal subjects.

While bankers and merchants organized the externalities to manage risk, the crown took a disproportionate cut because it essentially owned the means of production by divine right. Owning the means in a consolidated, too-big-to-fail proportion essentially meant the sovereign, with the means--the right--to self-determine, was renting the right to expand the pie, like financials do today.

American Revolutionaries considered the distribution--the philosophy--of risk to be unfair, and a new philosophy emerged that converged the risk with the labor value of the reward, which includes the angst of fully assumed loss that transformed into modern organizational technologies that network the externalities to reduce the risk, or the angst. Not only is this the source of mistakenly thinking risk is an added value, but also the source of mistaken analyses that considers value will always derive, or be "pulled," from the technicals regardless of a philosophical predisposition.

Consider, for example, the chart popularly used to show that the distribution of income over the past thirty years has technically favored the top one percent in zero-sum. During that period the policy space has been occupied by both liberals and conservatives in various proportions yet income steadily accumulated at the top, which infers that income naturally distributes to the top whether the policy space is occupied by the left or the right.

(Remember, the random walk of stochastic oscillation--what investors mean when they say past performance does not ensure future performance--is the defense used to shield the top one percent from the fully assumed risk of loss. Determining the risk of liability is not an ideological function...justice is blind because "the risk" is stochastic--it is ontologically derived. Those who walk through successfully by networking the externalities deserve--they have earned--the reward that is inherent--and proportional--to the risk. Since risk-reward is an integral value, it is then illogical, essentially illegal, to claim that risk has been subsequently derived from the reward, and if you do, you are not deprived of opportunity--of upward, class mobility--but "envious" and guilty of waging "class," or ideological, "warfare." So, when private equity firms raid businesses in a feudal fashion, risk is not being derived from the reward but is integral to the network--the systemic risk--labored over to produce value that would not otherwise exist.

Technically, capitalism is a process of "creative destruction." Economic value is not ideologically derived, it is technically derived, organized by the most enterprising among us, which includes organizing for the systemic risk that creates the opportunity to consolidate wealth and power with the legitimacy of being ontologically derived.)

While the technical distribution is stochastically the same independent of ideology, explaining the thirty-year, income chart is ideologically derived, nevertheless. The reactionary meaning of the chart is conserved, binomially, in historical perspective, and the distribution is decidedly leptikurtic with a risk value that peaks negative against a reward that peaks proportionately positive over time and space. The leptikurtic quality is a function of how the risk-reward is organized to technically distribute the quantity of risk over time, which determines occupation--the objective--of the policy space.

When Newt Gingrich says he wants to teach the unemployed how to get a job, for example, what he technically means is that we can attain full employment at the right price. His solution is, technically, classical economics in which the reserve army of labor is expected to bid the cost of labor down to subsistence, or starve. This, of course, gives real, technical meaning to his so-called left-wing position on Bain Capital, for example.

We should not rely on a predatory model like Bain, a reactionary can easily argue, because the classical model, if left alone to freely enterprise, will create more than enough detriment to subject labor to the consolidation of capital.

Since history admits that labor, technically, will starve anyway under classical conditions, right-wing conservatives must ideologically advocate for the technical strength of capitalism. Not only is labor not paid enough to buy what is produced (which, as the unsold supply accumulates, makes it look like capitalism cures shortages), but labor also has to pay rent in the form of debt. If Bain Capital is liquidating businesses to create wealth and not supply, it makes capitalism look like the disease and not the cure.

Debt (the economic rent) is extended to ensure the subsistence of labor (which essentially means you have to rent your job from the capitalist, and you do this when big corporations, for example, are given huge tax breaks to provide jobs). Labor is not likely productive (producing wealth for conspicuous consumption) if starving to death, or neotericly, in historical perspective, collecting welfare.

Ideology is critical for accumulating capital completely at the expense of labor, which distributes risk disproportionate to reward. Despite the extreme assumption of risk inherent to de-integrating risk-reward (the incentive to revolt, or the class warfare that American Revolutionaries essentially engaged to re-integrate the values), capitalism organizes so that labor takes all the systemic risk (all the detriment) with only a subsistence (counterinsurgent) proportion of the reward.

(Keep in mind that big, consolidated corporates consider small businesses to classify as laborers. Systemic risk distributes to small businesses in the same proportion as labor because, by definition, they are not too big to fail. This means they are not so big that they can, or will, cause the failure that consolidates the wealth of the nation, which includes the sweat equity--the labor and the added employment--of the small business person. Keep in mind, as well, that while welfare reduces the amount of systemic risk small business consumes, it tends to blame welfare for causing the risk and not consolidation of wealth and power to which they aspire integration.)

While in historical perspective the effect of capitalism is similar to the gamma accumulation of risk the king presented, according to today's reactionary ideologues, it is, nevertheless, the best of all possible alternatives. Divergence of risk from the reward (what classical economists called "overproduction" and "surplus value"), reactionaries say, cures shortages and thus reduces the primary, historical risk of conflict.

Since they know how to technically organize labor, and use the capital extracted to create the wealth of nations in historic proportion, right-wing conservatives contend redistributing the assumed risk proportion, like liberals do, is dystopic. Antidisestablishment philosophy especially advocates against any reintegration of the assumed risk by a government that ensures its deconsolidation in priority like free-market, limited government liberals say it should be.

Contrary to its free-market ideal, the right-wing establishment dissonantly considers deconsolidation to be anti-free enterprise and anti-private equity. Any government intervention destroys the natural, and thus legitimate, efficiency of markets (consolidated, inequitable, and risk-prone as they may unnaturally appear to be). Government that ensures a free and unconsolidated marketplace unconstitutionally deprives property owners of the natural right to freely use it as they see fit, effectively depriving them of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and remember, as Gingrich is apt to point out, "We" are entitled to "pursue" happiness, not attain it, and so wealth and accumulated power can easily be used to prevent it.

According to right-wing conservatives, not allowing capital to freely enterprise and consolidate equity (create wealth from capital by essentially consolidating its labor value, just like the king did) is a moral hazard because it increases the risk of conflict--it causes class warfare. As we know all too well, however, allowing wealth and power to consolidate (by depriving labor of all the value it produces, just like the king did with the bourgeoisie) results in class warfare. ("We" had the American Revolution, for example, and "We the People" have seen the stakes--the accumulated value--conserved over time, technically occupying an empirical policy space in which the stakes are ideologically tested.) Left-wing conservatives then, post hoc, advocate for welfare to reduce the hazard, which prevents consumption of the assumed risk and conserves the value consolidated in historical perspective.

Ideology, working with a moral, or normative, concept of reality, is technically operationalized to ensure the risk of loss is always assumed rather than consumed.

Ideology prevents the Revolution from being extended. It keeps the extension of the rent in historical perspective, valuing it as a benefit (like the king did) when it is a detriment, and risk-averse when it is really risk-prone. The hazard--the welfare that Gingrich and conservatives generally react to as immoral--is ideologically maintained in a gamma proportion, always on the verge of crisis.

Much improved from the way kings managed the fully assumed risk of loss, recurrent economic crises--the constant and cumulative risk of political revolution--is technically organized, binomially, to always assume the risk for future consumption. Systemic risk of default in a too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale proportion is "swapped" for credit. Labor value, jobs, the value of your home (or the better part of your savings) is held in reserve, and remember, the quantum in reserve (the economic rent, which is paid out in the form of interest) is value released by breaking the bond between risk and reward (remembering that the interest on government bonds is paid with virtually no risk of default, and keep in mind, as well, that the financing used to cause our current economic crisis toward a "jobless recovery" is borrowed at an economy-of-scale, zero-interest, too-big-to-fail rate). Class warfare, you see, indicates probable reintegration, not disintegration, of the values, producing a force that fuses, or converges, practical effect with normative legitimacy.

If the relationship between risk and reward is inverse (with the objective being: the less the risk the more the reward), it is illogical to argue the reward is distributed to whomever takes the risk. No, the risk has diverged from the reward so that, technically, the risk-reward is integral and ontologically legitimate only when it has converged, which is "the risk" capitalism operates to ideologically avoid by keeping the value politically derived in historical perspective.

The analyst has to seriously question whether the technicals are really ontologically derived. When considering, for example, the culpability of today's economic distributions, with glaring inequity, remember, an ontological argument is the rationale--the philosophy--that exculpates the liability--"the risk"--inherent to an accumulation of the reward.

(Look at what happened to the price of natural gas, for example. While the technicals show a steady drop in price when speculators were prosecuted for manipulating the price, reactionaries argue that the drop is the result of added supply, or supply-side economics. Correct--supply was being added at the fraudulently high price and that inventory, along with the risk of loss, fully assumed, continues to accumulate.

Along with the consumption of the accumulated risk, we see the price being technologically pulled down, as well, which is the direct result of accountability, or fully assumed risk that dark markets and economies of scale otherwise avoid and pass to consumers by objective. The price continues to fall, and the benefit, rather than the risk, distributes to consumers with the innovation of LNG plants that came on line well after the price began to fall from its overbought proportion when speculators were looking to profit from the fraudulent price being touted as "fundamental," or ontologically derived.

We see, then, how value is conserved even in a micro case, and the conservation is not necessarily "pulled" into a technical detriment, but is largely dependant on the way the sector space is organized by objective, or occupation.)

If the extension of the rent is purposefully organized, it is virtually impossible to argue the detriment is an unintended consequence without arguing what is essentially a Marxist concept of reality--that the motive to act is technologically pulled or, that is, ontologically governed. Since the reward is governed, or derived, by taking risk, and governance is an essentially political function, there is no need to add government, and if we do, it adds, or organizes, the risk, capitalists contend, that keeps the reward from distributing because it encumbers economic expansion, or productive incentive, like the king did.

(Although too-big-to-fail risk managers, for example, know very well that risk is a constant value that can be organizationally transformed, when confronted with the Volcker Rule, they contend, nevertheless, that the rule creates the risk of default because it reduces liquidity, which is destructive. The implication is that government adds risk by not letting oversized financials reduce it in an economy-of-scale proportion. As previously discussed, however, government, not risk, is added to manage the same amount of risk deliberately organized in a too-big-to-fail proportion. Since that proportion is prone to failure, its organization pushes into and occupies the space of government.

Regulating the oversized, accumulated proportion becomes the occupation--the objective--of government. The public-policy space is occupied to support systemic risk, not avoid it because, remember, systemic risk causes the opportunity to consolidate wealth and power--it creates "risk value."

The value systemic risk creates from the detriment it causes maintains elite power in historical perspective. Notice how value is technically derived from risk that is algorithmically determined and philosophically maintained in historical perspective at the same time, and here we are, at this point, scratching our heads, wondering why we keep making the same mistakes over and over again. It's very simple...being prone to catastrophic risk in order to avoid it is insane!

An economy of scale, you see, shifts all the risk to the consumer. So, yes, risk is increased--big banks report lower profits from proprietary trading, but higher profits from laying off its employees. Proprietary trading, remember, is a means for big banks to take the consumer's savings and invest it to create unemployment, including the people hired to do the investing, which creates wealth for the one percent and explains, along with a more regressive tax code, the kurtosis of the chart since 1999.

You see, then, how this works. When wealth continues to be created from capital by destroying the labor savings of the consumer--investing in dark, complex, financial instruments that transfer risk by causing unemployment--big banks will admit uncategorically that the Volcker Rule "created" the crisis--the risk--that consumes us.)

Confiscatory capitalists, then, acting like the king, cannot be held normatively responsible for what is nature's way of ensuring there are enough risk takers, or "job creators," with ample reward. Proprietary desks at big banks, for example, provide liquidity, and when combined with securitized debt they provide both the ample reward and the incentive (the economic desperation) necessary for labor to be productive at the lowest possible cost. Thus, conservatives contend, consolidation of the financial system (operating without Glass-Steagill) both controls inflation and increases productive incentive as long as government does not interfere with this "natural" process of debt extended to expand the pie (which in historical perspective, as we learn again and again, is nothing but an extension of the rent, like the king did). Trickle-down economics, a philosophy of investment risk that Alexander Hamilton, for example, favored, is supposed to extend prosperity for everyone, but historically, the rent is what extends.

How political governance is organized to derive economic value is a normative consideration. Our founders were consumed with answering the very questions that importune the intellect today.

Since we are still seriously arguing whether government is the problem and not the solution, we are clearly being condemned to making the same technical mistakes over and over again.

While the stakes are technically organized to politically conserve the value (which is the value of making the same mistakes over and over again, which accumulates risk), how the risk is valued is ideologically conserved. How we value risk determines what the stakes are, and its perception is filtered ideologically.

In a binomial, bi-partisan, philosophical fashion, from our founding, "We" are being technically determined by an elitist, aristocratic ideology that conserves value in historical perspective... and so, whether you are a Tea Partier or an Occupier, long live The Revolution!