Making Money

It is important to keep in mind that fiscal management is not just a function of government authority. Our economy, for the most part, is fiscally managed from the private sector by a technical elite recruited from our most prominent business schools where they learn to "make money."

Innovative, risk-transfer products, for example, were introduced to make markets more efficient, but were really designed to more efficiently "make" markets. When applied in conformity with "efficient-markets theory," in conjunction with the Commodity Futures Trade Modernization Act (the government authority needed to make the consequences of "making markets" legitimate and non-retributive), the economy predictably took a nose dive toward a K-wave, depressionary distribution of the risk. All the commercial paper created on demand to support the marginal profit was transformed into a fiscal crisis.

The demand created by CDS's, CDO's, MBS's, and various other RTV's (which are essentially debt instruments) did not take the form of Federal Reserve Notes until the destruction occurred.

Demand for monetary expansion (the central bank buying treasury notes, or swapping risk for government debt) did not occur until the value a free market otherwise efficiently retributes in short order (without the need for government intervention) presented as risk-detriment in late order. Government was supplied "on demand" to responsibly save us from our "selves." Consequently, the debt that could not be paid (remember that want-to-be kings always irresponsibly overextend the rent to satisfy themselves) was monetized--it became a liability of the Federal Reserve System where, in the light of day (in the form of massive budget deficits), it is subsequently being vilified as "too much government." (Notice how the risk of responsibility was "made" to "transfer" and make money that is now being used to bid up commodities, or swapped for risk, "on demand" in dark markets.)

The value to be retributed was turned into public debt, which is financed through the tax code and, by no coincidence, should not be paid by the primary beneficiaries of the detriment. Supposedly, retributing the value (the capacity for consumers to finance the profit, or pay the rent, on demand) is a "moral" hazard because it bankrupts the efficiency of markets (it reduces the supply of capital and causes shortages). This, you see, is what the so-called "efficient-markets theory" really is by technical objective--it "makes money."

Money is not made by adding supply, however, but by reducing demand, or the capacity for each and every one of us to self-determine "on demand." Without the retributive value inherent to demand economics, the theory of efficient markets is transformed into an ideological proposition rather than an empirical measure of well being.

When destruction derives from demand created from the top down, we are all, nevertheless, individually responsible for our fate from the bottom up. Self-determination is transformed into "personal responsibility."

We are all responsible for complying with the self-determination of the "job creators" or suffer the ill effects of non-compliance, which is essentially to work more and more for less and less to a fault (specifically, default, which is the opportunity to consolidate assets into private equity) "on demand." When we then show up at an ER to treat an illness because we do not have the income (the demand) necessary to be well, we are freeloaders.

Since freeloading is irresponsible, we are mandated to buy health insurance that becomes less and less affordable (and more and more monetized without adding supply) on command. We are then stuck with an even more robust price-support system instead of a system that would otherwise control the price by virtue of efficient markets (with adequate income that comes with added supply) on demand.

If we do not properly position ourselves to avoid it, the detriment we suffer is our own fault. That is, if we do not subordinate to the risk and fully assume the position the gods of misfortune intend us to be in, then we will always be entangled in conflict. We will always be consumed, to hear reactionaries tell it, with "class warfare," bemoaning a fate that is easily determined by delivering the "self" to the objective reality of the money makers (whether on the left or the right) who create the jobs we need to deliver us from angst and suffering otherwise expected.

Money is technically "made" by determining an outcome (position of the entangled risk, or the conflict that consumes us) that is easily predicted (expected) by the practical philosophy (the objective identity) of the risk proportion (like the utility of supporting profits without adding supply and employment). It is important to understand that the added money supply does not chase too few goods and cause inflation, as Milton Friedman argues. Quite the contrary, the result is classic overproduction--a lack of demand, which accumulates supply and cures the prospect of shortages.

The current situation with gasoline prices, for example. Now that the "risk mentions" indicate sentiment for price controls--since the oil market is so consolidated that it can support, or control, the price by commanding it to the up side despite declining demand--pop analysts are preoccupied with explaining why supply-demand fundamentals don't always behave as fundamentally expected.

(Analytically, it is important to understand that a price support encourages added supply. Since the supply added resists the support, the price is being paid on command, not demand. Commanding the price is a demonstration--a confirmation--of power that in a free market is limited by demand.

The quantity in command--the retributive value--is the quantity of governance--the tyranny--that the Tea Party, for example, expects to be limited. It is the "limited government" that technically indicates our freedom to prosper by controlling the price to be paid. It is the empirical value--the relative price expected to be paid proportionate to the risk taken--that measures the power of self-determination and thus the limit of personal responsibility.

Price supports can always be expected to be out of control, allowing the producer to sell an accumulating supply at a price that is rising against declining demand. As the supply rises, employment and consumer income falls, due to overproduction, increasing the price we can expect to pay.

We can always expect tyrants to tax more than subjects can pay, and in a market economy the money to be made has to come from somewhere, so we make it to support the price.

As the price commanded increases, the price demanded decreases, resulting in classic overproduction. Pop analysts are trained to ignore overproduction because the value produced is the holy grail of success--pricing power, which requires making money to pay the price and control the risk.)

Trying to control the price of oil on the supply side does not make sense because the price is being commanded, not demanded. Efforts to control the price by increasing supply has failed because there is ample supply.

Rather than too much money chasing too few goods, there is too much fuel at a price consumers can't afford to pay. Instead of inflation as Milton Friedman describes it, we have the classic phenomenon of overproduction.

Pop analysts reluct to mention overproduction because the logical cure is to either command (mandate) the price on the down side, or deconsolidate the command structure. Deconsolidation is to be avoided at all cost because the economy-of-scale, too-big-to-fail proportion is what empowers the corporate with self-determination--the power to command the outcome.

Deconsolidation structures the risk proportion so that price can be controlled on demand. When consumers are empowered with self-determination at the expense of producers, everybody, including the corporate body, tends to behave more responsibly on demand. Producers are more apt to add supply (a marginal product and a distribution of income) to make a profit (rather than inflating the price to reduce demand and add a marginal profit) because, as long as there is an alternative (supply pluralistically added to occupy the same space), a command posture is impolitic if not impossible without a price support. A government mandate, for example, is supposed to ensure we all behave responsibly, like mandating farmers not grow wheat for their own use because it does not support the price, or buy health insurance because it is unaffordable.

In the case of health insurance, the mandate is not considered a price support, but a means of resistance without sacrificing consumption. In other words, the support is provided to add the supply of insureds without adding the supply of insurers. It is structured into an economy-of-scale proportion, which in all probability will be used to support the price of health care to infinity and beyond. The marginal profit will be monetized (the profit will be "made") without adding a marginal product, which is inflationary.

No, this is not a problem of too much money chasing too few goods. This is an organizational problem that health care analysts fail to recognize because it consolidates power and structures it to distribute on command, by mandate, from the top down, not on demand from the bottom up. Instead of being self-determined, we are turned into animals in a Skinner box, operantly conditioned to responsibly (i.e., responsively) act in the image of our masters.

Consolidated capitalism much prefers a mandate because it conserves the command structure. What can be mandated on the down side can be mandated to control price on the up side, which is why Republicans originated the health-insurance mandate they now oppose. Republican opposition is based on free-market principles and ensuring a level of personal responsibility they can somehow self-determine as long as a command structure legitimately occupies the policy space over time.

Maintaining the utility of an economy-of-scale efficiency maintains the command structure and the crises of overproduction that plagues us. It is the disease, not the cure.

Markets are not made more efficient by means of consolidation. Supply, as in the case of oil and gasoline, keeps rising since the market cannot demand it even with more and more money being monetarily added, which instead of reducing inventory supports the price and thus the money to be "made" on command. Since the added supply does not, as we reasonably expect, reduce the price (because futures markets have "determined" it is too risky), the risk being mentioned outside futures markets, in the light of day, is an increasing probability for government price controls, which could possibly include deconsolidation.

Deconsolidation includes alternative sources, and the economic growth that results will not be inflationary, contrary to popular analysis. The growth will fiscally manage the demand destruction (the deflation) that occurs when supply accumulates to be sold at higher and higher prices.

By increasing the distribution of income (by broadening the base, which is the way Paul Ryan refers to his tax increase on the majority of Americans to pay down debt), the crisis of overproduction, and the fiscal crisis, is cured with sufficient income to demand it, and pay it (but not if we broaden the tax base as Ryan suggests, which would be deflationary and add to the debt proportion).

Instead of reducing demand to control inflation, which obviously doesn't work, but broadening the income base (not the tax base), there is less need to make money by monetizing an increasing debt proportion to income. Instead of ensuring futures volatility, the contradiction (the dissonance) of rising prices (inflation) against rising supply (unemployment) resolves.

Preventing a structural correction that resolves the dissonance is what capitalism is organizationally designed to do. It is designed to profit from detriment (deprivation) in the guise of curing shortages. This is why during the Great Depression we were dumping grain in the ocean to support the price when people were starving, and despite the "Great Moderation" we still struggle with, for example, a glut of homes in the face of homelessness, bulldozing entire communities to support the price. The price, however, is the creative-destruction that capitalism claims is our natural condition and from which it derives value to support it in the name of continuous improvement.

The only reason the choice is either deflation and unemployment (overproduction with falling prices) or inflation and unemployment (overproduction with rising prices) is because the marketplace is too consolidated. The cure is to deconsolidate but is never mentioned until it reaches an overwhelming crisis proportion.

Letting the risk go critically gamma and burst before we consider the obvious is not the model of an Enlightened intellect. Quite the contrary. At this point in our history, letting economic risk gain a fully political dimension is to gain, once again, a declining rate of profit. Instead of a New Deal, perhaps at this point, following the Great Moderation, a persistent deflationary risk signals the opportunity for a more genuine free-market structure that provides with less need for government, rather than deprives with more.

We ignore the obvious cure because we have to "deal" with the "new," immediate crisis. We aptly avoid the cure, and conserve the class identity (the Hamiltonian virtue) of the value, by monetizing the accumulated risk proportion--by "making money."

It is no coincidence that Bernanke reiterates a Fed policy that will continue to be "accommodative" for the foreseeable future. Equity prices (and bond prices) get support (which tends to push small, retail investors in to take the risk). There will be plenty of money being made despite the persistent, deflationary risk...for now, anyway.

Accommodative monetary policy indicates an accumulating fiscal crisis--the inability to pay the economic rent because money is being made on command (what Goldman Sachs and Bank of America do by pre-dicting, or self-determining, prices in the future, positioning 99.9 percent of payers to take the risk because most of us are trying to cope here and now--being personally responsible as pre-dicted). Paying the rent on command (rather than on demand, like in a free market) pushes prices up in the face of rising supply, which supports the profit margin by resisting the demand needed to pay it.

When the king overextends the rent, as "We the People" know very well, the price, historically, will be paid. Fortunately, we have the means to deconsolidate the risk without catastrophic consequences, on demand.

Controlling Energy Prices

By deconsolidating the risk we can control energy prices.

There is a general discussion on this site about deconsolidation, but the recent concern with inflation against falling, consumer income presents the opportunity to briefly discuss a particular case.

What too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale firms, like Exxon-Mobile, organize to achieve is price control. Being able to control the price is the power to self-determine.

In a free market, when the price (and the marginal profit) gets really high (so high that it is deflationary), entrepreneurs are supposed to actively pursue the profit by adding supply. This requires adding firms and employment, but instead, MBA's learn at Ivy-League business schools that it is more profitable to hedge (invest) the risk by consolidating existing firms, creating the beta volatility (and the accumulation of retributive value) that gives us more government, not less, and increases the probability prices will be controlled by government.

If avoiding the risk of government price controls is the objective, then it is necessary to deconsolidate. "Making money" (monetary expansion), as discussed in the previous article, must achieve a pluralistic rather than a monopolistic, technical objective.

Controlling the price by means of public authority will force consolidated firms to increase the supply to retain the marginal profit. (Notice how the risk is conserved in the form of retributive value.) Resisting a declining rate of profit is job one, which is why Exxon-Mobile is not Exxon and Mobile, and why, without a free-market mechanism in operation, the risk will always go gamma (i.e., it will always transform into the force and legitimacy of public authority).

Price control, whether by free-market means or government authority, is technically achieved because it is necessary to add supply to support the profit, and businesses are in business, technically, to make money.

The argument against controlling the price by means exogenous to the firm (with risk that is retributively alpha or gamma) is that it causes shortage. If that's the case then the price will really be the result of shortage and firms will be added (capital will distribute and employment income will be added) with the technical objective of "making money." The supply needed will be monetarily added to technically support the productivity necessary to fiscally manage it by means of deconsolidation.

In the alpha-risk dimension we all have more than ample opportunity to make money and directly verify the extent of our self-determination by controlling the price.

By always providing ourselves with an alternative to hedge the risk, rather than relying on our future being swapped for risk in dark markets, our freedom, Constitutionally endowed, will be technically confirmed.

Achievement by Technical Objective

High achievers that operate with a high level of accumulated capital to produce a high level of measurable income, like Goldman Sachs or Exxon-Mobile, know how to manage the risk. They especially know how to manage risk in a too-big-to-fail proportion so that it appears technically objective.

High-beta volatility (the relative value to be retributed in waves, like K- and E-waves) is the quantum result of technical devices like liquidity swaps. These highly technical devices are designed and implemented to manage risk-detriment and the distributive value it produces by essentially positioning counterparties to take the risk.

Essentially, anyone that pays economic rent but cannot participate to hedge the risk is positioned to take the risk. Lacking the accumulated wealth (the necessary classification in which to avoid the risk of default) puts a person in that position. The price paid to participate in the marketplace, as discussed in the previous article, is relative to the risk.

The liquidity swapped represents the beta volatility. When capital accumulated becomes wealth (private property), Paul Ryan's budget plan is required to swap it for capital (private equity), which causes the risk to be avoided (deficits) and the volatility (the opportunity) to make money (the liquidity needed to pay the rent by expanding the money supply, otherwise known as supply-side economics, which according to Rep. Ryan and the Republican Party is "The Path to Prosperity"). Plenty of opportunity is created, but if the risk distributes by income classification, which measures the level of achievement, it is questionable whether income is objectively achieved or determined by technical objective.

If the reward is not legitimately earned by increasing the marginal product (adding supply), marginal risk accumulates with the reward. Its value becomes highly retributive--it becomes more political than economic.

Swapping the marginal product (alpha risk) for a marginal profit (beta risk) "makes" the money needed to pay the rent and reduce the retributive value by creating budget deficits (by increasing the gamma risk). Reducing the value to be retributed then produces a marginal profit without adding a marginal product (the added employment, or demand, needed to regulate the risk, or the relative price to be paid, which according to Paul Ryan is caused by budget deficits when they are really the effect, and why his plan will technically fail to reduce our dependence on government, increasing it instead). The result, then, is inflation, unemployment, and big government to politically regulate the risk.

When risk is regulated politically, rather than economically, the opportunity to reduce the beta volatility by swapping it for alpha risk (full accountability without the need for government) is diminished and the cost (the relative price to be paid) accumulates as value to be retributed. If that value does not have the opportunity to distribute in an alpha proportion, the beta will go gamma--it will occupy policy space in a crisis proportion where it will either be retributed or buried in futures markets...hidden in the dark where it is swapped for the liquidity needed to support the margin of profit.

When gas prices reach record levels and Exxon-Mobile, for example, makes record amounts of money, the consumer is supposed to believe that Exxon is "making money" from risk that is technically derived in the alpha dimension. While it admits it is in business to make money, Exxon, like Goldman, in no way admits that it makes money by technically manipulating beta volatility, which increases the rent paid and the need to print the money (or expand the supply of money) to keep the margin of profit from declining. Not only is a make-it-for-others-to-take-it philosophy of risk contrary to a free-market legitimacy, it is supposed to be illegal, but too-big-to-fail corporates argue, of course, that it is necessary to protect the capital from risk (to avoid deflation, or a depression, for example), and what is necessary is legal and proper.

We have to keep in mind, however, that the exigent argument of being too-big-to-fail is post hoc. The oversized extent of the firm causes the oversized extent of the risk to be avoided. Technically, big corporates are not organized into an economy-of-scale dimension to reduce the probability of risk, but to, admittedly, avoid it.

Remember, being able to avoid the risk (the retribution) is to effectively crown your "self" king (what our founders did when "We the People" declared our "selves" to be independently sovereign). Technically monopolizing the means of self-determination effectively consolidates the means of power, which is why monopolies are supposed to be, by necessity, illegal.

In a free market the consumer is the prudent regulator. The consumer is king, not too-big-to-fail corporates. Operating to defeat the Constitutional right of self-determination by positioning others to take the risk is not a valid contract as envisioned by our founders.

Quite the contrary. Organizing to defeat a legitimate, free-market accountability is the tyranny our founders wanted to avoid if not prevent. In order to make money (without inflation), it is necessary to retain the risk (in the alpha dimension), not build a financial product that technically robs us of the power to prudently regulate without the need for big government in a too-big-to-fail (gamma-risk) dimension.

The crisis proportion (the beta-risk volatility) that plagues us is exactly what Hamilton implored and Jefferson abhorred--keeping aristocrats technically in charge with minimal accountability.

When Exxon-Mobile (and notice that it is not pluralistically Exxon AND Mobile for a reason) accumulates record profits, and consumers pay record prices, the price is fundamentally--inextricably--relative to the risk (which is why it is singularly Exxon-Mobile--to quantumly hedge, or technically achieve, the price without retribution). By means of consolidation (which is the problem to be solved), the economy technically achieves a high-beta environment, being both inflationary and deflationary at the same time.

Risk, by means of consolidation, is determined to be a function of probable, stochastic oscillation and less about competitive pricing and productive innovation that increases consumer income, demand, and the capacity (the pluralistic quantum) to prudently regulate without government intervention. Probable risk (rather than the real problem to be solved) completely occupies the objective of technical analysts who quantify the extent of the risk.

Quants are essentially employed to measure the probable effect of extending the economic rent (the amount of value to be retributed and swapped). The probable risk is then technically directed (positioned by objective, or swapped) to "make money" as the marginal product. A marginal product is not actually added (as supply-side theory postulates) because that would reduce the price and the rent that must be paid to participate with self-determination.

As the rent is extended, and self-determination is diminished, retributive value occupies more of the public policy space. (Government is not extending into private space as conservative reactionaries contend, but provides the opportunity for liberal reactionaries to apply their puritanical image of the way "We the People" should live our lives. By no coincidence, this lack of freedom leads us to want less government, which is then occupied by reactionary conservatives, and nothing really changes.) Freedom becomes so diminished by means both public and private that self-determination is reduced to the capacity to buy it, being sold to the highest bidder.

In all probability, of course, the highest bidder has the capacity to pay. Those who pay the least amount of rent (who surplus value by technically controlling the extension of the risk) have the most power to determine the self (which includes your "self"). Corporate entities that are organized to consolidate power in order to survive cyclical crises (by pre-dicting the probability of it) and, subsequently, have the means (the surplus value) to technically determine the extent of the risk have the capacity to buy their freedom by occupying public-policy space. In all probability, when the risk presented by liberals is off, the probability of cyclical crises is on, all with the force and legitimacy of public authority, fully occupied by the highest bidder.

Having the capacity to cause an extension of the rent (printing money to pay it, which is the objective to "make money") has the effect of increasing volatility, the opportunity to derive value from the risk, and the capacity to convert it into private equity. Technically, this stochastic oscillation (creative-destruction), which can be managed to be slow or fast (on or off), is what is referred to as the business cycle, and remember, as previously discussed, if we are increasing the rent to pay it, we're just setting ourselves up, technically, for one huge crisis proportion in the name of, intuitively, trying to avoid it.

When the business cycle swings back and forth (risk on, risk off), it is not because it is being technically manipulated, Exxon and Goldman contend, but because the risk-value produced and consumed is, technically, objective. Since the value is ontologically derived, there is no culpability and thus no value to retribute.

Retributive value is, however, an objective measure of reality. While it is a mistake to say it is a reality independent of perception (since it always occupies space over time), it is, despite ideological interpretation (deontologically organized to appear as "on" or "off"), the real, objective price to be paid relative to the risk. It is the economic rent nature will demand to be paid despite whatever psychotic misattribution, or pathetic fallacy, we may objectify in our "self" image. Like Ayn Rand says, "A is A.".

The quantum result is an accumulation of retributive risk-value that is technically considered non-existent and, thus, limitless (existing everywhere and nowhere at the same time). Its limitless accumulation nevertheless has a limit and will result in a burst (a massive correction) in the gamma-risk dimension. This K-wave distribution is managed by trying to keep it short term, and so we see, for example, our political-economic environment technically driven by near-term policies, like tax policy, just a few months at a time.

Sort-term management technically maintains beta-risk volatility (the opportunity to accumulate and distribute risk-value), which is considered to be technically objective and thus beyond our ability to manage it with a different, quantum result.

Effectively, by technical objective (or deliberate design), the expected K-wave distribution is transformed into a long series of E-wave accumulations and distributions that keeps prices high, wages and salaries low. The expected result is the effective (presumably ontological) result--inflation and unemployment.

The result of a fast stochastic is a macro-economic prospectus that calls for long-term inflation (high prices) and unemployment (low rent). These are not negative values, however, because they are expected to fend off deflation.

The Fed has been sure to swap the probable detriment with liquidity (quantitative, or accommodative, easing) because the expected result of deflation is a declining rate of profit from which derives the income (the value imparted to labor) to pay the rent. The profit must be "accommodated" to pay the rent and avoid the risk of "sovereign" default.

Since losing the capacity to make a profit is the detriment (the risk) to be avoided, which is technically being derived from falling labor value (inflation and unemployment), and because this resistance is supposed to support the capacity to pay the rent by resisting it (expecting then to make a profit by monetary expansion), the K-wave distribution, rather than being resisted, gets accumulative support.

Instead of inflation being simply a monetary phenomenon in every case, as Milton Friedman described it, inflation is an expected value of unemployment to pay the rent while deflating the means to pay it at the same time. The result (falsely described as "the paradox of thrift" to mitigate the sense of exploitation and the retributive value it represents) is Hamilton's vision of a robust economy that is always expanding the pie to pay the debt and avoid the fully assumed risk of loss--the risk of sovereign default and the diminished power to self-determine.

Historically, the power of the "sovereign" (which is now "We the People") is lost when the value to be retributed is technically ignored. The loss is, nevertheless, antithetically conserved and gained in the gamma dimension where, at a critical mass, it will in all probability burst if not deflated by technical objective.

(Keep in mind that, in historical perspective, kings and want-to-be kings are likely to extend the rent beyond the ability of their subjects to pay it, which accumulates retributive value in the gamma-risk dimension.

Over-extension of risk is what classical economists referred to as "overproduction." This classical, human condition that we still experience today is described and explained as a natural tendency to be thrifty and surplus value to prevent shortages. Paradoxically, however, there is a retributive value that naturally accumulates along with the benefit that must be managed and distributed as well.

Classically, the natural result of overproduction was, unparadoxically, a depression. A massive distribution of the accumulated risk occurred every ten years or so, but today, to mitigate the retributive risk by essentially shifting it to the future, we swap "the risk" for liquidity in dark markets.

Risk-value, instead of accumulating over a long term into a massively destructive and possibly revolutionary proportion, distributes in shorter, recessionary waves. Value is derived, or created, by destroying the integral, relative value between risk and reward with a shorter term. Risk can then be impulsively directed with ideological values, stochastically oscillated on and off to manage the inevitable, technical correction. The natural tendency to reintegrate the disintegration of relative risk to the legitimate reward is technically directed, rather than corrected, to conserve the value derived long term, but as we have seen, the value of the risk is still represented in the long wave.

Technically mitigating the retributive value of the risk is essentially what the Commodity Futures Trade Modernization Act achieves, but not by reducing it.

The CFTMA ensures the perpetual accumulation of risk without retribution, supposedly, by transforming the risk into the beta volatility of a fast stochastic. The higher frequency of the trade, or the swap, renders a "surprise" premium that Paul Ryan claims is a moral hazard to tax because value is created from the fully assumed ontology of the destruction. Taxing to reduce the detriment, you see, according to Ryan, just foolishly reduces the value we need to prosper.

By ensuring we allow futures markets to operate unregulated and tax free at a high rate of return, value is easily derived by algorithm with virtually no accountability. It is the way the gods of fortune intend it to be--because the stochastics are mere empirical measures of an objective, ontological reality in which we are all classically conditioned to surplus value and secure domestic tranquility by creatively destroying it as frequently as possible.

Alexander Hamilton, America's first treasury secretary, innovated managing the historical tendency to surplus value into a gamma-risk detriment.

By transforming the accumulative risk into public debt, which is fully assumed at the Federal level in the form of Federal Reserve Notes, the risk is allowed to go fully gamma without a gamma burst. Debt accumulates without the fear of going bankrupt.

Instead of being retributively counter-Revolutionary, the risk-value is constantly revolved. Rather than revolutionized, risk, and the value derived from it, always accumulates in the form of good credit--the "full faith and credit of the United States Government." Revolving credit, and having the right ideology to get it, rather than revolutionary sentiment, conserves the value in historical perspective.)

Probability of a gamma burst (risk-value that has reached a critical mass of self-determination) does not reduce, however, because, historically, it is achieved by means that are technically integral and objective rather than ideologically derivative and subjective. The fully assumed risk of loss that is consolidated and managed in the form of public debt, instead of prudently regulated at the individual level as Jefferson envisioned it, is to be fully expected, and the technical signal for that fully assumed proportion is the process we have now for "making money."

The technical objective is to render the gamma-risk evolutionary rather than objectively revolutionary by occupying space that appears ontologically derived rather than technically achieved. This may appear to be a quantum leap for capitalism and its probable position for survival, but as its resistance to a free-market accountability waxes, and its legitimacy wanes, the technical support necessary to ontologically achieve a gamma-risk dimension will fully obtain.

The hope is that when the revolution comes, the power elite will be positioned to profit from it. Making money will still be the measure of achievement, but technically directed in the public interest.

Fortunately, in these United States of America, the revolution, conserved in historical perspective, can be technically achieved by Constitutional authority.

Peaceful prosperity will not be the product of risk unaccountably imagined in dark markets, but by the image of our founders who, in historical perspective, knew that risk can be managed to achieve the general welfare by means of intellectual Enlightenment and an empirically verifiable self-determination that "We" can all freely pursue with objective consensuality.

The means to achieve peaceful prosperity is always at hand...it is conserved. While, since the Glorious Revolution, for example, we have technically achieved the self-determination to make money, we can start "making money" to achieve it by objective at any time.

Price Relative to Risk

Supposedly, monetary and fiscal policy is designed to maintain a stable political-economic environment, but the economy is prone to crisis, which expresses as political risk maintained with a representative form of governance. Retributive value (an elusive quantum that has measurable, empirical value but is analytically treated as an intuitive measure of risk) is then re-presented as consensually derived and the outcome (classified consumption of the risk) has the force and legitimacy (the value) of public authority.

The Zen (an intuitive measure that renders risk with relative, retributive value) is an elusive quantum that mystically exists everywhere and nowhere at the same time. As an expression of relative value (being essentially ineffable but nevertheless knowable), the Zen (a cult of objective identity that defines what reality is and the motive to pursue it or not) is used to exculpate and conserve the value derived from the risk. It is a psychological component that binds the outcome to our unavoidable, natural condition. "A is A" as Ayn Rand described it, for example, or it is the secret knowledge that right-wing reactionaries refer to when trying to explain bogus economic paradoxes as a binding contract (a necessary trade off) with nature or God, which governs the natural extent (or the probability) of our self-determination and the value of its technical achievement.

The Zen (an intuitive perception of knowledge that has a calming sense of certainty and expectation) is used to maintain the legitimacy of the risk-value distribution. The practical concept of creative-destruction, for example, is an expected value of nature. It demonstrates a natural tendency to revolutionize the status quo into something better. At the same time, however, "something" (that elusive but intuitively knowable value) is made retributively worse.

The value retributed is the value conserved. It is the value of creative-destruction--a mysterious quantum that paradoxically cannot be created or destroyed but that we are always determined to retributively achieve as value technically added, and deleted, in impulsive and corrective waves.

The impulse to create something (like risk) and then technically correct for it is the Zen of beta volatility. Without giving it too much objective thought, relying mostly on ideological identity, we systematically maintain volatility to manage the objective risk, and while causing risk by trying to avoid it may seem counter-intuitive, the accumulation of retributive value that results is the motive to redefine our objective reality.

While resistance is futile--and we should resign to the inevitable risk of change--we should nevertheless organize to direct (or deontologize) the risk to satisfy the self, which is the only thing we really, intuitively, know.

When Bank of America and Goldman Sachs use our money against us (positioning us for the inevitable risk by transforming our money into their private equity from their proprietary desks) it is not a function of selfish greed, it is creative-destruction. Operating with the Zen of beta volatility makes us better off, not worse. The price of going bust is relative to the value of the risk--the accumulation of capital that makes us all better off, and we all know that because we all want, intuitively, to satisfy our "self."

The philosophy of selfishness is so endemic that not acting selfishly is considered a moral hazard. If we do not consider Goldman Sachs to be a peer, with an objective identity to which we all aspire, as Ayn Rand puts it, we deny our very nature. This cult of selfishness is so culturally endemic that rich people--just when we thought the level of psychoses couldn't be any grander--think it is an honor to be bilked by big bankers that bundle their booty into a big bag of bogus benevolence, giving real meaning--objective identity--to the expression, "stupid money."

Not subscribing to the cult of Goldman's greed, and the mysterious, dark side of investment banking, is to not understand how the world really works by default. No matter what we do to try and not be greedy, greed always wins because it is our nature. Communism, socialism, fascism, capitalism...no matter the "ism," the ambitions of a power elite will always rig the system, operating in the dark to achieve a classified distribution of the risk. Resistance is futile.

The philosophy of risk is like a kind of religious, mystery cult...like believing in the gods that Socrates said was nonsense and so was condemned by the establishment for corrupting the youth with the truth.

(We all "know" that to make something better something has to quantumly change. For change to occur without a quantum difference is a technical trick, and so there is a tendency to organize the risk binomially so that it is either on or off, which maintains quantum value in the form of expected change. When, for example, the CFTMA abolished Glass-Steagall, the risk inherent to consolidation of financial markets was turned on--it was modernized. When it is turned off, or changed, the quantum value accumulated will not distribute. The value of the accumulation will be conserved in historical perspective as an expected value--something that will always happen no matter what we do to change it. This is the anchoring effect--a psychological trick that gives the quantum value of the risk the appearance of legitimate consensuality when it is really a perceptual manipulation...what swindlers do to get their victims to pay them bonuses for robbing them.

Conservation of risk-value is the Zen of beta volatility. Despite change, it is quantum value we know will be timelessly conserved by means of creative-destruction. The price we pay is always relative to the risk no matter what we do--it's only natural. Angst, then, cannot be quantumly reduced, but it can be quantumly managed to represent our values.)

We see today, physicists describing a mysterious quantum entanglement that occurs in nature. When describing and explaining the elusive value of beta-risk volatility (remembering that its empirical value--measurable income--represents objective, moral value, which is the price paid "relative" to risk) there is an exculpatory zeitgeist. A risk ontology is inferred that derives from the upper echelons of our intellect.

Reason converges with intuition in the quantum dimension where, paradoxically, things just don't happen like we expect them to. We are enlightened by objective observation--nature is volatile with infinite probability and our fate is in the lap of the gods who are, by nature, fickle, changeable, "unpredictable."

The gods are busily plotting to determine our fate and appoint our natural leaders who are created (and naturally represent values) in their own self image. Thus, naturally selected, they are the most determined to occupy the upper echelons of power where risk is, by nature, in their own image, fickle, changeable, and predictably entangled by objective.

Objectivism guides our technical endeavors. Risk is not objectively determined, but is technically derived to conform to our moral objectives. We hedge the fully assumed risk of loss by organizing markets to predict the future (to reduce risk not by reducing volatility but by positioning to profit from it). When Goldman Sachs and Bank of America bundles (or consolidates) risk into securitized debt (in a too-big-to-fail proportion) and markets it as low risk because their organizations are big enough to withstand the volatility, they are predicting the future.

The risk of loss is fully assumed, but not necessarily occupying the space as technically projected because risk, like predictng the position of quantum matter, does not naturally appear where expected. Its position is naturally volatile and unpredictable but can be organized, or structured, to occur in a way that is technically beneficial for everyone as we, by nature, act to surplus value and hedge the risk in our self-interest.

Risk-value (the detriment) does not only distribute by technical objective, but is randomly objective as well. Goldman Sachs and Bank of America are not, technically, behaving immorally, but objectively protecting themselves, as expected, from risk that is fully assumed and occurs with equal opportunity.

Empirically, the price to be paid relative to all the risk Goldman Sachs and Bank of America avoided in a too-big-to-fail proportion is, naturally, a massive detriment. Loss of income and net worth continues to accrue to ninety-nine percent of the income distribution, which technically, and not coincidentally, represents the values of the top one percent and maintains the Zen of beta volatility.

Volatility is the playground of opportunity. It is the quantum change (the retributive value) that objectively measures, and technically maintains, the difference between "us" and "them"--the opportunity to occupy the space that binds us together.

Maintaining Beta Volatility (Getting More for Less)

Intuitively, the Zen of volatility maintenance is to reduce it. Reducing volatility is beneficial, presumably, because it reduces angst (if that's the objective, anyway). Being unemployed and economically insecure (competing to keep a job to avoid default) as the result of economic instability is, however, the incentive to work more for less.

With a more-for-less identity of the risk, wages and salaries competitively disinflate by objective, expanding the marginal profit and, supposedly, the extent of economic security. There is, however, less income to reduce the supply (what is paid to expand the margin, or pay the economic rent). Rather than a disinflationary effect, the effect is objectively deflationary (falling income against rising prices to expand the margin), producing the risk supposedly being avoided.

Capitalist theory maintains that economic volatility increases the profit margin (it produces risk-value--the creative-destruction that Mitt Romney has described to explain the benefit of private-equity firms). Overproduction (the bust that follows the boom) results in more labor value for less rent, cures shortages, and controls inflation by increasing the amount of rent paid to gain capital.

(Remember that the savings rate for investment requires austerity. Hedge-fund and private-equity firms exact austerity from labor in the form of unemployment because labor is not otherwise thrifty. The detriment exacted is described and explained as a naturally recurrent risk, meaning that the capital accumulated does not cause the detriment, but provides the opportunity to create value--capital--for reinvestment. It only looks like a deliberate expropriation because the risk is being deliberately organized to use the opportunity that naturally derives from the need to surplus value and cure shortages--that is, to reduce volatility.

Paradoxically, being thrifty to surplus value causes the risk to be avoided--what capitalists know is the "opportunity" to get rich and stay rich in zero-sum. If the risk distributes in a 99-1 proportion, however, arguing the benefit is indivisible is patently false--it is a disconfirmed hypothesis, which means government is required to give the outcome the force and legitimacy of indivisible, public authority.)

Increasing the rent in order to ensure the financing to pay it (increasing the risk of default in order to reduce it) is a contradiction. It is not a paradox as capitalist theory describes and explains it because the cost of labor (the rent job creators pay) is declining while the rent job holders pay is increasing. The result (predictably) is a liquidity crisis--the inability to pay the economic rent, which results in default (a declining rate of profit) like in Greece, for example.

In the bust phase of the business cycle, labor pays higher prices and taxes (keep in mind that job creators enjoy tax breaks to create jobs, which leaves labor with higher taxes). Labor's rent increases (literally paying the employer to have a job in the form of taxes) while its income is declining, which according to the theory of capitalism forms the capital that keeps people employed and prices affordable--in other words, it purports to prevent the risk (the detriments of inflation and unemployment) that plagues us on a regular basis.

Not only does labor literally pay the "job creators" to have a job, but then has to give up personal freedom, as well. Drug tests, for example, are increasingly common to get a job. So, not only does labor pay more to rent a job, but must increasingly subordinate the "self" to the image of the job creators because, apparently, they literally think they own the labor they rent. (The subordination is supposedly beneficial, and objectively identified with the noble intentions--the intuitive knowledge--of elite authority, because the masses are too ignorant to know how to productively organize and manage themselves without being structured into the risk--the zeitgeist--that creates the quantum value called "capital"). Keep in mind that this sense of ownership is the direct result of increasing the supply of labor in an economy-of-scale, quantum proportion. It is a function of organizational size and influence, which takes the form of higher taxes and rising prices--detriments that, remember, the accumulation of capital in an economy-of-scale proportion is supposed to prevent, and capitalists conveniently blame on government.

Not only does labor have to bear up to the angst of a declining income and certain unemployment to afford an accumulation of capital that is postulated to prevent it, but it then has to subordinate the image of its "self" (its "objective identity," as Ayn Rand describes it) to both big business and big government. So, where's the freedom?

According to capitalism, freedom is maximized by curing shortages, for example. We are not slavishly bound to the dictates of nature if we intelligently organize to manage (or pre-dict) risk in an economy-of-scale proportion, which as we know all too well results in inflation (rising prices) and unemployment (declining consumer income). Instead, by intelligent design, labor is naturally subordinated to the job creators (which according to Rand is its objective identity) who create volatility (the conditions for boom and bust) to manage "the risk," which under these conditions is highly retributive and predictably unstable.

According to capitalism, volatility forms the capital to expand the pie (by default) from which employment and economic security derives, but (paradoxically?) we cannot have economic security without maintaining its insecurity. We cannot have certainty without maintaining the volatility (the certain uncertainty) that, intuitively, we want to avoid.

(The paradox intuitively appears less as a puzzle than just being totally crazy...and that's because it is!

Causing the risk in order to avoid it is just insane! It is full-blown psychosis, and in order to manage the psychosis we have people like Eric Cantor acting to manage the risk and Randly confirm the psychoses of our objective reality.

Supposedly, representing the special interests of the job creators first--getting more for less--indivisibly represents us all...it is the objective reality to which we all aspire. Representing the interests of the job creators is sure to trickle down to reduce the angst we rely on to create it, and if this seems counter-intuitive, then you do not have the level of understanding required to be among the best and the brightest who manage the risk. This is not, however, a function of the best and the brightest, but who is the most psychotic, which is then described as, "we get the government we deserve.")

We are living (empirically verifying) the practical result of maintaining beta volatility. We get more capital accumulated for less economic rent. What it costs to derive the accumulated value and create wealth for the "job creators" is reduced by default, which creates plenty of labor in oversupply to serve the wealth up while the cost goes down (verifying the objective of getting more for less). The result is an expanding service economy in which the vast majority of consumers rely on debt to pay the rent. (What we then have is an economy designed for servitude, creeping ever closer to representing ownership of your "self" by means of default. Requiring, for example, being tested for controlled substances whether employed or unemployed is nothing but fascism masquerading as public health and welfare--it is full blown psychosis of people who, by classified exemption, will be fully intoxicated with the right of self-determination by default.) What we have is a demonstration of value in which the job creators get what they want to provide less of what the market needs (the income) to sustain it, rather than the market providing the job creators with what they need (the profit) to provide consumers what they want on demand.

The cost of deriving the accumulation is effectively zero. Entities that are too-big-to-fail are expanding the economy at an effective zero rate of interest. The objective, in other words, is not economic expansion, but volatility. Expansion and contraction maintains the accumulation without risk of retribution because the vast majority are immediately preoccupied with reducing the angst of an uncertain future (and remember, the Commodity Futures Trade Modernization Act, for example, is supposed to be reducing the volatility, and the angst, that plagues us by, paradoxically, causing it).

Managing the retributive value is a function of complex, monetary and fiscal policies and programs. The risk becomes so entangled within this space that it requires a high level of expertise to manage it. These high priests manage the surplus value that occupies ninety-nine percent of us with angst--the quantum value to be retributed and thus to be managed without risk. "The risk," however, as we know, can not be avoided, but it can be transferred to the future, which makes volatility all but uncertain.

Managing retributive value (political risk in the gamma dimension) is fundamental economics. It is a function of price relative to quality--economic rent (the price you pay for economic participation) relative to the quality of life (the amount of angst to be reduced or retributed, which is otherwise political risk divisibly managed in the alpha dimension by means of direct accountability that truly--objectively--represents everyone's self-interest).

In a free-market economy, risk is directly presented rather than indirectly represented. The ambitions of elite authority are directly subordinated to the risk, which provides the incentive for productive innovation (economic growth and employment) to make a profit instead of representing an insubordination with value that is politically retributive. Rather than being preoccupied with class warfare, for example, status is positioned to be fully occupied with the ambition of productive innovation and the full employment required to get there.

Without a free-market legitimacy (the productive incentive, and less need for government, that comes with direct accountability), we go to the high priests to manage the risk and reduce the angst, divining, through intelligent design, an objective reality from a universe of infinite probability.

Price (what we pay, or the value to be retributed, like "getting the government we deserve") is essentially relative to the risk (how intelligently it is managed by organizational design).

Getting more for less is highly improbable, not without a lot of retributive value, anyway, which then has to be managed.

When we innovate with labor-saving technology, for example, we don't really get more for less. More labor was put into the technology to produce more savings which is transformed into the quantum called "more capital accumulated." If the value accumulated does not distribute to reduce the rent by the same value, a crisis ensues to correct for, or retribute, the missing value--the economy is unstable, or volatile.

Retributive value is the "dark matter" of our political-economic universe. It is value managed in dark markets where it is quantified and emotionally charged with angst, which then becomes the visible risk to be consumed by position--occupying the space that intersects with the risk at any particular time.

Quantum Mechanics and the Zen of Beta Volatility

Intuitively, as Kant, for example, explained it, our mind is pre-occupied. It is pre-enlightened, or as Plato explained it, the Socratic method demonstrates we already know what the truth is but don't realize it until we ask the right questions.

A practical example of asking the right question is the problem of falling Wall Street bonuses and declining tax revenue. As these bonuses decline (overproduction), the wealth does not trickle down as much, which leads to the conclusion that we have to support trickle-down economics to promote the general welfare.

To the question, does resisting Wall Street bonuses (trickle-down economics) generally increase the risk of loss, the answer is yes...but we already knew this intuitively, and anyone that thinks otherwise is being counter-intuitive, right? The quantum value "risk," although empirically verified to have increased with the loss of tax revenue, has been conserved and conveyed (constructed) as truth (intuitively known) in the form of the question being asked.

Conserving the identity of the variable to be explained is a tautology--it mirrors the image of the question. When the answer is the intuitive hypothesis (the Zen) to be empirically tested, it is presumed (by trying to prove it rather than disprove it) to be the truth (ignoratio elenchi). Ignorance of disproof (disapproving something by approving something else) is essentially the definition of confirmation bias.

While the question to be asked is whether income is distributed equitably enough to ensure risk is more equitably distributed (less volatile), it does not mirror the practical image (the objective identity) of the conserved, quantum-risk proportion and the value it is presumed to legitimately produce.

The zeitgeist of modern political-economic theory and practice mirrors the image of modern physics. Risk and value are elusive quantum existing both separately and as a simultaneous singularity that commonly binds us (our self-interest) to an objective, existential reality. Risk-value imaginatively exists everywhere and nowhere at the same time until it is objectively realized at a particular point in time and space by its direct, empirical observation.

Technically, understanding how value objectively derives from risk is the Zen of modern physics. We have an intuitive sense about what the good life is and how to get there since, apparently, truth, whether dependant on perception or not, has present value based on the probability of future events.

With the "self" being the only thing we objectively know, risk derives from its preservation. ("I think, therefore I am" is a subjective but objectively confirmable hypothesis, especially when imagining the probable risk to that existence.) Acting in the interest of the self is (objectively and at the same time intuitively) integral to (or the Zen of) the probable risk of loss that we imagine as fully assumed, and with as many objective realities as there are people, the probabilities--separately, combined, and fractally compounded--are virtually limitless. Hence, the value derived from the truth of the fully imagined risk (in one's self-interest) is naturally conserved in historical perspective (in one's self-image). Value is organizationally structured to reduce the probabilities by positioning (or pre-dicting) the risk.

Economics, for example, has become a technical operation of applied quantum mechanics. The same technical graduates building quantum calculators with Q-bits are building quantum risk determinators (the essential bits and bytes of RTV's) for Wall Street to pre-dict (since what they are really doing is dictating) where the risk is to be positioned at any particular time. The result (the risk-value derived) is then determined to be freely ontological (technically based on the laws of nature) with the Zen of feeling the direction of a trend (professional expertise) being what determines the marginal product.

The Zen of quantum mechanics avoids risk (like when animals are spooked before an earthquake) and produces a profit (capital gained and accumulated to avoid risk). Quantum accumulation of capital empirically expresses what we intuitively already know--the reward naturally accumulates with those capable of predicting the position, or timing, of risk.

Humans are economic animals, and just like other animals in nature, we struggle to successfully reproduce. With humans, however, there is a selective deontology that passes on values. Risk-value, as discussed in a previous article, is conserved in historical perspective, and like other animals, humans operate with the capacity to avoid risk, but in our case, risk is avoided to make it unavoidable for others, and the best way to do that is to create the "Zen" of beta volatility.

E-Motion and Pre-Occupation of the Policy Space (The Impulse to Correct)

Governance and public policy is space preoccupied with status positioning. Being subordinated to the risk defines status--who rules and who is ruled.

In a free market, we all rule together. Governance is purely democratic. The representative form is subordinated to the risk so that what is re-presented is confirmation of the risk-value. The determined value of the risk rules, or governs, through self-determination, objectively expressed and directly verified by all parties, which is why government interference is considered a moral hazard.

As soon as we are forced to subordinate, governance by authority rules rather than the empirical ontology of the outcome. Risk is then subordinated to its classified consumption (it is de-ontologized), representing the rulers as unsubordinated to the ruled. The insubordination accumulates retributive value that, by its nature, is emotionally charged and tends to be governed outside the empirical rule of reason.

(We often hear our representatives say, for example, that public policy is made and administered to promote the general welfare whether we all like it or not. The detriment suffered is turned into a public good for consumption. The "self" in the representative form gains a retributive value, transferring "the risk" to the gamma dimension where it is, deontologically, much more volatile--unpredictable--by definition because it is no longer ontologically self-determined.)

The value to be retributed (meaning that it has not been added, but gained by another party, or transferred by assignment in zero-sum) must be managed with authority to maintain the presentation of that risk-value. Market value takes a representative form--the zero-sum does not represent a mutual benefit but demonstrates (is re-presented) to verify the subordinated risk. The power structure is confirmed to be representative and to contain the quantum value (the unsubordinated market risk) to be retributed, which demonstrates power.

When consumers bargain in a free market, they govern the risk. Those whom the market favors gain market share and gain status. That position can quickly change, however, if consumers are dissatisfied with price, quantity, and/or quality. This is alpha-risk volatility in which entrepreneurs are subordinated to an unconsolidated risk proportion.

As soon as industry and markets become consolidated, consumers no longer occupy consensual policy space. Instead, we become preoccupied with status positioning to avoid the risk. Since risk cannot be avoided, but deferred to the future, the present is preoccupied with the probability of the risk--or beta volatility.

(Monetary expansion is supposed to resist beta volatility through the extension of credit. With stability being the objective, we seem to be preoccupied with reducing volatility without the economic expansion that creates jobs and the demand necessary to stabilize the economy.

With the more credit extended the more potentially volatile the economy becomes, we can easily infer that there is value misplaced. Value is being improperly derived from the fully assumed risk proportion in the form of detriment. Reactionaries, however, have an entirely different attribution.

Average incomes, reactionaries explain, are too imprudent for the extension of credit, which implies that "average people" are naturally subordinate to the better judgment of elite authority. Specifically, value is being added in the form of subordinated debt with an accumulative, retributive value so big that the more credit extended the higher the beta risk--the greater the opportunity to consolidate assets and rule with negative equity.)

In a free-market environment, credit extends to support subordination of risk, not resist it. Instead of preventing volatility, a free market uses it to control behavior--to govern; and although retributive value presents as mutual value, ontologically derived, reasonably fair and equitable, relatively stable and unemotional, volatility (and its quantum of emotional baggage--greed, fear and loathing--that empirically measures the risk) nevertheless rules.

Volatility governs the risk. High volatility technically indicates the level of innovation, and low volatility the level of popular consent (low angst). Ambition (the position of status) effectively subordinates to the risk (the productive incentive to innovate and occupy a position of high status measured by the marginal profit).

Achieving status in a free-market environment does not, mind you, reduce angst, but subordinates it to a high level of alpha-risk volatility. To reduce the value "angst" it is necessary to subordinate, which is, of course, exactly what an aristocratic identity is loathe to do by objective occupation.

In a free market, status does not pre-occupy the people, the people pre-occupy the achievement of status. An aristocratic identity does not rule its subjects, but is subjected to the will of the people.

If we want to change the identity of our objective reality, in the same way e-commerce is changing the way we do business, we have to get e-motional.

Changing the way status is determined is a highly charged, emotional value. Elites have no intention of subordinating to risk determined by the masses, and the best way to conserve occupation of the determining policy space is to fill it with emotion.

An appeal to reason does not mean we will not react with emotion. Reactionaries, liberals and conservatives alike, are always applying arguments to support programs that have an emotional, motivational effect that occupies policy space over time.

If "We" want to occupy critical policy space, it is necessary to act e-motionally--by building social networks into a virtual reality that eventually becomes the objective reality we all know to be the truth, but reacted to as a moral hazard.

The American Revolution continues, not by its preoccupation with elite identity but by virtual pre-occupation of space (the risk of loss fully assumed, or gamma-risk) that is charged with an e-motional wave (the impulse to act converging with the technical means to pull it into an objective reality).