Friday, March 23, 2012

Achievement by Technical Objective

High achievers that operate with a high level of accumulated capital to produce a high level of measurable income, like Goldman Sachs or Exxon-Mobile, know how to manage the risk. They especially know how to manage risk in a too-big-to-fail proportion so that it appears technically objective.

High-beta volatility (the relative value to be retributed in waves, like K- and E-waves) is the quantum result of technical devices like liquidity swaps. These highly technical devices are designed and implemented to manage risk-detriment and the distributive value it produces by essentially positioning counterparties to take the risk.

Essentially, anyone that pays economic rent but cannot participate to hedge the risk is positioned to take the risk. Lacking the accumulated wealth (the necessary classification in which to avoid the risk of default) puts a person in that position. The price paid to participate in the marketplace, as discussed in the previous article, is relative to the risk.

The liquidity swapped represents the beta volatility. When capital accumulated becomes wealth (private property), Paul Ryan's budget plan is required to swap it for capital (private equity), which causes the risk to be avoided (deficits) and the volatility (the opportunity) to make money (the liquidity needed to pay the rent by expanding the money supply, otherwise known as supply-side economics, which according to Rep. Ryan and the Republican Party is "The Path to Prosperity"). Plenty of opportunity is created, but if the risk distributes by income classification, which measures the level of achievement, it is questionable whether income is objectively achieved or determined by technical objective.

If the reward is not legitimately earned by increasing the marginal product (adding supply), marginal risk accumulates with the reward. Its value becomes highly retributive--it becomes more political than economic.

Swapping the marginal product (alpha risk) for a marginal profit (beta risk) "makes" the money needed to pay the rent and reduce the retributive value by creating budget deficits (by increasing the gamma risk). Reducing the value to be retributed then produces a marginal profit without adding a marginal product (the added employment, or demand, needed to regulate the risk, or the relative price to be paid, which according to Paul Ryan is caused by budget deficits when they are really the effect, and why his plan will technically fail to reduce our dependence on government, increasing it instead). The result, then, is inflation, unemployment, and big government to politically regulate the risk.

When risk is regulated politically, rather than economically, the opportunity to reduce the beta volatility by swapping it for alpha risk (full accountability without the need for government) is diminished and the cost (the relative price to be paid) accumulates as value to be retributed. If that value does not have the opportunity to distribute in an alpha proportion, the beta will go gamma--it will occupy policy space in a crisis proportion where it will either be retributed or buried in futures markets...hidden in the dark where it is swapped for the liquidity needed to support the margin of profit.

When gas prices reach record levels and Exxon-Mobile, for example, makes record amounts of money, the consumer is supposed to believe that Exxon is "making money" from risk that is technically derived in the alpha dimension. While it admits it is in business to make money, Exxon, like Goldman, in no way admits that it makes money by technically manipulating beta volatility, which increases the rent paid and the need to print the money (or expand the supply of money) to keep the margin of profit from declining. Not only is a make-it-for-others-to-take-it philosophy of risk contrary to a free-market legitimacy, it is supposed to be illegal, but too-big-to-fail corporates argue, of course, that it is necessary to protect the capital from risk (to avoid deflation, or a depression, for example), and what is necessary is legal and proper.

We have to keep in mind, however, that the exigent argument of being too-big-to-fail is post hoc. The oversized extent of the firm causes the oversized extent of the risk to be avoided. Technically, big corporates are not organized into an economy-of-scale dimension to reduce the probability of risk, but to, admittedly, avoid it.

Remember, being able to avoid the risk (the retribution) is to effectively crown your "self" king (what our founders did when "We the People" declared our "selves" to be independently sovereign). Technically monopolizing the means of self-determination effectively consolidates the means of power, which is why monopolies are supposed to be, by necessity, illegal.

In a free market the consumer is the prudent regulator. The consumer is king, not too-big-to-fail corporates. Operating to defeat the Constitutional right of self-determination by positioning others to take the risk is not a valid contract as envisioned by our founders.

Quite the contrary. Organizing to defeat a legitimate, free-market accountability is the tyranny our founders wanted to avoid if not prevent. In order to make money (without inflation), it is necessary to retain the risk (in the alpha dimension), not build a financial product that technically robs us of the power to prudently regulate without the need for big government in a too-big-to-fail (gamma-risk) dimension.

The crisis proportion (the beta-risk volatility) that plagues us is exactly what Hamilton implored and Jefferson abhorred--keeping aristocrats technically in charge with minimal accountability.

When Exxon-Mobile (and notice that it is not pluralistically Exxon AND Mobile for a reason) accumulates record profits, and consumers pay record prices, the price is fundamentally--inextricably--relative to the risk (which is why it is singularly Exxon-Mobile--to quantumly hedge, or technically achieve, the price without retribution). By means of consolidation (which is the problem to be solved), the economy technically achieves a high-beta environment, being both inflationary and deflationary at the same time.

Risk, by means of consolidation, is determined to be a function of probable, stochastic oscillation and less about competitive pricing and productive innovation that increases consumer income, demand, and the capacity (the pluralistic quantum) to prudently regulate without government intervention. Probable risk (rather than the real problem to be solved) completely occupies the objective of technical analysts who quantify the extent of the risk.

Quants are essentially employed to measure the probable effect of extending the economic rent (the amount of value to be retributed and swapped). The probable risk is then technically directed (positioned by objective, or swapped) to "make money" as the marginal product. A marginal product is not actually added (as supply-side theory postulates) because that would reduce the price and the rent that must be paid to participate with self-determination.

As the rent is extended, and self-determination is diminished, retributive value occupies more of the public policy space. (Government is not extending into private space as conservative reactionaries contend, but provides the opportunity for liberal reactionaries to apply their puritanical image of the way "We the People" should live our lives. By no coincidence, this lack of freedom leads us to want less government, which is then occupied by reactionary conservatives, and nothing really changes.) Freedom becomes so diminished by means both public and private that self-determination is reduced to the capacity to buy it, being sold to the highest bidder.

In all probability, of course, the highest bidder has the capacity to pay. Those who pay the least amount of rent (who surplus value by technically controlling the extension of the risk) have the most power to determine the self (which includes your "self"). Corporate entities that are organized to consolidate power in order to survive cyclical crises (by pre-dicting the probability of it) and, subsequently, have the means (the surplus value) to technically determine the extent of the risk have the capacity to buy their freedom by occupying public-policy space. In all probability, when the risk presented by liberals is off, the probability of cyclical crises is on, all with the force and legitimacy of public authority, fully occupied by the highest bidder.

Having the capacity to cause an extension of the rent (printing money to pay it, which is the objective to "make money") has the effect of increasing volatility, the opportunity to derive value from the risk, and the capacity to convert it into private equity. Technically, this stochastic oscillation (creative-destruction), which can be managed to be slow or fast (on or off), is what is referred to as the business cycle, and remember, as previously discussed, if we are increasing the rent to pay it, we're just setting ourselves up, technically, for one huge crisis proportion in the name of, intuitively, trying to avoid it.

When the business cycle swings back and forth (risk on, risk off), it is not because it is being technically manipulated, Exxon and Goldman contend, but because the risk-value produced and consumed is, technically, objective. Since the value is ontologically derived, there is no culpability and thus no value to retribute.

Retributive value is, however, an objective measure of reality. While it is a mistake to say it is a reality independent of perception (since it always occupies space over time), it is, despite ideological interpretation (deontologically organized to appear as "on" or "off"), the real, objective price to be paid relative to the risk. It is the economic rent nature will demand to be paid despite whatever psychotic misattribution, or pathetic fallacy, we may objectify in our "self" image. Like Ayn Rand says, "A is A.".

The quantum result is an accumulation of retributive risk-value that is technically considered non-existent and, thus, limitless (existing everywhere and nowhere at the same time). Its limitless accumulation nevertheless has a limit and will result in a burst (a massive correction) in the gamma-risk dimension. This K-wave distribution is managed by trying to keep it short term, and so we see, for example, our political-economic environment technically driven by near-term policies, like tax policy, just a few months at a time.

Sort-term management technically maintains beta-risk volatility (the opportunity to accumulate and distribute risk-value), which is considered to be technically objective and thus beyond our ability to manage it with a different, quantum result.

Effectively, by technical objective (or deliberate design), the expected K-wave distribution is transformed into a long series of E-wave accumulations and distributions that keeps prices high, wages and salaries low. The expected result is the effective (presumably ontological) result--inflation and unemployment.

The result of a fast stochastic is a macro-economic prospectus that calls for long-term inflation (high prices) and unemployment (low rent). These are not negative values, however, because they are expected to fend off deflation.

The Fed has been sure to swap the probable detriment with liquidity (quantitative, or accommodative, easing) because the expected result of deflation is a declining rate of profit from which derives the income (the value imparted to labor) to pay the rent. The profit must be "accommodated" to pay the rent and avoid the risk of "sovereign" default.

Since losing the capacity to make a profit is the detriment (the risk) to be avoided, which is technically being derived from falling labor value (inflation and unemployment), and because this resistance is supposed to support the capacity to pay the rent by resisting it (expecting then to make a profit by monetary expansion), the K-wave distribution, rather than being resisted, gets accumulative support.

Instead of inflation being simply a monetary phenomenon in every case, as Milton Friedman described it, inflation is an expected value of unemployment to pay the rent while deflating the means to pay it at the same time. The result (falsely described as "the paradox of thrift" to mitigate the sense of exploitation and the retributive value it represents) is Hamilton's vision of a robust economy that is always expanding the pie to pay the debt and avoid the fully assumed risk of loss--the risk of sovereign default and the diminished power to self-determine.

Historically, the power of the "sovereign" (which is now "We the People") is lost when the value to be retributed is technically ignored. The loss is, nevertheless, antithetically conserved and gained in the gamma dimension where, at a critical mass, it will in all probability burst if not deflated by technical objective.

(Keep in mind that, in historical perspective, kings and want-to-be kings are likely to extend the rent beyond the ability of their subjects to pay it, which accumulates retributive value in the gamma-risk dimension.

Over-extension of risk is what classical economists referred to as "overproduction." This classical, human condition that we still experience today is described and explained as a natural tendency to be thrifty and surplus value to prevent shortages. Paradoxically, however, there is a retributive value that naturally accumulates along with the benefit that must be managed and distributed as well.

Classically, the natural result of overproduction was, unparadoxically, a depression. A massive distribution of the accumulated risk occurred every ten years or so, but today, to mitigate the retributive risk by essentially shifting it to the future, we swap "the risk" for liquidity in dark markets.

Risk-value, instead of accumulating over a long term into a massively destructive and possibly revolutionary proportion, distributes in shorter, recessionary waves. Value is derived, or created, by destroying the integral, relative value between risk and reward with a shorter term. Risk can then be impulsively directed with ideological values, stochastically oscillated on and off to manage the inevitable, technical correction. The natural tendency to reintegrate the disintegration of relative risk to the legitimate reward is technically directed, rather than corrected, to conserve the value derived long term, but as we have seen, the value of the risk is still represented in the long wave.

Technically mitigating the retributive value of the risk is essentially what the Commodity Futures Trade Modernization Act achieves, but not by reducing it.

The CFTMA ensures the perpetual accumulation of risk without retribution, supposedly, by transforming the risk into the beta volatility of a fast stochastic. The higher frequency of the trade, or the swap, renders a "surprise" premium that Paul Ryan claims is a moral hazard to tax because value is created from the fully assumed ontology of the destruction. Taxing to reduce the detriment, you see, according to Ryan, just foolishly reduces the value we need to prosper.

By ensuring we allow futures markets to operate unregulated and tax free at a high rate of return, value is easily derived by algorithm with virtually no accountability. It is the way the gods of fortune intend it to be--because the stochastics are mere empirical measures of an objective, ontological reality in which we are all classically conditioned to surplus value and secure domestic tranquility by creatively destroying it as frequently as possible.

Alexander Hamilton, America's first treasury secretary, innovated managing the historical tendency to surplus value into a gamma-risk detriment.

By transforming the accumulative risk into public debt, which is fully assumed at the Federal level in the form of Federal Reserve Notes, the risk is allowed to go fully gamma without a gamma burst. Debt accumulates without the fear of going bankrupt.

Instead of being retributively counter-Revolutionary, the risk-value is constantly revolved. Rather than revolutionized, risk, and the value derived from it, always accumulates in the form of good credit--the "full faith and credit of the United States Government." Revolving credit, and having the right ideology to get it, rather than revolutionary sentiment, conserves the value in historical perspective.)

Probability of a gamma burst (risk-value that has reached a critical mass of self-determination) does not reduce, however, because, historically, it is achieved by means that are technically integral and objective rather than ideologically derivative and subjective. The fully assumed risk of loss that is consolidated and managed in the form of public debt, instead of prudently regulated at the individual level as Jefferson envisioned it, is to be fully expected, and the technical signal for that fully assumed proportion is the process we have now for "making money."

The technical objective is to render the gamma-risk evolutionary rather than objectively revolutionary by occupying space that appears ontologically derived rather than technically achieved. This may appear to be a quantum leap for capitalism and its probable position for survival, but as its resistance to a free-market accountability waxes, and its legitimacy wanes, the technical support necessary to ontologically achieve a gamma-risk dimension will fully obtain.

The hope is that when the revolution comes, the power elite will be positioned to profit from it. Making money will still be the measure of achievement, but technically directed in the public interest.

Fortunately, in these United States of America, the revolution, conserved in historical perspective, can be technically achieved by Constitutional authority.

Peaceful prosperity will not be the product of risk unaccountably imagined in dark markets, but by the image of our founders who, in historical perspective, knew that risk can be managed to achieve the general welfare by means of intellectual Enlightenment and an empirically verifiable self-determination that "We" can all freely pursue with objective consensuality.

The means to achieve peaceful prosperity is always at hand...it is conserved. While, since the Glorious Revolution, for example, we have technically achieved the self-determination to make money, we can start "making money" to achieve it by objective at any time.

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