Romney and Ryan claim their philosophy of risk models the American dream.
Stagflation, however, indicates a bogus, supply-side economics in operation. It is a deceit (a fraud) that deliberately yields high margins at the expense of demand. It models the risk of the Romney-Ryan plan, promising the path to prosperity despite demonstrating a path to disparity for the last twelve years.
High margins at the expense of demand does not increase supply. Instead, it models the classic crisis of overproduction. It gives the appearance of expansion when the economy is really contracting (the stagflation we have now). Despite knowing the model has a classic, detrimental effect, it yields big profits for long-short hedge funds, and big banks that lend long but sell short.
The long-short technique is a risk-timing-and-transfer device that traps liquidity into crisis, liquidating assets according to class. This classic model is sure to confirm class identity with empirical value--the ability to pay.
If you can't pay the debt (money borrowed to consume and keep the economy from overproduction--i.e., money borrowed to pay the rent) your assets will be consumed on demand (to pay the rent). You will be at fault, personally responsible for debt organized into default by people who lend money not for economic expansion (to add supply) but for the purpose of demanding consumption of the fully assumed risk proportion.
Although being held responsible for detriment deliberately caused by others yields value that is highly retributive, stagflating the accumulated risk assumes the loss over time in a long wave interrupted by small, impulsive waves. Free-market mechanics appears to determine the value derived from the risk with all of us participating in a kind of stag hunt, positioning for the kill with equal opportunity, consuming the value necessary for economic growth on demand.
Romney and Ryan claim their policy program--Reaganomics--will give all of us the capacity to share in the hunt, and even if it does, keep in mind, the hunt is self-consuming because the value added relies on producing detriment, not avoiding it. Reaganomics just turns most of us into easy game.
Recalling the era of Reaganomics, ensuring the "American dream"--a place where people can still get rich, as Reagan described it--resulted in a more progressive tax burden. The tax rate progresses to control public debt and reduce the probability retributive risk will present in the form of overproduction, which for the capitalist represents value that is self-retributive.
To reduce the self-retributive value, risk is transferred to the future in the form of debt, and while the risk is mitigated with a progressing tax rate, the value is conserved long by selling the accumulative debt short. The long-short technique keeps the risk-value stagnant and the organized means of producing it conserved.
Efficient-markets theory emerged during the Clinton administration, administering the long-short technique with a more progressive tax code. Progressing the code paid the rent, but the technique conserves the value of overproduction, and in order to ensure that your firm is not the stag in the hunt, consolidation occurred to "efficiently" avoid the risk.
The risk avoided, however, produces self-retributive value that is efficiently managed by swapping it--extending it long into the future in the form of credit-default insurance.
By using capital accumulated to buy credit-default swaps, the economy is sold short, which pre-dicts the value of the risk going long. The crisis of overproduction extends well into the future, stagflating the American dream, accumulating retributive value.
For capitalists, the trick is to conserve the value going long with the appearance of it being generally beneficial, or at least philosophically legitimate, in the short run.
The organizational technology being used to conserve the value of the risk is consolidation with the theory that markets efficiently manage themselves. Of course, the problem with this risk-management model is that self-retributive risk accumulates by constantly swapping it long for short-term value. The long-short technique makes it appear supply is being added, and risk is being reduced, with economy-of-scale efficiency when, actually, retributive value is being added.
While ensuring a free market in priority will reduce the retributive value of the risk to its proper, non-crisis proportion, that's not what we're doing. Instead, we are consolidating industry and markets and calling it "market efficiency."
Instead of reducing risk and making the American dream more opportune, we are efficiently making the market to reduce the risk of the value retributed--the American dream.
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