Making Money On Demand

According to Romney and Ryan, a lower, more regressive tax burden pays the rent. The budget passed by the House will raise middle-class taxes (what Ryan calls "broadening the base") so that the top income class can have a lower rate and make money.

Hypothetically, policies and programs that support income at the top, like a regressive tax burden, frees capital for investment and increases supply, paving the path to prosperity.

Added supply controls inflation and unemployment. By creating supply, income rises against falling prices (disinflation), which controls the price on demand (governance when you need it) and reduces unemployment by adding the income needed to demand it. Adding the supply of income on demand without having to tax it or print it avoids the crisis of overproduction (deflation). By reducing gamma risk to the alpha dimension, price control is technically achieved with limited government intervention. Government will reduce if there is less demand for it.

(According to Rep. Ryan and the Republican Party delegation, cutting government adds supply. Since the demand for government derives from slow, economic demand, however, which is the result of no added supply--classically referred to as overproduction and a term Ryan and company ideologically ignore--arguing that the effect yields the cause lacks good intellectual value. Specifically, it lacks empirical value that, ironically, is at the very foundation of Enlightenment philosophy that the Tea Party delegation is supposed to represent.

Occupying policy space with ideological rhetoric adds to the problem to be solved. Practical solutions ideologically derived from both parties are exacerbating, which is why Congress is so unpopular.

The binomial solution we have now suggests that we can have big government and rising public debt or small government and rising private debt. In both cases, ideologically derived, the risk-value is conserved, not avoided. Money is "made" by creating debt in a Hamiltonian fashion, which destroys demand and the means for each and every one of us to self-determine.

As long as money is made to ensure "We" can not control our destiny on demand in a too-big-to-fail proportion, we cannot be held personally responsible for it. Instead, we then rely on government to be responsible for our destiny, technically achieving a gamma-risk dimension that renders the "self" in the image of the "job creators" who, both public and private, as we see over and over again, treat us like inventory managed in pursuit of an objective reality that is verifiably not our own.

With the means to self-determine, we verify, rather than ideologically validate, whether the rent paid is good and adequate consideration by controlling the price we are willing to pay on demand, not mandated to pay by means either public or private in an economy-of-scale proportion.)

Price control without destroying the means to demand it (inflation and unemployment) requires adding supply--it requires a distribution from the accumulation of capital to demand it, preventing the need to inflate the money supply (which reduces demand) to make money. Overproduction is then a function of disinflation--rising consumer income against falling prices, providing sufficient income to pay the rent and form the capital necessary to reduce beta-risk volatility and the need to politically manage it in a gamma-risk proportion.

Without an on-demand distribution, a redistribution occurs (taxing and spending) to resist deflation (a declining rate of profit). As income falls against rising prices (and taxes), instead of being distributive on demand, value (the rent to be paid) becomes retributive on command. Prices are not controlled by supply but by destroying the capacity to demand it (the capacity to buy something at a particular price OR NOT).

(Remember, not demanding something controls the price. So, when we don't demand health care and the price keeps rising it means the free market has been defeated. If the price is being supported so that it will not lower to meet demand, the "market" is broken, and if we fix it by mandating we buy health insurance--adding demand without adding supply--we break it even more!

Consumers need to understand what consolidated capitalists want us to ignore: consolidation of industry and markets, health care or anything else, commands the price, creating value by destroying demand. The destruction is what consolidated capitalists refer to as "efficient markets." Unparadoxically, by defeating the means to technically achieve market efficiency, consolidation supports the price and destroys the power of consumers to self-determine on demand.

While we tend to perceive demand destruction as a dead-weight loss in which everybody loses, the destruction creates value. A marginal profit is added without actually adding a marginal product, as in a free market, because consumers do not have the income to demand it. Instead, the power to self-determine and its market value--its power to modify behavior by popular consent--is consolidated on command.

Economy-of-scale does not make markets more efficient. Demand efficiency is swapped for command proficiency. Popular demand, or rule, is reduced--in many ways seduced--to technically achieve a command dimension that poses as popular consent.

Popular rule is a value Hamiltonians famously favored over slavery, for example. By paying labor a wage or salary, big business, which at the time of the Revolution was considered by Republicans to be abusive like the king, reduces retributive value and turns the swap--a subsistence wage--into the personal responsibility of the wage earner. The detriment is transformed into value derived--the creative destruction that haunts us today--without fear of retribution because we are all Constitutionally endowed with self-determination.)

Destroying demand creates the supply, and the value--the prosperity--added. Since creating value by destroying it is a zero-sum game, the accumulated value expected to "trickle down" (which is a concept Alexander Hamilton used to describe the utility of big bankers and big business that Jeffersonians objected to) gains retributive value and is then managed as political, rather than economic risk. Gaining political value, the risk goes gamma to manage a continuous failure of expectations (the hypotheses tested) that with a republican form of government is empirically confirmed, or not, by popular vote.

The popular vote, whether economically with dollar votes in the marketplace or politically by casting votes in an election, is an empirical measure that is supposed to objectively measure reality. Voters are frustrated that reality is being objectively determined to make money in zero-sum more by means of validation than verification.

On the economic side, we are determined by an economy-of-scale efficiency that makes money by commanding the price. On the political side, we have a government that commands we engage in economic activity, or not, to support the price and command the margin of profit without adding a marginal product. Both validate a too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale proportion, validating the problem as the solution on command rather than verifying the means to self-determine and responsibly solve our problems, and make money, on demand.

An Organizational Problem

Our continuing financial crisis is the latest example of ignoring what is technically an organizational problem being philosophically maintained.

Consolidation of the governing, policy space, both politically and economically, is technically risk-prone, not risk-averse; and philosophically, organizing to avoid the assumption of risk (or to empirically determine a probable outcome) is what the American Revolution (the age of Enlightenment) was all about.

When empiricism--a philosophy of thinking--emerged not as magic tricks, but a verifiable (risk-averse) means of acquiring knowledge, a revolution occured. This Enlightenment led us into an industrial revolution (the technical application of empirical philosophy), and that revolution continues to converge technical and philosophical aspects of sovereign power (organizing for self-governance, or self-determination) to occupy a singular space.

Philosophically, the political-economic interests that supported the American Revolution were technically interested in creating wealth and keeping it from being confiscated by the sovereign. Technically, they organized to protect their interests with a philosophical foundation that is empirically derived--they declared themselves ("We the People") sovereign. This "Declaration" (this thesis of independence that is the working hypothesis of science) essentially converges the "self" and "governance" into a singular space so that our objectives are easily measured and verifiably attainable, or "self evident."

(Occupy Wall Street protesters don't see a verifiable attainment, for example, and so they intend to occupy the policy space that governs the evidence--the profit and loss--of that attainment.

The protest is both prescriptively and descriptively in the spirit of the American Revolution, and the right-wing reaction is how kings reacted to the Declaration of Independence...with indifference at first, until it became self-evident that sovereignty empirically resides, both technically and philosophically, with "We the People." This, you see, is the gamma-risk dimension where the risk ontology obtains as a quantum singularity but paradoxically attains a pluralistic, teleological expression. The expression is a creative process, intelligently designed, much as our founders originally viewed the empirical value, the ontology, of a government designed by consent, or by "objective" of the governed.)

According to original, American Revolutionary thought, consolidation of power is risk prone. When sovereign power is consolidated into the hands of kings the state naturally operates contrary to our objectives--the risk of loss is fully assumed in priority. (The risk of loss is gamma, but when intelligently organized, or pluralized, in the alpha dimension, the reward fully converges with the risk so that power is both normatively legitimate and technically verifiable).

At the time of the American Revolution the debate naturally centered around the role of government authority. The Revolution revolved around determining who is legally sovereign, or self-determined, which is essentially a question of organizational technique that is philosophically derived.

While dialectical determinists argue that the philosophy of risk is technologically "pulled," consider that at the time of the American Revolution philosophy was more concerned with the risk of losing economic value to the sovereign, value that was essentially derived (organized) from the labor of the bourgeoisie (to fulfill the king's objective reality). This is what Adam Smith was referring to when he declared it is the natural right of the business class to make as much profit as it can, and keep all that it makes, because it labored over it. It was a calculus of profit and loss with the sovereign taking more value than risk assumed because the king was, by his divine, insurmountable, singular nature, too big to fail. He could cover his losses, or cause loss and determine his competition, by merely raising the rent; and if his subjects didn't like it, well, they're just "envious"...sound familiar?

Empirically, however, the (envious) bourgeois class, being Enlightened (and prone to revolution), knew that the king's "nature" (his objective reality) was not verifiably singular, but relied on the wealth that its class created to demonstrate power and maintain status (the status quo). It reasoned then that the wealth created is not the wealth and power of kings alone, but "The Wealth of Nations," which is organized by an entrepreneurial class willing to take risk as long as government does not interfere or try to take its wealth. The objective, then, is to devise a mode of sovereignty that is "hands off," and the best way to do that is "hands on"--by declaring your "self" the sovereign.

Hence, government had to be organized to ensure the right to self-determination, which essentially requires a philosophy of risk that ensures the reward is legitimately derived, and thus legitimately kept and used as the private property of the sovereign. There needs to be a philosophy to support the new, organizational technology from which the value of self-determinism derives--the job of managing risk so that the risk-taker can keep, as Smith said, everything the risk-taker labored to earn, but as Smith said, as well, the risk-taker, like the king, is not a quantum singularity.

The right to private property (the right to sovereign power) is organized today to deprive it of others, which demonstrates power. When private equity firms, like Bain Capital, buy up foreclosed homes, it is called "free enterprise." In other words, the corporate body (the collective person, Bain Capital, for example) is legally sovereign and has the power to determine the self, including the "self" of others like the crown did by extension of the rent.

Extension of the rent (the economic risk that inevitably transforms into political risk) is accomplished by organized consolidation of the capital, which is called free enterprise. So, when private-equity firms, like Bain, buy up distressed assets, they are consolidating industry and markets (the quantum) toward a singularity (political risk they react to as "communist" or "socialist") that overextends the rent and forces assets into distress. While it freely demonstrates (enterprises) the power of the sovereign, it arrogantly forgets what objective reality really looks like and diminishes, like the king, that on which it naturally depends.

The risk-taker is dependent on conserving the natural right of others to self-determine, and as soon as that right (his sovereignty) is not conserved, he no longer, by nature, fully assumes the right in the future, but fully consumes that right by his own self-determination. Not only is it foolishly self-destructive (greedy) to consolidate industry and markets, Smith contends, for example, it is a moral hazard (which the greedy psychopathically describe as "class envy" and "class warfare").

If the objective is to avoid the moral hazard--the fully assumed risk--by ensuring free markets, it is necessary to avoid the problem of a declining rate of profit that classical economists referred to. Remember, "the declining rate of profit" is a demand deficiency due to liquidity crises, like we have now, which results from insufficient income to demand the value of labor put into expanding the pie. This pathology of insufficient income (our recurrent risk of default), as Smith said, is an organizational problem, and while today we support the margin (the risk) by monetizing the debt, the problem, and the solution, remains the same.

Toward a Consensual Working Model

If the average American income is being reduced by lower pay, declining asset values, and higher prices for food and fuel, it is absolutely imperative to reduce the tax burden for the average-income class.

It is essential we increase the income of average Americans if we want to emerge from this persistent, recessionary trend. Increasing the income of upper-class Americans, despite Republican rhetoric, does not, will not, increase income for everyone else. If recession (declining demand and rising debt) is what you want, tax cuts for the rich will surely get you there.

Empirically, we see the rich getting richer at the expense of everyone else. The effect is a high demand for government spending while revenues are declining because, philosophically, in spite of the evidence, we must have tax cuts for the rich to increase income and reduce the demand for government debt (which is one of the more dogmatically mind-numbing tautologies of Republican logic and rhetoric to validate otherwise disconfirmed hypotheses).

Empirically tested, the tax policy we have now will keep us in a recessionary trend. The policy is so detrimental--the wealth is so accumulated--that even a massive, government stimulus plan did not pull us out. If we want to reverse this trend, it is necessary to reverse the "effective" tax policy: progressively higher rates toward the upper margin and lower rates toward the lower margin with the nominal rate being the "real" rate collected with no exemptions, deductions, or subsidies.

Increasing income toward the lower margin reduces the need for government spending. If we want to reduce spending, this is the way to do it without causing an even more massive rate of unemployment. Remember, unemployment produces a massive, systemic benefit for the rich. Your job and your assets are liquidated and sold back to you with money you borrow from them at a high rate because you are--by deliberate, systemic determination--a bad credit risk. Equity is effectively turned into debt, and if you are not the beneficiary of the lower, marginal tax rate, which includes tax-incentives to even have a job that you pay through the public bonding authority, you suffer even more to make the rich even richer. By all accounts, empirically, despite what Republicans preach, tax-incentive programs for the rich are not Pareto Optimal because your loss is their gain.

The Republican agenda calls for both spending cuts and tax cuts at the high margin, which is deflationary. It will increase the need for government spending while revenue is declining (like we have now), so it cannot be considered a serious plan for debt reduction despite being declared "The Path to Prosperity."

Since the average-income class is the vast majority, Constitutionally endowed with the power of popular consent, how come there is not a clear and decisive consensus to confirm its self-interest with the force and legitimacy of public authority?

The reason we do not have a clear, political consensus is because, as described and explained in previous articles, there is a complex conflation of political philosophy combined with technical theory and practice. These elements combine to form a complex working model, and while it may appear impossible, modifying it toward a clear and decisive, middle-class consensus is not really that difficult. It appears to be impossible because, for example, when Democrats gained a majority and captured the executive as the Great Recession transpired, the first thing they did was raise taxes to finance healthcare and dickered with an unfathomable healthcare plan while Americans lost their jobs, their incomes, their homes.... Democrats literally fiddled while Rome burned!

Following all the economic fiddle-faddle, political folderol, and garishly self-aggrandized gamesmanship, voters had enough. The vote effectively de-selected the conceit that a select few should mandate what consumers are going to buy at a government-negotiated, economy-of-scale price which, empirically, by past experience, means we do business with firms because we have to, not because we want to, at a no-bid price we have to pay because we can't say no!

Democrats came up with a healthcare plan that is ripe for expensive corruption and abuse because it is effectively non-consensual (by mandate) and, thus, inherently unempirical (unaccountable). It is a plan that needs to be de-selected because it represents a largely non-consensual working (Hamiltonian) model despite all the legitimate, democratic process associated with it. Hence, voters elected a counter-party presence conflated with the element of a third-party accountability because Hamiltonian modeling has driven us to the point of uncontrollable debt in an unrelenting crisis proportion!

People can't buy healthcare because of insufficient funds...and mandating they buy it, despite all the technical mumbo-jumbo, is not the solution to this problem! So, when Republicans assumed the majority position, they summarily lost their counter-party mandate to de-select the healthcare bill and went right to validating what keeps us from affording to buy healthcare at any price--insufficient income! According to the new, Republican majority, its mandate is to ensure tax cuts for the rich and cut welfare which, on the heels of the Great Recession, will turn the recession into a full-blown depression!

I do believe "The People" have had enough, and so it will be up to the technocrats to keep us from gravitating toward a more consensual, working model.

Much of what prevents consensus is its being mired in abstract, technical analyses promulgated by a bureaucratic, administrative elite that average Americans cannot verify or disconfirm with a popular vote. This working, administrative, bureaucratic model has a more elitist than a pluralist aspect, and so it tends to produce elitist benefits validated, rather than pluralistically verified, with the force and legitimacy of state authority (See the article, "The Bureaucratic Model of Power and Political-Economy" on this web site).

Sociologists tell us that a bureaucracy is an organization structured for stable, routine tasks. When we have high inflation, for example, the Fed routinely raises interest rates to reduce it. The bureaucratic effect is equally stable and routine--it produces a predictable, structurally reliable result that we all bank on. Why, then, is there so much uncertainty and all that systemic risk (angst) associated with our inherent, economic existence? It would seem, then, that the risk is not an unavoidable ontology, but is structurally (purposefully or, that is, teleologically rather than ontologically) engineered to operate with predictable, bureaucratic, reliability. Technically, it is both.

While risk is structurally teleological, it has an ontological dimension, nevertheless, which I refer to as the "gamma" risk proportion. No matter how hard we try to avoid it, the risk will always present with real, empirical value representing the ontology (the categorical imperative) of a teleological, and needlessly angst-driven existence (being that we are more than economic animals). Since we are endowed with moral intelligence, we have the freedom to choose whether we model risk into a diffused, pluralistic, non-catastrophic proportion, or not.

The risk, remember, cannot be avoided. It is always there, ontologically (it does not care how we perceive it or how we structure it, it just "categorically" is what it is, and it is up to us to choose what is "imperative"). While it cannot be avoided, it can be allowed to accumulate in order to be structurally managed into a predictable, reliable distribution, like when we experience massive unemployment and massive transformation of equity into debt (a huge public debt to be managed by our "prudential regulators" or the bureaucracy). This, of course, results in an alienated complexity (and anxiety) that appeals to authority with less and less accountability--it becomes a working model that is progressively more authoritarian and less verifiably consensual.

The trend to establish an evermore authoritarian state is a trend that can, nevertheless, be reversed; and contrary to what Republicans want, it does not require deconstructing regulatory authority but operationalizing it to fit a more pluralistic, working model.

Clever economic and political manipulations to gain value by causing detriment is not the measure of sophistication. Causing the Great Recession and then telling baby boomers they are an unaffordable liability is the height of arrogant stupidity. Growing old is not a liability we cannot afford, but an asset in which to distribute accumulated wealth into sustainable, post-industrial, economic growth; and if you are too greedy to see that, you are philosophically determined to the unavoidable risk...an economic animal unwittingly snared in the detriment of his own devices.

The purpose of life, we come to find out, is to always do the right thing and be creative about it...not to do the wrong thing and innovate clever structures to get away with it as a confirmative demonstration of power.

Finding the Limit

Critical to any analysis is to recognize the limitations of the data. Identifying, describing, and explaining the limitations is where interpretation of the data takes a speculative dimension and tends to reduce to the assumptions inherent to a theoretical and practical model.

Political-economy is replete with an inability, if not an unwillingness, to technically identify the limitations of the data. This is mostly to avoid the risk of throwing out a model which may mean throwing out the principles, or assumptions, inherent to a model; and since political-economic arguments are usually based on immutable, absolute truths, these principles cannot be modified without reforming the model. Arguments tend, then, to be rhetorical and not scientific, refusing to recognize the limitations of the data where the truth is waiting to be discovered.

Philosophically, this discovery of latent truth is called "the thesis of independence" in which reality, Aristotle argued, is independent of perception. The implication to be avoided is that truth is not whatever we want to make it. (When hedge funds "make the market," for example, the risk is not reduced, it is transformed and will re-present in another form.) Our perception of things is immutably either true or false, right or wrong. The scientific method, however, is more phenomenological (dependant) because reality is based on perception (the ability to detect signals that indicate knowledge--the phenomenon--of the truth). That is: reality is only as good as our perception of it, which could very well be limited by the interpretation of the data (the signals that are, or are allowed to be, detected). In other words, without the scientific method, we may, or may not, have the truth, but we would never know it.

Kantians argue it both ways, much like Plato did, postulating that truth can be known by a critique of pure reason, with science (practical reason) verifying what we already know. For Kantians, moral truth, for example, can be logically reduced to "categorical imperatives" that are verified by practical application (verifying what we already knew).

According to Emanuel Kant, there is no limit to knowledge. It is as unlimited as our imagination, which was verified by Einstein's conceptual modeling in the 20th Century, and suggests today's M-theory in which probability is infinitely extensive but quantifiably limited (like the example of the hedge fund's perception of the risk being quantifiably limited and local but extensively unavoidable).

Despite Kant's epistemology, we may have truth but never know it without verification, which is the built-in rhetoric--the universal ethic of thinking, the immutable rule of reason--that governs the scientific method.

Models conceptualize what is believed to be the truth. When applied, however, the results (the signals detected) are likely to modify the perception. If the model is not changed to represent the knowledge of it (the phenomenon), then the "reality" becomes a function of intentional error (teleology). The phenomenon is the reality that philosophers like Hegel and Marx described as "alienation." Even though we may "know" the reality is "not" true (the null hypothesis) in a Kantian way, nature dialectically reconciles the discrepancy (the error), reducing the cognitive dissonance by our choosing the new model, nulling the hypothesis in posteriori (ontology).

Truth just ontologically is. It does not care what our perception of it is and so we are determined to a natural existence despite as we may to teleologically make our own reality in spite of the ontological truth.

The model of capitalism, for example, assumes a free market. The model assumes that capitalism accurately represents our natural existence and is empirically measured by free exchange in the marketplace in which our dollar votes democratically choose the difference between right and wrong, extending down to each and every individual. Winners and losers are ontologically selected (determined) by collective action extended from individual tastes and preferences.

If government chooses winners and losers with tax and subsidy, the system is teleologically corrupted. The model is no longer ontologically true (a free market). Winners and losers are no longer objectively determined by the legitimate logic of collective action and the model has reached the limit of the available data that determines the legitimacy of the risk/reward. The data is now interpretatively limited to validate, rather than verify, the model, which essentially disconfirms it.

The extent of government measures the extent of a free market and the extent of the risk (the alienation that Hegel and Marx describe). The Tea Party caucus detects the extent of the risk, for example, demanding we go back to a free-market legitimacy. They detect signals (budget deficits, for example) that indicate crises that they know by experience reduces the income required to have equitable dollar votes in a free market.

Marxists argue that there is no going back. The evidence, however, does not support that hypothesis.

Despite an observable dialectic, history is not perfectly linear, and a linear projection indicates a marketplace that is so consolidated (the banking system, for example) that individuals have progressively less choice for collective action. It can hardly be considered an improvement despite what progressives may argue in the name of the public good, rendering a public policy environment that is anything but liberal as "liberals" are apt to allow for continuous consolidation of power to control risk (bailouts, mergers, and expansion of debt to provide for our social security) in a characteristically conservative manner (what Marx called "anti-socialist socialism").

We have reached the limit and the Tea Party caucus is an indicator of that arrival. The freedom to choose is not ensured if we have to do business with firms that are progressively more consolidated. Sure, that accumulation of power is destined for a distribution, but that correction does not have to be catastrophic. We can accept the limitations of capitalism and deconsolidate the risk as the primary function of government authority, much as Adam Smith described it economically, and Thomas Jefferson politically. These are not ideas limited to a historical time and space.

The model of democratic pluralism is a model that is still unfolding to reveal the reality of a natural existence that is not limited to the better judgment of elite authority. It is not necessary to sacrifice liberty in order to attain it.

Thomas Jefferson said revolution is a continuous process of improvement as long as power is not allowed to consolidate, much like Adam Smith described it.

Dialectically, the antithesis of directing risk into continuous consolidation is to reverse the trend and deconsolidate. According to Hegel, for example, it is the rational action to take, and what is rational is what is verifiably real (universal, immutable truth); and Kant adds that it is therefore a moral imperative. Hegel argues we are determined to make the right choice because what is rational (dialectically determined) is really not a choice at all. What is rational is immutably real--either true or false like one-plus-one always verifiably equals two. Kant agrees, but contends that choice is not limited to the dialectic--we can choose to be irrational and accept what is not morally imperative, or conversely interrupt the dialectic and project rationality into the future to give truth (reality) the currency of present value (what is and always will be, like our "inalienable" rights, formulated into an ontologically confirmable hypothesis).

Jefferson and Smith tend to agree with Kant while Marx tends to a dialectical determinism. Marx, though, admitted that it appears to be a "soft" determinism, recognizing that we don't have to wait for catastrophe to do the right thing (confirmed by avoiding potential disaster).

Pluralism, according to Smith and Jefferson, is a way to have freedom (the reality of choice) without sacrificing ontology. A free market, for example, puts ontology to work for The People. The dialectic occurs in small packages. Risk is not allowed to accumulate into a crisis (gamma) proportion because it is micro managed by each and every individual according to his or her moral imperative, forming a collective ontology We call a free and open society (the classic concept of liberalism).

Philosophy has everything to do with technical analyses. The assumptions that go into analytical models determine the limits of the data toward a predictive utility. Assessing risk, for example, is a highly philosophical endeavor.

The hedge fund example illustrates the need for philosophical insight to determine the extent of the risk. If analysts consider dialectics to be a lot of Marxist bunk, then they are unlikely to see that risk is not being created with financial leveraging tools, but is being reshaped. Risk is not being created ex nihilo, but accumulated. Then, of course, the complaint is that risk is too accumulated, but because it is not considered to be dialectic, but an expected risk-ontology of the business cycle nevertheless, they do not consider themselves responsible for the full value of the risk that comes back to haunt them to exact austerity in the same measure.

Ensuring the pluralism of a free-market system in priority exacts this austerity (the full value of the risk of loss fully assumed) in small (non-economy-of-scale) units. Factoring in the trillions and trillions of dollars spent over the past two years to manage the accumulated risk, with more to come, the economy-of-scale efficiency is decidedly inefficient on a colossal scale. Nevertheless, we will ideologically (philosophically) ignore the technicals and limit the data, as well as its interpretation, to conserve the accumulated value of the risk in a crisis proportion. That proportion, however, as I have endeavored to describe and explain on this web site, is ontologically gamma--it will unavoidably emerge with a power and determination that needlessly condemns us all to the fate (the inevitable austerity and insecurity) of ignorance and irrationality.