Class Warfare Begs the Question

When the war is over, who is the ruling class?

It begs the question.

Change of elites renders beta and gamma risk (high anxiety), not alpha risk.

The more alpha the risk proportion the less anxiety. The more alpha, the more confidence there is about one's fate legitimately self-determined, which is fundamental to consent of the governed and what it means to have a government that governs least.

While conservatives postulate that small government reduces the gamma-risk proportion, it does not. It actually increases the anxiety of what they consider to be illegitimate loss of value--the margin of profit earned by means of self-determination--in the gamma dimension.

Analysis of the risk proportion, as previously discussed, reduces to a philosophical conundrum of legitimate power and the technical indicators that reliably measure and signal its probable direction. If the measures are conflated so that a verification is next to impossible, then we rely on less empirical measures in the dimension of politics. Legitimacy of outcomes becomes a function of validation, rather than verification, in the gamma dimension where war is waged between self-determined classes.

(At the extreme of the gamma dimension, without counter-measures to reduce the risk, the risk becomes so dense, the gamma bursts. The result is the needed distribution, but the stochastic event--warfare--is catastrophic. Analytically, we can refer to this as "critical density of the gamma-risk proportion" to predict, and avoid, a gamma burst. Currently, monetary measures are reducing fiscal-policy density.

Keep in mind that a burst begs the question. Although a distribution occurs, the potential of the risk proportion is conserved because it is still consolidated to fight the war, or manage the risk. What was being fought over--distribution of the risk--is conserved. The empirical--objective--cure for this problem of conserved value is not warfare, which begs the question, but deconsolidation.)

While the outcome in the gamma dimension confers (validates) the winner with power, the legitimacy of the risk proportion is still unconfirmed (not yet verified). Both the winners and losers are set up for a failure of expectations determined by their own devices, which confirms the gamma risk as the "iron law."

With the risk of loss fully assumed, and thus bureaucratically managed to avoid it, even more risk accumulates. Instead of ensuring the power to self-determine, bureaucratic management of an oversized risk proportion serves only to diminish the ability to confirm a self-determination. Evidence to verify the culpability of one's self is subjected to political interpretation rather than its objective reality.

Ayn Rand, for example, postulates an objective reality corrupted by political interpretation, but concludes with an objective reality that serves to validate (or prove) her premise. A capitalist, she argues in true Aristotelian (aristocratic) fashion (in spite of the evidence), economically earns a profit and government politically steals it. Epistemically, however, as any modern (non-aristocratic) logician will tell you, declaration of objective truth without verification merely begs the logical question.

Accordingly, Ayn Rand submitted that the Soviet Union, for example, verified her premise that government is the problem and not the solution (argued post hoc). Both the capitalist model she advocates (her premise) and the socialist model (the evidence that proves her premise), however, operate with an economy-of-scale efficiency. Not only does she rely on a post-hoc argument, but her analysis lacks the objective depth she so strongly advocates to advance an anti-communist sentiment. Both methods of argument are characteristic of aristocratic philosophy and rely heavily on Aristotelian logic to "prove" a premise rather than "verify" a hypothesis.

It is not difficult to understand, then, why conservatives tend to reject science as a legitimate form of knowlege. Instead they rely on arguments structured to validate their principles (typically post hoc) which includes, for example, devalidating regulations that derive from scientific data.

(Remember that a post-hoc argument fallaciously argues a temporal sequence to prove a causal relationship. Rand's argument is: since government provides welfare, government is the problem, not the solution. "After this, therefore because of this" is a logical fallacy, yet Rand maintains it is a verified hypothesis--welfare is a self-fulfilled prophecy that defeats self-determination and predicts low productivity.

Yes, welfare does predict low productivity--what classical economists called overproduction--but it does not cause it. A harvest moon, for example, signals--or correlates with--the time to harvest, but does not cause the harvest.

Remember, when applied to risk, a post-hoc accumulation of error results in a post-hoc fallacy of the risk proportion and punctuated, stochastic events like the Great Depression and the Great Recession. Remember, we have welfare in reaction to the Great Depression, and the overwhelming proportion of the current budget deficit is the result of the financial crisis--application of Ayn Rand's philosophy--and the Great Recession.)

Both a nominally free-market and a nominally socialist state rely on government to manage consolidated risk in reaction to class warfare. If this verifies anything it is that government is necessary to reduce the risk of class warfare (the effect of consolidated power).

Rand argues, nevertheless, consolidation that results from capitalism is a more efficient means of resource allocation despite its natural tendency for class envy (and class warfare, which results in reactionary tendencies--government; that is, her scheme causes the very thing it abhors). Her argument begs the question into oblivion, which gives rise to the conservative argument that perpetuation of class distinction (and warfare) drives a productive incentive that makes capitalism far superior to any model that structures for economic equivalence and thus stasis (lack of a productive, and therefore meaningful, existence). The argument is presented as risk averse, but it is really risk prone; so prone, in fact, that warfare is the likely, verifiable result.

Megadeath (full employment) so that productivity (overproduction and the profit derived from boom and bust) does not die is not exactly the ideal model for a meaningfully productive existence. It is, in fact, dystopic!

To subdue the tendency to violent aggression, Rand proposed that non-aggression is categorically imperative to maintain a meaningful, productive existence. So, we presently hear conservatives aristocratically argue it is immoral to incite class warfare. Rhetoric that advocates raising marginal tax rates, for example, will "loot" the wealth of the nation and deprive us all of a meaningful, productive existence (the absurdity of the argument is only surpassed by its shameless self-indulgence). Despite advocating for a system of incentives that make aggression the likely "reaction" (which demands government authority), Rand's "Objectivism" is but a convoluted, ideological bias created to make the abusers look like the abused--up is down, down is up, left is right, right is left, good is evil and evil is good.

Technically, the practical result of Rand's philosophy is to cause the risk it is supposed to prevent (big government). Since it argues for the efficiency of consolidated power (the tendency to class warfare), the risk proportion must be argued post-hoc to render its "objective" identity (Rand's "A is A" proposition). Technically, however, Rand's objective proposition is but a classic case of fundamental attribution error that twists the technicals into what only appear to be freely random, ontological, stochastic oscillations. Objectively, these stochastics (frequency of the boom-bust cycle that "twists" the position of the risk and turns equity into debt) are really the product of an aristocratic, teleological, predetermination.

Any economic system technically structured with Rand's philosophy of risk (I dare say) cannot expect to be anything but twisted. "Operation Twist" is an apt expression for trying to control the verifiable, risk-prone philosophy of Ayn Rand in political practice.

Objectively, Rand goes wrong limiting politics to government. Her so-called "Objectivist" argument is fallaciously post-hoc and begs the question.

Consolidation of industry and markets out of self-interest is a highly political (meaningfully self-indulgent) activity. It has political consequences--it accumulates risk that must be managed (post hoc) in a political (gamma-risk) dimension or it will deconsolidate under the free-market conditions Rand, for example, advocates. The political and economic realities are objectively the same thing. They have the same objective--consolidation of power, which is the outcome Rand says government wrongly interprets to be inimical.

(Business executives--owners and operators--are politically self-indulgent. Having enjoyed the success of meaningful productivity, aristocratically enjoying administration of power from the top down, altruistic public service is, as Ayn Rand points out, an extension of that self-indulgence, but she wrongly reasons this to be a general, principle motive for a meaningful self-determination. Rand's objectivism characteristically begs the question.

A person that is motivated by selfishness is a slave to appetite and spoiled, emotional disturbances. Eric Cantor is a good example. Such a person does not demonstrate the freedom that is characteristic of self-determination, but is a prisoner of an irrational exuberance that is antithetical to an altruistic existence. This renewed, Randian philosophy of meaningful, objective, self-attribution is inimical to the objective of a peacefully prosperous pluralism that aligns, and confirms, altruistic attributes with the rewards of a meaningful, self-indulgent existence.

Recognizing that a free-market structure is aptly suited for a meaningful, productive, and safely legitimate self-determination does not require trading off attributes, like doing the right thing despite your appetite, that determine the accountability--the identity--to attain it. Saying the ability to defeat the means of self-determination is the measure of its attainment is just irrational, elitist nonsense.

Despite the declared, technical primacy of a self-serving identity (and the tendency to "run with the herd"), it is not at all impossible to serve the self through selfless service. The notion that public service and self service are mutually indulgent is unenlightened. To be intellectually honest, actualizing an identity that is not at the base, but at the height, of a moral existence not only serves the public, but indulges the knowledge of the self.)

While Rand is right that government is the reactionary element, she is wrong to identify it as categorically left-wing. Even the left-wing elements of government react with policies and programs that keep the risk proportion consolidated (conserved).

Rand "axiomatically" postulates we are all selfish, which determines our political fate. Despite how evil selfish outcomes may appear to be, in reality, she says, it is the only common objective, so it is objectively immoral to victimize those that attain the measure of success we all aspire to achieve. Selfishness, then, is a categorical imperative and government should act in priority to protect its attainment rather than interpret, or affect, its otherwise "objective" (Aristotelian), independent reality.

Contrary to the Randian axiom, however, the risk assessments presented on this website do not postulate government is inherently evil because it prevents us from being liberated (creative and productively self-determined). Instead, government authority is the means (Constitutionally endowed) to prevent a dystopic vision that, when pursued, profiles the Randian risk--a philosophy of risk that accumulates the risk to be prevented by liberal pursuit of its practical attainment.

Objectivism is a function of empirical analysis, and having been tested, Rand's vision tests positive for dystopia. Her philosophy accumulates the political risk--the only evil--it purports to prevent. It predicts the objective reality it is supposed to resist. It begs the question because it ignores the risk of loss fully assumed, which selfishly consolidates power (categorically classifies it as a moral imperative) to politically prevent its inevitable objectivity--the common, axiomatic right to self-determine.

Hayek, for example, concluded that the class with the most economic power has the most political power (and risk to be managed to prevent its loss, fully assumed). If we are to use his measure of power (economic power is political power), then, as Hayek argued, it is necessary to keep power diffused (non-exclusive) in a pluralistic (non-elite), democratic (not a republican) proportion. (The more indivisibly alpha the risk proportion, in other words, the more divisibly self-determined.)

Conservative philosophy always begs the question, and Hayek, for example, made it clear that he did not subscribe to it like Ayn Rand, for example, later did. Instead, Hayek suggested there be a minimum, guaranteed income so that everyone has the means (the power) to self-determine.

A minimum, guaranteed income would allow every citizen to logically act with collective, self-determination. Both the means and the ends would be highly divisible, easily verifiable, and directly accountable measures of a free-market process that never begs the question, but intuitively (with an inevitable, rational, ontological legitimacy) provides answers through a naturally occurring, empirical process of continuous improvement.

Such a process of continuous improvement is the means for less government, but not less governance. "The risk" would be redistributed so that it is more self-determined instead of existentially obtained in a high-anxiety, too-big-to-fail dimension. Doing this, however, as we have explored on this website, requires deconsolidation of the risk proportion in priority, which requires government intervention--what conservatives are, in priority, opposed to.

The conservative argument for less government is always post-hoc and begs the question. Reducing government without deconsolidation does not decrease, but increases the need for government; and in the same way, cutting government spending without reducing the need for it just increases the need for more debt. Thus, Hayek, for example, says government is causing debt, but the argument is a post-hoc fallacy.

If, instead of trillions to bail out big (horizontally and vertically integrated) banks, government spends to pluralize the system rather than keep it consolidated, the political means to self-determine increases and the need for government (what Schumpeter described as accumulation of "exogenous errors") reduces. The reason we, instead, allow for continuous consolidation is not because it efficiently (more selfishly) allocates capital, but because it structures power for elite self-indulgence (accumulation of errors rendered unaccountable--or the risk of loss fully assumed), aristocratically identified as the liberty to self-determine.

Hayek agrees that self-determination (the fundamental measure of utility that determines the legitimate use of capital) is not possible if the measure of attainment is its deprivation. Hayek said he is not a conservative because the measure of its utility is fundamentally irrational, which is why his philosophy tends to be "classified" as "liberal."

The more self-determined the process (the more pluralistic the predictive model) the more genuinely legitimate the outcome. We will be more peacefully prosperous (free of class warfare) if "the risk" and its otherwise classified proportion is more fundamentally legitimate.

If the risk proportion is always being divisibly formulated as verifiable hypotheses politically self-determined (pluralistically accountable rather than aristocratically authoritative), the errors naturally reduce. The measurable utility of capital investment can then be "freely" determined without warfare.

In the alpha dimension, in priority, instead of one big, catastrophic correction in which we are all victims of our selves (dystopically Randian) in a too-big-to-fail proportion, change we really need is dialectically fluid and continuous. It is peacefully legitimate in a proportion that is small enough to be productively innovative without being, as Rand described it, "looted" and "victimized."

As Hayek, for example, recognized, the technical aspects of economics presents with a philosophical conundrum that cycles an empirical test of political will (i.e., what this website refers to as accumulation and inevitable, ontological distribution of gamma risk). It is a technical puzzle that analysts cannot avoid being philosophically engaged. It is what gives the discipline of political-economy its technical complexity.

Instead of supporting what is too big to fail, which always begs the question, use the value accumulated to deconsolidate the risk proportion and the war is over.

Stochastic Indicators and Risk Proportion

Previously, we discussed the post-hoc fallacy of the risk proportion.

When risk is consolidated from its otherwise free-market (not too big to fail) proportion to maximize the profit margin, GDP (and eventually the rate of profit) declines. Massive debt results and risk gains an increasing political (gamma) dimension.

For big, consolidated corporates, gaining the gamma proportion is critical for the administration of power (extracting value by extension of the risk proportion--shipping jobs to China, for example, where labor is largely a function of state control). Austerity is exacted (redistributed, or extended) from the top down with the force and legitimacy of public authority. (Keep in mind, risk that gains a gamma dimension relies on popular consent, and unpopular measures to pay the debt are systemically risky. The large, economy-of-scale proportion is inherently volatile and predictive control of the risk requires hard power. Maintaining the consolidated, risk proportion, while attributed to being the result of free-market mechanics by both the left and the right, is dependent on the administration of the state.) At this point, while the economy appears to get profitable support, the positive indicators are really negative. While it appears to be going long, the economy is really accumulating a massive, short interest.

Debt reduction will not cause GDP. Arguing that it will is a temporal fallacy. Risk, then, instead of reducing, becomes more extended.

Extension of the risk proportion is touted by both the left and the right to be pro growth. It is not! It is stagflationary. It psychologically sets us up for accepting an intentionally structured, crisis proportion as "the law of unintended consequences." This so-called "law" falsely exculpates the risk proportion, falsely reducing it to an unpredictable, stochastic oscillation. It is a clever, temporal fraud that extends the risk with the appearance of a legitimately undirected, fair-and-equitable, diffused, ontological proportion.

It appears, for example, that the President's latest debt-reduction program is fair and equitable because it flattens the rate we all pay to reduce it. Yes, raising taxes on the rich cleverly flattens a rate that the right wing argues is too progressive.

A flat rate, however, is not fair, nor is it equitable. The burden is regressive, and a regressive tax burden not only results in insufficient demand to drive the economy but insufficient revenue to pay the debt it generates.

Temporally--over time--extending the risk proportion is psychologically anchored-in to be the solution that solves the problem of over-extended risk. Cleverly, we have then a masterful execution of the post-hoc fallacy.

Temporal fallacy of the risk proportion results in what appears to be a random walk. A stochastic storm of contrary indicators emerge and subside with no apparent reason. Market valuation is like predicting the weather which, by no coincidence, relies on complex, fractal modeling that is the realm of quantitative gnosticists who have the secret knowledge to divine the present value of the risk by determining its future value. Predictors appear random, but are really known quantities black-boxed to appear stochastic.

The result is an oxymoron: stochastic oscillation of predetermined risk. It is a fraud, but there is no law that directly prohibits this arcane manipulation of market value that gains a benefit by causing deliberate detriment.

Legal remedy and regulatory authority is indirect and post hoc at best, and congress is making sure that where regulation does not promote even more consolidation of risk in a too-big-to-fail proportion, it will act to reduce the authority to regulate. Being free of government regulation, according to conservatives, is what a free market is (argued post hoc) with an apparent random walk being the evidence that profiles "the risk" and justifies the reward.

Notice how "the risk" (i.e., the reward in the gamma-risk proportion) is being characterized as "class warfare." Before analytically dismissing this as meaningless, ideological rhetoric, consider that it indicates the classical model of capitalism is fully operational despite neo-classical means to give its intended consequences the appearance of a free-market, stochastic ontology.

The consequences are no random walk. As long as "We the People" are not self-determined, the politics of elite control will always be reduced to a game of innovatively creating the appearance of a legitimate, risk ontology.

Notice that innovating the appearance--the predictable presence--of the risk is largely a function of political authority. While that authority is structured to binomially oscillate between what we call "liberal" and "conservative," the stochastics are, regardless, structured to be risk prone (the risk of loss is fully assumed), which means risk analysts will be fully prepared to cover their shorts by going long. The result is a stochastic (but predictable) oscillation of a predetermined risk proportion that has the appearance of random variability.

Monetizing Market Value

Understand that monetized, market value--added risk value--is to grow the economy, but it is positioned to grow profits with little or no growth (with little or no risk). Value, then, is derived from its accumulated deprivation, not legitimate distribution of capital. Understand that a legitimate distribution not only diffuses risk, it diffuses power--exactly what capitalists want to prevent.

A free market empowers consumers, meaning that power is exercised from the bottom up, not the top down, which is why capitalists tend to describe democracy as an unstable form of government. Capitalists work to consolidate power--create an economy of scale--not because it is more efficient, or generally beneficial, but because it accumulates power--risk--to be exercised from the top down.

Both politically and economically, monetarism is being used as a mechanism--a technology--for gaining a favorable market position. At the same time, however, technology also tends to naturally--empirically--pull us toward the right thing to do. Monetizing for deconsolidation (freedom) rather than consolidation (subjugation) is entirely possible.

Capitalists, despite forever singing the praises of an empirical, free-market efficiency, do everything they can to resist it (reduce the risk it presents). They do everything possible to make it look like free-market economics is a passe technology for organizing risk. They do everything to make the market-risk proportion look like it naturally progresses into its organized consolidation (which defeats its diffused, market value and the ability to sanction without government intervention).

To avoid the risk of direct, democratic accountability, capitalists do not want a free market to demonstrate. If it does, then we come to expect risk to be systemically diffused in priority. Crises will be prevented in a monetized, diffused, free-market proportion rather than a post-hoc proportion of consolidated risk (which provides the elite with the currency of power--massive debt).

We can see the post-hoc proportion currently at work. Deliberations of the Joint Deficit Reduction Committee have Democrats at least making an effort to identify attributions, but Republicans are determined to argue the consolidated, risk proportion post hoc.

According to the Republican delegation, the large size of the deficit (massive debt) causes reduction of GDP. Their participation on the Committee is devoted to proving this post-hoc fallacy of the risk proportion.

Consolidation of the risk proportion causes reduction of GDP. Massive debt is the effect. Therefore, debt reduction will not cause GDP. Arguing that it will is a temporal fallacy.

In order to avoid crises, capitalism monetizes massive debt to support the profit margin without employment (the income needed to support the margin). So, you see, in a complex way, value is systematically exacted (bought and sold) with the intention of being risk prone while appearing averse to a false, risk ontology. The result is an economy that is both stagnant and inflationary to avoid unemployment being transformed into the declining rate of profit.

Remember that "the" classical, unavoidable, economic "risk" capitalism innovatively offsets at any cost--falsely referred to as the paradox of thrift--is "the declining rate of profit." In order to avoid "the risk," capital is positioned and repositioned to maintain the profit margin which, when manipulated, accumulates the risk to be avoided.

While unemployment profitably increases the supply of labor, there is a point of diminishing returns. Unemployment (income deprivation) naturally reduces the profit margin (deflation, or general economic crises, naturally occurs). By monetizing the risk value, the diminished empowerment of the free market (unemployment, which accumulates into fully "gamma" risk in a political dimension) is turned into a profit, which provides the incentive to accumulate more and more of the risk (unemployment) like we have now.

Stagflation turns the liability of unemployment (the declining rate of profit) into an asset (which capitalism, in various forms, describes as "thrifty" or a necessary condition for growth). Instead of capital being transformed into productive value, it is conserved in the form of accumulating wealth. The consolidated value keeps the economy in a continuous state of crisis, like we have now, with highly compressed cyclical trending and high-frequency stochastic oscillations of an oversized, too-big-to-fail, risk proportion.

Shareholders are always renting risk to extract value from it (to exact detriment) rather than produce added value (GDP). The economy is organized to systematically produce ever-larger losses to derive, and consolidate, ever-larger gains at an ever-higher frequency in an ever-larger proportion that is too big to let it fail.

What the Joint Committee will do is accumulate even more risk. By elite authority, "the risk" will be extended, cleverly reasoned to save the free market with its continued consolidation.

Foolish to think that consolidation of power will save us from tyranny, but that is our fate constructed by joint committee, binomially self-determined.

There is another fate, nevertheless, to be constructed. Monetized, market value--added risk value--can be used to ensure economic stability. Rather than stochastically stumble into the next crisis, it is possible to position for profit without deprivation.

As long as we are always being conditioned for a random walk into the next crisis, it will always appear that value can only be derived with little or no risk from its accumulated deprivation. It is time we all understand--exactly the opposite is true.

Yes, we are all "Fed Up" and it is time to use the technical means evolved to manage the risk with market value traduced by capitalists who want to use it to crown themselves king.

Consolidation of power is what America is not.

Understand that a free market does not consolidate power. It not only diffuses risk, it diffuses power. It keeps want-to-be tyrants directly accountable to "the risk"--exactly what capitalists venture to avoid with what only appears to be a blamelessly random walk.

Those who think market value can be continuously consolidated will not be prepared to cover their shorts.