Historical Determinism by Objective

Instead of our economic problems technically correcting (as K and E-Wave theory suggests, for example), we support them with a battery of elite recruits disposed to technically demonstrating an ideological, or philosophical, objective. Although a highly technical civil service has developed to objectively manage risk (existential angst), ideological loyalty still prevails over intellectual prowess which, technically, accounts for most of the risk (the angst).

The reason we don't simply let economic problems cycle into a natural correction as Hayek suggests, for example, but actively manipulate the means to ends like Keyenes suggested, is because we don't want to take the risk that our natural existence is the angst to be prevented. So, we manage the angst by objective, measuring the probable risk ontology with reactive, normative values that tend to an ideological bias that confirms the angst of our natural existence.

The Fed, for example, has at this point declared that its objective to maximize employment is technically impossible. Monetary policy, it says, does not determine the rate of employment (the extent of economic angst), but it does determine, with near-zero rates, if economy-of-scale financials (organized to avoid risk and reduce economic angst) fail or not.

Federal Reserve programs do little to ensure employment, but by ensuring too-big-to-fail institutions do not fail (essentially providing the liquidity they consolidate), Fed programs are effectively limited to preventing massive unemployment in late order (serving only to reduce the retributive value). By objective, keeping the distributive value of the risk in historical perspective, the accumulation (and the potential for crises that measures the inherent, or integral, value to be retributed) is contained.

Instead of keeping markets open, we see, then, a tendency to keep markets closed in a too-big-to-fail proportion to manage the risk. Instead of the bottom-up, free-market accountability of the prudent regulator that needs only limited government authority, what occupies the policy space is accumulated risk with an unlimited need for government authority. Risk is managed by objective from the top down to prevent even more civil unrest than we have now, but without sacrificing the benefit of unemployment.

(The benefit that unemployment provides is the deflationary risk that turns the equity of the average income into debt, which creates the retributive value that needs to be regulated to keep the value consolidated. Increasing debt to equity--liquidating the assets of the middle class, which requires adding liquidity in the form of debt to buy it back at a profit--consolidates wealth and power and at the same time gives the middle class, especially the unemployed, the "objective" identity of being an unproductive, fiscal liability. Since, however, the business activity that creates and services the debt is measured as GDP, the liability is managed, by objective, as an asset, and that objective identity is the difference between the need for limited and unlimited government authority.)

The Fed, as of the date of this publication, says its technical objective is to prevent liquidity crises, which are highly probable if employment does not dramatically improve (and remember, controlling the angst--the unrest--this causes becomes the objective--the reality--that technically defines the risk, and that valuation technically results in even more consolidation of power, not the deconsolidation we technically need). While the Fed cannot predict economic outcomes, because if it did, it must then admit to rigging the market (and thus a de-ontology), it can nevertheless determine the extent of crises that ontologically derive from free-market activity. If, however, the free market is allowed to consolidate, the Fed acts to support an ontology (a natural, undetermined outcome) that does not exist.

A fraud systematically perpetrates, and although the economy-of-scale efficiency is supposed to reduce risk, it is the cause of general anxiety (and psychoses described as "class warfare") in a too-big-to-fail (gamma-risk) proportion.

(Keep in mind that while ontology refers to a lack of objective--that nature yields predictable outcomes without purpose--economics is a "science" that is largely concerned with management by objective. This does not mean, however, that the "objective reality" of economic outcomes is not ontological. Most of the analysis found on this website is devoted to describing and explaining an ontology of risk that is politically motivated while technically assumed to be derived from natural forces that are undetermined.

Exploiters objectively become philanthropists because, paradoxically, they are naturally thrifty; and the meek, then, naturally inherit the earth because nature, unparadoxically, is objective.)

It is not difficult to see the technical problem here. First of all, predicting the outcome can sham for its deliberate determination. Risk can be managed toward an objective, and then it can be argued that avoiding the risk is the result of predicting it, not managing it (or "making markets") to position it for someone else. In the vernacular of private equity, this is the so-called ontology of "creative-destruction." Investors naturally seek (freely enterprise) to create, or derive, value (the marginal profit) by destroying the integral value of labor put into it (the opportunity to self-determine, or prudently regulate) in the free marketplace.

Markets are made to freely enterprise a marginal profit, and technically, with more than enough historical evidence to support it (the Great Recession and a persistent high rate of unemployment being the latest confirmation), the value created from the risk (the detriment) is risk prone, not averse, by objective.

Unemployment is the objective, and value (risk) is derived from the detriment (the objective). So, when the Fed says its mandate to control the rate of employment is technically impossible, its mandate has been effectively trimmed to fit the objective. (The Fed does not control the banks, the banks control--they own--the Fed by extension in a too-big-to-fail proportion, and thus they own the "Open Market" by committee.) The policy space, then, is fully occupied by an elite authority empowered to privately enterprise the risk that yields the value to be regulated.

We see, then, how the accumulated value is being historically determined by objective. The authority needed to regulate an accumulation of risk-value, that goes back to our founding, is expected to be a function of elite identity, and that identity manages our objective reality (who gets what, when and how) in historical perspective.

Although, since the Revolution, "We" are all equally self-determined, historically, however, we are all predictably determined by our natural ability to manage the risk that, nevertheless, ontologically presents. So, as Alexander Hamilton explained it, for example, it is reasonable for us all to assume the risk will always be managed by objective of elite authority.

According to reactionaries, then, while we can fully expect The Revolution to live long, the result (the value derived from the risk), historically, will always be conserved. What reactionaries don't admit, however, is that the distribution of the value depends on the objective, which could very well be not depending on the so-called "job creators" to predict the outcome with limited liability, but "We the People" determining the outcome with full accountability in the representative form.

Value Conserved in Historical Perspective

A lot of what we refer to as politics today centers on rhetoric that conserves value in historical perspective. It is necessary to maintain the philosophy of risk from which value legitimately derives and occupies policy space over time.

Binomialism, as we have discussed before, is critical to occupying policy space over time. Eventually, however, the philosophy of the risk's legitimate value and the organizational technology that has evolved to control it converges over time to occupy the same space, which essentially conserves the value in historical perspective.

When Newt Gingrich attacks Romney from the left, for example, he is no less right-wing reactionary than he was before. What we see, rather, is the spectrum converging, being compressed to occupy the same space in order to remain reactionary in a binomial fashion. If Gingrich is a socialist then Obama must be farther left than we all thought although the President's policies and programs, at this point in our political-economic history, clearly occupy space to the right of center.

Despite the perennial appearance of a necessary, populist shift of the right to the left, a binomial determination nevertheless conserves value (the stakes) in historical perspective.

Despite the Square Deal, the New Deal, the Civil Rights Act, or the marginal rhetoric of Gingrich, the historical objective does not really change much. The distribution of the total risk proportion largely remains the same. The top one percent organized the Revolution, organized the government, and continues to labor over consolidating value into a revolutionary (reactionary) proportion that, as far as the political-economic elite are concerned, always presents the opportunity (the reaction) to consolidate power even more.

Do we not hear policymakers advocating the practicality of bipartisanship--consolidating the competition--to solve our problems? Yet, at the same time, partisans vote the party line to maintain a philosophy of risk in historical perspective until finally we have a compromise that essentially conserves the risk proportion with distributive value that conserves the problem in the form of a solution. (The stakes, you see, are to prevent the increasing frequency of opportunity--crises--from resulting in a proactive deconsolidation rather than a continuous, reactionary consolidation of power.) As power consolidates with each crisis (which is the incentive for revolutionary change and measures the total risk proportion), institutions are strengthened, technically organized to produce the probable effects that cause the need for consolidated power (what is referred to as an "organizational tautology" in previous articles). Within these institutions is held the organizational memory that conserves, or stores, value in historical perspective, being switched on or off to conserve the stakes over time in a crisis proportion that must be laboriously networked (bureaucratically organized) to maintain.

Back in Adam Smith's day, entrepreneurs did most of the organizational work, which included organizing labor, but laborers worked for the crown who owned the means of production outright or by the extension of debt (the rent). Laborers, including the entrepreneurial class, were royal subjects.

While bankers and merchants organized the externalities to manage risk, the crown took a disproportionate cut because it essentially owned the means of production by divine right. Owning the means in a consolidated, too-big-to-fail proportion essentially meant the sovereign, with the means--the right--to self-determine, was renting the right to expand the pie, like financials do today.

American Revolutionaries considered the distribution--the philosophy--of risk to be unfair, and a new philosophy emerged that converged the risk with the labor value of the reward, which includes the angst of fully assumed loss that transformed into modern organizational technologies that network the externalities to reduce the risk, or the angst. Not only is this the source of mistakenly thinking risk is an added value, but also the source of mistaken analyses that considers value will always derive, or be "pulled," from the technicals regardless of a philosophical predisposition.

Consider, for example, the chart popularly used to show that the distribution of income over the past thirty years has technically favored the top one percent in zero-sum. During that period the policy space has been occupied by both liberals and conservatives in various proportions yet income steadily accumulated at the top, which infers that income naturally distributes to the top whether the policy space is occupied by the left or the right.

(Remember, the random walk of stochastic oscillation--what investors mean when they say past performance does not ensure future performance--is the defense used to shield the top one percent from the fully assumed risk of loss. Determining the risk of liability is not an ideological function...justice is blind because "the risk" is stochastic--it is ontologically derived. Those who walk through successfully by networking the externalities deserve--they have earned--the reward that is inherent--and proportional--to the risk. Since risk-reward is an integral value, it is then illogical, essentially illegal, to claim that risk has been subsequently derived from the reward, and if you do, you are not deprived of opportunity--of upward, class mobility--but "envious" and guilty of waging "class," or ideological, "warfare." So, when private equity firms raid businesses in a feudal fashion, risk is not being derived from the reward but is integral to the network--the systemic risk--labored over to produce value that would not otherwise exist.

Technically, capitalism is a process of "creative destruction." Economic value is not ideologically derived, it is technically derived, organized by the most enterprising among us, which includes organizing for the systemic risk that creates the opportunity to consolidate wealth and power with the legitimacy of being ontologically derived.)

While the technical distribution is stochastically the same independent of ideology, explaining the thirty-year, income chart is ideologically derived, nevertheless. The reactionary meaning of the chart is conserved, binomially, in historical perspective, and the distribution is decidedly leptikurtic with a risk value that peaks negative against a reward that peaks proportionately positive over time and space. The leptikurtic quality is a function of how the risk-reward is organized to technically distribute the quantity of risk over time, which determines occupation--the objective--of the policy space.

When Newt Gingrich says he wants to teach the unemployed how to get a job, for example, what he technically means is that we can attain full employment at the right price. His solution is, technically, classical economics in which the reserve army of labor is expected to bid the cost of labor down to subsistence, or starve. This, of course, gives real, technical meaning to his so-called left-wing position on Bain Capital, for example.

We should not rely on a predatory model like Bain, a reactionary can easily argue, because the classical model, if left alone to freely enterprise, will create more than enough detriment to subject labor to the consolidation of capital.

Since history admits that labor, technically, will starve anyway under classical conditions, right-wing conservatives must ideologically advocate for the technical strength of capitalism. Not only is labor not paid enough to buy what is produced (which, as the unsold supply accumulates, makes it look like capitalism cures shortages), but labor also has to pay rent in the form of debt. If Bain Capital is liquidating businesses to create wealth and not supply, it makes capitalism look like the disease and not the cure.

Debt (the economic rent) is extended to ensure the subsistence of labor (which essentially means you have to rent your job from the capitalist, and you do this when big corporations, for example, are given huge tax breaks to provide jobs). Labor is not likely productive (producing wealth for conspicuous consumption) if starving to death, or neotericly, in historical perspective, collecting welfare.

Ideology is critical for accumulating capital completely at the expense of labor, which distributes risk disproportionate to reward. Despite the extreme assumption of risk inherent to de-integrating risk-reward (the incentive to revolt, or the class warfare that American Revolutionaries essentially engaged to re-integrate the values), capitalism organizes so that labor takes all the systemic risk (all the detriment) with only a subsistence (counterinsurgent) proportion of the reward.

(Keep in mind that big, consolidated corporates consider small businesses to classify as laborers. Systemic risk distributes to small businesses in the same proportion as labor because, by definition, they are not too big to fail. This means they are not so big that they can, or will, cause the failure that consolidates the wealth of the nation, which includes the sweat equity--the labor and the added employment--of the small business person. Keep in mind, as well, that while welfare reduces the amount of systemic risk small business consumes, it tends to blame welfare for causing the risk and not consolidation of wealth and power to which they aspire integration.)

While in historical perspective the effect of capitalism is similar to the gamma accumulation of risk the king presented, according to today's reactionary ideologues, it is, nevertheless, the best of all possible alternatives. Divergence of risk from the reward (what classical economists called "overproduction" and "surplus value"), reactionaries say, cures shortages and thus reduces the primary, historical risk of conflict.

Since they know how to technically organize labor, and use the capital extracted to create the wealth of nations in historic proportion, right-wing conservatives contend redistributing the assumed risk proportion, like liberals do, is dystopic. Antidisestablishment philosophy especially advocates against any reintegration of the assumed risk by a government that ensures its deconsolidation in priority like free-market, limited government liberals say it should be.

Contrary to its free-market ideal, the right-wing establishment dissonantly considers deconsolidation to be anti-free enterprise and anti-private equity. Any government intervention destroys the natural, and thus legitimate, efficiency of markets (consolidated, inequitable, and risk-prone as they may unnaturally appear to be). Government that ensures a free and unconsolidated marketplace unconstitutionally deprives property owners of the natural right to freely use it as they see fit, effectively depriving them of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and remember, as Gingrich is apt to point out, "We" are entitled to "pursue" happiness, not attain it, and so wealth and accumulated power can easily be used to prevent it.

According to right-wing conservatives, not allowing capital to freely enterprise and consolidate equity (create wealth from capital by essentially consolidating its labor value, just like the king did) is a moral hazard because it increases the risk of conflict--it causes class warfare. As we know all too well, however, allowing wealth and power to consolidate (by depriving labor of all the value it produces, just like the king did with the bourgeoisie) results in class warfare. ("We" had the American Revolution, for example, and "We the People" have seen the stakes--the accumulated value--conserved over time, technically occupying an empirical policy space in which the stakes are ideologically tested.) Left-wing conservatives then, post hoc, advocate for welfare to reduce the hazard, which prevents consumption of the assumed risk and conserves the value consolidated in historical perspective.

Ideology, working with a moral, or normative, concept of reality, is technically operationalized to ensure the risk of loss is always assumed rather than consumed.

Ideology prevents the Revolution from being extended. It keeps the extension of the rent in historical perspective, valuing it as a benefit (like the king did) when it is a detriment, and risk-averse when it is really risk-prone. The hazard--the welfare that Gingrich and conservatives generally react to as immoral--is ideologically maintained in a gamma proportion, always on the verge of crisis.

Much improved from the way kings managed the fully assumed risk of loss, recurrent economic crises--the constant and cumulative risk of political revolution--is technically organized, binomially, to always assume the risk for future consumption. Systemic risk of default in a too-big-to-fail, economy-of-scale proportion is "swapped" for credit. Labor value, jobs, the value of your home (or the better part of your savings) is held in reserve, and remember, the quantum in reserve (the economic rent, which is paid out in the form of interest) is value released by breaking the bond between risk and reward (remembering that the interest on government bonds is paid with virtually no risk of default, and keep in mind, as well, that the financing used to cause our current economic crisis toward a "jobless recovery" is borrowed at an economy-of-scale, zero-interest, too-big-to-fail rate). Class warfare, you see, indicates probable reintegration, not disintegration, of the values, producing a force that fuses, or converges, practical effect with normative legitimacy.

If the relationship between risk and reward is inverse (with the objective being: the less the risk the more the reward), it is illogical to argue the reward is distributed to whomever takes the risk. No, the risk has diverged from the reward so that, technically, the risk-reward is integral and ontologically legitimate only when it has converged, which is "the risk" capitalism operates to ideologically avoid by keeping the value politically derived in historical perspective.

The analyst has to seriously question whether the technicals are really ontologically derived. When considering, for example, the culpability of today's economic distributions, with glaring inequity, remember, an ontological argument is the rationale--the philosophy--that exculpates the liability--"the risk"--inherent to an accumulation of the reward.

(Look at what happened to the price of natural gas, for example. While the technicals show a steady drop in price when speculators were prosecuted for manipulating the price, reactionaries argue that the drop is the result of added supply, or supply-side economics. Correct--supply was being added at the fraudulently high price and that inventory, along with the risk of loss, fully assumed, continues to accumulate.

Along with the consumption of the accumulated risk, we see the price being technologically pulled down, as well, which is the direct result of accountability, or fully assumed risk that dark markets and economies of scale otherwise avoid and pass to consumers by objective. The price continues to fall, and the benefit, rather than the risk, distributes to consumers with the innovation of LNG plants that came on line well after the price began to fall from its overbought proportion when speculators were looking to profit from the fraudulent price being touted as "fundamental," or ontologically derived.

We see, then, how value is conserved even in a micro case, and the conservation is not necessarily "pulled" into a technical detriment, but is largely dependant on the way the sector space is organized by objective, or occupation.)

If the extension of the rent is purposefully organized, it is virtually impossible to argue the detriment is an unintended consequence without arguing what is essentially a Marxist concept of reality--that the motive to act is technologically pulled or, that is, ontologically governed. Since the reward is governed, or derived, by taking risk, and governance is an essentially political function, there is no need to add government, and if we do, it adds, or organizes, the risk, capitalists contend, that keeps the reward from distributing because it encumbers economic expansion, or productive incentive, like the king did.

(Although too-big-to-fail risk managers, for example, know very well that risk is a constant value that can be organizationally transformed, when confronted with the Volcker Rule, they contend, nevertheless, that the rule creates the risk of default because it reduces liquidity, which is destructive. The implication is that government adds risk by not letting oversized financials reduce it in an economy-of-scale proportion. As previously discussed, however, government, not risk, is added to manage the same amount of risk deliberately organized in a too-big-to-fail proportion. Since that proportion is prone to failure, its organization pushes into and occupies the space of government.

Regulating the oversized, accumulated proportion becomes the occupation--the objective--of government. The public-policy space is occupied to support systemic risk, not avoid it because, remember, systemic risk causes the opportunity to consolidate wealth and power--it creates "risk value."

The value systemic risk creates from the detriment it causes maintains elite power in historical perspective. Notice how value is technically derived from risk that is algorithmically determined and philosophically maintained in historical perspective at the same time, and here we are, at this point, scratching our heads, wondering why we keep making the same mistakes over and over again. It's very simple...being prone to catastrophic risk in order to avoid it is insane!

An economy of scale, you see, shifts all the risk to the consumer. So, yes, risk is increased--big banks report lower profits from proprietary trading, but higher profits from laying off its employees. Proprietary trading, remember, is a means for big banks to take the consumer's savings and invest it to create unemployment, including the people hired to do the investing, which creates wealth for the one percent and explains, along with a more regressive tax code, the kurtosis of the chart since 1999.

You see, then, how this works. When wealth continues to be created from capital by destroying the labor savings of the consumer--investing in dark, complex, financial instruments that transfer risk by causing unemployment--big banks will admit uncategorically that the Volcker Rule "created" the crisis--the risk--that consumes us.)

Confiscatory capitalists, then, acting like the king, cannot be held normatively responsible for what is nature's way of ensuring there are enough risk takers, or "job creators," with ample reward. Proprietary desks at big banks, for example, provide liquidity, and when combined with securitized debt they provide both the ample reward and the incentive (the economic desperation) necessary for labor to be productive at the lowest possible cost. Thus, conservatives contend, consolidation of the financial system (operating without Glass-Steagill) both controls inflation and increases productive incentive as long as government does not interfere with this "natural" process of debt extended to expand the pie (which in historical perspective, as we learn again and again, is nothing but an extension of the rent, like the king did). Trickle-down economics, a philosophy of investment risk that Alexander Hamilton, for example, favored, is supposed to extend prosperity for everyone, but historically, the rent is what extends.

How political governance is organized to derive economic value is a normative consideration. Our founders were consumed with answering the very questions that importune the intellect today.

Since we are still seriously arguing whether government is the problem and not the solution, we are clearly being condemned to making the same technical mistakes over and over again.

While the stakes are technically organized to politically conserve the value (which is the value of making the same mistakes over and over again, which accumulates risk), how the risk is valued is ideologically conserved. How we value risk determines what the stakes are, and its perception is filtered ideologically.

In a binomial, bi-partisan, philosophical fashion, from our founding, "We" are being technically determined by an elitist, aristocratic ideology that conserves value in historical perspective... and so, whether you are a Tea Partier or an Occupier, long live The Revolution!

No Bain, No Pain

According to the Republican Party's front runner, Mitt Romney, private equity firms, like Bain Capital, engage in a process inherent to capitalism called, "creative destruction."

While this has the look and feel of being the Zen of capital formation and distribution, it is a technique for organizing markets so that they consolidate.

The objective is to creatively destroy demand (what causes deflationary risk, or the risk of default). By enterprising to form more capital (consolidate more private property) than distributed, our economy is organized for failure, from which private equity firms "derive" benefit by default.

Using the example of Bain Capital, the sound-bite description of the way capitalism operates is, "whether the firms acquired survive or not, win or lose, Bain profits." So, you see, capital can be organized and enterprised so that it destroys demand without causing a declining rate of profit, which suggests that the risk of loss is avoided. No! The risk of loss is fully assumed.

The risk of loss is gamma (consolidated)--it cannot be avoided.

Creative-destruction suggests that the capital gained has to derive from inflicting pain. Causing harm (by avoiding the risk--the probable detriment--rather than taking it yourself) is a demonstration of power, and as power consolidates, the risk of loss becomes more fully assumed, not less. The Romney camp and the rest of his party are discovering the inevitable, practical effects of the gamma-risk proportion.

Like I have said before, the revolution is just as likely to proceed from the right as from the left (because the risk of loss is fully assumed). As we plod along after the Great Recession, being offered the problem in the form of a solution, we come to discover, more and more, where there is no Bain, there is no pain.

An Organizational Problem

Our continuing financial crisis is the latest example of ignoring what is technically an organizational problem being philosophically maintained.

Consolidation of the governing, policy space, both politically and economically, is technically risk-prone, not risk-averse; and philosophically, organizing to avoid the assumption of risk (or to empirically determine a probable outcome) is what the American Revolution (the age of Enlightenment) was all about.

When empiricism--a philosophy of thinking--emerged not as magic tricks, but a verifiable (risk-averse) means of acquiring knowledge, a revolution occured. This Enlightenment led us into an industrial revolution (the technical application of empirical philosophy), and that revolution continues to converge technical and philosophical aspects of sovereign power (organizing for self-governance, or self-determination) to occupy a singular space.

Philosophically, the political-economic interests that supported the American Revolution were technically interested in creating wealth and keeping it from being confiscated by the sovereign. Technically, they organized to protect their interests with a philosophical foundation that is empirically derived--they declared themselves ("We the People") sovereign. This "Declaration" (this thesis of independence that is the working hypothesis of science) essentially converges the "self" and "governance" into a singular space so that our objectives are easily measured and verifiably attainable, or "self evident."

(Occupy Wall Street protesters don't see a verifiable attainment, for example, and so they intend to occupy the policy space that governs the evidence--the profit and loss--of that attainment.

The protest is both prescriptively and descriptively in the spirit of the American Revolution, and the right-wing reaction is how kings reacted to the Declaration of Independence...with indifference at first, until it became self-evident that sovereignty empirically resides, both technically and philosophically, with "We the People." This, you see, is the gamma-risk dimension where the risk ontology obtains as a quantum singularity but paradoxically attains a pluralistic, teleological expression. The expression is a creative process, intelligently designed, much as our founders originally viewed the empirical value, the ontology, of a government designed by consent, or by "objective" of the governed.)

According to original, American Revolutionary thought, consolidation of power is risk prone. When sovereign power is consolidated into the hands of kings the state naturally operates contrary to our objectives--the risk of loss is fully assumed in priority. (The risk of loss is gamma, but when intelligently organized, or pluralized, in the alpha dimension, the reward fully converges with the risk so that power is both normatively legitimate and technically verifiable).

At the time of the American Revolution the debate naturally centered around the role of government authority. The Revolution revolved around determining who is legally sovereign, or self-determined, which is essentially a question of organizational technique that is philosophically derived.

While dialectical determinists argue that the philosophy of risk is technologically "pulled," consider that at the time of the American Revolution philosophy was more concerned with the risk of losing economic value to the sovereign, value that was essentially derived (organized) from the labor of the bourgeoisie (to fulfill the king's objective reality). This is what Adam Smith was referring to when he declared it is the natural right of the business class to make as much profit as it can, and keep all that it makes, because it labored over it. It was a calculus of profit and loss with the sovereign taking more value than risk assumed because the king was, by his divine, insurmountable, singular nature, too big to fail. He could cover his losses, or cause loss and determine his competition, by merely raising the rent; and if his subjects didn't like it, well, they're just "envious"...sound familiar?

Empirically, however, the (envious) bourgeois class, being Enlightened (and prone to revolution), knew that the king's "nature" (his objective reality) was not verifiably singular, but relied on the wealth that its class created to demonstrate power and maintain status (the status quo). It reasoned then that the wealth created is not the wealth and power of kings alone, but "The Wealth of Nations," which is organized by an entrepreneurial class willing to take risk as long as government does not interfere or try to take its wealth. The objective, then, is to devise a mode of sovereignty that is "hands off," and the best way to do that is "hands on"--by declaring your "self" the sovereign.

Hence, government had to be organized to ensure the right to self-determination, which essentially requires a philosophy of risk that ensures the reward is legitimately derived, and thus legitimately kept and used as the private property of the sovereign. There needs to be a philosophy to support the new, organizational technology from which the value of self-determinism derives--the job of managing risk so that the risk-taker can keep, as Smith said, everything the risk-taker labored to earn, but as Smith said, as well, the risk-taker, like the king, is not a quantum singularity.

The right to private property (the right to sovereign power) is organized today to deprive it of others, which demonstrates power. When private equity firms, like Bain Capital, buy up foreclosed homes, it is called "free enterprise." In other words, the corporate body (the collective person, Bain Capital, for example) is legally sovereign and has the power to determine the self, including the "self" of others like the crown did by extension of the rent.

Extension of the rent (the economic risk that inevitably transforms into political risk) is accomplished by organized consolidation of the capital, which is called free enterprise. So, when private-equity firms, like Bain, buy up distressed assets, they are consolidating industry and markets (the quantum) toward a singularity (political risk they react to as "communist" or "socialist") that overextends the rent and forces assets into distress. While it freely demonstrates (enterprises) the power of the sovereign, it arrogantly forgets what objective reality really looks like and diminishes, like the king, that on which it naturally depends.

The risk-taker is dependent on conserving the natural right of others to self-determine, and as soon as that right (his sovereignty) is not conserved, he no longer, by nature, fully assumes the right in the future, but fully consumes that right by his own self-determination. Not only is it foolishly self-destructive (greedy) to consolidate industry and markets, Smith contends, for example, it is a moral hazard (which the greedy psychopathically describe as "class envy" and "class warfare").

If the objective is to avoid the moral hazard--the fully assumed risk--by ensuring free markets, it is necessary to avoid the problem of a declining rate of profit that classical economists referred to. Remember, "the declining rate of profit" is a demand deficiency due to liquidity crises, like we have now, which results from insufficient income to demand the value of labor put into expanding the pie. This pathology of insufficient income (our recurrent risk of default), as Smith said, is an organizational problem, and while today we support the margin (the risk) by monetizing the debt, the problem, and the solution, remains the same.

Mutual Risk and Occupation of the Policy Space

Ensuring that consumers have integral value (like a free market provides), rather than derivative value, is what capitalism will not do by technical design.

Our being plagued with a "jobless recovery" is no accident. Nor is it the product of a cyclical ontology derived from a natural, stochastic tendency to extract value (capital) for reinvestment.

(Remember that even though capital accumulates with each boom and bust, the cycle is the result of deliberate economic action. Capitalists want us all to believe it is derived from nature--a natural law--but it is really intended to derive detriment by technical design.

The risk of default is more by human, intelligent design than a crap shoot, delimiting the concept of "risk" to "being stuck with the detriment."

The successful capitalist innovates techniques for avoiding "the risk," which means it is left for others to consume by "default"--it's survival of the fittest. The crude, selfish exploits of Homo habilis may be derived from intelligence, but it is not to be confused with the self-interest of the wise man who realizes sticking others with the detriment is but to hoist the "self" on one's own petard.)

While the detriment exacted--the austerity--is supposed to provide a benefit, according to neo-classical economics the benefit is derivative. (In other words, the benefit--the reward--is fully assumed with the risk of loss. Hence the risk and reward are integral components of the derivative process but are considered neo-classically to be the natural, and thus legitimate, outcome that derives over time which, as we know, occupies space. While we typically consider space to be an empty nothingness, this space, understand, is the "quantum" that the quants on Wall Street work with to calculate the risk of loss fully assumed and, remember, occupying this space directs the detriment, positioning "the risk" for consumption. In a free market, the risk is consumed in the alpha dimension--it is calculated by the consumer with the quantity "income," which is value accumulated over time. In the world of Wall Street quants, risk is consumed in the beta dimension. Volatility--cyclical frequency--creates the opportunity to apply the risk, or detriment, which reduces the income, or the quantity, needed to apply risk in the alpha dimension which prudently regulates, or legitimately derives, the outcome. Without fully occupying this space, the consumer--the prudent regulator--is at a loss, and this loss is the quantity of government needed to control the proportion of risk accumulated that I call, "the gamma-risk proportion"). The benefit (which fully assumes the detriment), neo-classically derives from the accumulated capital and the demand for its consumption, not the value of labor input. So, for example, when we hear analysts describe and explain the Euro crisis, it's all about consumers (the populus) needing to undergo austerity. If capital is stuck with the risk, which according to popular analysis reduces its demand for consumption (investment), then we all suffer. Hmmm...doesn't that mean only the popolaccio (the little people) should suffer detriment?

The benefit, you see, is supposed to be mutual (integral). It is supposed to benefit both labor (the physical energy needed to create value, including the intellectual energy and labor-saving property put into it) and capital (the symbolic, highly portable value that seeks the lowest risk at the highest possible return to support its integral value--the labor that adds supply and reduces risk with adequate income, and savings, to demand its consumption). Neoterically, however, risk, rather than being integral to its value, is derived from the reward.

(Keep in mind that philosophers conservatives typically refer to--Hume, Burke, Locke, Adam Smith--classically regard labor as integral value from which capital investment--adding supply, or productivity--is derived. Smith, for example, regarded consolidation of savings derived from the value of labor into the hands of a few people--which became known as "the capital"--to be a moral hazard. In other words, he regarded consolidation of value, like we have now, to not be normal, and Marx certainly did agree with that. Except for Marx, who is credited with giving capitalism a bad name and whose philosophy is identified with the tyranny and oppression he so avidly argued against, these classical philosophers are neoterically cited without regard to the integral value of labor.)

Capitalism is expected to charge the highest possible price at the lowest possible cost, which means there will always be demand insufficient to pay the price. Consequently, we should always expect there will be crises that measure overextension of that marginal product--the inability to demand the supply--as a natural condition for expanding the pie (which in a post-industrial, neo-classical environment is largely a function of labor-saving productivity gains).

Normatively, we should always expect for "the capital" to foreclose on the marginal product. It is normal for the rich to buy it up, providing the liquidity necessary to pay for it, recycling the marginal risk (the unproductive waste--the productivity gained or, that is, derived) into future, accumulated value (the expected value of productive, economic expansion being held in reserve and normatively described as "the paradox of thrift"). Naturally recurrent crises (or the risk of loss fully assumed) always makes us stronger. Without it, capitalists say, paradoxically, we cannot all have the opportunity to share in the prosperity.

The virtue (the normative, moral strength) of recycled marginal risk, understand, is an accumulation marginally excised from labor but neoterically valued as consumer demand. Depriving consumers of the value needed to avoid foreclosure (the risk of default) is the moral hazard to be avoided, not the normative value to be expected.

Instead of providing strength, the cyclical value (the beta) of the marginal risk is really the source of systemic weakness. It is used to command the marketplace enough to determine its direction while, at the same time, claiming it is free and open as long as government does not intervene.

When labor suffers the detriment of capital formation ("the risk" fully assumed), the loss, you see, paradoxically, is not really a loss. It is not necessary for government to intervene and spoil the benefit. When the Great Recession deflated the housing market, for example, and forced millions out of their homes, which hedge funds subsequently bought cheap and are now renting dear to the foreclosed until eventually their homes are sold back to them for a capital gain, there is a net benefit that accrues to consumers as long as government does not try to modify it. Measuring the detriment, you see, according to capitalists, has a late-order benefit that is described as "paradoxical" because it is really a net loss in zero-sum to the vast majority of consumers.

Since, capitalists claim, labor does not have the capacity to understand this paradox, labor erroneously tries to retribute the loss (a liability that is really an asset) by unionizing and engaging in other means of collective action. According to reactionaries, demanding government intervention is the problem and not the solution in a marketplace that is fully assumed to be free and open to anyone willing to take the risk (or as it consolidates more and more with each business cycle, to freely avoid it). The really big error here, however, is that reactionaries claim big government adds risk. No, it adds regulation missing from organizing to avoid the risk; and instead of resisting consolidation of the risk, government regulation tends to support it. Dodd-Frank, for example, is now forcing small banks to merge in order to absorb big, too-big-to-fail compliance costs, which forces them to be "too big to fail." So, here we are, accumulating risk by erroneously trying to avoid it being added. This is not paradoxical, it is, rather, a cognitive deficiency that results from an affective disorder--a full-blown ideological psychosis that fully assumes selfishness is the wisdom that prudently regulates the risk, and then when it doesn't, but goes hog-wild crazy...well, isn't that paradoxical?

(Remember, the "fully assumed risk" is a pre-ordained ontology--it is the gamma risk that catastrophically presents when it is always being avoided. For capital, it is a function of resisting consolidation of labor; for labor, resisting the consolidation of capital. The risk factor is mutual. In both cases, the natural "objective" is to resist the consolidation of power, but in both cases, paradoxically, resisted by its consolidation.)

The measurable error, according to capitalists (which includes consolidated labor that organizes to equally share in the profit margin), is inflation and unemployment, like we have now. "Surplus value" (accumulating risk of a declining rate of profit derived from a rising marginal rate) as classically described is characterized, neo-classically, as a fundamental misattribution, which is a symptom of psychosis--specifically, according to reactionaries, the psychosis of giving up the "self" (selfishness) to the tragedy of the commons.

Acting in self-interest, labor organizes to share in the profits. Since the marginal profit is demanded by earned income (labor value from which the marginal value fundamentally derives), labor does not try to derive value, but to retribute, or reintegrate, the value held in reserve. Bear in mind, the more labor shares in the profit, the more the rate of profit, paradoxically, declines; and remember, a declining rate of profit is what deflation is.

Deflation, remember, is to be resisted at all cost by keeping value held in reserve at the expense of labor (which, as is plain to see, supports the risk by trying to resist it). This is what capitalism is and does--it relies on crises to increase the economic rent. As the cost of labor falls, the cost of living increases, and if we do not bail it out with the value in reserve (the risk to be consumed), we experience general economic crises.

Without the bailout that follows every crisis (in which economic leverage--the rent--exceeds the quantity of currency in circulation, like the trillions of dollars currently occupying dark markets), the full quantity of risk assumed in priority (the gamma risk) will be measurably consumed. Consumption of the overextended value (payment of the extended rent in late order, which capitalism refers to as "needed austerity") reintegrates the derivative value in a crisis (gamma-risk) proportion. This full reintegration of value (in which labor value fully converges with consumer value) is what capitalism must prevent at all cost.

If capitalism does not prevent full consumption of the risk (typically with war and welfare in various proportions, which essentially fits, or measures, the risk proportion), capitalism meets its demise (the convergence occurs). However, full consumption of the gamma risk (by resisting it with austerity measures that serve only to support it) does not necessarily have to take the highly consensual mechanics of a peaceful and prosperous pluralism (a free market) with it.

Supporting the risk by trying to resist it is the "gamma-risk proportion." It is the risk ontology fully assumed in priority. Declaring, for example, "We hold these truths to be self evident..." is to declare, in priority, empirical occupation of the policy space that determines the self; that is, government, in priority, is what allows us to freely choose our objectives, which means "We the People" divisibly define our objective reality based on self-interest.

Our founders made it clear that government, in priority, occupies the space of risk that is fully assumed. This prior assumption of risk was, and still is, based on experience. It was clear then, as it is now, that the sovereign has the power to independently define the objective (and, keep in mind, pursuing an objective gives existential identity, both divisibly and indivisibly, to our "objective" reality). Where there is an objective there is purpose.

Objectively, however, the risk ontology does not care what our ideology is. It assumes nothing--it just "is" (as Ayn Rand described it, for example, "A is A"), which is what it means for it to be a fully assumed quantum (the value to be retributed) that will fully consume us (or reintegrate) if we do not heed the indicators of impending crises.

Understand that our founders intended to empower government with all "the risk" in priority. This "risk," you see, is the fully assumed gamma risk--the angst the kings experience by always having to shift all the detriment to their subjects in order to maintain their status, empowered with self-determination. Today, want-to-be kings operationalize this working, revolutionary hypothesis with conserving consolidation of wealth and power--the essential attributes of self-determination.

Today's power elite consider themselves the keepers of the Revolution and are entrusted with keeping its morals (essentially avoiding "moral hazards," like the power to self-determine from the bottom up) by essentially ensuring a reactionary, binomial, republican form of government ("A" is always A by ensuring that the process is "A" therefore B therefore "A" therefore B...). They must always react ("A" therefore B therefore always objectively "A") to what they consider counter-revolutionary objectives, which are typically characterized as "socialist or communist" tendencies that threaten the natural, Constitutional right of self-determination.

Toggling between "A" and "B" always centers on the size of government, which essentially operates to control the risk proportion, as we previously discussed, in priority. When the risk is off (identifiably "B"), conservatives consider the risk to be "on" (too big) and liberals consider the risk to be in abatement or "off." Being always either on or off, you see, conserves the risk in a crisis proportion--it is risk prone by being operationally risk averse, which is just nuts! It is completely psychotic, but then we have people like Ayn Rand to let us know that being selfishly psycho is not at all abnormal. It is a normative identity in which our concept of good and evil is pathologically delusional.

The only objective, verifiable morality, according to conservatives (which, by process, we have to include the "B" side) is the moral hazard of government being so big that it occupies the power of self-determination--the power of the prudent regulator to occupy his or her own space. Government does not allow, but disallows, ownership of the "self" by occupying its space.

While the occupation is supposed to be mutual, Constitutionally endowed with the consent of the governed, reactionaries are always limiting ownership of the policy space in the representative form. So, you see, while businesses that are too big to fail (which occupies the space of the prudent regulator) are the model of efficiency (capable of demutualizing the risk so that only the non-elite occupy that space), government that is too big in reaction spoils the efficiency.

Government, conservatives argue, referring to Rand's Objectivism, for example, is actually the reactionary element--it wants to go back to when the king (the sovereign power) feudally occupied the space of prudent regulator with the power of self-determination. Government, they argue, reacts to diminish the austerity (the ownership) required to occupy the space of elite status, which according to capitalists is the objective (the productive incentive) that causes economic growth and expands the opportunity to earn wealth and gain power. Government, not big business, then, presents the risk to be consumed.

Even though big business axiomatically operates to increase sales with as few employees as possible (which is a contradiction, not a paradox, because increasing sales requires employment--a distribution, or more ownership of income, not less), the reaction is to always blame the size of government for the fully assumed crisis proportion. "The risk" fully occupies the space of the prudent regulator in the form of austerity in the gamma dimension rather than the income required to consent in the alpha dimension. This is big business occupying the space of the prudent regulator, not government, and keep in mind, this occupation does not "add" risk.

(Keep in mind that a paradox, by nature, resolves. A contradiction, however, derives by objective. A contradiction will not resolve without throwing it out by objective.)

In a consolidated, corporate environment, with a massive government authority to control its extent, risk is being constantly misattributed ("A" therefore "B" therefore "A"...). Constant fundamental attribution error indicates a persistent, organizational pathology, and rather than being addressed as an accumulation of errors, it is deliberately described and explained by the high priests of consolidated capitalism, and routinely believed by the laity, to be added risk.

What is added by corporate consolidation is not risk, but government authority (bureaucratic power) to mange its accumulatively derived (gamma-risk) proportion (a' posteriori). "Government is," then, fallaciously considered, "the problem and not the solution" (post hoc). If we want to create jobs, you see, all we have to do is get government out of the way.

In a neo-classical, high-efficiency, economy-of-scale corporate environment, proponents of consolidation maintain that government does not add integral value. Instead, government adds risk from which derives a failure of expectations and civil unrest.

Occupy Wall Street, for example, conservatives contend, is not a function of economic failure because, remember, systemically influential industries and markets are neo-classically designed so that they are "too big" to fail. (Being "too big" to fail means, unparadoxically, operating with pricing power that subjects the consumer--the prudent regulator--to the producer, unlike a free market, which is why, for example, we need a Consumer Finance Protection Bureau that the corporate says is antithetical to free-market mechanics.)

The economy is deliberately organized (with subjugating pricing power) so that "the best and the brightest money can buy" controls our destiny from the top down (as Alexander Hamilton envisioned it). It is when government (consent of the sovereign) occupies economic space (like the king did) that we can expect failure. So, you see, it stands to reason, conservatives contend, the problem isn't "big business," it's "big government."

(Remember that while Hamiltonians react to consent of the governed as the tyranny--the risk--to be avoided in the interest of the general welfare, the argument relies on there being a free market. There is supposed to be a clearly defined, economic space in which consent--a pure, democratic form of governance by objective that is highly divisible and thus easily measured right down to each and every individual--operates without encumbrance. It is a space fully assumed by the prudent regulator with the full faith and credit of the Federal Government. Thus, for example, we have the Federal Open Market Committee, and thus we must have a free market--the democratic form--because we have it efficiently consolidated and operating by organized committee.)

Reactionaries argue that government gets so big it occupies the space needed to grow the economy (and, as Rand argues, because it tries to operate contrary to our highly divisible, objective, self-interested nature, government naturally limits our liberty, and thus our productivity, which leads to crises). Quite the contrary, however. By consolidating, business gets so big that it occupies the space that we call government, and then government is co-opted, promulgating regulations that support rather than resist the demand for big government--consolidation.

By allowing the consumer to fully occupy the policy space in priority, the objective (our objective reality, as Rand describes it) is redefined in a highly divisible, pluralistic manner that allows for a government that governs least.

As long as the prudent regulator is subjected to the objectives of consolidation, the consumer always occupies the toxic space where risk is dumped (de-mutualized) to presumably protect us from its aversion.

Held in Reserve

Modern economic analysis tells us that there is no savings (no reserve) because we are a consumer society.

The value of the prudent regulator is objectively identified by modern economics primarily as a consumer--a spender rather than a saver making enough money to hold value in reserve. Instead, the missing value is held, and measured, in the form of personal wealth--private property possessed by the upper class who, as consumers, provide income on demand for the lower class who, as labor on demand, do not, for the most part, make enough to save for investment, or prudently regulate.

Measuring value as a consumer implies that labor is value derived from capital (consumed on demand) rather than capital derived from labor. Regarding labor as an integral value implies class warfare, and that, as reactionaries are quick to posit, is a moral hazard that threatens civil order.

(Here we discover how power is structured with consumer demand, which according to free-market economics rules civil society with the consent of the governed. Power is modeled with a demand dimension to build an elite power structure--filled with the best and the brightest--that appears to have the pluralistic legitimacy of a popular consent.

The on-demand dimension is a means for elite recruitment. With labor value dependant on discretionary income, which is governance by consent, the capacity of the upper class to demand its value is, well, consumer driven. It is consumer-driven governance by elite consent. Class mobility, loyalty, and compensation of upper-class laborers, like the big salaries and bonuses of corporate CEO's, is value derived from consumer demand.)

In order to maintain civil society (by consent of the governed from the top down), labor value (wages and salaries paid to demand products and services produced by investment of capital) is value (neo-classically derived) to be minimized by highly technical, bureaucratic processes and authorities (like the Federal Reserve and the investment-banking system). Through these highly structured processes and authorities, labor value is minimized. It is value held in reserve and administered with minimal, if not inscrutable, accountability, except, of course, what is demanded from the top down. It is value minimized, except when recruiting the labor to minimize the value.

Labor, primarily valued as either consumed or not consumed to produce savings, is value deliberately minimized to exact detriment. The exception is, of course, elite recruitment. In that case, labor value is maximized with a class identity that is typically anti-labor and pro-consumer since that is what the upper class, with the power of discretionary spending, demands.

Value demanded from the top down is, you see, value held in reserve, which according to reactionary philosophy of risk management is our civilized "identity" (as Ayn Rand would describe it, for example). So, demand from the bottom up is uncivil behavior--it is class warfare.

In order to secure civil society, it is necessary, conservatives maintain, to minimize labor value with large, reactionary, political structures (like large, economy-of-scale corporates) from the top down. Economies of scale effectively control the ability to demand investment, or the ability to prudently regulate (the missing value we call "savings"--the private property classically referred to as "the means of production," or capital investment). Without labor value being fully included in the capital invested, however, the result, as we see time and time again, is deficient demand--economic contraction, or what is classically described as "overproduction."

We no longer refer to overproduction because it smacks of Marxist analysis, which is classical economics. No, we use neo-classical analysis in which the way things are (Rand's objective reality) is "on demand"--by popular consent (the empirical means of the prudent regulator that ensures civil society with productive capacity through private ownership of the means of production). The more savings labor has, the more it owns the means of production and profits from the capital invested in the form of income that is "the wealth of the nation."

Hence, capitalism resists the value of labor (the empirical value of free-market economics) at all cost and clearly (objectively) identifies the classical risk proportion we neo-classically derive. If the value of labor is not systematically reduced (consolidated, or marginally compressed, through the business cycle), the surplus value (the labor-saving means of production) will not distribute to the upper class.

According to conservatives, if surplus value (labor savings) does not distribute to the upper class (and cause overproduction, what they refer to as "adding supply"), the result will be civil disorder--kind of like we see now with worldwide protests but, ironically, without the distribution (the savings) reactionaries predict will cause it.

It is important to understand that labor-saving capital investments are used to reduce the value of labor and increase the profit margin. The demand reduction that occurs--overproduction--results in what modern, business analysts call "margin compression."

While it may not be readily apparent, when analysts refer to margin compression, they are referring to the measure of labor-saving value that did not accrue to labor, which is the systemic risk--the quantum value--demanded and consumed in dark markets with devices called "derivatives." The value derived, you see, is not the value consumed by labor, which is what Marx and other classical economists referred to as "surplus value."

Value held in surplus--in reserve--is then used to demand consumption of the risk which is systemically endowed with labor savings. When Bain Capital, for example, buys an existing firm with what is called a "leveraged buyout," loads it with debt, lays off employees, and deducts the interest on the debt from its taxable income, equity is being transformed into debt with the assistance of public finance. Labor equity is effectively swapped for risk which is then hidden in dark markets. In the dark, the value is swapped even more, rather than invested to expand the economy. The economy then contracts and the money borrowed has thus been used to gain a profit by causing loss in the form of a "default swap."

When the savings is consolidated into risk-value--the gamma-risk proportion that is detrimental to everybody--the value ultimately consumed is a dead-weight loss. The result of this risk-value is, predictably, civil unrest, with warfare being the scenario in the worst case.

The loss, as Marx explained, for example, is to be expected of capitalism. So when we hear neo-conservatives denouncing as Marxist any call for a more adequate distribution of wealth, while at the same time marching our forces off to war, they stupidly confirm what is so vehemently denounced--something that is characteristic of power that is too consolidated.

The risk of loss is fully assumed in priority, it's just a matter of when, but by ensuring a free market in priority, the labor savings--the gamma-risk proportion--goes from catastrophic detriment to an overwhelming benefit that accrues to everyone. We go from a philosophy of privation that demonstrates power from the top down to a philosophy of privatization from the bottom up that is neither deprivationally Marxist or capitalist with value held in reserve. That is, value that is "savings and investment" does not result in demand reduction because it accrues to labor in the form of integral rather than derivative value, which is exactly what capitalists do not want and thus falsely attribute the detriment of minimizing labor value (demand reduction that is classic "overproduction") to "the paradox of thrift." By not reducing labor value to its derivative consumption, the paradox "naturally" resolves.

The more the value of labor is reduced, the more capital is available for investment. So, mistakenly, we are always engineering markets to accommodate capital and investment strategies, like free-trade agreements that serve as accoucheur for global economic development and ever-larger economies of scale, to reduce the value of labor.

While minimizing the value of labor is supposed to increase supply and reduce consumer prices to the benefit of consumer demand, the result is a demand deficiency that expresses as a liquidity crisis (insufficient income to demand the supply to be consumed). The neoteric, economic measure of integral value (consumer demand) results in the classic crisis of overproduction, which is the opportunity to consolidate assets, wealth, and power.

With opportunity comes risk. So, the more frequently we cycle into recession, the more wealth and power can be consolidated over time (and the more risk is consolidated and packed into the policy space that governs the crisis proportion, like central banking, which manages the surplused value--consumer value in the form of capital--held in reserve). With higher frequency, the policy space that governs the risk becomes saturated with the selfish imprudence of capitalism rather than the self-interest of the prudent regulator. Value that derives from a free market--providing a sufficient, fully legitimate, peaceful and prosperous, income distribution (wages and salaries paid)--is insufficient to demand it. The value demanded and consumed, then, is debt, which depletes savings (the ability to pay the debt) and results in liquidity crises.

The ability to pay the debt is fully liquidated, or at least liquidated enough that the only funding available to pay the principle and interest are those who own the debt and thus are not expected to pay it. This is what capitalism is...this is what it is expected to do: liquidate equity (the ability to pay--the reward) into debt (the inability to pay--the risk that is integral to, but at the same time derives from, the reward). The lack of payment is "the risk"--the risk of default which, neo-classically, is swapped to hide the extension of the risk proportion until it reaches a critical mass within the policy space (the risk goes gamma). If the mass is not deconsolidated its reactionary tendency becomes critical (a gamma burst--the fully assumed risk of loss--will consume the consumers). The natural condition is indeed, as Nietzsche says, well beyond our notions of good and evil.

Nature doesn't care about the right ideology, it just does what comes naturally. Doing the right thing is left up to us, it's called "free will." The consequences experienced (the empirical value of what we freely will or will not do), consciously enjoyed or suffered, is the measurable difference between good and evil (Keep in mind, detrimental value derived and hidden in the future, with the risk of loss fully assumed in priority, or held in reserve, is not a function of probability that exculpates the risk by misattributing it to the "objective," natural order of things. It is a function of ignorance and full-blown stupidity--psychosis of consolidated power that regards a consensual critique of fundamental misattributions as insubordination).

The power to avoid self-consumption (self-determination) is being held in reserve. It is intentionally alienated, technically "sequestered," from its prudent regulation, depriving us of the direct accountability (the wisdom, the power, and the providence) that comes with the empirical confirmation of a popular consent (what ensuring a free market provides in priority). We have the power to self-determine if we deconsolidate its critical mass and unleash the power of the prudent regulator...what the free market is, and what capitalism obviously is not.

To control the impending reaction, "We" need to actively seek risk instead of hiding from it...what holding it in reserve (allowing for its continued accumulation) will not do because that is what it cannot do.

By occupying the critical policy space, in which the "critical mass" (popular consent) naturally exists, "We the People" can turn the moral hazard of selfishness into the peaceful prosperity of self-interest, prudently regulated by the freedom to choose in a free and open market where opportunity is created for ourselves, independent of the so-called "job creators."

The Prudent Regulator

In order to prudently regulate in a free market, the prudent regulator requires income, and the more income acquired the more ability to regulate--to govern--with a prudence that is self-determined.

As you may have guessed, this is a philosophy of equilibrium. As soon as someone has more income than others, odds are the outcome will favor the accumulation of income, not its distribution, which according to free-market capitalism is a virtue that provides for economic strength, not a weakness.

If we all pursue the strength of accumulation, its virtue becomes a source of deprivation. It is easy to then reason that deprivation (in pursuit of life, liberty and happiness) is a virtue. Capitalism, for example, calls this the paradox of thrift, and in a free-market environment is the strength--the austerity--of self-deprivation that forms capital. When invested (or if invested), the capital (the deprivation) expands the economic pie to provide for others.

It is easy to see, then, how the philosophy of risk inherent to capitalism becomes a philosophy of deprivation--austerity that surpluses value to prevent shortages. (It is important to note here that proponents of capitalism always site, for example, that its participants do not cue-up for goods in short supply like they did in the former Soviet Union. No, instead, participants do not have the money to demand it. There is no reason to stand in line for something you can't buy, and not being able to buy assures ample supply. While Russian citizens no longer visibly cue-up, the reduced demand, added to the top income class, is divisibly less visible than the accumulating supply, and because the demand is added at the top, prices marginally rise to meet the marginal consumer demand--the ability to pay--at the top. Characteristic of capitalism, then, prices rise against a falling demand until the alpha risk--the ability to self-determine and prudently regulate--is so accumulated that the only way to reduce the risk is to issue debt, which reduces buying "power"--the alpha risk--even more, and increases supply.) More and more, over time, the surplus occurs less by adding supply than by reducing demand (classic overproduction), which conservatives falsely refer to as "supply-side" economics. Who sacrifices to gain the surplus is "the risk" to be philosophically constructed and is essentially the debate we currently have over policies and programs that will keep us out of recession.

In order to determine the direction of the risk (the capacity to self-determine), it is necessary to occupy the policy space in the gamma dimension where risk is systematically managed (governed) in the representative form. Since we see a divergence of philosophy and practice over time, we see a kind of quantum entanglement of the risk that clearly identifies the position required to avoid taking the risk.

For example, when Occupy Wall Street occurs, there is a quantum-mechanical entanglement that conservative philosophy reacts to with rhetorical hyper-tropisms. Governance becomes a function of dogmatic rigor...we need to return to our roots, our foundation, our heritage, conservatives proclaim, and we hear things like, "the protesters don't know how wealth is created," which infers, in true Hamiltonian form, they are too ignorant--too uncivil--to know any better. It is "us" and "them" by construction of the argument, but admitting to it is a moral hazard. Not submitting to higher authority (governance of the best and the brightest), the one-percent contends, is to solicit class warfare and wantonly endanger civil society.

Quite the contrary. Occupy protesters know very well how wealth is created, and they know very well that capital is not productive if they are not at work producing it. They know very well that the capital to reduce debt-to-equity is not being used to create jobs (supply), it is being used to create debt. They know all too well that unemployment is the objective (the value of their austerity surplused as the private property of the upper class), not shared prosperity.

Debt (unemployment due to unproductive use of capital) is the supply being added, effectively raising the economic rent. Raising the rent turns equity (self-determination) into debt, and the vast majority into credit-score slaves.

Unproductive use of capital despoils the consumer...the prudent regulator with the power to determine (the quantum, pluralistic power of numbers to apply risk, which in the case of the upper class is value surplused disproportionate to their numbers). The consumer is demoralized, willing to do the bidding of the master for economic security and social mobility. The Occupiers are more than just animals, though, willing only to despoil the debt with productivity and make sure despoilers get their due.

Robbing labor of the value (the power) of self-determination is the objective, the reality, of capitalism, not the shared prosperity a free market provides (which assures despoilers get their due in short order). To tell victims they do not deserve an equal share because they are unproductive, because they lack the value (the civility) of those who manage the capital to victimize them, is to invoke the moral hazard (the incivility) capitalists say it is imperative to forswear--class warfare.

Instead of creating jobs and adding supply, capital is being distributed to create unemployment. Capital neo-classically demanded and consumed in speculative markets is where the risk is entangled, positioned, and arbitraged with the desired quantum effect. By focusing its value on the demand and consumption dimensions, rather than the value of labor (the power of the prudent regulator), capital is deliberately (systematically) horded to accumulate the wealth and power (the quantum effect) necessary to self-determine.

The Occupiers very clearly observe a quantity that is not "supply-side" driven, but a demand-side deprivation falsely postulated as benefiting them. They detect a con game to exact a detriment by promising prosperity--what criminals do, but because it is all entangled on Wall Street the detriment is exacted without the assumption of liability because it is presumed to function with the legitimacy (the philosophy of risk) a free-market provides.

(Remember that a free market requires full participation. If you did not participate and you, thus, have no income, it is your own fault. Hence, the marketplace is freely self-determined, ontologically entangled, and because of this unpredictable, probabilistic, quantum entanglement, the result is legitimately derived. Since the result is probabilistically ontological, the results are "objective" as Ayn Rand describes it, for example, and as Nietzsche explains, the results are "Beyond Good and Evil").

Understand, when Wall Street quants transfer risk, the quantum exchanged is entangled. Default swaps, for example, are a means of transferring risk (which, by the way, is a measure of risk that is exchanged in the dark). The quantum effect is not limited to the swaps market, which few people understand beyond its participants. It is a way to apply risk to the lower classes (the ninety-nine percent) in the dark.

The risk is applied in the dark so that it is not detectable (a quantum uncertainty) until it has an effect. Application of the risk can then be argued as ontologically derived (a quantum mechanism, unpredictable and probabilistic, like a free market), and thus legitimately free and open to anyone willing to take the risk. If the reward is taxed away or the market regulated, conservatives say, the incentive to produce what consumers demand (the will to take risk) is diminished. (Of course, this argument is nonsense. Most of the risk inherent to capitalism is consolidation of income--buying power. The incentive to produce inversely correlates with the accumulation of the income to demand it, and since it is the goal of capitalists to make money, not necessarily produce--which adds supply and disinflates prices, "the risk" consolidates with income. This income-deficit is falsely argued by reactionaries to be a deficiency of risk-taking. The incentive to take risk is not, however, value that is missing or lacking, but simply consolidated--misdirected--into a too-big-to-fail proportion that is fully assumed, in priority, to be lost without government intervention. What results is state capitalism, what Marx called "anti-socialist socialism," and what capitalists falsely refer to, post hoc, as imprudent regulatory authority that kills the incentive to create jobs. Understand that this fully assumed risk of loss is the feeling--the thrill...the quantum risk--capitalists have of gaining wealth and power, and keeping it, in defiance of the law of large numbers.) Declining demand (the lack of productive investment that adds supply and the income--the employment--to demand it), conservatives explain, is the entangled, quantum effect (the falling income of the ninety-nine percent) that expresses as populist sentiment, not a decline of income. (Income is rising just fine, all be it for the top one percent, but remember, according to conservative philosophy, this is not a zero-sum because it provides the incentive for labor to be more productive, which resists shortages, and thus hyper-inflation.)

Declining demand does not derive from the lack of income, according to conservative philosophy of the risk, because it implies that labor is its integral value. Declining demand, rather, is the result of low productivity--the more productive labor is, the more money it makes, which leads to hyper-tropic, reactionary rhetoric like, "get a job" when unemployment is at depressionary levels. (In other words, that's why conservatives never make much sense. Ideology prevents them from properly identifying the derived and integral parts that calculate the probable direction, position, and thus the space the risk proportion occupies at any particular time. This also accounts for most of the beta volatility--the entropic value--concomitant to organized consolidation of the risk proportion which, ironically, is supposed to lower the entropic value).

According to reactionaries, the problem is not the lack of income since keeping labor costs low is disinflationary. Modern economic theory, you see, focuses on consumer demand--creating debt and managing the money supply to resist the declining rate of profit. Of course, neo-classically, monetizing debt does not have a disinflationary, quantum effect. It has an entangled, stagflationary effect that renders the practical concept of labor value (unaccumulated income and the deflationary risk proportion that goes with it) as a value to be resisted by any and all means. Hence, disinflation, rather than being the benefit (the freedom) that a free market naturally provides to prudently regulate right down to each and every individual, is redefined, neo-classically, as a function of its consolidated value--adding supply at an economy-of-scale, volume discount against declining consumer income (demand) and rising unemployment.

The declining demand (zero-sum reduction of consumer income by reducing the amount of labor demanded) accounts for the amount of government regulation added. The demand (the power of the prudent regulator) is added to the size of government and is the entangled quantity that gains a gamma-risk proportion.

(It is important to understand here that competitive innovation is not considered by capitalists to be value that accrues to labor. Labor-saving devices are not employed to make labor easier at the same price, which increases the value of labor by making it more productive, but to increase the return on investment--the value of accumulated capital. The accumulation in zero-sum, you see, renders labor less productive, not more, and that is why there is so much confusion about the reward that derives from the risk. The legitimately derived reward is so entangled with varying, ideological quantifications of its, distributive, proportional attributes, its objective reality is reduced to whoever has accumulated the most wealth and power to determine it, which is the power to self-determine, or prudently regulate as one sees fit in the pursuit of liberty.)

The reaction to regulation is that it does not allow for the liberty to organize as one sees fit, and that liberty (essentially derived from the incentive to control the cost of labor as a matter of prudential regulation) is value that is legitimately "self" determined. This value of the risk (its legitimately derived accountability) is, according to reactionaries, not only at the foundation of what it means to be American, but is at the root of the problems that plague us.

Industries and markets are merged (deliberately organized) so that labor costs are minimized while profits are maximized (stagflation and a continuously rising debt-to-equity). This, you see, is a deliberate act--an organizational technology--to gain profit by causing detriment, and since the capital derived by this technology is not converted back into labor value (disinflationary, competitive, innovatively productive capacity), but instead used to deflate wages and salaries of the ninety-nine percent, the effective quantum value of "the risk" (the fully assumed loss) is evermore probable.

Populist sentiment that reactionaries claim unnaturally resists the way things are and should be, resistance they say will result in a crisis, naturally occurs to deconsolidate the risk and prevent the crisis. (Correct! The implication here is that reactionaries want crises. It is the opportunity to react. It is the opportunity to foreclose on value accumulated in the lower classes.) So, when Bank of America reacts to deflationary crises with a massive, hubba-hubba foreclosure program, the quantum entanglement increases to a ninety-nine percent risk proportion and naturally tends to occupy the critical policy space that governs the risk--the space we refer to as self-determination...the space that must be occupied to demonstrate, or verify, how much power you have. Remember that Bank of America says its reaction is only natural...and acting contrary to its natural "objective" (its self-interest) is, like Ayn Rand says, the ultimate moral hazard--it will surely result in crises that, you see, the reaction is sure to cause.

Populist sentiment (declining consumer demand transformed into political demand), conservatives contend, is not class warfare. It is an economic technicality that "the mob" does not understand.

Turning consumer demand into political demand is a critical, technical error. The reason we use consumer demand to quantify value, instead of labor value, for example, is because labor tends to transform into political risk, which inflates costs and entangles economic risk. This entanglement is, you see, conservatives say, the uncertainty (the complexity that the non-elite are too slow or "intellectually lazy" to understand) that prevents economic growth and debt reduction.

In order to cause a distribution (increase demand for added supply so that, as conservatives will have it, there is no disinflationary effect, which according to neo-classical economics is bad because it empowers labor and reduces profits) it is necessary to free capital from taxation and government regulation. If capital is not freed from oppression (the political demands of empowered labor value), it will not distribute--it is horded (and kept in the dark), like we have now.

Capital is grossed and hidden in largely dark markets until the value of labor is reduced to economic desperation. At that point the philosophy of self-determination is invoked to identify the problem as self-oppression (Ayn Rand's "A is A" identity hypothesis and Herman Cain's "blame yourself" thesis). It is the point at which labor (including the small proprietor) seeks to cause a distribution through government process--essentially taxing and spending to turn accumulated wealth (and power) back into labor value (working capital), which is "the risk" neo-classically identified as consumer demand (buying power).

(Since buying power is the critical measure of the prudent regulator--for the ability to self-determine--it is necessary to consolidate this power to avoid its oppression and demand that others take the risk. This is accomplished by essentially "swapping" the role of oppressor and oppressed while, at the same time, retaining the original position--Rand's "A is A" identity--to avoid the liability of rigging the market and robbing consumers of their regulatory capacity. This capacity is, you see, the power of governance, or the ability to self-determine, and you can't be the governor if you are governed. Hence, we have the working hypothesis, "government is the problem and not the solution" and, at the same time, the practical theory that consumer demand is at the fundament of economic value where government, properly understood, is nothing but a moral hazard.

Being unwittingly stuck with all the risk is no accident. You are a likely counterparty--a likely victim--for consumption of "the risk" if you do not have the buying power to, for example, bid prices up and swap the risk in dark markets.)

According to the proponents of consolidated capitalism, the populus does not understand that government, not Wall Street, is the oppressor. Those who adamantly advocate for dark markets and counterparty "swaps" to effectively identify "the risk" and thus efficiently distribute capital to control it, like we are doing now, say this is the free market at work.

The more free-market "capitalism" we have (the more markets are allowed to freely consolidate into efficient, too-big-to-fail economies of scale), conservatives contend, the more private enterprise occupies the space otherwise used to oppress us by keeping demand (income) dependent on government action. It is as necessary to declare our independence now as it was in 1776. (Notice here that the argument is reduced to a functional binomialism. The potential, entropic value of consolidating the risk proportion--the increased entropy of "making" markets more efficient, or orderly, by commanding labor value, or income, with so-called consumer-demand measures--is operationalized with a predictable, binomial variation. The choice--the capacity to prudentially regulate--is binomially determined: either big government or a too-big-to-fail corporate state. It is here we all understand that consolidation of industry and markets causes the need for big government to prevent what is "too big to fail" from failing.)

Government, then, according to conservatives, causes demand reduction by taxing, spending, and regulating what is otherwise a free-and-open market. Government, they say, "crowds out" the prudent regulator, which they say "adds" risk, but as we know, risk is not added, it is consolidated. It is deliberately organized into an economy-of-scale efficiency that hides in the dark to avoid "the risk" of liability, which eventually transforms into, and presents as, the demand for government and sovereign debt. "Sovereign," remember, means debt that is largely paid (consumed) by "We the People" (the ninety-nine percent), collected by the top, one percent with the legal authority to tax and spend, or not, by means of due (public) process. Those who accumulate value by the invisible hand of providence (public processes), you see, are next to God...they are supra-sovereign. They are so enlightened with the secret knowledge of our true, "objective" reality (class identity verified by the capacity to make money and use buying power), they can see what the rest of us cannot see--the invisible hand doing its handy work (making money), without liability, in the dark. We can't presume to sue what "We the People" can't see, can't do, or properly understand, right?

The invisible hand (dark markets) ontologically commands the risk--it as an act of God, in whom we trust, and it is imprudent to try and regulate the providential (the objective) hand of God. So, for example, according to the Objectivist, reactionary version of this natural philosophy, when we experience a recession, it is best to just let God's hand play out, providentially consolidating wealth and power into the hands of those naturally selected to prudently regulate risk with, for example, dark markets.

The fatal flaw of Objectivist, natural philosophy is that it is reactionary--it is fallaciously post hoc. Without ensuring deconsolidation of the risk in priority (the fully assumed risk of loss consumed in priority by the prudent regulator), the consumer is not empowered to demand the objective reality (the self-determination) it professes.

Reactionaries are always sure to identify populist sentiment with high entropic value. Populist movements indicate impending chaos, confirming what they always knew to be true, that disestablishment of conservative values and institutions always re-establish. The ensuing chaos of a populist sentiment (not the gamma-risk proportion that accumulates with the established consolidation of wealth and power) objectively identifies the risk of loss that is fully assumed (i.e., the risk of loss correlates with the determinant without deviation and is thus fully assumed in priority). While David Hume, for example, reflected on the French Revolution as the evidence that supports the conservative hypothesis of natural, elite authority, Karl Marx's assessment of the risk was quite different.

According to Marx, the entropic value indicates impending change that quantifies (synthesizes) the risk proportion. The objective reality that occurred, as history unfolded, was Hume's hypothesis synthesized with Marx's concept of socialism. We had, for a time, state socialism versus state capitalism with a well-defined, binomial structure of global power.

Conservatives, now claiming the end of history with the dominance of global capitalism, are quite sure of their conservative hypothesis. They react to any challenge to established authority with absolute confidence, and a sense of absolute power. They are sure, absolutely, "We" naturally tend to a low entropic value by continuously organizing toward a singularity of the quantum risk (merging and acquiring into an ever-smaller policy space with an ever-larger span of control), despite increasing entropic value world wide.

To control entropic value (to command it and direct it to resist the declining rate of profit) central banks (a singular, coordinated quantum that is too big, and too entangled, to fail) react to the probable risk proportion by managing the money supply (the quantum), and much of this activity occurs in the dark (the entanglement). (Remember that a free market requires the quantum value of the risk not be in the dark. If it is, it is impossible for the consumer to be the prudent regulator.) The Fed, for example, recently disclosed its secret trillion-dollar transaction with the financial sector to forestall financial collapse, but without forestalling foreclosure. (Keep in mind that the total amount spent to bailout big financial establishments is currently estimated at over $120 trillion. At the same time, virtually nothing is made available to prevent the property of the lower classes from being confiscated, and in many cases these victims of private enterprise--their property unprotected by the state--are still obligated to pay the mortgage and the costs of foreclosure on property they do not own sold short. Not only did the ninety-nine percent get royally scammed, but paid the scammers--the consumers demanding it--a big bonus to do it! So, if conservatives cannot see what the gamma-risk proportion looks like because they are always too busy lurking in the dark, this is what objective reality really looks like.)

The reason this kind of macro-risk management occurs in the dark is not because its disclosure would cause financial panic, but because it rewards rampant psychosis on Wall Street...the same people that tell the Occupiers to "get a job" and "take a bath"...the same people who believe it is normal to allow for massive foreclosures and widespread economic desperation while its perpetrators are rewarded, and sustained, in zero-sum through the Federal Reserve System.